LEBANON

AROUND 1.05 MILLION PEOPLE FACE HIGH LEVELS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY FOLLOWING TWO SUCCESSIVE CONFLICTS AND A FRAGILE RECOVERY

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS
SEPTEMBER 2026 - JULY 2027
Published on 5 November 2026

CURRENT PERIOD: SEPTEMBER 2026 – FEBRUARY 2027
(Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria)

1.05M
21 percent of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	52,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	997,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	2,151,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	1,831,000 People in Food Security

PROJECTED PERIOD: MARCH - JULY 2027
(Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria)

1.15M
24 percent of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	97,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	1,050,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	1,959,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	1,700,000 People in Food Security


Overview

Despite slight improvements from the previous IPC analysis, acute food insecurity in Lebanon remains widespread across all population groups and is particularly severe among refugees and recently displaced Lebanese populations. Household-level evidence continues to show severe pressures on livelihoods, purchasing power and coping capacity, while livelihoods, purchasing power and household resilience remain severely constrained. The improvement compared to the previous analysis also reflects a reduction in the overall population of Syrian refugees. Between September 2026 and February 2027, approximately 1.05 million people, representing 21 percent of the analysed population, are experiencing IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse), including 52,000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and approximately 997,000 people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis).


The situation is driven by the cumulative impacts of two consecutive conflicts in less than two years, compounded by a fragile economic environment and rising living costs. While the October 2025 IPC analysis reflected the impact of the 2023–2024 conflict and subsequent ceasefire, the current analysis assesses food security outcomes following a second major conflict escalation that began in March 2026. Although the intensity of the conflict has decreased since the June 2026 ceasefire agreement, the security situation remains fragile, with hostilities continuing in southern Lebanon despite ongoing diplomatic efforts to secure a more durable ceasefire. This prolonged insecurity has further undermined households' capacity to recover from previous losses, displacement, livelihood disruptions, and asset depletion.

Food insecurity in Lebanon is increasingly shaped by deteriorating livelihoods and constrained economic access to food. Although markets remain functional and food is generally available across most areas of the country, households face significant constraints in accessing it due to weak income opportunities and reduced purchasing

Current Acute Food Insecurity: September 2026 - February 2027



Projected Acute Food Insecurity: March - July 2027



power. The combined effects of conflict-related livelihood losses, slow reconstruction, elevated food and fuel prices, and rising transportation and energy costs continue to erode households' economic access to food. As food prices remain elevated and incomes fail to recover at the same pace as living costs, many households continue to rely on debt, consumption-based and livelihood coping strategies, and humanitarian food security assistance (HFSA) to meet their basic food needs. The cumulative impact of these drivers has reduced households' ability to absorb further shocks, particularly among vulnerable Lebanese households, refugees, agricultural communities, displaced populations, and residents of conflict-affected areas.

Acute food insecurity is projected to worsen between March and July 2027, with approximately 1.15 million people (24 percent of the analysed population) expected to face Phase 3 or above, including 97,000 people likely to be in Phase 4. The projected deterioration is driven by declining humanitarian assistance, continued livelihood constraints, delayed reconstruction, persistent insecurity in conflict-affected areas, elevated food and fuel prices, and sustained pressure on household purchasing power.

In addition, excessive rainfall and sudden deluges during the late-fall-to-spring period could disrupt seasonal wheat sowing, damage crops, and further degrade already fragile topsoil. These findings suggest that without continued humanitarian support, livelihood protection and recovery, agricultural rehabilitation, and broader economic recovery, the cumulative effects of two successive conflicts will continue to undermine food security outcomes across Lebanon. In the projection period, only 30 percent of the Lebanese in Phase 3 or above are planned to be supported, as well as only 55 percent of the Syrian refugees recently displaced after December 2024.



Continued hostilities, repeated displacement and delayed reconstruction: Ongoing insecurity, repeated displacement and conflict-related damage continue to disrupt livelihoods and constrain returns, particularly in southern Lebanon. Limited reconstruction and slow recovery from successive conflicts have further weakened household resilience and capacity to restore livelihoods and productive assets.



Economic pressures and reduced purchasing power: Elevated food, fuel and living costs, combined with limited income growth, weak labour market recovery and high levels of indebtedness, continue to erode household purchasing power. Annual inflation reached approximately 17 percent in August 2026, with prices increasing by 1.4 percent month-on-month. As a result, vulnerable Lebanese households, refugees and conflict-affected populations face growing constraints in accessing food and meeting other essential needs.



Weak livelihood recovery and erosion of household resilience: Conflict-related livelihood losses, slow reconstruction and weak economic activity continue to constrain income opportunities and livelihood recovery. Depleted savings and productive assets, combined with continued reliance on debt and coping strategies, have weakened household resilience and increased vulnerability to food insecurity.



