



Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions



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Study on the IPC Chronic Food Insecurity Scale Reform Final Report



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Final Report

The IPC Global Partners



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Contents

Acronyms	2
1. Introduction	3
1.1 Background and objectives of the study	3
1.2 Methodology	4
2. Appreciations and analysis	5
2.1 Context and main issues	5
2.2 Mission of the IPC Chronic Food Insecurity scale	7
2.3 Target audiences and their needs	10
2.4 IPC Chronic Food Insecurity process	11
2.5 IPC Chronic Food Insecurity product	13
2.6 Governance of the IPC Chronic Food Insecurity scale	14
3. Summary and way forward	16
Annex 1: Issues and recommendations made by recent studies on the IPC CFI	18
Annex 2: Literature	19
Annex 3: List of persons interviewed in bilateral meetings	21
Annex 4: List of participants to the workshop (13-14 December 2021)	23
Annex 5: Existing tools and systems that measure chronic food insecurity	24



Acronyms

AFI	Acute Food Insecurity
AMN	Acute Malnutrition
CFI	Chronic Food Insecurity
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CILSS	Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FIES	Food Insecurity Experience Scale
GSP I	Global Strategic Programme 2014-2018
GSU	Global Support Unit
IFPRI	International Food Policy and Research Institute
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
LF&D	Limiting factors and drivers
PoU	Prevalence of Undernourishment
RIMA	Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis
SADC	South African Development Community
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SICA	Sistema de Integración Centroamericana
SOFI	State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNSDCF	United Nation Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and objectives of the study

1. Following the recommendations of the final evaluation of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Global Strategic Programme 2014-2018 (GSP), the IPC Steering Committee decided to put on hold the roll-out of the Chronic Food Insecurity scale (CFI). Several studies carried out between 2015 and 2019, including the evaluation of the GSP, have brought to light the strengths and weaknesses of the IPC CFI, regarding its relevance and use for policy decision making, governance and implementation structure, implementation process and communication and dissemination of results (see in Annex 1 main issues identified and recommendations made by recent studies). The most important recurrent finding of these assessments is that in most countries where the IPC CFI has been implemented, there is no or scarce evidence that its results have been used as a key source of information for decision making. This motivated the decision to put the roll-out on hold.
2. The IPC Steering Committee agreed on the basis of the evaluation that the management response would be to explore options for reforming the IPC CFI. It decided to define a new structure under the existing governance structures of the IPC, that would allow the reform of the scale and its implementation in new countries. With this in mind, it committed to conduct a study to explore the possible new organisational structure and to develop a clear road map for the implementation of the reform.
3. The IPC Global Support Unit (GSU) has elaborated Terms of Reference for the reform of the CFI, that potentially include four pillars: 1. Governance and participation; 2. Implementation process; 3. Technical development; 4. Communication and dissemination. The Terms of Reference propose two phases to address those pillars. The first phase focuses on the first pillar (governance and participation) and on making recommendations for the other three pillars, while the second phase refers to the implementation of pillars 2, 3 and 4.
4. The main objective of the present study is to assist the IPC and, potentially, the *Cadre Harmonisé* (CH) leadership to implement the first phase of the reform. This includes two sub-objectives:
 - Defining and implementing the pillar on governance and participation. It was found critical that the CFI reform includes as a core objective the modification of the current IPC governance and management structures at all levels, in order to allow for the emergence of a new leadership for the IPC CFI. This potentially includes the participation and leadership of new stakeholders with a strong development profile. It could also include a stronger role for specific existing IPC global partner(s) depending on capacities and interest.
 - Clarifying the objective and scope of the IPC CFI outputs and outcomes, and providing recommendations on the content and implementation process of the other pillars of the reform. As mentioned above, several issues are already known from recent studies. The present study had to review and complement the corresponding recommendations based on consultations of global key players of chronic food insecurity and donors and the assessment of the potential added value of the IPC CFI to other existing ongoing processes and products.

1.2 Methodology

5. The overall approach of the study was to answer the following key guiding questions:
 - Why is the CFI scale not used for decision making?
 - Is there potential added value for the CFI scale, considering other existing tools and processes and the needs of decision makers?
 - What should the outputs and outcomes of the CFI scale be?
 - What modifications are needed in the governance structure and relating to the other pillars of the reform to ensure the CFI scale meets the needs of decision makers?
6. To answer these questions, the following activities have been undertaken:
 - Review of the literature available on the IPC CFI (see documents reviewed in Annex 2).
 - Mapping of existing chronic food insecurity global initiatives, information systems and key actors.
 - Consultations with global, regional and country actors, through bilateral interviews with the study team (see list of persons interviewed in Annex 3).
 - Internal workshop with GSU staff and external workshop with key actors to discuss preliminary options (see list of participants to the workshop in Annex 4).

2. Appreciations and analysis

2.1 Context and main issues

7. The IPC Steering Committee recommended to pause the roll-out of the Chronic Food Insecurity (CFI) scale. This reflects that the CFI roll-out in 22 countries between 2014 and 2019 offers a mixed track record on actual uptake of the results by stakeholders. In comparison with the Acute Food Insecurity (AFI) and Acute Malnutrition (AMN) scales, the results are less than satisfactory.
8. There is widespread support to ensure that food security becomes a permanent, sustained feature of any country policy mix so as to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Zero Hunger objectives. Pausing the CFI roll-out reflects that either the CFI is less well geared towards documenting chronic food insecurity, or that other tools do it just as well. It could also be that its results are not well communicated at the right moment to the right actors, or that the governance set-up for the CFI must be adjusted to resolve these challenges.
9. The point of departure of this study has been governance issues. However, the dialogue with key informants has made it clear that there cannot be improvements in governance if there is uncertainty as to what the CFI tool should do, how it is run and how it inserts itself into the humanitarian/development architecture. Hence, some more fundamental reflections came up that have a bearing on governance.
10. Especially among humanitarian actors, but increasingly also among developing actors, there is a nagging feeling that acute events become more frequent and protracted, while at the same time not sufficiently countered by structural policies.
11. With climate change, demographics and conflict patterns evolving negatively, there is a risk that acute crises intensify and become chronic, as indeed some have already done, and that the SDG Zero Hunger objective will become elusive. Acute food crises require humanitarian responses, but if they reflect structural vulnerabilities and long term trends, then humanitarian response cannot stand alone and, given budget constraints, do not constitute the most cost effective or sustainable solution. To some extent, donors are becoming weary that repetitive humanitarian responses are pointless, because the issues remain the same and interventions will have to be repeated without an end in sight. There is a growing perception that the resources should be allocated with more long-term food security in mind and that more attention should be given to anticipation and prevention, including addressing the root causes of food insecurity. The CFI scale was originally developed to support this approach and remains therefore relevant.
12. The objective of the IPC CFI tool is to flag food insecurity that is protracted or permanent in nature and that therefore requires structural interventions. The CFI offers an analysis over a longer time-span, based on a variety of indicators. These go beyond calories and caseloads and include food and nutrition quality as well as drivers and root causes, such as markets, transport, poverty, education, health, social services, governance, instability, etc. It aggregates the data through a qualitative convergence process to generate the levels of severity according to geography and population groups, while drawing attention to structural factors.
13. In places where the AFI and AMN scales have been rolled out, the CFI provides context, which

