



Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions



IPC RISK OF FAMINE REVIEW - LESSONS LEARNED

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Cover: OCHA, South Sudan

Background

In 2020, several humanitarian agencies issued warnings of worsening food security in countries around the world and raised the possibility of potential famines unless quick action was taken to counter the effects of conflict, climate-related shocks, and the economic and other effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The list of countries frequently cited was diverse, including Burkina Faso, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen. The term 'risk of famine' was used to describe different countries and contexts without standardised criteria or analysis, raising concerns within the humanitarian community. As a result, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Global Support Unit (IPC GSU) was approached by partners to develop standards for assessment and communication of a Risk of Famine (RoF). The IPC GSU and partners agreed to work on the issue and a series of pilot analyses were planned to test a new guidance note for conducting risk of famine pilots, drafted in late 2020.

It was agreed to pilot the guidance in a few countries, followed by a review process focusing on analysing lessons learned and feedback received during the piloting period. The results of the review are expected to inform the revision of the draft guidance on RoF analysis and communication before a full roll-out of the RoF guidance and process. This report includes the key findings of the review process, including recommendations for different aspects of IPC RoF analysis.

Methodology

The review process was conducted in August-October, 2021 and included the following components:

- Interviews with key informants from the following groups:
 - o IPC Technical Working Group (TWG) members from pilot countries
 - o Partner staff who participated in the pilots
 - o Resource partners
 - o IPC Famine Review Committee members
 - o GSU personnel who participated in/facilitated pilots
 - o IPC Steering Committee representatives and/or personnel nominated by them for interviews
 - o Other key actors from the humanitarian community
- Review of the pilot process in the three countries where RoF analysis was conducted
- Review of key documents, such as the inter-cluster statement on famine and food crises in September 2021 and the Independent Review of the IPC in South Sudan by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG).

GSU staff conducted 29 interviews with 36 total respondents. A list of all interviewees is included in the annex of this report. The annex also contains the two questionnaires (one for pilot participants and another for decision-makers) used to conduct the interviews.

Limitations of the review

Some limitations with implications on the scope and content of the review can be identified:

- Despite efforts to reach all intended respondents, a few did not respond to requests for interviews. As a result, interviews with six intended respondents did not take place.
- The interviews focused on pilot country TWGs, partner and GSU personnel who were involved in the pilots, and decision-makers in IPC partner organizations and resource partners. While communication challenges were highlighted in the interviews, no communications personnel as such were interviewed. The interviews and the content of the review concentrated on technical and process aspects of the pilots, while potentially leaving out other relevant issues.

IPC Risk of Famine Pilots: Feedback and Lessons Learned

Risk of Famine pilots

South Sudan

The draft guidance was originally prepared for use in the South Sudan IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis of October–November 2020. The IPC TWG, however, declined to conduct an RoF pilot. Given the severity of the food security and nutrition situation at the time, especially in Pibor County and Jonglei State, and the breakdown of technical consensus among TWG members, the analysis was referred to the IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC)¹.

During the FRC analysis process, it was confirmed that whereas outcome evidence was available for western payams, or third-level administrative units, of Pibor County, making assessment of potential Famine/Famine Likely possible, outcome evidence was unavailable for central and eastern payams. The FRC, with support from GSU, used the draft RoF guidance to conduct an analysis for central-eastern Pibor County, specifically for the Kizongora and Maruwa payams. Given the information available on contributing factors and supplemental information from key informants, the FRC concluded that a Risk of Famine existed in the projection period of December 2020 – July 2021 for the two payams. This finding was communicated in the FRC report on South Sudan.

Ethiopia

A regular IPC analysis was conducted in October 2020 in Ethiopia, with a validity period through September 2021. Given the outbreak of conflict in the Tigray Region in November 2020, and the rapidly deteriorating situation in Tigray Region in subsequent months, the TWG decided to conduct an update for the analysis in April–May 2021. During the analysis, food insecurity was found to be severe and potentially extreme within at least some areas of the region. Several TWG members noted a potential risk of famine in some analysis areas.

This prompted further analysis within the TWG, supported and facilitated by GSU staff. Two small analysis groups used the draft RoF guidance and concluded on the existence of a risk of famine in the period July–September 2021 for Northwestern, Central and Eastern Tigray Zones. While these findings were included in the draft IPC analysis brief produced by the TWG, this draft was not approved by the Federal Government of Ethiopia. Analysis findings, including the RoF statement, were released by the GSU, the decision being made by the IPC Global Steering Committee, without the endorsement of the government. Given the breakdown in technical consensus and potentially extreme situation, the FRC was asked by the IPC Steering Committee to review the TWG's analysis, particularly the RoF conclusion. The FRC agreed with the TWG's findings, with the full FRC analysis released in July.

Madagascar

Given the severe outcome data available for southern Madagascar, and the desire to pilot the RoF guidance, GSU proposed holding an RoF pilot in Madagascar in mid-2021, which the TWG accepted. The pilot was scheduled so as to connect to an IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis (AMN) that was also occurring. The pilot was conducted over two days at the end of June with key members of the TWG and some IPC Technical Advisory Group (TAG)² members. The pilot was co-facilitated by the Chair of the TWG and GSU. The analysis team concluded that there was a Risk of Famine in the projection period of October to December 2021 in Ambovombe-Androy district, a second-level administrative unit, but assessed that there would be no risk of famine in two other districts analysed, Amboasary Atsimo and Ampanihy. The pilot results were released together with the findings of the IPC AMN analysis.

Knowledge of Risk of Famine protocols

Interviews included questions on respondent knowledge of the draft RoF guidance note. The purpose was to find out how familiar the interviewees were with the RoF initiative, the guidance note, and the differences between the classifications of Famine and Famine Likely, and the statement on Risk of Famine.

Most respondents were very knowledgeable about the initiative, familiar with the guidance note, and knew the differences between the types of famine classifications and statements produced through IPC. These respondents were the ones who are either intimately involved in the IPC (GSU staff as well as IPC TAG, FRC, or TWG members) or who follow it closely and regularly need to communicate analysis findings (some resource partner and IPC Steering Committee members).

A smaller group of respondents was less familiar with the initiative, had no or little familiarity with the guidance note, and was somewhat confused about the differences in famine classifications and statements, especially between Famine Likely and RoF. This group included some TWG members, some resource partners staff, and other decision-makers within the IPC Steering Committee. The differences between the groups generally corresponded to different levels of interviewee involvement in the development and application of IPC protocols.

¹ IPC Famine Review Committee consists of five senior, independent food security, health and nutrition experts who are tasked with reviewing IPC Famine analyses.

