Yemen is facing alarmingly high levels of food insecurity, with pockets of the population projected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) by September 2025. 

Nearly half the population for both the Government of Yemen (GoY) and Sana'a Based Authorities (SBA) controlled areas are facing high levels of acute food insecurity, translating to over 17 million people classified in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse) between May and August 2025. Over 5.2 million people are experiencing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) and 11.9 million people (34 percent of the analysed population) are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of acute food insecurity. 

The food security situation is projected to worsen between September 2025 and February 2026 with an estimated 18.1 million people expected to face Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse), representing 52 percent of the population. Alongside severe reductions in humanitarian aid, the unseasonal deterioration is driven by below-average agricultural and livestock production due to erratic rainfall in May-June and anticipated flash floods—especially in Al Hodeidah, Ma’rib, Taizz, and Hajjah—diminishing the mitigating effects of the productive season.

This marks a surge of 1 million additional people in Crisis or worse compared to the May to August 2025 period, including around 41,000 people expected to experience catastrophic levels of hunger and classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Abs and Kushar in Hajjah governorate, Az Zuhrah in Al Hodeidah governorate, and Al Ashah in Amran governorate. Extreme food consumption gaps and high adoption of emergency and often irreversible coping mechanisms, are mainly attributable to the lingering and direct impact of conflict, macro-economic downturn and lack of income opportunities, as well as to the shrinking ability to address the extreme needs of people as safety nets weaken. 

Yemen’s food security crisis stems from shocks—floods, conflict, and economic issues—exacerbated by poverty and other structural vulnerabilities. While external aid and strong social ties previously mitigated severe food insecurity, these safeguards are now weakening and insufficient to prevent further deterioration.

• Macro-economic stability: Coordinated efforts by all actors are crucial to stabilise macro-economic conditions, with key measures including controlling prices and exchange rate, functioning supply chains, and resuming negotiations to restart oil and gas exports.
• Humanitarian food security assistance: Humanitarian food and livelihood assistance needs to be scaled up immediately. This entails reversing assistance termination orders but also securing additional funding to sustain critical life-saving assistance. Populations with the greatest needs should be targeted and prioritised, leveraging collaborative and integrated programmes in partnership with the relevant clusters and social protection schemes (such as nutrition and multi-purpose cash). Enhanced food security monitoring and early warning systems should inform emergency preparedness efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of climate, conflict, and economic shocks.
• Operational environment: Efforts need to be intensified to establish sustainable solutions that enhance the operational environment, facilitating principled and targeted emergency food and livelihood support. In addition to ensuring the safety and security of humanitarian workers, sustained access to field locations for monitoring and assessments, and effective and timely implementation of humanitarian projects must be ensured. This includes ensuring the safety and security of humanitarian workers, the removal of restrictions on assessments and monitoring activities, and expedited approvals on co-operating partner agreements particularly in SBA areas.
• Cessation of hostilities and restored stability and security: Advancing sustainable peace, particularly through the de-escalation of tensions along all frontlines, including within Yemen, the Red Sea, and the broader region, remains a critical priority.