can help to determine which part of an acute food insecurity situation actually is chronic and which part is not. In other places, the CFI serves to identify chronic food insecurity, which is a problem in itself, but moreover has the potential to morph into acute crises.

14. Based on the consultations with global, regional and country stakeholders, six major issues stand out:
15. First, there is uncertainty as to what questions the CFI is supposed to answer and what the target audience and level of ambition should be. Is the analysis to serve advocacy at a high level? Should it aim at giving a global comparative assessment on where the chronic food insecurity challenges are? Or is its purpose to influence and inform development strategies in selected countries and nationally. If so, is the CFI to simply raise awareness in general terms or go into drivers and root causes? If the latter, would that mean addressing Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategies and vulnerability and resilience objectives or would it mean suggesting sector development benchmarks to promote food security in agriculture, water, social services, governance or the like? Or – more limited – should the CFI just give some context for understanding AFI caseloads and highlight the limitations of short-term response as opposed to structural longer-term response? Would there be an in-between option providing intermediary responses informing structural policy without being too prescriptive?
16. Second, while the AFI and AMN scales speak to humanitarian actors, and basically call for resource mobilisation, prioritisation and response through the cluster system to assist the population in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, the response is less straightforward when it comes to the CFI scale. In fact, the CFI's focus on severity in geographic regions might constitute a mismatch when considered from a development angle, because the instruments of development policy first require multi-sectoral priority setting at a national level, and only as a second step focus on individuals or sub-regions. Structural issues often transcend regions, even if every structural intervention does translate to impact on the ground at some point. CFI results can be aggregated at national level, but fall short in providing recommendations that can feed into national policies. Somehow, this problem has to be solved and, depending on the answer, the CFI should find its appropriate place and timing at the national level.
17. Third, the CFI may be seen as occupying a crowded place: there are a variety of indicators and standards for measuring food insecurity in its various manifestations. Each of these indicators has an institutional home that sets objectives and guards the integrity of that tool. Some are more focused on the short term, some are long term, but less connected to long-term data. Some are global and serve to raise awareness at the level of the global community. Others are regional or national, servicing populations in need, but without a standardised methodology across the globe (see in Annex 5 the presentation of some of those systems). Where does the CFI fit and how sure are we that there is no duplication?
18. Fourth, while it is appreciated that the CFI does provide convergence of analysis, there are questions being asked whether it is worth the effort in time and money, given that there are doubts as to what happens next with the analysis. Could the tool be made more simple and therefore easier and faster to roll out? Is there a real anchoring at national level that would allow the results to have an impact on the reality in the field? Is such an anchoring stemming from an explicit demand for a more solid assessment of chronic food insecurity or is a CFI analysis perceived as invasive, adding a layer of complexity to an already crowded place? Is it able to offer sufficient geographical cover addressing most of the chronic food insecurity caseloads across the globe, or is it going to remain an ad hoc analysis, driven by the occasional demand from governments or stakeholders and hence covering a smaller sub-set of vulnerable developing countries?
19. Fifth, from a substantive angle, the question has been raised on the availability, choice, quality and rigour of data that feeds into the CFI, given that it intends to underpin medium to long term structural interventions as opposed to emergency response, hence setting a higher benchmark for data availability and quality in this domain. In the same context, acknowledging that data collection is beyond the scope and control of the IPC, the contribution of the CFI exercise to improving data streams has been mentioned as a potential

important added value.

20. Sixth, there have been reflections on the governance structure, and in particular, the composition of the Steering Committee, the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) and the IPC GSU, where the humanitarian expertise dominates, while the development expertise is less well represented. Also, the involvement of actors in the field, notably Government authorities, with a responsibility to formulate development policy, has been deemed as important, again from the viewpoint of ensuring uptake and influence of the CFI on country policy making and programming.
21. These six high-level challenges each have many layers of complexity and are mainstreamed through many of the urgent issues addressed with key informants. Both the high-level and more urgent issues have been appreciated differently by the informants. Answers, solutions and suggestions have been registered on possible alternatives to the CFI, on how to mitigate risks or how to solidify the governance, management, roll-out and communication of the CFI scale.
22. So far it remains that the CFI scale and its protocols constitute the only methodology for assessing chronic food insecurity that combines all data sources into a single holistic assessment, also at sub-national level, that is endorsed by all major stakeholders including governments. This speaks in favour of maintaining and improving the CFI, if consensus can be found to do that, based on appropriate answers to the six challenges described above.

2.2 Mission of the IPC Chronic Food Insecurity scale

23. All key informants were well versed in the AFI scale and its benefits for humanitarian response. The same was not the case for the CFI scale. The knowledge was broader in locations and among institutions that had been involved in previous CFI exercises, but among some development actors, there was a lack of awareness as the focus was on the AFI and hence the complementarity between the AFI scale and the CFI scale was not easily understood. As a result, the CFI did not feature high on the list of tools used in programming.
24. This lack of familiarity with the tool led to the conclusion that the CFI scale in its present form was redundant as the two tools were two sides of the same coin. The simple interpretation was that CFI just reflected many successive IPC AFI Phase 3 or above crises. "So why bother? We know a chronic when we see it".
25. For those with more direct experience with the CFI scale, the perceptions were different: One group, including those that were using the tool, notably in the Philippines, in the Southern Africa region or in Central America, felt that long-term trends and structural interventions were their real challenges, and they acknowledged that the AFI scale could not fulfill their aspirations. For their part, they were asking for more detail on how the CFI scale could help them identify the levers of structural/sector policies that could alleviate food insecurity. As they were involved in programming closer to the ground, they were asking for more detail and granularity, not least on the level of disaggregation at sub-regional level, on urban caseloads and gender aspects, but equally on the root causes and drivers linked to sectors. They called for