² IPC TAG consists of technical representatives of IPC partner agencies and is tasked with reviewing technical guidance of IPC and providing recommendations on technical decisions to the IPC Steering Committee.

Knowledge of the RoF initiative prior to the pilots varied more than familiarity with the guidance note and understanding of the differences between IPC famine classifications and statements. TWG members in South Sudan and Ethiopia, and some GSU members who were involved in these two pilots, felt that they had not received sufficient information prior to the pilots. No training or information-sharing meetings were held prior to these pilots and, if the guidance note was shared, it either did not reach all relevant persons or was shared late. In both cases, the use of the draft RoF guidance was opportunistic, rather than planned. The TWG in South Sudan did not conduct RoF analysis itself. In Ethiopia, concerns about an RoF were raised only in final plenary sessions, prompting small groups – not the whole TWG – to conduct RoF analysis only at the end of the regular analysis.

The participants who took part in the Madagascar pilot, on the contrary, felt that they had received enough information prior to the pilot and also had access to the guidance note. The guidance note was only available in English at the time, however, which was a limitation. A teleconference, held in French, involving the Madagascar TWG and partners was arranged prior to the pilot in which the pilot objectives and the concept of risk of famine were explained. Interviewees who had taken part in the call felt that it was very useful in clarifying the different aspects of the pilot. Some confusion on the concepts and the process nevertheless occurred during the analysis, pointing to the need for a well-structured preparation process.

IPC Famine typologies

IPC has two Famine classifications, Famine and Famine Likely. Both signal that the area classified is in Famine, but with different amounts of evidence. For a Famine classification, high quality quantitative evidence for food consumption/livelihood change, nutrition, and mortality above standard Famine thresholds must be available. For Famine Likely, available quantitative evidence must surpass the Famine thresholds, but evidence may be of lower quality and is only needed for two of the three main outcomes. Famine and Famine Likely classifications can be prepared either for a current situation or to reflect the most likely situation in a projection period.

Risk of Famine, conversely, is not a classification, but a statement about a future situation. It can only be prepared for a projection analysis, and it is not necessarily based on the most likely scenario. It is an alternative scenario with a reasonable chance of happening, intended to highlight a risk of famine if one or more key assumptions in a most likely scenario are incorrect or invalidated.

Table 1: Famine, Famine Likely and Risk of Famine

Key Differences between Famine and Famine Likely Projections and Risk of Famine			
	Evidence requirements	Type of projection scenario	IPC Products
Famine	Adequate	Most likely scenario	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Classification map Population tables
Famine Likely	Minimally adequate		
Risk of Famine	Unspecified	A worst-case scenario that has a reasonable chance of happening	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Headline / text form Additional mapping symbols / tables / diagram (tbc)

Whereas most interviewees felt that the technical differences between the three are clear to them, they also felt that these differences are not clearly communicated or understood by others. Many interviewees generally thought that while the Famine classification is not problematic, there is a large amount of confusion regarding the difference between Famine Likely and Risk of Famine. Different views were also expressed depending on whether a colloquial or technical view of key terms in the classifications was used. Several native English speakers remarked that in English, the terms 'likely' and 'risk' are so close to each other in common usage that understanding the nuances based on the names alone is practically impossible. According to another point of view, however, risk is technically a combination of likelihood and impact and even if there is a risk of something, it does not necessarily mean that it is likely.

When interviewees were asked how the terminology could be improved, responses varied widely. Some interviewees did not consider the existence of the three concepts problematic. Most respondents, however, felt that there is a lot of confusion among key non-technical groups like the media and decision-makers, though did not suggest changing the terminology. Instead, they suggested that clearer communication of the differences and of IPC findings would address this confusion. Some respondents (only four) felt that the terminology itself, particularly Famine Likely, should be changed.

Three concrete suggestions were presented. One was to refer to all Famine classifications in terms of confidence level (high, medium, low). This includes renaming a Famine classification in the current situation as 'Famine – high confidence' and a Famine Likely classification in the current situation as 'Famine – low confidence'. Another suggestion was to replace Famine Likely with something akin to 'Famine with less-than-optimal evidence'. The third suggestion was to refer to both Famine and Famine Likely as 'Famine'.

These options would clarify that the difference between the two is not in severity, but rather the types and quality of evidence available. The term Risk of Famine would remain unchanged in all of these suggestions, highlighting how Famine Likely is generally the greatest source of terminological confusion. No respondents questioned the need to have different classifications and statements for famine occurrence and risk with different levels and quality of evidence. There seems to be wide acceptance within the larger IPC community of the decisions taken on IPC Famine protocols regarding evidence reliability and minimum evidence requirements.

Most respondents, when asked about Famine-related terminology, felt that the problem is not with the terminology itself, but with the communication of it. They thought that changing terminology would not solve the communication challenges. Instead, respondents often discussed how important it is to develop additional and improved communication materials that clarify the differences between Famine, Famine Likely, and RoF, including recommendations on language to use when communicating IPC findings to different kinds of audiences. Decision-makers and technical advisors in particular described the considerable time they spend giving presentations and clarifying, and even rewriting, IPC findings for their advocacy and communication colleagues and to higher-level decision-makers.

Three other, linked challenges were noted by interviewees:

- The tendency of general audiences to understand every situation as a famine when the word 'famine' is used in any way – whether in Famine or Famine Likely classifications or in a Risk of Famine statement. The nuances between the three are lost in the media and to decision-makers as soon as the word 'famine' appears, regardless of the context or other terminology around it.
- Frequent use of 'risk of famine', 'brink of famine', 'on the verge of famine', etc. by different agencies – some of which are IPC partners – and the media. 'Famine-like conditions' are also used to describe extreme conditions and e.g. populations in Phase 5. The use of this kind of language was noted especially by decision-makers, who were either IPC resource partners or IPC Steering Committee members. This use of different kinds of famine-related terminology was seen as a considerable challenge to effective communication and respondents wished that all agencies would commit to the joint RoF analysis and standards spearheaded by the IPC, rather than make these statements on their own. Development of a 'code of conduct' for IPC partners on communication of risk of famine and other IPC famine analyses was suggested. The interviewees also noted that occasionally there is a somewhat opportunistic tendency to view everyone in Phase 4 as at 'risk of famine', using IPC findings to serve fund- and awareness-raising purposes regardless of the technical correctness of such interpretations. Others did not think that a 'code of conduct' would work, as IPC is not applied everywhere, and agencies do conduct their own analysis based on their own methodology or even IPC-compatible methods and they have the right to release independent findings on acute food insecurity.
- One respondent also described how high-level actors appear willing to wait for something like RoF statements or classifications of Famine or Famine Likely before paying serious attention to a given food security crisis. There is a feeling that decision-makers have become 'desensitised' to severe food insecurity. Solving this issue, according to the respondent, would require a review of all IPC Phase descriptions and related communication protocols to underline the seriousness of the Phases prior to Phase 5. If adequate attention and assistance followed Phase 3 and Phase 4 classifications, severe food insecurity could potentially be mitigated and there would not be a need for later RoF or other famine-related analysis. This would also work better with governments of countries affected by severe and extreme food insecurity, which tend to be uncomfortable with the word 'famine' in any form, as it conveys a message of governance failure.