Agricultural disruptions and reduced rural livelihood opportunities: Conflict-related damage to agricultural land, infrastructure and productive assets, combined with rising input costs and access constraints, continues to limit agricultural production and rural livelihoods. While national food availability remains broadly stable, affected agricultural households face reduced incomes and recovery opportunities.



Humanitarian assistance gaps and protracted refugee vulnerability: Refugees, post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria, conflict-affected populations and vulnerable Lebanese households remain highly dependent on humanitarian assistance amid limited livelihood opportunities and constrained access to social protection, leaving these populations particularly vulnerable to economic and food security shocks.

CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (SEPTEMBER 2026 – FEBRUARY 2027)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS
CURRENT AFI: September 2026 - February 2027

686,000
18% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	11,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	676,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	1,549,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	1,629,000 People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES
CURRENT AFI: September 2026 - February 2027

230,000
28% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	18,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	212,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	446,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	144,000 People in Food Security

PALESTINE REFUGEES
CURRENT AFI: September 2026 - February 2027

82,000
35% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	12,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	70,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	105,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	47,000 People in Food Security


POST-DECEMBER 2024 ARRIVALS FROM SYRIA
CURRENT AFI: September 2026 - February 2027

51,000
45% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	11,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	40,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	51,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	11,000 People in Food Security



POPULATION TABLE FOR THE CURRENT PERIOD (SEPTEMBER 2026 – FEBRUARY 2027)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Akkar	Lebanese	270,910	67,728	25	135,455	50	67,728	25	0	0	0	0	3	67,728	25
	Syrian ref.	118,195	11,820	10	65,007	55	35,459	30	5,910	5	0	0	3	41,368	35
	Total	**389,105**	**79,548**	**20**	**200,462**	**52**	**103,187**	**27**	**5,910**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**109,096**	**28**
Aley	Lebanese	188,556	84,850	45	75,422	40	28,283	15	0	0	0	0	2	28,283	15
	Syrian ref.	49,006	14,702	30	26,953	55	7,351	15	0	0	0	0	2	7,351	15
	Total	**237,562**	**99,552**	**42**	**102,375**	**43**	**35,634**	**15**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**35,634**	**15**
Baabda	Lebanese	365,773	128,021	35	164,598	45	73,155	20	0	0	0	0	3	73,155	20
	Syrian ref.	70,200	21,060	30	35,100	50	14,040	20	0	0	0	0	3	14,040	20
	Total	**435,973**	**149,081**	**34**	**199,698**	**46**	**87,195**	**20**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**87,195**	**20**
Baalbek & El Hermel	Baalbek & El Hermel Lebanese	201,020	60,306	30	90,459	45	50,255	25	0	0	0	0	3	50,255	25
	Baalbek Syrian ref.	126,156	12,616	10	75,694	60	31,539	25	6,308	5	0	0	3	37,847	30
	El Hermel Syrian ref.	21,184	3,178	15	10,592	50	6,355	30	1,059	5	0	0	3	7,414	35
	Total	**348,360**	**76,099**	**22**	**176,745**	**51**	**88,149**	**25**	**7,367**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**95,516**	27
Bcharre & Zgharta	Bcharre & Zgharta Lebanese	84,267	42,134	50	33,707	40	8,427	10	0	0	0	0	2	8,427	10
	Bcharre Syrian ref.	793	198	25	476	60	119	15	0	0	0	0	2	119	15
	Zgharta Syrian ref.	13,736	3,434	25	6,868	50	3,434	25	0	0	0	0	3	3,434	25
	Total	**98,796**	**45,766**	**46**	**41,051**	**42**	**11,980**	**12**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**11,980**	**12**
Beirut	Lebanese	167,656	83,828	50	67,062	40	16,766	10	0	0	0	0	2	16,766	10
	Syrian ref.	23,331	6,999	30	11,666	50	4,666	20	0	0	0	0	3	4,666	20
	Total	**190,987**	**90,827**	**48**	**78,728**	**41**	**21,432**	**11**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**21,432**	**11**
Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Hasbaya, Rachaya & Sour	Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Lebanese	55,174	11,035	20	27,587	50	13,794	25	2,759	5	0	0	3	16,553	30
	El Nabatieh Lebanese	161,759	32,352	20	80,880	50	40,440	25	8,088	5	0	0	3	48,528	30
	Hasbaya & Rachaya Lebanese	64,837	29,177	45	22,693	35	12,967	20	0	0	0	0	3	12,967	20
	Sour Lebanese	293,816	73,454	25	146,908	50	73,454	25	0	0	0	0	3	73,454	25
	Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Hasbaya, & Sour Syrian Ref.	29,609	4,441	15	16,285	55	7,402	25	1,480	5	0	0	3	8,882	30
	Rachaya Syrian Ref.	4,430	886	20	2,658	60	886	20	0	0	0	0	3	886	20
	Total	**609,625**	**151,345**	**25**	**297,011**	**49**	**148,943**	**24**	**12,327**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**161,270**	**26**