CONCLUSION 1: General CFI features

- The CFI scale is unique, based on all available data and a convergence process involving local stakeholders.
- CFI analyses may usefully complement AFI analyses.
- The uptake of CFI analysis findings depends on how well severity levels are translated into evidence-based recommendations.
- Convergence analysis adds real value, not least if over time it is combined with an improvement in the quality of the data that feeds IPC analyses.
- The CFI scale requires more buy-in at the national level by governments than the AFI and AMN scales.
- The CFI governance model must evolve to include fragility, resilience, and structural development expertise as well as voices representing governments at all levels, in particular, through an increased participation of regional organisations in the IPC Steering Committee.

more precision on those underlying causes, and better anchoring of the analysis in national political policy making, something that was a difficult task, at best. They also expressed wishes to see a more frequent update of analyses as well as trend analysis of acute food insecurity, predictions, risk identification or trigger points.

28. Another group very familiar with both AFI and AMN scales as well as the CFI scale recommended a more nimble and fast CFI tool to be deployed more flexibly with a wider geographical coverage. Some informants suggested to focus on fairly simple indicators that could support budget support conditionality at national level. Others recommended light and easy indicators that could serve global monitoring of progress towards SDG 2 (Zero Hunger). For both, the limited geographical coverage, infrequent updates and complexity of the CFI was an issue.
29. Some experienced practitioners with academic knowledge of food security and nutrition were caught in between: They agreed that high level global data were needed, but rejected that the CFI scale would be the tool for that. They were also struggling with already many data streams and processes and questioned if another process such as the CFI would add much value. However, when going into the details, they also concurred that effectively combating chronic food insecurity necessitated interventions in many different areas if the root causes were to be addressed. It was noted that a tool like the CFI scale in combination with an analytical process to inform interventions could make an important contribution to solving structural obstacles to food security.
30. At this point, a cursory overview of the existing data sources or analytical compilations could be useful: At the global level, the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) provides an overview of the global food security and malnutrition situation, with interpretations of drivers and root causes. The SOFI benefits from the AFI findings, while it extrapolates the analysis to structural aspects. The Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) and Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) also feed into the SOFI and give a picture of the food insecurity situation and serve to document progress towards the SDG 2. The SOFI provides a highly useful snapshot at a given moment or over a relatively short time span, without delving into driving forces or whether the insecurity is transitory or a permanent feature, and without providing information at sub-national level.
32. The food balance sheets give a good overview of availability of food at national level, but the SOFI does not go into sub-national analysis, neither into root causes or drivers.
33. The food systems analysis focuses on the interaction between many policies and drivers of food insecurity, but without linking the data to specific subsets of populations. The World Food Programme's (WFP) Integrated Context Analysis (ICA) also provides insights into drivers and causalities and exploits as much as possible data on acute food insecurity as well as nutrition, while it could benefit from a more solid and robust synthesis of all data pertaining to food insecurity.
34. The Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) considers food insecurity and combines it with knowledge about coping strategies and how response can strengthen the resilience of communities.
35. The Household Hunger Scale and other longer term indicators such as measurement of stunting give valuable insights, but are not contextualised in a wider set of indicators.
36. Also, at the national level, government authorities and development actors conduct analysis and planning processes that often touch on food security, but only in varying degrees integrate those concerns operationally in the development plans. Poverty Assessments produced by the World Bank frequently mention the issue among other sector challenges, but often in a rather cursory way.
37. The UN Common Country Analyses elaborated in response to the SDG 2030 are at present being rolled out. The SDG 2 is given an important place, however, as opposed to the AFI scale, structural assessment tools

such as the CFI scale play a small role in the diagnosis so far. National resilience plans also dwell on food security and rely on many of the same data that underpin AFI and the CFI analyses, without necessarily making direct use of the IPC reports. Each of these tools have their legitimacy and help formulate policy.

38. As was mentioned above, an alternative to the CFI scale in the form of a super light CFI tool has been suggested. It would consist of combining the population in IPC AFI Phase 2 (Stressed) or above over a prolonged time span with the prevalence of stunting, the prevalence of undernourishment as well as micronutrient deficiencies. It is held that this composite measure would provide a reliable proxy to estimate the population that is chronically food insecure. Other informants, however, were of the view that this limited set of indicators needs to be held up against other benchmarks to provide context, if they are to inform concrete policymaking in a robust way. In addition, different indicators reflect different aspects of food insecurity and the correlation between each other may be limited. This calls for caution in interpreting indicators and would support an approach that casts the net wider on indicators (knowing also that they are not all available at the same time in any one location) and subjecting them to human expertise for their contextualisation and for conducting a qualitative convergence process. The CFI is intended to do exactly that. In this context, there was an insistent call for further technical work to clarify how the different indicators perform individually and in conjunction and how data collection methods and the overall quality of data feeding into CFI analyses could be improved.
39. Therefore, the mission of the CFI will have to reflect a choice between approaches.
40. Either the aim is to get a limited set of data regularly, rapidly and with greater coverage across the globe to inform the most elevated levels of global governance; or the objective is to go deeper, more granular, closer to the ground and generate consensus so that the analysis could fit with the local/national context and insert itself into the national resilience or development processes. Under this option, the level of detail and intensity of interaction would presumably set limits to its geographical coverage, at least in the medium term, concentrating on countries with high vulnerability that at the same time could fulfill some preconditions regarding partners and capacity building before the launch of the CFI process.
41. Consistency between CFI indicators at global level and the results of CFI analyses was seen as important by some informants. Indeed, where divergence occurs, such findings would merit further cross-checking of data through an organised effort.
42. The interaction between the AFI and AMN and the CFI scales also needs to be better understood and explained. There are two schools that are not contradictory, but point to slightly different interpretations of the role given to the CFI scale.
43. One school would see CFI analysis as an add-on to AFI and AMN analyses. It would provide an estimate of the caseload that is affected by a persistent food insecurity as opposed to the caseload that is affected by a peak event, acute and unusual. The benefit of this approach would be to enable humanitarian operators to solicit development funds to overcome food insecurity.
44. The other school would agree to associate a CFI to AFI and AMN analyses, but would recommend that it is a separate process with different preparation and another subsequent process for translating the outcome into policy. While humanitarians do influence policies and programmes related to social protection, cash programming, farmer's insurance, etc., they nevertheless face challenges in engaging with development actors. Therefore, success in tackling structural issues would require that the CFI insert itself in a DRR, resilience or development process. This does not go against contextualising acute interventions, but it does open up for more effective CFI analysis in supporting structural interventions.