Value-added of Risk of Famine

Decision-makers were specifically asked to assess if it is important to have the option of an RoF statement further to the possibility of projecting Famine or Famine Likely. All felt that it has utility, especially from an early warning perspective. Many respondents saw the IPC Phases as a continuum, with RoF situated between Phases 4 and 5, and thought that RoF takes pressure off of IPC Phase 5 classifications by offering a less sensitive, scenario-based approach to warning of a potential Phase 5 situation in the future.

Several respondents, in contrast, feared that the option of RoF might deter TWGs from even trying to classify Famine or Famine Likely due to their sensitivities, and that allowing the use of RoF might risk diluting IPC key messages and communication of the seriousness of a situation. However, with clear protocols for the use of RoF, Famine, and Famine Likely, these risks may be mitigated.

Risk of Famine process

Respondents were asked for their opinion on the RoF pilot process they participated in or followed, in terms of organisation, communication, and stakeholders.

South Sudan

The RoF pilot was eventually conducted by the IPC FRC, given that the South Sudan TWG declined to conduct the pilot. The FRC members overall felt that there were no major issues with the pilot organisation. IPC GSU acted as a secretariat by pulling data together and drafting the report based on the FRC's inputs. This process worked relatively well.

Some FRC members noted that conducting this analysis for South Sudan was relatively easy, as they had already worked on South Sudan several times before and had been analysing western Pibor and reviewing data for central-eastern Pibor for several weeks prior to the RoF pilot. This implies that it may be possible to standardise the analysis process, even if RoF itself and the analysis of RoF will always be contextual.

Ethiopia

Respondents noted considerable problems with the pilot process in Ethiopia. The pilot was not planned with the TWG prior to the regular in-country Acute Food Insecurity Analysis and practically no advance communication or planning took place. This situation was reflected in the responses of many interviewees, who up to the time of the interview were uncertain on what had happened in the pilot analysis, including who participated, and in the communication of the pilot findings. One respondent who was present in the analysis and took part in the RoF discussions said that he was not aware that there was a pilot.

As the RoF analysis was concluded after the plenary session of the regular IPC analysis, only the analysis teams tasked with analysing the most vulnerable areas participated in actual RoF analysis and reported conclusions on RoF for three areas. These findings were not presented in a full plenary, as would normally happen when an analysis team finished analysing its assigned areas. The RoF findings were, however, included in the analysis brief that, while approved by the analysts conducting the Tigray analysis, was not endorsed by the federal government. The government's position concerned the overall analysis findings, of which the pilot results were just one part. The ad-hoc and complicated set-up of the pilot analysis meant that no normal pilot process – as specified in the RoF guidance – took place.

The interviewed participants overall felt, however, that the RoF analysis was useful and necessary. They indicated that while the pilot process was far from optimal, they did what they could, given their constraints. Some decision-makers interviewed mentioned that the pilot took place very late given the severity of the situation, although they acknowledged that lack of data prevented detailed analysis prior to the IPC analysis and the RoF pilot.

Due to the breakdown in consensus, the IPC FRC was asked to review the IPC and RoF findings on short notice and with a strict deadline. During this analysis, the FRC tried to interview as many key informants as possible, but it was difficult to reach key informants with good primary knowledge of the current conditions in Tigray. Many key informants (e.g. conflict analysts interviewed) worked outside the country. One respondent pointed out that the exercise was too focused on food security and that key information and diverse thematic experts within Ethiopia were lacking, including for Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation (WASH), nutrition, health, and conflict.³

Madagascar

The Madagascar pilot was the only 'normal' pilot in a sense that it was planned in advance with full knowledge of all stakeholders (Madagascar TWG, GSU and IPC partners), and conducted by an analysis team consisting of key members of the TWG, facilitation support from GSU, and some members of the global partner agencies.

The respondents felt that the pilot was organised relatively well, and they thought that especially the presentation given 1-2 weeks in advance of the pilot on RoF concept, pilot purpose and process was useful.

Areas of improvement

During the interviews respondents also discussed several issues they had noted during the pilots and suggested revisions for the RoF analysis process:

- Data available for the pilot should be released in a timely manner to participants, such as one week prior to the pilot (in Madagascar the results of the SMART survey for the RoF became available only over the weekend prior to the pilot). Furthermore, more detailed data on historical trends would facilitate the analysis.
- Analysis teams should include local experts with profound knowledge of the areas under analysis, rather than having a large presence of global-level analysts with less detailed knowledge of the context. Such local experts should play a substantial role in the discussion, with encouragement of the facilitators.
- There must be greater clarity in the structure of the analysis process. This could include suggested structure and process for plenary and/or small group discussions of RoF analysis and conclusions, including assessment of different assumptions and related data on outcomes and contributing factors.
- More guidance is needed regarding the development of assumptions for expected levels of humanitarian food assistance (HFA) and how to define alternative scenarios for HFA.
- Guidance on conducting probabilistic analysis, such as assessing the likelihood of an individual assumption or of an entire scenario occurring, is not robust and this analysis risks being neglected in the absence of sufficient guidance. Establishing a shared understanding of terminology and the meaning of different concepts, as well as clearly articulating a theory of change for how shocks and drivers are likely to impact different outcomes within scenario-building, would help in developing consensus on assumptions and potential alternative scenarios.

³ One FRC member also noted that this expertise is also lacking within the FRC and that adding members with these profiles is crucial.

⁴ SMART stands for Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions. It is a survey methodology that focuses specifically on collection of data on nutrition and mortality.