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Chouf & Jezzine	Chouf & Jezzine Lebanese	208,571	104,286	50	73,000	35	31,286	15	0	0	0	0	2	31,286	15
	Chouf Syrian ref.	37,116	7,423	20	24,125	65	5,567	15	0	0	0	0	2	5,567	15
	Jezzine Syrian ref.	2,447	367	15	1,591	65	489	20	0	0	0	0	3	489	20
	Total	**248,134**	**112,076**	**45**	**98,716**	**40**	**37,343**	**15**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**37,343**	**15**
El Batroun & El Koura	El Batroun & El Koura Lebanese	110,959	72,123	65	33,288	30	5,548	5	0	0	0	0	2	5,548	5
	El Batroun Syrian ref.	8,063	2,016	25	4,838	60	1,209	15	0	0	0	0	2	1,209	15
	El Koura Syrian ref.	13,475	2,695	20	7,411	55	3,369	25	0	0	0	0	3	3,369	25
	Total	**132,497**	**76,834**	**58**	**45,537**	**34**	**10,126**	**8**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**10,126**	**8**
El Meten	Lebanese	364,067	218,440	60	109,220	30	36,407	10	0	0	0	0	2	36,407	10
	Syrian ref.	30,731	9,219	30	15,366	50	6,146	20	0	0	0	0	3	6,146	20
	Total	**394,798**	**227,659**	**58**	**124,586**	**32**	**42,553**	**11**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**42,553**	**11**
El Minieh-Dennie	Lebanese	112,501	45,000	40	45,000	40	22,500	20	0	0	0	0	3	22,500	20
	Syrian ref.	40,831	8,166	20	18,374	45	12,249	30	2,042	5	0	0	3	14,291	35
	Total	**153,332**	**53,166**	**35**	**63,374**	**41**	**34,749**	**23**	**2,042**	**1**	**0**	**0**		**36,791**	**24**
Jbeil & Kesrwane	Lebanese	301,918	196,247	65	75,480	25	30,192	10	0	0	0	0	2	30,192	10
	Syrian ref.	17,174	5,152	30	7,728	45	4,294	25	0	0	0	0	3	4,294	25
	Total	**319,092**	**201,399**	**63**	**83,208**	**26**	**34,486**	**11**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**34,486**	**11**
Saida	Lebanese	549,737	219,895	40	219,895	40	109,947	20	0	0	0	0	3	109,947	20
	Syrian ref.	32,399	4,860	15	17,819	55	8,100	25	1,620	5	0	0	3	9,720	30
	Total	**582,136**	**224,755**	**39**	**237,714**	**41**	**118,047**	**20**	**1,620**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**119,667**	**21**
Tripoli	Lebanese	175,404	78,932	45	70,162	40	26,311	15	0	0	0	0	2	26,311	15
	Syrian ref.	39,780	7,956	20	19,890	50	11,934	30	0	0	0	0	3	11,934	30
	Total	**215,184**	**86,888**	**40**	**90,052**	**42**	**38,245**	**18**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**38,245**	**18**
West Bekaa	Lebanese	62,467	24,987	40	28,110	45	9,370	15	0	0	0	0	2	9,370	15
	Syrian ref.	43,924	6,589	15	24,158	55	13,177	30	0	0	0	0	3	13,177	30
	Total	**106,391**	**31,576**	**30**	**52,268**	**49**	**22,547**	**21**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**22,547**	**21**
Zahle	Lebanese	124,904	56,207	45	49,962	40	18,736	15	0	0	0	0	2	18,736	15
	Syrian ref.	97,433	9,743	10	53,588	55	34,102	35	0	0	0	0	3	34,102	35
	Total	**222,337**	**65,950**	**30**	**103,550**	**47**	**52,838**	**24**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**52,838**	**24**
Total	**Lebanese**	**3,864,296**	**1,629,002**	**42**	**1,548,888**	**40**	**675,566**	**18**	**10,847**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**686,413**	**18**
	Syrian Ref.	**820,013**	**143,520**	**18**	**446,187**	**54**	**211,888**	**26**	**18,419**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**230,306**	**28**
	Post-December 2024 Arrivals	**113,000**	**11,300**	**10**	**50,850**	**45**	**39,550**	**35**	**11,300**	**10**	**0**	**0**		**50,850**	**45**
	Palestine Ref.	**234,276**	**46,855**	**20**	**105,424**	**45**	**70,283**	**30**	**11,714**	**5**	**0**	**0**		**81,997**	**35**
	Grand Total	**5,031,585**	**1,830,677**	**36**	**2,151,349**	**43**	**997,286**	**20**	**52,280**	**1**	**0**	**0**		**1,049,566**	**21**

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (SEPTEMBER 2026 - FEBRUARY 2027)

Acute food insecurity remains a significant concern in Lebanon, driven by the combined effects of prolonged economic pressures, limited livelihood opportunities, conflict-related disruptions, and continued dependence on humanitarian assistance among vulnerable population groups. Between September 2026 and February 2027, approximately 1.05 million people, representing 21 percent of the analysed population, are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above, Crisis or worse), including 52,000 people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and approximately 997,000 people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). A further 2.15 million people across the four population groups are classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed). While these households are able to maintain minimally adequate food consumption, they continue to face difficulties meeting essential non-food needs without resorting to stress coping strategies.