2.3 Target audiences and their needs

45. With the gradual mainstreaming of the NEXUS approach across the development, humanitarian and peace spectrum, it may seem superficial to pinpoint any of the actors, be it from agencies, NGOs or Governments, as prone to be main beneficiaries of a CFI analysis. All may have an interest in being provided with a map and demographic breakdowns of chronic food insecurity, because it has a bearing on all three sets of operators, although to a different degree and with different emphasis.
46. First, humanitarian informants did appreciate getting a clearer picture of the part of any AFI crisis that is of protracted or persistent nature as opposed to sudden and acute. The benefit would be to include resilience and exit strategy elements into their humanitarian project design while at the same time advocating with their development colleagues to consider hand-over programming with development resources that can take over once the immediate hardship abates. In fact, many humanitarian NGOs and agencies report that their programming increasingly factors resilience aspects into their project design. The present CFI scale does provide maps and sector information that allow a rough prioritisation of areas in need of structural food insecurity/resilience oriented interventions. Ideally, if the CFI maps are superposed on the AFI maps, a picture emerges of the relative priority that has to be given to urgent life-saving as compared to resilience.
47. When a classification of IPC AFI Phase 3 (Crisis) or above calls for very well-defined action, which is urgently needed to provide food assistance, that message is easily understood by a humanitarian country team. By comparison, an IPC CFI Level 4 classification requires a response that involves a multitude of sectors. If an IPC CFI Level 4 is classified, because of the multi-sectoral nature of the challenge, these findings would be relevant for decision making by most stakeholders in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF). If the international financial institutions and the Government are added to the equation, this should allow for comprehensive decisions and actions.
48. Second, the development community may be the primary beneficiary of a better picture of the chronic caseloads across a country. It would allow ministries, agencies and donors to focus on the regions most in need, where there is hope of creating a positive impact over time, reforming seed policy, establishing food banks, improving market functioning, opening up transport bottlenecks, etc.
49. However, general sector policy formulation, such as agricultural policy reform (land ownership, support to household farming, etc.) or reform of water management, transport infrastructure or social safety nets, done by the central actors, from various ministries or agencies, would probably require more information than what the present CFI can deliver.
50. The limiting factors and the drivers (LF&Ds) that are included in each CFI report do go some way in pointing to structural factors, but so does RIMA or national resilience plans or DRR plans and the modest level of

CONCLUSION 2: What is the IPC CFI scale supposed to achieve?

- The CFI scale pinpoints the persistent, protracted vulnerable populations focusing on drivers and root causes as opposed to the AFI and AMN scales, which focus on sudden onset manifestations of food insecurity and malnutrition.
- The CFI is not perceived global but country oriented. For a global overview of chronic food insecurity, other tools are considered more pertinent, even if less granular.
- The CFI complements global tools with a focus on specific vulnerable countries.
- The CFI indicates structural factors that determine protracted food insecurity and is multi-sectoral and longitudinal.
- Trend analysis of acute food insecurity, risk scenarios and tipping points indicating a chronicity of acute food insecurity could be included.
- CFI analysis should ideally accompany AFI and AMN analyses and influence national development and resilience strategies.
- The CFI stands a better chance of impact if linked to a national plan or programme.

prescriptiveness of LF&Ds in the CFI reports at present leaves development actors questioning what to do next. What would be the two or three critical policy initiatives most likely to reverse a trend?

51. As of today, the IPC CFI stops short of offering sector specific and actionable recommendations, let alone suggest who should do what. One way of resolving this would be to allow CFI analyses to evolve in getting closer to recommendations of interventions or at least to set some benchmarks that could be used for measuring structural progress. Another way that has been mentioned would be that the CFI would be complemented post-analysis with an analytical process run by development actors that translates the CFI results into operational advice for development policy and programming. A few informants suggested that CFI analyses should feed into a “Platform for Action”, which could take different forms depending on local circumstances.
52. Third, it is reasonable to assume that the actors that deal with resilience and DRR interventions would be those primarily interested in the CFI tool. This stems from the fact that the CFI ultimately constitutes a call for structural interventions with a geographical emphasis as per the limiting factors and the drivers annexed to each report and moreover stops short of nation-wide sector recommendations. Most of the actors that respond to fragility and vulnerability are running programmes that have a geographic concentration for reasons of impact, visibility, monitoring and evaluation. So if the CFI convergence analyses were linked up with resilience and DRR operators, there would be a natural fit. To the extent that a national resilience or risk reduction plan are being developed, they would equally benefit from a CFI analysis. However, the benefit would be the greater if CFI analyses could better identify nation-wide root causes, which is not yet the case.

CONCLUSION 3: The users of IPC CFI analysis findings

- The CFI scale has an interested audience among humanitarian responders. If they are made aware and can understand better the interplay between AFI, AMN and CFI, it can help them in shaping exit strategies and build resilience into humanitarian projects. Their advocacy with development actors could benefit, but only indirectly.
- The DRR and resilience actors, from Governments, international financial institutions, agencies and NGOs are natural beneficiaries of the CFI, but the process has to involve those constituencies more closely and the product should evolve towards suggestions for resilience-oriented response, perhaps as a separate post-analysis process.
- The development actors could also benefit from the CFI as it provides solid input for baselines and trends.
- There is a potential for the CFI to combine the identification of drivers and root causes with a post-analysis process (separate from the CFI) that identifies policy adjustments from which development actors would benefit more directly in their programming.

2.4 IPC Chronic Food Insecurity process

53. According to all the informants consulted, the performance of the IPC GSU in running the CFI scale was praised.
54. Informants offered pertinent recommendations addressing each stage of the CFI project cycle, from the launch of a request till the CFI analysis finds its way towards evidence-based action.
55. As a general remark, typically, clients in the various countries where the CFI has been run request more IPC GSU presence, and more often.
56. There was widespread consensus that the most successful CFI analyses are the ones that are embedded solidly in a national process, which put the emphasis on strong government participation and leadership. The initiative to launch a CFI may be generated autonomously, by common decision of the national Technical Working Group and the IPC GSU. But often it does not come out of the blue. It may be nudged

along by dialogue with national stakeholders, donors or in connection with work on the AFI in a previous cycle. In any case, the government should be put at the center of the process.