- Some respondents noted a lack of clarity on how to formulate assumptions and a scenario within RoF analysis. While not as much of an issue within the South Sudan pilot, it was for the Tigray and southern Madagascar pilots. In Tigray, the volatility of the situation and the lack of detailed information on some key factors greatly hampered the preparation of a single scenario to assess RoF. As a result, the FRC prepared four scenarios to assess the risk of famine. In Madagascar, the most likely scenario developed by the TWG was already very severe and involved a deterioration of the situation due to seasonal patterns, high food prices, lack of production, and other factors. This led to a situation where it was somewhat difficult to assess and understand the differences between the concepts of the most likely and the worst-case scenarios, as with RoF.
- A few respondents thought that it is crucial to provide more guidance on the preparation of assumptions and how they relate to each other to formulate a logical sequence of events and a more complete picture of the envisioned scenario. For example, assumptions on food prices should be connected to assumptions on production, and assumptions of acute malnutrition levels should be linked to assumptions on health services, WASH, and other factors relevant to acute malnutrition.
- The analysis is reportedly easier to conduct if there is one key driver, or lynchpin, of the scenario, such as conflict. In the case of Madagascar, there was no single clear driver, but multiple drivers and an assumption that if one or several of them are realised there is a risk of famine in the projection period. This led to some confusion on understanding and communication of analysis findings.

Guidance and Tools for Risk of Famine Analysis

There is only one tool currently available for RoF analysis: the table for recording assumptions for the most likely and the worst-case scenarios, the latter informing the RoF analysis. While respondents generally thought that the tool itself is useful and informs the analysis, they also felt that more structure to the analysis is required. A more standardised analysis process, with more detailed tools, was suggested.

Several respondents suggested the inclusion of optional tools in the online analysis tool, Information Support System (ISS). For example, an icon in Step 8 labelled 'Click here if conducting Risk of Famine –analysis could open up a new table of assumptions for RoF analysis. Similarly, otherwise hidden tables or worksheets could become available for the analysis and conclusions -sections in projection analysis if RoF analysis is activated in ISS for a given area.

Many respondents noted that development of more detailed tools and embedding them in ISS would require incorporation of RoF as a standard type of analysis for IPC. Respondents in general felt that this is the right direction to take, and that IPC should invest in this.

Some respondents mentioned the lack of practical 'how to' guidance for conducting RoF analysis. Whereas the current guidance note explains the concept of RoF and helps in assessing when to do the analysis and who should do it, details on the actual analysis process are limited. Respondents suggested including several real-life case studies from risk of famine analyses and situations and providing more details on how the analysis itself should be done, including guidance for development of assumptions and review of evidence.

Conducting Risk of Famine analysis in different contexts

Considerable time in interviews was spent discussing how the RoF analyses should be conducted in 'optimal' and more difficult contexts, in terms of political, resource, and other constraints on data collection and in-country analysis.

Optimal context

The responses regarding optimal contexts were rather uniform: a large majority of respondents recommended that the TWGs conduct the analyses, although with assistance from the GSU (and other external experts if/when required). A few respondents were somewhat afraid that the TWGs might not have the required technical expertise or neutrality for RoF analysis and they suggested large global involvement, while still acknowledging that TWG members typically know the context far better than outsiders.

TWG not conducting the analysis in politically sensitive contexts

Respondents were also given two scenarios involving concerns of a famine developing within a few months. In the first scenario, the TWG is, for reasons related to the politically sensitive context, unwilling or unable to conduct an RoF analysis. In the second scenario, the TWG is willing to conduct the analysis but cannot do it for the next 3 months due to some impediments, such as security concerns, lack of funding, or lack of data.

The responses to the first scenario varied widely depending on the position of the respondent (country, regional, or global).

- The country and regional-level respondents almost uniformly preferred working with the TWG in this scenario. In their opinion, there are a lot of options for conducting the analysis through the TWG. For example, if there is a real concern of a famine developing, agencies can collect data to prove it and convince the rest of the TWG to conduct the analysis. The point made by the respondents was that the TWGs are not singular entities: they consist of different agencies and personalities and there are always some who are interested in conducting the RoF analysis even if others are against it. This can be used as a leverage to convince the rest and different country-level actors – Humanitarian Country Team, Humanitarian Coordinator, donors – can also help in influencing the TWG members not willing to do the analysis. Respondents also felt that if RoF analysis is made a standard protocol when certain conditions are met, the countries applying the IPC would not be able to say no to the analysis. Furthermore, if the message of RoF is clear to all – not the most likely scenario, but rather an early warning statement for action to be taken – then TWGs may feel more inclined to conduct the analysis even in difficult contexts.

- Country and regional respondents also said that the IPC should not get involved in political processes but maintain a technical character and neutrality. This neutrality should be used to show the non-political nature of RoF analysis. Finally, some respondents also mentioned the option of a minority report: if the entire TWG is unable to do the analysis, a smaller group of agencies could possibly do it or some agency could use the option of IPC-compatible analysis for doing it. In any case, going through the TWG was seen as the only option to maintain in-country ownership as well as relationships and trust both within the TWG and between the TWG and the IPC (particularly the GSU).
- Global respondents were more inclined to give the responsibility for the RoF analysis to an external group in this kind of a situation. The suggested composition of this group varied widely, including varying proportions of regional, GSU, other global staff). GSU was often seen as an important player in convening a group of experts, with country-level experts taking part to the extent possible, anonymously if needed. Some respondents also felt that in these situations, the FRC would be best placed to do the analysis. The FRC members themselves, however, thought that they can play a role in reviewing RoF analysis in this situation and that they are typically mobilized in case of a contentious analysis of an extreme situation or a breakdown in consensus, as was the case with South Sudan and Ethiopia analyses. They also acknowledged that they do not have the time and resources to conduct the actual analysis themselves, including collating and processing data for it.
- Respondents also noted that if a normal RoF process is conducted, then the standard communication guidance – to be finalised – can be followed. However, if standard RoF analysis cannot be done due to the sensitivity of the context and if individual agencies, or a small group of analysts, are conducting the analysis, the question of communication arises. There may be a need for alternative messaging to communicate assessed RoF, such as 'on the brink of famine'). These situations, and to what extent they should be treated as IPC analyses or not, also need to be covered in the revised RoF guidance note.

TWG not conducting the analysis for other reasons

The second scenario of the TWG not being able to conduct the analysis for three months for reasons related to funding, lack of data, and other issues was not considered a difficult scenario by most respondents. All country and regional-level respondents, as well as many global respondents, had ready solutions to the presented challenges. These were all based on the premise of a TWG using resources present in the country to solve problems.