All population groups are affected by acute food insecurity; however, the prevalence and severity vary considerably. Approximately 686,000 Lebanese residents, representing 18 percent of the analysed Lebanese population, are classified in Phase 3 or above. Lebanese residents represent approximately 65 percent of all people classified in IPC Phase 3 or above, constituting the largest affected population group. However, the prevalence of acute food insecurity is substantially higher among refugees and recently arrived populations from Syria, reflecting continued dependence on humanitarian assistance, limited livelihood opportunities, and constrained access to economic resources.

Approximately 230,000 Syrian refugees (28 percent of the analysed Syrian refugee population), are classified in Phase 3 or above. Among Palestine refugees, around 82,000 people (35 percent of the analysed Palestine population), are facing Crisis or worse outcomes. Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria remain the most food-insecure population group, with approximately 51,000 people (45 percent of the analysed post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria population), classified in Phase 3 or above. Although many refugees have returned to Syria, those who remain in Lebanon continue to face high levels of vulnerability and dependence on humanitarian assistance. The high prevalence of acute food insecurity among refugees and recently arrived populations reflects persistent vulnerabilities, limited livelihood opportunities, and reduced capacity to cope with economic and conflict-related shocks.

Areas of analysis: The analysis applied population-specific units of analysis and district clustering where necessary to ensure adequate and reliable evidence for IPC classification. Lebanese residents were analysed across 19 units, Syrian refugees across 21 units, while Palestine refugees and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria were analysed at the national level. Additional information on the analytical approach, units of analysis and evidence sources is provided in the *Process and Methodology* section.

Lebanese residents: Of the 19 units of analysis assessed for Lebanese residents, nine are classified in Phase 3, while the remaining ten are classified in Phase 2. The highest prevalence of acute food insecurity is observed in El Nabatieh and the Bent Jbeil-Marjaayoun cluster, where approximately 30 percent of the analysed population is classified in Phase 3 or above. This is largely attributable to the cumulative impacts of conflict, livelihood disruptions, damage to productive assets and infrastructure, and limited economic recovery, which have constrained households' income and access to food. These are followed by Akkar, Sour, and the Baalbek-El Hermel cluster, where around 25 percent of Lebanese residents face Crisis or worse outcomes. The largest numbers of Lebanese residents experiencing acute food insecurity are recorded in Saida, with approximately 110,000 people classified in Phase 3 or above, followed by Sour (73,000 people), Baabda (73,000 people) and Akkar (68,000 people). These areas combine relatively large population concentrations with continued economic hardship, livelihood constraints and conflict-related impacts.

Syrian refugees: Food insecurity among Syrian refugees remains widespread, with 17 of the 21 units of analysis classified in Phase 3 and the remaining four classified in Phase 2. The highest prevalence of acute food insecurity is recorded in Akkar, El Hermel, El Minieh-Dennie, and Zahle where 35 percent of Syrian refugees are classified in Phase 3 or above. This is followed by Baalbek, Saida, Tripoli, West Bekaa and the combined Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Hasbaya and Sour cluster, with 30 percent of the Syrian refugee population in Phase 3 or above. The largest absolute caseloads of Syrian refugees classified in Phase 3 or above are recorded in Akkar (41,000), Baalbek (38,000) and Zahle (34,000). These areas continue to face challenges related to income generation, access to services and dependence on humanitarian assistance.

Palestine refugees: At the national level, approximately 82,000 Palestine refugees, representing 35 percent of the analysed population, are classified in Phase 3 or above. This includes approximately 70,000 people in Phase 3 and 12,000 people in Phase 4. The high levels of acute food insecurity reflect continued economic vulnerability, limited livelihood opportunities, and dependence on external support.

Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria: Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria remain the population group most affected by acute food insecurity. Approximately 51,000 people, representing 45 percent of the analysed population, are classified in Phase 3 or above, including 40,000 people in Phase 3 and 11,000 people in Phase 4. This reflects the group's limited livelihood opportunities, reduced resilience, and continued dependence on humanitarian assistance following displacement.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO FOOD INSECURITY

Hazard and vulnerabilities and acute events

Lebanon's structural economic vulnerability predates the recent conflict escalations. Weaknesses in the financial system and public finances, widespread informal employment, and gaps in social protection are long-standing constraints, deepened by the economic and financial crisis that began in 2019 (World Bank, 2024; IMF; ILO, 2026). These underlying weaknesses limit households' ability to withstand income losses and rising costs. The March 2026 escalation added a second major conflict shock before households had recovered from the 2023–2024 conflict and the economic crisis. Insecurity, displacement and widespread damage to homes and productive assets have further constrained livelihoods and access to essential services. National trade and retail indicators nevertheless show continued commercial supply in safer areas and an uneven recovery of market capacity.

The distinction is between the underlying conditions that leave households vulnerable and the additional pressures that worsen their food security. Interrupted earnings, rising costs of essential needs, asset depletion, accommodation expenses and restricted access in affected localities are contributing factors that deepen this vulnerability. They affect all population groups, though in different ways. These pressures compound long-standing economic weaknesses; they did not create them.

Conflict damage and restricted recovery: The renewed conflict has compounded damage to infrastructure, livelihoods and population well-being accumulated during the previous escalation. In a mid-September 2026 address to Parliament, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers stated that the combined economic cost of the 2023–2024 and 2026 conflicts had exceeded USD 20 billion and could surpass USD 27 billion once the full cost of the 2026 conflict is calculated. For the March 2026 escalation, it cited preliminary direct costs of USD 3–4 billion and at least USD 4–5 billion in additional economic losses.[1] Although these are government-reported preliminary estimates and are not a finalised assessment of recovery needs, the scale of cumulative losses hints at severely deteriorated housing, productive activity and household income before recovery from the earlier conflict was complete.[2]

The human toll of the re-escalation is significant. The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health reported 4,359 deaths and 12,349 injuries between 2 March 2026 and 6 September 2026. These numbers include health and emergency personnel, 135 of whom were killed and 416 injured, while 17 hospitals and 184 emergency vehicles were damaged. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education reported 64 educational facilities severely damaged and 37 destroyed as of September. In total, some 100,000 students reportedly could not return for the 2026–2027 school year because of damage, destruction, insecurity, or displacement. During the escalation, around 433 public education facilities were used as displacement shelters, while an estimated 12 percent of teachers and other education personnel were displaced. Although large-scale returns subsequently reduced the displaced population, more than 700,000 returnees were experiencing disrupted access to safe drinking water as of late July 2026 because of damaged water systems, while electricity outages remained a central constraint.


A UNDP-CNRS satellite assessment identified damage to 52,284 of 167,460 assessed buildings in southern Lebanon, including 24,068 destroyed buildings, using imagery from June 2026. The assessment excludes buildings already identified as damaged in the 2024 conflict. The concentration of physical destruction in southern localities provides evidence of substantial obstacles to return and the resumption of economic activity, even if conflict were to cease overnight.[3]

1. *Presidency of the Council of Ministers — Statement to Parliament, 15 September 2026*

2. *The World Bank's assessment of 8 October 2023–20 December 2024 estimated USD 6.8 billion in physical damage and USD 7.2 billion in economic losses, with recovery and reconstruction needs of USD 11 billion. World Bank 2025 Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment*

3. *UNDP Building Level Damage Assessment South Lebanon Issue 2*

Figure 1: Buildings affected by damage status (South Lebanon)



Source : Building Level Damage Assessment, UNDP/CNRS-L, June 2026

Insecurity remained an active constraint entering the third quarter of 2026. September witnessed renewed escalation, particularly around El Nabatieh El Tahta city (El Nabatieh district) and Al Mansouri (Tyre district). In localities affected by hostilities, military deployments and access restrictions south of the "IDF declared military zone",[4] households are unable to reach homes, farmland, employment or their usual markets. Housing damage and losses increase accommodation and repair costs, while damage to productive assets limits earnings. Where water, electricity or cooking facilities are disrupted, households also face difficulties storing and preparing food safely. These constraints compound the effects of lost income even where food continues to enter the country.

The future of the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon remains uncertain as its current mandate, extended by UN Security Council Resolution 2790, is due to expire on 31 December 2026. It is not yet clear whether the mandate will be renewed, modified, or allowed to lapse. Should UNIFIL's presence be significantly reduced or withdrawn, security risks for civilians could increase due to the loss of key monitoring, liaison, and deconfliction functions that currently help contain tensions and facilitate humanitarian movement. Deteriorating security conditions would likely further disrupt livelihood activities, restrict access to agricultural land and markets, limit humanitarian access, and discourage private investment and economic recovery. In turn, these factors could reduce household incomes, constrain food access, and increase the risk of food insecurity among vulnerable populations in southern Lebanon.

4. Refers to the Israeli military's unilaterally established forward defence line and associated area of military control inside southern Lebanon.