57. However, the initiation should ideally come from the Government, where the institution in the administration that is most capable of influencing policy or absorbing the results subsequently should request an analysis. In some countries, there is a national nutrition institute or similar, in others a *Cellule de Sécurité Alimentaire*. At the regional levels, organisations such as the *Sistema de Integración Centroamericana* (SICA) in Central America, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa or the *Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel* (CILSS) in West Africa may play a role in triggering demand. Whatever instance triggers the demand nationally, the national anchor points are crucial and must be identified. This said, the impact of any anchor point is conditioned on a strong link to the central planning authorities, for example, the Prime Minister offices or the Ministry of Finance or any other centrally located coordination entity, if the subsequent uptake is to be successful.
58. The request can also come from donors or other stakeholders. Typically, that will be combined with financial resources. In those cases, it is critical that efforts are made to involve the relevant government authorities, even if they may not have all the expertise or capacity at the outset. This prior involvement is crucial for what happens next, i.e. after the completion of the analysis. No uptake is often associated with weak prior engagement or lack of synchronisation with country-based processes.
59. As a way to create ownership and transparency, it has been suggested to include a national officer in the country team. This person has to be identified ideally before the request is made for a CFI analysis, so as to make it part of their Terms of Reference and prepare the ground.
60. It follows from the above that it is difficult to roll out a CFI analysis in a conflict-ridden country. There has to be an assessment of the level of instability to judge if the production and uptake of a CFI can be satisfactory. With major obstacles it is pointless to go ahead. In this respect, the CFI scale is very different from the AFI and AMN scales, which are launched almost by reference to the humanitarian imperative irrespective of obstacles. This being said, many vulnerable countries do have a level of stability that could provide a frame for a useful CFI exercise.
61. When to launch a request raises the issue of timing and synchronisation. Informants drew the attention to cases where the CFI analysis findings had been properly used to inform food security policies and interventions. It happened typically where the findings were available when a policy cycle was starting or at least not completely nailed down. In most of the potential candidate countries for a CFI analysis there are country-led development plans or resilience policies being formulated. It was recommended that a CFI analysis should harmonise with such processes. This also applies to 5-year plans with mid-term reviews. Indeed, mid-term reviews were often good moments to influence policy choices. Many informants wished to ensure a link between the CFI process and the UNSDCF, others referred to various policy processes from agencies, such as the WFP's Integrated Context Analysis (ICA) or the Zero Hunger Strategic Review or international finance institutions such as the World Bank country strategies or strategies from regional development banks.
62. Recently, a request has been made for CFI analysis to provide input to the national resilience plan in Malawi. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a request has emerged as a number of stakeholders wanted to shift their response towards more sustainable food security. These moments of policy inflexion or programmatic shifts are propitious for the impact of a CFI analysis.
63. Training and data collection are other critical factors for success. The big challenge, which does not have an easy or immediate result, is the sustained capacity building in-country through training. The CFI is run with long intervals. Very often, those trained in one process have moved or have lost track after 4-5 years, so training has to be repeated. As the ambition is that national stakeholders over time should have the capacity to run the analysis themselves, this requires reflection on how to scale up training, for instance through the certification program that already exists. There is no alternative than to train nationally based

stakeholders so that gradually they can take on the elaboration of CFI analysis. In the meantime, continued external support is necessary to ensure compliance with IPC quality standards.

64. The important task of identifying and compiling upfront the data that feeds into IPC CFI analyses is however a task that can be entrusted to specialised data and statistical experts that do not need to be part of the national team, even if it may be necessary to associate a national officer to facilitate access to data. Data preparation could be dispatched and statistical issues dealt with before the study is launched. These experts could also help promote better data generation, not least those data mapping structural elements. One could envisage adding other outside experts depending on the particular challenges in the country.

2.5 IPC Chronic Food Insecurity product

65. There are five recurrent points on the format and content of the reports that have been made in various forms by the key informants.
66. First, the maps, that are the main selling point of any CFI report, are difficult to differentiate. It seems that some clients just look at the maps and say: "Told you!" and "So what?". Ideas have been floated that the differentiation of levels of severity should be improved by adjusting the 20% rule. Another suggestion has been that the maps could be broken down according to the various drivers, nutrition, stunting and the like. A third suggestion has been if and when the CFI analysis complements an AFI analysis to produce a map which highlights where the chronic part and the acute part prevail. These are ideas and suggestions that have to be tested and subjected to expert analysis.
67. Second, many requests were made on data regarding gender and urban caseloads as well as demographic breakdowns based on age and socioeconomic status. Equally, the wish was expressed to conduct CFI analyses at lower administrative levels (i.e. level 2 or 3) for more granularity. These wishes are legitimate, but all dependent on resources and data availability and it is acknowledged that the shift from data collection at household level to individual level represents a challenge.
68. Third, there are wishes expressed for more weight to be given to the development of solid structural statistics and mapping of root causes. It is recognised that this might require a review of the CFI protocols at some point in time.
69. Fourth, the tables and the explanations relating to the drivers and limiting factors should ideally be developed further. For resilience and developing actors, these tables and narratives contain useful information and need somehow to take centre stage, right after the main diagnosis. Some more detail, perhaps with evidence-based suggestions for action, could be welcomed and will form the basis for concrete policy recommendations as a follow-up to the CFI in the context of a national development plan or similar.
70. Fifth, attention must be paid to the communication tools associated both with the process as well as with the presentation of analysis findings and publication. The various target audiences need different forms

CONCLUSION 4: Running the IPC CFI scale

- The request to launch a CFI analysis should ideally come from the host Government or at least be cross-checked and welcomed by it.
- A national officer can create ownership and transparency.
- An anchor institution with strong links to the central planning process should host the CFI team and take care of follow-up.
- Timing is of essence. The CFI analyses should harmonise with one or more national development processes, resilience plans or similar.
- Data preparation can be brought in from outside even if a national officer is involved.
- The country team should include GSU and local/national stakeholders including Government.
- The capacity development approach has to be rethought to support technical autonomy.
- There is no point in launching CFI analyses in conflict zones where basic framework conditions are not met.

of messages and narratives. Most importantly, the messaging to the top-level policy makers must be precise and easy to understand, while giving hints as to what could be done. Such material can only be worked out in collaboration with people close to those for whom the information is intended, so as to avoid mishaps and frustration. At the same time, more technical communication material should accompany the publication intended for academia, civil servants and operators.