If funding is an issue, but there is a concern of a potential famine developing in a few months, respondents believed that there would be agencies and donors willing to fund the analysis and data collection, if needed. If logistics or security is an issue, analysis can be conducted with a smaller group of people or remotely. Lack of data is not a fundamental problem for RoF, as the RoF analysis does not have specific data requirements. In any case, if the TWG feels that more data is required prior to the analysis, a quick data collection can be arranged by some partner agencies in the areas of concern. Finding funding even for robust surveys (such as SMART) is likely to be feasible in emergency situations.

Triggering a Risk of Famine analysis

While the question on how and when to trigger an RoF analysis was not included in the questionnaire, the issue came up with several respondents.

All respondents who discussed this favoured setting up some criteria for triggering the analysis. It was also noted that if RoF is made a standard part of IPC protocols, some criteria for triggering the analysis must be developed. No one was in favour of setting specific quantitative indicator cut-offs, like Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) at or above 25% for RoF analysis to be conducted. Respondents generally favoured establishing criteria while leaving some flexibility so that situations can also be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This often meant population estimates prepared during the Acute Food Insecurity Analysis. For example, if an area is in Phase 4 and has any population in Phase 5, RoF analysis should be conducted. Even with this criterion, RoF analysis could still be conducted for other areas in Phase 4 with no population in Phase 5.

Evidence requirements for Risk of Famine analysis

Respondents were asked about their opinion regarding evidence requirements for RoF analysis. Currently, there are no evidence requirements, only analysis requirements. Most respondents were reluctant to put in place specific evidence requirements. In their opinion, the current flexibility is an asset allowing for quick and contextual analysis when required. Given that RoF is a statement, not a classification, and that it is prepared for a projection period, coming up with certain evidence requirements would also be problematic.

Many respondents, however, felt that even if no specific requirements can be provided by outcome, as is the case for normal IPC analyses, evidence must be available for the analysis and the analysis itself should be well-documented. Respondents provided several ideas on further guidance regarding evidence to be used for RoF analysis. While some respondents mentioned evidence on outcomes, including trends in outcomes, such as for GAM, most spoke at length about evidence on contributing factors that would be beneficial for RoF analysis.

For example, good evidence on HFA is fundamental, as well as data on historical trends of seasonality, market prices for staple foods, or food production. Respondents proposed providing guidance on contributing factors, such as a list of evidence that would be beneficial to RoF analysis. Overall, many respondents emphasised the need to have good knowledge on the context, such as food and income sources, level of basic services, markets, and humanitarian access.

Given that in many situations conflict is a major driver, understanding of the conflict dynamics is also crucial. For an RoF analysis, any available evidence on expected future trends, such as price and rainfall forecasts, or potential contextual evidence on expected levels of conflict, displacement, or natural shocks are also of crucial importance.

When asked whether evidence available was sufficient for RoF analysis and conclusion, the main remarks were the following:

South Sudan

Data was sufficient for an RoF statement. Sufficient information was available on contextual factors and from key informants, although there was no direct evidence on outcomes.

Ethiopia

Data was enough for making an RoF statement, but there were multiple gaps. Contextual information was difficult to get and often lacking, no conflict expertise was available within the country – at least for the FRC review, and evidence regarding the actual situation on the ground within Tigray Region, such as for coping strategies employed, was not robust.

Madagascar

Evidence was sufficient for reaching a conclusion on RoF, but data on many key aspects of the situation was missing, such as for production, climate forecasts, and trends of different indicators.

Development of assumptions for Risk of Famine analysis

Development of assumptions is a crucial part of RoF analysis. In all three pilots, assumptions were developed, but the experiences related to this varied by pilot and by respondent. Overall, all felt that the development of assumptions is very important and a lot of time and effort in any RoF analysis should be spent on this task. Even though the guidance note on RoF states that assumptions should be developed by the analysts, the reality in the pilots was rather different.

In South Sudan and in Ethiopia, the process was quite limited as the full TWG did not participate in developing assumptions in either country. For South Sudan, GSU and the FRC formulated the assumptions, whereas for Ethiopia GSU developed assumptions that were subsequently discussed by two small analysis teams drawn from the wider TWG. For Madagascar, the initial assumptions were developed by GSU as a basis for discussion, but more elaborate assumptions were developed in plenary by the TWG and subsequently by each analysis team for their own analysis area.

Many respondents noted the difficulties in developing good assumptions. For example, assumptions are often developed individually, rather than integrated within a logical worst-case/alternative scenario underpinning the RoF analysis. All analysts should also have a similar understanding of the assumptions being used and the expected severity of the situation if the assumptions materialise. As noted earlier, this is easier if there is one strong driver that can act as the lynchpin of an alternative scenario, such as conflict in South Sudan or Ethiopia. In Madagascar, with the relative absence of conflict, identification of such a strong singular driver is very difficult if not impossible. Even in situations of conflict, analysts need to be clear on how they assess it, such as in terms of lives lost or in terms of stress put on livelihoods (reduced cultivation or lack of market access, for example). The latter may be more detrimental to food security over time, with larger RoF implications, than the former.

Analysts struggled with assessing the likelihood of assumptions and scenarios. The guidance states that RoF 'refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into famine in the projected period'. Assessing whether something had such a 'reasonable probability' turned out to be difficult. This is also tied to the question of the scenario(s) to be used. Even if the guidance note refers to a 'worst-case scenario that has a reasonable chance of happening', it was occasionally difficult to define this scenario – especially in Madagascar in the absence of one strong driver – and the boundary between the most likely and the worst-case scenario became blurred. The interviews also revealed some differences in thinking regarding the scenarios. Some respondents focused on identification of the worst-case scenario, whereas others were content to assess a 'less likely' (but deteriorating) scenario that has a reasonable chance of occurring in contrast to the most likely scenario used for normal projection analysis.

Development of different scenarios for Risk of Famine

Given the complications with the Tigray analysis, including the lack of clear data on the situation, the FRC developed four different scenarios for the projection period and assessed the likelihood of risk of famine in each scenario (see table in annex 4). The respondents were asked if developing multiple scenarios in this way would be useful in RoF analysis more broadly.

The responses were mixed. Many respondents felt that these types of scenarios would be useful. Some highlighted how in the case of Tigray, multiple scenarios helped to concretely underline the seriousness of the situation more effectively than a somewhat abstract risk of famine statement would have on its own. Others thought that the development of such scenarios would be exceedingly complicated, and that communication of analysis findings would be more difficult. Some also doubted the capacity of analysts to come up with different, elaborate scenarios. Some respondents also felt that in general, the actual future situation, even if it worsens from the most likely scenario, is not likely going to match exactly any of the specific scenarios but will contain elements from several. Several respondents concluded that while the development of different scenarios may be a useful analysis tool, they should not all be publicly communicated as analysis findings. Analysts would need to choose which single scenario to communicate as their main message.