Displacement and incomplete return: Large-scale returns to areas of origin currently coexist with persistent displacement. IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) recorded 341,228 internally displaced people (IDPs) as of 15 September 2026. Approximately 86 percent of IDPs are currently concentrated in the districts of Beirut (98,000), Saida (61,000), Sour (47,000), Chouf (34,000), Aley (28,000) and El Nabatieh (23,000). Renting remains a financial burden for 78 percent of IDPs, while a further 10 percent are accommodated in collective sites (5 percent) or hosted by another family (5 percent).

The same IOM DTM round recorded 864,680 returnees, defined as people who had returned or begun returning to their places of origin.[5] Recorded returns, however, do not necessarily indicate that households have regained adequate housing, employment or access to services. Households repairing damaged homes may continue to incur accommodation costs elsewhere, while travel between hosting and origin locations can add expenses and interrupt work. Those unable to return remain exposed to ongoing accommodation costs and separation from their previous livelihoods. Together, these pressures reduce the resources available for food and other essentials and can sustain reliance on borrowing or humanitarian assistance.

The implications differ across population groups. For Lebanese households with damaged homes, farms or businesses, return costs can coincide with the loss of asset-based income. Syrian and Palestine refugees may face additional displacement within Lebanon while relying on insecure work and assistance. Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria face the separate challenge of re-establishing livelihoods and accommodation after cross-border movement.

Insecure legal status adds a critical protection risk for post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. UNHCR reports movement difficulties among new arrivals and detention and deportation risks linked to missing residency or documentation among Syrian refugees more broadly (UNHCR, 2025). Where these risks restrict access to work, markets or assistance, they can reduce earnings and food access, compounding displacement losses and increasing reliance on borrowing or eating less. These protection-related constraints add another layer of vulnerability to the broader economic pressures affecting Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria households in Lebanon, further limiting their capacity to secure livelihoods and meet essential food needs.

Social tensions: political divisions, service pressures and food access: Social tensions remain an important contextual risk to household access and livelihoods, but the picture is mixed. UNDP's Tensions Monitoring System (TMS) reports that 51 percent of Lebanese respondents assessed relations between Lebanese groups in their area positively and only 13 percent negatively. Despite generally positive perceptions, political and sectarian conflict is an increasingly prominent source of intra-Lebanese tensions, cited by 52 percent of respondents in April 2026, up from 34 percent in July 2025. Economic competition and cultural and religious differences were cited by 27 percent of respondents.

Relations between Lebanese and Syrians represent a separate potential pressure point, with 33 percent describing relations positively and 32 percent negatively in April 2026. The political situation at national and regional levels was cited by 41 percent as a source of Lebanese Syrian tensions, followed by competition for services and utilities (36 percent), competition for lower-skilled jobs (33 percent) and competition for basic goods and commodities (31 percent).

Despite some improvements since 2025, access to public services and utilities remains limited, with 74 percent of respondents reporting poor or no electricity service and 55 percent reporting poor or no access to water. These challenges compound household vulnerability, with 75 percent of respondents in April 2026 worried about having enough money to buy food, up from 57 percent in July 2025. Concerns also remain high regarding access to medical care (87 percent), cooking and heating fuel (79 percent), safe drinking water (70 percent) and education (64 percent), highlighting the cumulative pressures on household well-being and food security.

Overlapping shocks in conflict-affected communities: In southern Lebanon, conflict-related livelihood and asset losses, displacement, access constraints and disrupted services interact with high living costs and weak purchasing power, reducing households' capacity to recover. Field observations from August–September humanitarian convoys also point to localised market disruptions: severe supply constraints and limited retail availability were observed in Rmeich, while markets visited in Majdel Selm (Bent Jbeil district), Fardis (Hasbaya district) and Borj el Molok (Marjaayoun district) remained functional but under stress, with weak customer demand, incomplete replenishment and uncertainty over supplies.[6] These conditions reinforce the combined effects of reduced incomes, high prices and constrained physical access, contributing to high-severity food insecurity outcomes.

5. IOM DTM Lebanon Mobility Snapshot Round 117

6. WFP VAM Market Assessment in Conflict-Affected Areas – September 2026

Food availability

Uneven recovery of market functionality: WFP's August 2026 Market Functionality Index (MFI) showed a drastic difference between El Nabatieh governorate and the rest of the country. Nationally, the MFI increased from 5.4 in March 2026 to 6.9 in August 2026 (out of 10), although it remained below the level recorded in September 2025 (7.8). Availability and supply-chain resilience improved while price performance remained the weakest national dimension. South governorate and Baabda district both recovered to 7.3, whereas El Nabatieh improved only from 1.7 to 2.3.

The share of functional retailers rose from 31 to 79 percent in the south and from 49 to 85 percent in Baabda. In El Nabatieh, it increased from 16 to 47 percent, still far below 84 percent in September 2025. Among non-operational retailers, conflict was the reported driver for 92 percent in El Nabatieh, 71 percent in the South and 67 percent in Baabda.