CONCLUSION 5: The IPC CFI product

- Maps to be better differentiated, also where possible netting out acute from chronic food insecurity.
- Demographic breakdowns to be provided according to gender, urban, socioeconomic groups, etc.
- Drivers and root causes: more detail and indications of resilience oriented responses to be provided.
- All of the above require technical and academic validation.
- Communication products to be differentiated for policy makers and technical experts.

2.6 Governance of the IPC Chronic Food Insecurity scale

71. A preliminary question has been raised if indeed the CFI should be hosted outside the IPC in an academic structure or another institution. The Global Network Against Food Crisis has been mentioned. The International Food Policy and Research Institute (IFPRI) as well. However, a strong case has also been made to keep a link between the IPC's work on Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition on the one hand and the IPC CFI work on the other. Quite a good deal of reflections went into unpacking the relationship between the two, which is seen as important for coming to grips with food insecurity as a humanitarian objective as well as a development objective. The conclusion was to keep the CFI scale within the IPC governance structure.
72. To the extent the IPC CFI evolves in the direction of informing resilience and DRR stakeholders and even at times may provide inputs to sector development plans, in particular those with a direct bearing on food insecurity (agriculture, water, poverty, social, etc.), it seems that the various structures of the CFI - from headquarters to the field - must include some form of structural or development expertise. There has been interest expressed from key informants including the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) development branch or the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) development branch to consider their participation, without at this stage committing.
73. The emphasis on country ownership also points to the usefulness of including the voice of beneficiary Governments.
74. When it comes to the IPC Global Steering Committee, this can be accommodated by adding a number of carefully selected participants with an interest in resilience, vulnerability analysis or DRR from within those agencies or international finance institutions. The identification of the voice of Governments is more challenging, as there should be no geographical bias. This issue can be solved through rotation and through nomination of respected persons from the global south that have had or still have international institutional responsibilities.
75. The modus operandi of the Steering Committee poses another challenge. It is well known that often short term is prioritised over long term. Even before the roll-out of the IPC CFI was paused, the Steering Committee devoted the vast bulk of its work to acute crises and comparatively less to chronic situations. It reflects the urgency of the work and perhaps also that the humanitarian profiles of the members of the Steering Committee lead to a natural inclination to give priority to immediate life saving rather than

structural responses.

76. Ideas have come forward suggesting to organise the work of the Steering Committee and the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) in two distinct work streams. Indeed, there are advantages to be gained from having the expertise on the two issues combined in the same meetings, but there are also drawbacks. As a minimum, the agenda of the Steering Committee should be set in such a way that the emergency issues are dealt separately from the structural issues. The point is to allow development experts to attend discussions relating to the CFI scale.
77. More radically, the suggestion has been made to create a Steering Committee for the CFI scale that works in parallel to the existing one. The chairs could attend each other's session to ensure consistency and there would be some overlaps in participation. The wish to see a dedicated TAG on structural CFI issues was also quite widespread and merits reflection.
78. When it comes to the GSU, the suggestion has equally been made to include development, resilience, fragility and vulnerability experts in the team. They would provide knowledge input on a variety of root causes, from food systems to water management, social services, health and nutrition, education, etc.
79. This obviously also goes for the teams that are created in the field and who carry out the real work. The challenge is to find the balance given that any team or group loses efficiency if growing bigger than a critical number.
80. Governance at field level is particularly critical. There is no one-size-fits-all. Each country has its own characteristics. But much more than the AFI and AMN scales, the CFI scale is in need of an institutional support in-country. Ideally, the central planning authorities should endorse the launch of a CFI and identify who in the government structure has the authority to collaborate and follow up. The link to the World Bank, the regional development banks and the International Monetary Fund country teams should be helpful and the link to the UNSDCF a matter of course. The involvement of the Government in subsequently elaborating more detailed policy recommendations is particularly important.

CONCLUSION 6: IPC CFI Governance

- The CFI scale is best served by staying close to the AFI and AMN scales inside the IPC governance structure.
- The various governance levels of the IPC (Steering Committee, Technical Advisory Group, GSU, country teams) when dealing with the CFI scale must evolve by including resilience, DRR and structural development expertise.
- The voice of recipient/client governments must be included.
- The Steering Committee must give space for addressing long-term structural issues, eventually by splitting itself into two formats, while keeping strong links between the two.
- Attention must be given to provide a national anchor for a CFI exercise, context specific but close to central decision-making.
- Strong links must be established with ongoing national development processes.



3. Summary and way forward

81. The conclusions above as summarised below need to be validated by the Steering Committee and adjusted as necessary. While doing so, it is useful to bear in mind that not all elements need necessarily to be implemented at once. Just as the AFI and AMN scales developed over time, so will the CFI scale, and a proper sequencing is useful to avoid set-backs and confusion.
82. It could be useful for the Steering Committee to consider the implementation of a few pilots where attention has been given to the preconditions listed above and then to draw some lessons from that.
83. The main conclusion is positive, in the sense that there is a role to play for the CFI scale and that there are no obvious competing candidates for offering a holistic assessment of chronic food insecurity. The mission of the CFI scale is to identify the protracted elements of food insecurity and explain how chronic food insecurity overlaps with sudden onset food insecurity and crises and hence calls for different types of interventions. Once the mission is understood, there are users from Governments, from the humanitarian, resilience, DRR and development communities that have confirmed their interest.
84. However, it is also clear that a number of essential preconditions must be fulfilled if the tool is to be taken up, have an effect in real terms and be cost effective from a resource perspective:
85. First, a better explanation of the characteristics and interlinkages of the AFI and the CFI must be provided. A narrative is required that explains how, in a CFI exercise, a multitude of data interact and together produce a picture of persistent food insecurity which is different from acute events. At the same time, it is recognised that the CFI scale should remain close to the AFI scale inside the IPC governance.
86. Second, a commitment from GSU to liaise with the agencies involved in data collection and advocate for improved data generation over time must be ensured. The reason for this is the availability and quality of data as well as the adequacy of indicators chosen to reflect structural conditions that have a bearing on chronic food insecurity are questioned. These concerns are all the more legitimate as the tool addresses medium to long term structural challenges where the assumption would be that there is less time pressure compared to an acute food emergency. Hence, the ambition should be higher. This necessitates as well an element of capacity building linked to the national statistical offices or similar as well as a process of academic verification of structural indicators. The IPC GSU could identify partners to initiate this work, bearing in mind that when the moment comes for yet another review of the protocols the material is available.
87. Third, a close association with host governments and their structures must be made, closer than in the case of the AFI and AMN scales. There are ways to improve buy-in upfront, either through a proper request from a government or by including a national officer involved in the development planning of the country.