Acceptance and use of pilot findings

Agreement with analysis conclusions

When asked if respondents agreed with the findings of the pilots, including RoF statements made for certain areas, responses could be divided in three groups. Most respondents who had taken part in the analyses answered 'yes' – especially when assessing the accuracy of the analysis they took part in. If the respondent was a high-level decision-maker, the answer was also typically 'yes'.

Most decision-makers explained that although they were not part of any analysis and were not familiar with the data used or the analysis details, they trusted the analysis process and the IPC standards. Many of these respondents also specifically mentioned trusting the FRC and the quality of FRC analysis. The remaining decision-makers and analysts, who either had not taken part in any analyses, had taken part partially, or who had little information on the analysis processes and findings expressed some level of doubt regarding the analysis conclusions. Several of these respondents concluded, however, that given the nature of the analysis and the 'worst-case scenario' used, the findings were justified.

Perception of acceptance of conclusions by decision-makers

Analysts were asked to estimate how analysis findings had been received by decision-makers. Several analysts at the global or regional level did not know how findings were received. Others had more information on this, and again the responses were divided by country of analysis:

South Sudan

The Pibor County analysis was a special case as RoF analysis findings for two payams in Pibor County were connected to a Famine Likely classification for western Pibor County. The breakdown in consensus combined with the release of FRC findings, especially on Famine Likely, triggered an independent review of IPC in South Sudan. Respondents outside the TWG had some difficulty in assessing how the RoF results were received due to the complications related to the process and the mixed opinions on the severity of the situation within the TWG. The TWG members, however, felt that many partners, including donors, NGOs, and some United Nations (UN) agencies took the findings at face value and acted on them.

Ethiopia

Again, many respondents confessed to not knowing how the results were received, but those who had opinions on the topic felt that the reception was two-fold. Some respondents said that members of the international community overall felt that the findings were accurate, even if the Government of Ethiopia rejected them outright, and thought that the IPC findings confirmed the suspicions of many agencies or were even an understatement. Some mentioned that the IPC showed determination and did the right thing by releasing the RoF findings, independently of the political consequences on the IPC in Ethiopia.

Actors aligned with the Government of Ethiopia, however, did not receive the findings well and have questioned them.

Madagascar

Those who were aware of the response to the IPC findings stated that the reception was positive. Several meetings were arranged at the country level after the pilot to discuss the situation and all actors in the humanitarian field, including donors, government agencies, UN agencies, and even non-donor foreign embassies, have been included in the discussions.

Several respondents stated that the IPC RoF statement alerted them to the seriousness of the situation. Many decision-makers said that Madagascar had not been 'on their radar' and that the RoF statement raised the profile of Madagascar so that they and other actors started paying more attention to the situation.

Use of analysis findings

Decision-makers were asked specifically if they used the pilot findings, such as to raise awareness or funding, or for programming.

Most decision-makers had used the findings. Most commonly, findings were used in internal and external communication. Respondents reported, for example, reflecting the analysis results in an internal list of priority countries and using them in internal discussions and communications with colleagues and superiors. The RoF statements also helped some agencies in forming a joint internal position on the seriousness of the situation in a certain country. Some partners also explained that in politically challenging situations they feel comfortable using and referring to IPC findings, including RoF, whereas they would be reluctant to release their own statements. Many, however, underlined that the IPC findings were not used alone but in combination with other sources.

Several decision-makers had used the findings also in external communication. The pilot results informed press releases and statements, reports, discussions with other humanitarian agencies, and apparently some pilot results made their way to the UN Food Systems Summit in September and the UN Security Council.

Humanitarian partners also used the findings for fundraising for their programmes in the three pilot countries. Based on the responses of the resource partners and the humanitarian agencies working in the three contexts, it also appears that the results did contribute to increased funding for programmes in the assessed areas.

Pilots also reportedly contributed to increased assistance to affected areas. Programming increased in South Sudan, even if not all partners were convinced of the accuracy of the FRC findings. Programming also increased in Madagascar. Many partners were also willing to increase programming in Tigray but faced the *de facto* access constraints for movement of personnel and deliveries of assistance to Tigray Region.

Suggestions for the future

Analysts were asked if they'd be willing to take part in a similar exercise in the future if the situation so warrants. All responded yes, and some respondents elaborated that they considered the pilots useful and felt that IPC should keep doing this type of analysis in the future. In the words of one respondent, 'Risk of Famine is the best thing that has come out of IPC famine analysis'. Overall, several respondents felt that the RoF analysis has a crucial early warning function and that by applying it consistently when needed there may be a chance to avoid Phase 5 classifications that represent a failure and come too late to prevent widespread deaths and human suffering.

Decision-makers were asked if IPC should carry on developing protocols for RoF analysis, and spending resources (human and financial) on these analyses. A common response to this question was 'absolutely'. All decision-makers felt that IPC should continue focusing on this initiative, and that RoF brings a lot of value-added to the IPC.

Key recommendations

The main recommendations provided by the respondents are grouped below by topic.

Risk of Famine analysis process

- RoF should be made a standard part of IPC protocols, with clear criteria for when to conduct RoF analysis.
- RoF analysis is optimally conducted in conjunction with routine IPC analysis when possible, and IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition analyses in general.
- Strong involvement of country experts, and experts of specific fields not necessarily present in a standard TWG (e.g. WASH, conflict, health) relevant to the area in question, is needed in any RoF analysis.
- The structure of the analysis process must be improved, including prescriptive analysis process for development of assumptions and at least one overall scenario and reviewing available data on contributing factors and outcomes.
- Guidance and real-life examples are needed on the development of assumptions and the selection of the scenario for RoF analysis.
- Sufficient time must be provided for analysis. Depending on the number of areas, 1-2 days may suffice, but a longer time may also be needed.
- Following any RoF analysis, a strong monitoring and verification system must be established to help in assessing if the assumptions used for the RoF scenario are becoming a reality. If possible, food security and nutrition assessments should also be conducted.

Risk of Famine analysis tools

- The table on assumptions is useful and should be used also in the future.
- More structured tools are needed for recording the analysis and conclusions. These tools can be embedded in relevant parts of the ISS.
- Development of different scenarios, such as in the FRC analysis for Tigray, may be useful if prepared by knowledgeable analysts. However, to avoid confusing decision-makers, it may be best to select one scenario for communication and include all assessed scenarios in the annex of the analysis brief for those who are interested in the details or engaged in subsequent monitoring and verification efforts.