Access and supply constraints eased but remained concentrated. Conflict-related market-access limitations fell from 87 to 47 percent in El Nabatieh and from 30 to 3 percent in the south. Food-delivery disruption remained at 29 and 11 percent, respectively. Retailers with critically low stocks, covering less than one week of local consumption if supply stopped, fell to 6 percent in El Nabatieh and 5 percent in the south. These findings point to improved replenishment rather than a uniform shortage, while leaving substantial localised constraints.

Governorate-level MFI recovery does not establish that every household can safely reach a shop or afford an adequate diet. Real-Time Monitoring (RTM) data for Lebanese households (mVAM – May 2026 to September 2026) show 28 percent of households reporting difficulty accessing markets. Among those reporting difficulty, lack of money was reported by 83 percent. This supports a prominent affordability constraint alongside the localised security and physical-access problems shown by the retail survey.

Domestic food supply: Despite agricultural losses in conflict-affected areas, national cereal production recovered in 2026. FAO's 25 August GIEWS brief estimated cereal output at about 160,000 tonnes, close to the five-year average, following improved rainfall and the completion of the harvest in late July. It forecast cereal import requirements of 1.3 million tonnes for the July 2026–June 2027 marketing year, around 4 percent above average. Imports therefore remain critical to national consumption needs.[7]

Commercial imports and improved market supply suggest that food remains generally available at the national level. Lebanese customs recorded 1.82 million tonnes of food imports between January–August 2026, 1.8 percent above the same period in 2025. Cereals reached approximately 928,000 tonnes, up 2.3 percent, and represented about 51 percent of imported food mass. Vegetable, fruit and nut imports rose 4.8 percent, while sugar, beverages and condiments declined 6.7 percent.

Agriculture livelihoods: Agricultural livelihoods in Lebanon remain severely constrained by the cumulative impacts of recurrent conflict, displacement and reduced access to fields and farms, prolonged economic instability and rising production costs. According to FAO's Data in Emergencies (DIEM) Monitoring Survey (December 2025), approximately 10,000 agricultural households required emergency agricultural assistance (AgHiN), while a further 54,000 households were classified as at-risk of livelihood deterioration. Nearly three-quarters of these vulnerable households were concentrated in Akkar, North Lebanon, Baalbek–El Hermel and Nabatieh. Declining agricultural productivity and profitability were already undermining livelihoods, with 80 percent of AgHiN households reporting reduced harvests compared with the previous year, alongside persistent constraints related to agricultural inputs, irrigation and market access.

Against this backdrop of already weakened agricultural livelihoods, the renewed conflict escalation in March 2026 further compounded existing vulnerabilities, particularly in South and Nabatieh, where widespread displacement, restricted access to agricultural land and damage to productive assets severely disrupted farming activities.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)– National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS)-L Rapid Needs Assessment (May 2026), approximately 56,264 hectares of agricultural land were affected, while nearly 78 percent of farmers in southern Lebanon were displaced. The CNRS-L Agricultural Damage and Loss Assessment (August 2026) estimated USD

7. *FAO GIEWS Country Brief Lebanon – August 2026*

89 million in cumulative direct damage to approximately 2,988 hectares of perennial crops requiring rehabilitation or replanting, predominantly olive and citrus orchards, alongside USD 66 million in field-crop production losses during May–August 2026, largely attributable to tobacco production. The assessment also documented damage and production losses affecting greenhouses, livestock, poultry and beekeeping, further undermining agricultural productive capacity and household incomes. These impacts compound the estimated USD 704 million in agricultural damages and losses previously documented by FAO for the October 2023–November 2024 conflict period.

Damage to water-related infrastructure represents an additional constraint on agricultural production and rural livelihoods in conflict-affected areas. Disruptions to irrigation networks, pumping facilities and energy infrastructure may reduce access to irrigation water and increase reliance on more costly alternatives. Together with high fuel, fertiliser and transportation costs, these constraints are likely to slow the rehabilitation of productive assets, reduce seasonal cultivation opportunities and further erode agricultural incomes. Consequently, already vulnerable and conflict-affected households face an increased risk of livelihood deterioration, with negative implications for food access and acute food insecurity during the projection period.

Food access and utilisation

Despite relative exchange-rate stability, Lebanon's economic recovery remains weak and uneven. Stabilisation of the currency has not translated into a comparable recovery in household purchasing power, as elevated living costs, constrained income opportunities and weak livelihood recovery continue to limit economic access to food.