88. Fourth, the CFI roll-out should be anchored in or connected to an ongoing development process, be it UNSDCF, the World Bank country strategies, a resilience plan or DRR, etc., not to be subordinated, but to timely feed into those plans as they are defined or as they are subject to mid-term reviews.
89. Fifth, a gradual deepening of the analysis of the root causes and drivers of chronic food insecurity and – over time – a refinement of critical recommendations as a part of the reporting. This could also be envisaged as part of a post-analysis exercise linked to the development, DRR or resilience planning in-country.
90. Sixth, it is recommended that the CFI remains hosted by the IPC initiative. At the same time, it is suggested that the two work streams on the AFI and the CFI scales are organised as two separate exercises at the level of the Steering Committee, the Technical Advisory Group and in-country, supported by GSU-dedicated teams with AFI, AMN and CFI expertise. Indeed, the urgency of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition should not distract from the seriousness of the work on chronic issues. Equally, the expertise on the two tools is very different, as the CFI requires relatively more development expertise while the AFI and AMN scales require relatively more humanitarian input.
91. Seventh, and as a consequence, development actors should be invited to participate in the work of these governance bodies when it comes to the CFI scale. This goes in particular for the World Bank, the regional development banks, IFPRI, UNICEF, WHO, etc. This will only happen if they see a genuine commitment to address structural issues and root causes from a development angle.
92. Eighth, training in the country should help create a revolving pool of certified experts that can support CFI analyses in-country and globally.
93. Ninth, more attention must be given to the presentation of data and maps in the reports. There is a need to better differentiate areas when it comes to the composite aggregated figures for CFI. Perhaps maps could also illustrate different drivers and their impact geographically.

Annex 1:

Issues and recommendations made by recent studies on the IPC CFI

Domain	Issues	Recommendations
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of coverage of the whole territory in several countries • Lack of disaggregation of results at lower levels • Lack of sufficient and quantified information on the root causes of food insecurity • Lack of gender-disaggregated information • Lack of information on urban food insecure population • Insufficient in-depth information on chronically food insecure areas and groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generate information at lower administrative level • Cover all the territories of a country • Generate quantified information on the root causes of food insecurity • Generate gender-disaggregated food security information • Generate information on urban food insecurity information
Governance and participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate participation in IPC CFI governance and implementation: same actors as for the acute IPC scales, dominated by humanitarian actors • Lack of capacity of the GSP to address the key issues identified that affect the relevance and use of the IPC CFI • Lack of participation of IPC Global partners in in-country implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote stronger engagement of development actors with much wider range of stakeholders than the current participation • Adapt the governance structure of the IPC CFI with more engagement of development actors • Explore whether another organisation would be better placed than the GSU to take over the development and roll-out of the CFI
Implementation process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensive process that requires considerable time and resources • Lack or delayed access to quality data • Lack of a formal feasibility study at country level with dialogue with policy makers • Lack of linkages with potential uses and users across all the implementation process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve the planning of the implementation process • Improve and conduct a more efficient implementation process • Conduct a formal feasibility assessment at country level, with in-depth assessment of information gaps and potential use, data availability, etc.
Communication and dissemination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak communication and dissemination strategy of IPC CFI results • Lack of homogeneity of IPC CFI products, template does not allow capturing the depth of analyses • Endorsement and dissemination affected by political sensitivity of IPC CFI results • Lack of support in the follow-up phase that engages with policy makers to demonstrate the relevance of IPC CFI results and how they can be used 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elaborate communication and dissemination strategies. Improve and prepare two IPC CFI communication templates, one for senior policy makers and one for the technical staff

Annex 2:

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Annex 3:

List of persons interviewed in bilateral meetings

WA = West Africa; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; SA = Southern Africa; EA = East Africa; CA = Central Africa		
Organization	Name	Scope
Governments		
CILSS	Baoua Issoufou	Regional (WA)
CILSS	Mohalmoudou Hamadoun	Regional (WA)
NEDA	Kevin Godoy	Country (Philippines)
NNC	Ellen Ruth Abella	Country (Philippines)
NNC	Leah Felismino	Country (Philippines)
PROGRESAN/SICA	Patricia Palma de Fulladolsa	Regional (LAC)
PROGRESAN/SICA	Ricardo Sibrian	Regional (LAC)
SESAN	Juan Roberto Mendoza	Country (Guatemala)
IFIs		
ECHO	Christophe Breyné	Regional (WA)
ECHO	Johan Helffinck	Country (DRC)
ECHO	Cedric Turlan	Country (DRC)
FCDO	Iris Krebber	Global
INTPA	Philippe Thomas	Global
INTPA	Giampiero Muci	Global
INTPA	Amadou Hebie	Regional (WA)
USAID	Christopher Hillbruner	Global
USAID	Kilian Mutiro	Regional (SA)
USAID	Halima Ouattara Ayanou	Regional (WA)
USAID	Kaya Adams	Country (DRC)
World Bank	Madhur Gautam	Global
World Bank	Dorte Verner	Global
World Bank	Melissa Williams	Regional (EA)
IPC GSU		
IPC GSU	Jose Lopez	Global
IPC GSU	Sophie Chotard	Global
IPC GSU	Leila Oliveira	Global
IPC GSU	Kaija Korpi	Global
IPC GSU	Nicholas Haan	Global
IPC GSU	Duaa Sayed	Regional (Asia)
IPC GSU	Feroz Ahmed	Regional (Asia)


WA = West Africa; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; SA = Southern Africa; EA = East Africa; CA = Central Africa