Communication

- A few respondents felt that the IPC famine terminology should be revised in order to improve clarity of communication. The majority of respondents, however, did not think that changing the names, like changing Famine Likely to something else, would solve the problem. Instead, they advocated for more and improved communication of IPC famine analysis findings, regardless of the type of famine classification or statement.

- A much better and clearer communication guidance on IPC Phase 5 classifications independently and vis-à-vis IPC Risk of Famine is needed from GSU. This should include examples of statements related to different types of findings to be provided to different audiences. The current famine communication guidance must also be updated to include RoF so that differences between Famine, Famine Likely, Catastrophe, and Risk of Famine are clear. Provision of training and training materials to advocacy and communication staff of IPC partner agencies and resource partners, and other media personnel would also be very useful and needed.
- All respondents felt that there is a lot to improve in communication of IPC analysis findings, especially when it comes to Famine classifications and statements. They thought that the differences between some form of IPC Phase 5 and RoF are not clear, including the option of having populations in Catastrophe, and that most decision-makers and people not intimately familiar with IPC are not aware of these differences. There is also a need to review the communication of other (severe) Phases, especially of Phase 4, to emphasize that it is an extremely severe situation.
- More clarity regarding IPC communication and the communications of different humanitarian agencies when it comes to severe food insecurity and some view of a risk of famine is sorely needed. No standards currently exist, and any standards are likely to be difficult to achieve, but at the very least a discussion on the challenges and possibilities should be had.

Roles and responsibilities

- The responsibility for conducting the RoF analysis falls primarily on the TWG of the country in question. Most of the respondents recommended giving the TWG the lead role in RoF analysis when possible and to consider alternative options only when absolutely necessary. All avenues should be exhausted in challenging situations, such as using willing TWG partners and extra-IPC pressure, like Humanitarian Country Teams and donors, to convince others of the utility of the analysis and collecting data to prove the seriousness of the situation. Even if the TWG is not conducting the analysis, different members should play a key role in it, such as by sharing information and by participating in the analyses to the extent possible, even anonymously if needed. Making RoF analysis a standard procedure in certain situations is also likely to decrease the number of occasions when the TWG is unwilling to conduct it.
- If it is not possible for a whole TWG to conduct the RoF analysis, it may be possible for a part of a TWG to release a minority report on RoF with GSU support – or even use the IPC-compatible option, provided that agencies proceeding with the analysis are willing to face the potential consequences from other agencies and institutions opposing the analysis.
- If there is no option for conducting RoF analysis within a country for political reasons, an external analysis group should be formed, typically led by GSU and involving different thematic and area experts and country-level analysts as possible.
- GSU plays a key role in the provision of technical guidance and in guaranteeing the quality of IPC analysis and should continue to do so within RoF analysis. The recommended role for the FRC is to review RoF analyses, especially ones with contentious results. The FRC is not and should not become the first-choice option for conducting RoF analysis directly.
- External experts need to be sought for important thematic topics on which expertise is not available in the TWG or the team conducting RoF analysis.

Annexes

Annex 1: List of people interviewed

No.	Name	Agency
1	Daniel Maxwell	Tufts University, IPC FRC
2	Oleg Bilukha	Centers for Disease Control, IPC FRC
3	Nicholas Haan	Singularity University, IPC GSU & FRC
4	Peter Hailey	Centre for Humanitarian Change, IPC FRC
5	Andrew Seal	University College London, IPC FRC
6	Jose Lopez	IPC GSU
7	Moctar Moussa	IPC GSU
8	Belihu Negesse	IPC GSU
9	Rashid Mohamed	IPC GSU
10	Barbara Frattaruolo	IPC GSU
11	Nicholas Kerandi	FAO
12	Ismail Kassim	UNICEF
13	Kiross Tefera Abebe	UNICEF
14	James Bwirani	FAO
15	Bezaka Rivolala	Plan d'Action pour le Développement
16	Nianja Raonivelo	Bureau National de Gestion des Risques et des Catastrophes
17	Anne-Claire Thomas	JRC
18	Brian Svesve	FEWS NET
19	Saeed Rahman	REACH
20	Dunja Dujanovic	FAO
21	Tim Hoffine	FEWS NET
22	Peter Thomas	FEWS NET
23	Emily Farr	OXFAM
24	Binta Cesse	Save the Children
25	Justus Liku	CARE
26	Shannon Wilson	USAID
27	Samuel Carpenter	FCDO
28	Giampiero Muci	DEVCO
29	Jose Ruiz Espi	ECHO
30	Calogero di Gloria	ECHO
30	Judith Munayo	ECHO
31	Hailu Wondim	ACF
32	Cyril Lekiefs	ACF
33	Luca Russo	FAO
34	Eric Brancaert	WFP
35	Anna Ziolkovska	GNC
36	Cristina Majorano	gFSC

Annex 2: Key informant questionnaire for analysts

Key informant questionnaire for pilot participants

Name: _____
 Organisation: _____
 RoF pilot participated in/ RoF piloted followed: _____
 Level of representation (global/regional/country): _____
 Sectoral expertise: _____
 Date: _____