Organization	Name	Scope
IPC GSU	Majid Abdul	Regional (Asia)
IPC GSU		
IPC GSU	Jerry Arguello	Regional (LAC)
IPC GSU	Belihu Negesse	Regional (EA)
IPC GSU	Rashid Mohamed	Regional (EA)
IPC GSU	Ernest Moise Mushekuru	Regional (CA)
IPC GSU	Kudzayi Kariri	Regional (SA)
IPC GSU	Simon Muhindi	Regional (SA)
NGOs		
CARE	Justus Liku	Global
Oxfam	Emily Farr	Global
Oxfam	Eric Munoz	Global
Oxfam	Sebastien Thomas	Global
Save The Children	Binta Cisse	Global
UN		
FAO	Dominique Burgeon	Global
FAO	Jose Rosero Moncayo	Global
FAO	Carlo Cafiero	Global
FAO	Brenda Lazarus	Regional (EA)
FAO	Cyril Ferrand	Regional (EA)
FAO	Lewis Hove	Regional (SA)
OCHA	Gemma Connell	Regional (SA and EA)
UNDP	Rachel Scott	Global
UNICEF	Grainne Mairead Moloney	Global
UNICEF	Megan Gayford	Global
UNICEF	Daniel Tewoldeberha	Regional (EA)
UNICEF	Mara Nyawo	Regional (EA)
WFP	Raphael Guevinnicoloff	Global
WFP	Blessing Butaumocho	Regional (SA)
WFP	Siddharth Krishnaswamy	Regional EA
WFP	Juanito Berja Jr	Country (Philippines)
WFP	Hector Roca	Country (Guatemala)
WFP	Enrico Pausilli	Country (DRC)
WFP	Aysa Twose	Country (DRC)
WHO	Marina Adrianopoli	Regional (WA)
WHO	Andre Griekspoor	Global
Other		
EU JRC	Felix Rembold	Global
EU JRC	Joysee Rodriguez Baide	Global
FEWS NET	Peter Thomas	Global
FEWS NET	Lorena Aguilar	Regional (LAC)
FEWS NET	Laouali Ibrahim	Regional (WA)
Global Food Security Cluster	Naouar Labidi	Global
IFPRI	Rob Vos	Global

Annex 4:

List of participants to the workshop (13-14 December 2021)

Organization	Name
EU JRC	Felix Rembold
FAO	Dominique Burgeon
FAO	Luca Russo
FCDO	Iris Krebber
FEWS NET	Peter Thomas
IFPRI	Rob Vos
INTPA	Giampiero Muci
IPC GSU	Nicholas Haan
IPC GSU	Jose Lopez
IPC GSU	Sophie Chotard
IPC GSU	Leila Oliveira
Oxfam	Emily Farr
Oxfam	Eric Munoz
PROGRESAN/SICA	Patricia Palma de Fulladolsa
Save The Children	Binta Cisse
UNICEF	Megan Gayford
USAID	Christopher Hillbruner
WHO	Marina Adrianopoli
WHO	Andre Griekspoor
World Bank	Melissa Williams
WFP	Riccardo Suppo
WFP	Eric Brancaert



Annex 5:

Existing tools and systems that measure chronic food insecurity

The list presented below does not intend to exhaustively include all tools and systems that include elements relevant for measuring chronic food insecurity. It includes the most relevant ones mentioned by stakeholders consulted at global, regional and country level.

- The State of Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in the World (SOFI): Based on the Food Security Experience Scale and Prevalence of Undernourishment, it is led by FAO with the participation of IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. It provides estimates of undernourishment, severe food insecurity and moderate food insecurity (people who do not have access to nutritious and sufficient food, even if not necessarily suffering hunger).
- The Global Network Against Food Crises is an “Alliance of humanitarian and development actors united by the commitment to tackle the root causes of food crises and promote sustainable solutions”. It was launched by the EU, FAO and WFP in 2016. In practice, the main focus is on acute food insecurity and food crises. One of the main global products in which the network is involved is the annual publication of the Global Report on Food Crisis that reports mainly on acute food insecurity based on IPC data.
- The Food Security Information Network is co-sponsored by FAO, WFP and IFPRI “to strengthen food and nutrition security information systems for producing reliable data and accurate data to guide analysis and decision-making”. It integrates 16 global and regional partners and contributes to the Global Report on Food Crises.
- FAO hosts other initiatives to monitor food security such as the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS), focused on “monitoring food supply and demand and other key indicators for assessing the overall food security situation in all countries of the world”.
- WFP conducts regional, national and sub-national food security and nutrition analysis through the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit, although more oriented on crisis, post-emergency and contingency planning and preparedness. Integrated Context Analysis (ICA) focuses on identifying areas affected by recurrent shocks and food insecurity to support resilience programming. In the last years, WFP has supported the implementation of Strategic Zero Hunger Reviews at national level to inform the formulation of its country strategic plans. These reviews allowed to address food insecurity comprehensively and included an analysis of national policies related to food security and nutrition.
- The UN country team conducts Common Country Assessments to inform the United Nations

Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

- IFPRI conducts research at global, regional and national level on five strategic areas: 1) Climate-resilient and sustainable food supply; 2) Healthy diet and nutrition for all; 3) Inclusive and efficient markets, trade systems and food industry; 4) Agricultural and rural economies transformation; 5) Institutions and governance.
- Food system analysis is applied at all levels by a wide range of actors (EU and FAO support rapid food system assessments, IFAD, WWF, NGOs, etc.).
- The World Bank supports poverty assessment at national level to inform its country programmes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, attention given to chronic food insecurity is rather limited.
- *Cadre Harmonisé* in West Africa. The CILSS has not adopted yet the chronic scale developed by the IPC. Two pilots have been conducted and several concerns were found on the indicators included in the protocol showing transitory conditions and the representativeness of data at the appropriate level for supporting decision making.
- Resilience analysis: RIMA is conducted by FAO and AMR (*Cadre analytique de mesure de la resilience*) supported by CILSS in West Africa.

At national level, the main multisectoral supports where chronic food insecurity is addressed are often national development plans, which provide the sectoral priorities that are further developed into sectoral policies. Chronic food insecurity related sectoral policies may be multiple, including proper food security policies, climate change, resilience, nutrition, agriculture, livestock and fisheries, water management, etc. Often in the absence of multi-sectoral coordination mechanisms, these policies are implemented by line Ministries in siloes. This makes more difficult the identification of users and clear policy processes that the CFI could inform. As mentioned above, complementary assessments conducted by the UN or other actors, such as the Zero Hunger Strategic Reviews or the UN Common Country assessment may provide a more comprehensive approach to food insecurity.

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