No.	Question
General Question	
1	In this interview I want to ask you a few questions about your opinion on issues related to the IPC Risk of Famine initiative. But before we go into the detailed questions, I would like to give you exactly 3 minutes to state your general feelings about the Risk of Famine initiative and your key considerations.
A) Knowledge of RoF protocols	
2	How would you describe your knowledge of the IPC Risk of Famine initiative? Do you think you had sufficient information on it before the pilot?
3	Are you familiar with the Risk of Famine guidance note? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If you are familiar with the guidance note, what do you think about it? Any strengths and weaknesses that you have noted?
4.	How do you understand the difference between Risk of Famine, Famine likely and Famine? Do you think the differences are clearly understood?
B) RoF process	
5	What is your opinion of the RoF analysis you took part in? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In terms of organisation? In terms of efficiency of the process? In terms of stakeholders?
6	In an optimal context, who in your opinion should conduct the RoF analysis and how should it be done? What should be the role of TWG, GSU, FRC and of partners?
7	Now, can you please think of a context where there is a concern of a potential Famine happening in the next months but, for political reasons, the TWG is unwilling or dysfunctional and will not conduct the RoF analysis. What, in your opinion, should the process be in this case? What should be the role of the TWG, GSU, FRC and partners?
8	Now, can you please think of yet another context, where there is concern of a Famine happening in the next months and the TWG is functioning and willing to do RoF analysis. However, due to issues related e.g. to logistics, data collection, delayed process, or funding they cannot conduct the analysis for the next 3 months. What, in your opinion, should the process be in this case? Which takes priority, need for quick information or need to follow a TWG-led process?
C) RoF tools and procedures	
9	Currently there is a table to guide the RoF analysis (identifying the scenario for RoF as compared to the most likely scenario in an Excel or Word tool). What do you think about the tool? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think the tool is useful for the analysis? What would you change? Is there a need for a more structured tool with more steps? Should this be embedded in the ISS?
10	Currently there are no special evidence requirements for RoF analysis, only analysis requirements. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think that the current criteria work, or would you rather also have evidence requirements e.g. in terms of type of evidence, or severity of indicators? Was data available sufficient for the RoF analysis? If not, what was missing?
11	In RoF analysis, assumptions for the worst-case scenario that has a reasonable chance of happening are developed. How was this done and were the assumptions useful for the RoF analysis? How do you feel the process went?
12	For interviewees familiar with Tigray RoF analysis: The FRC developed four different scenarios to better assess the RoF in Tigray. What do you think of this idea? Do you think the TWG should prepare different scenarios in RoF analyses?
D) Conclusions and recommendations	
13	Do you agree with the findings of the pilots? If needed to be reminded: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> South Sudan: RoF for Eastern Pibor Tigray: Risk of Famine for Northwestern, Central and Eastern Tigray Madagascar: RoF for Ambovombe
14	How do you think the pilot results were received by decision-makers?
15	Did you find the pilot useful?
16	Would you be willing to do a similar analysis in the future if the situation so warrants?
17	What suggestions do you have for improvement of the RoF process and guidance?

Annex 3: Key informant questionnaire for decision-makers

Key informant questionnaire for resource partners and other decision-makers

Name: _____
 Organisation: _____
 RoF pilot participated in/ RoF piloted followed: _____
 Level of representation (global/regional/country): _____
 Sectoral expertise: _____
 Date: _____

No.	Question
General Question	
1	In this interview I want to ask you a few questions about your opinion on issues related to the IPC Risk of Famine initiative. But before we go into the detailed questions, I would like to give you 3 minutes to state your general feelings about the Risk of Famine initiative and your key considerations.
A) Knowledge of RoF protocols	
2	How would you describe your knowledge of the IPC Risk of Famine initiative? Do you think you had sufficient information on it before you received the results?
3	What do you understand when IPC findings say that there is a Risk of Famine in some area?
4	How do you understand the difference between Risk of Famine, Famine Likely and Famine? Do you think they are clearly communicated? What would you suggest to improve?
5	Do you think it is important to have an analysis of the Risk of Famine further to Projection of Famine/Famine Likely?
B) RoF process	
6	What is your opinion of the RoF process you followed? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In terms of how it was organised? • In terms of clarity of communication? • In terms of stakeholders who conducted the analysis?
7	In an optimal context, who in your opinion should conduct the RoF analysis and how should it be done? What should be the role of TWG, GSU, FRC and of partners?
8	Now, can you please think of a context where there is a concern of a potential Famine happening in the next months but, for political reasons, the TWG is unwilling or dysfunctional and will not conduct the RoF analysis. What, in your opinion, should the process be in this case? What should be the role of the TWG, GSU, FRC and partners?
9	Now, can you please think of yet another context, where there is concern of a Famine happening in the next months and the TWG is functioning and willing to do RoF analysis. However, due to issues related e.g. to logistics, data collection, delayed process, or funding they cannot conduct the analysis for the next 3 months. What, in your opinion, should the process be in this case? Which takes priority, need for quick information or need to follow a TWG-led process?
C) RoF tools and procedures	
10	If you are familiar with Tigray FRC report, where they developed four different scenarios to assess the Risk of Famine, what do you think about it? What do you think of the idea of presenting scenarios for the projection and stating for which of them there might be a risk of Famine? <p>Follow up:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you think we should present different scenarios?
D) Conclusions and recommendations	
11	What do you think about the pilot results? Do they make sense? Do you trust them?
12	Did you use them?
13	Do you think we should carry on developing protocols and spending resources on these analyses?
14	Do you have any other suggestions for improvement of the RoF initiative?

Annex 4: FRC scenarios for assessing risk of famine in Tigray

Table 2: Possible scenarios

	Scenario	Time frame	Likelihood of scenario	Risk of Famine
1	Intensity of conflict: Wide scale conflict ceases or is very localised in Western and Southern zones, Northern strip bordering Eritrea and/or in Southern Tigray zones bordering Amhara; Humanitarian supply lines, access and level of operations: Unfettered humanitarian access and uninterrupted influx of sufficient humanitarian supplies; Private sector and informal supply lines and availability of commercial goods and services: Full restoration of communication services and infrastructure, electricity functioning or fuel available for it, reopening of banks and cash available, resumption of commercial supply chains and functioning of basic services.	Near term (July-Sept)	Low	Very low
		Medium term (Oct-Dec)	Low	Very low
2	Intensity of conflict: Continuation of conflict or some escalation of the conflict in the Western zone, Southern zone and/or along the Northern border; Humanitarian supply lines, access and level of operations: Moderate humanitarian access within and into Tigray and reduced or intermittent influx of humanitarian supplies; Private sector and informal supply lines and availability of commercial goods and services: Irregular and intermittent communication services and electricity with limited fuel available, irregular bank service or low availability of cash, irregular commercial supply chains, and irregular functioning of basic services.	Near term (July-Sept)	High	Low
		Medium term (Oct-Dec)	High	Medium
3	Intensity of conflict: Cessation of ceasefire and resumption of widespread conflict in all or most of the Tigray region; Humanitarian supply lines, access and level of operations: Low humanitarian access within and into Tigray and sporadic and insufficient influx of humanitarian supplies; Private sector and informal supply lines and availability of commercial goods and services: Partial and sporadic communication services and intermittent electricity with insufficient fuel available; sporadic bank service or poor availability of cash; sporadic functioning of commercial supply chains and of basic services.	Near term (July-Sept)	High	Low to medium
		Medium term (Oct-Dec)	High	High
4	Intensity of conflict: Conflict escalation, spreading outside Tigray region; Humanitarian supply lines, access and level of operations: No access within and into Tigray and no influx of humanitarian supplies; Private sector and informal supply lines and availability of commercial goods and services: Extremely limited communication services, banks closed, no cash available, no commercial supply chain, no basic services.	Near term (July-Sept)	Medium	Medium to high
		Medium term (Oct-Dec)	Medium	High

Source: Famine Review of the IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis July 2021

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