The economic outlook deteriorated following the March escalation. In its August 2026 Lebanon Economic Monitor, the World Bank projected a 6.4 percent contraction in 2026, upsetting a pre-conflict forecast of 4.8 percent growth. Weaker tourism and private consumption, together with conflict-related disruption, constrain enterprise activity and the demand for labour.[8]

This deterioration came as global food prices showed renewed upward pressures. The FAO Food Price Index was recorded at 136 in September 2026, 5.8 percent above September 2025 and 8.4 percent above February 2026. The cereals index reached 122.8, up 17 percent year-on-year and 13 percent since February. Local consumer prices also remained high. The Central Administration of Statistics reported annual inflation of around 17 percent in August 2026 and a monthly increase of 1.4 percent.[9] WFP's August 2026 basket costs place the full Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) at USD 556 per household of five and the full Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) at USD 713. The full SMEB increased by 7 percent from February 2026 and 11 percent from August 2025, while the full MEB increased by 6 percent and 11 percent, respectively. Food SMEB costs reached USD 43.6 per person (up 6 percent since February 2026 and 11 percent since last year), while non-food SMEB costs reached USD 338 per household (up 8 percent since February and 10 percent since last year).

This contraction in income opportunities and persistent inflation is having a clear impact on food security. Rent, transport, energy, health care and repair costs compete with food within already constrained budgets. Low-income households may reduce diet quality, postpone other essential spending or borrow to maintain consumption. During the winter months within the current period, heating and generator costs are expected to add pressure, particularly for displaced households and those living in mountainous regions and damaged or poorly insulated accommodation.

Energy-price pressures: global and regional shocks, domestic costs: The 2026 conflict in the Middle East disrupted Gulf oil production and exports, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz, placing sustained upward pressure on global oil prices. The Brent oil price as a result rose from USD 70.9 per barrel in February to USD 117.3 in April, eased during June–July, then reached a September monthly average of USD 114.1, 25 percent above August. The IEA's September oil market outlook describes constrained Gulf exports through the Strait of Hormuz and particularly tight refined-product supplies.[10]

8. World Bank Lebanon Economic Monitor Summer 2026

9. Central Administration of Statistics Consumer Price Index


10. IEA — Oil Market Report, September 2026

Lebanon's reliance on imported petroleum has increased its exposure to global fuel price shocks. By September 2026, diesel and gasoline prices had risen by 94 percent and 68 percent, respectively, compared with February 2026. In contrast, cooking Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) prices remained 9.5 percent below February levels, despite a 4 percent monthly increase, reflecting lower international LPG prices and reduced Sonatrach selling prices during the summer.

For food security, higher diesel-related transport, pumping, refrigeration and generator costs can increase the cost of producing, distributing and preparing food, resulting in higher prices at retail level. Businesses may absorb part of the increase through lower margins or reduced hours; households may respond by cutting consumption or other expenditure.

Employment losses and reduced earnings: The May 2026 International Labour Organization (ILO) survey indicates a substantial employment and income shock following the conflict escalation. Among 2,485 surveyed private-sector workers employed before March, 33 percent were no longer working, rising to 76 percent in El Nabatieh and 43 percent in South governorate. Average labour income fell by an estimated 40 percent, alongside reductions in food expenditure across Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian respondents. Recent mVAM data similarly indicate weak labour-market conditions, with national employment at 45 percent and unemployment at 29 percent, reaching 43 percent in Saida, 39 percent in Sour and 38 percent in Bent Jbeil–Marjaayoun. Households reported only one income earner on average, while one-third relied on debt as a resource. Employment conditions among Syrian refugees also show important geographic disparities. While VASYR reports an 86 percent employment ratio among the Syrian refugee labour force, unemployment reached 26 percent in El Nabatieh and 19 percent in South. Refugee livelihoods remain concentrated in relatively insecure activities, including agriculture, home-based work, construction and crafts, alongside reliance on debt and humanitarian assistance. Together, employment losses, reduced earnings, irregular livelihoods and indebtedness constrain households' capacity to absorb additional economic and price shocks.

Figure 2: Main employment types among Lebanese residents and main income sources among Syrian refugees



Competing essential needs and water access: Damage to water supply networks, pumping stations and associated electricity infrastructure has disrupted access to regular water services in parts of conflict-affected Lebanon, particularly South and El Nabatieh. Where public supply is insufficient or intermittent, households may depend more heavily on purchased or trucked water, potentially increasing essential expenditure at a time of constrained earnings, displacement-related costs and already elevated living costs. For vulnerable households, these additional costs compete with food, health, energy, transport and accommodation expenditure, potentially reducing resources available for an adequate diet or increasing reliance on borrowing and other coping strategies. Limited access to safe water can also complicate food preparation and hygiene, particularly for displaced and returning households in locations where essential services have not been fully restored. The severity of these effects depends on actual water-service functionality, the affordability of alternatives and the availability of repairs and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) assistance.

Nutrition situation: Malnutrition remains a significant public health concern in Lebanon and is increasingly characterised by the coexistence of undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, and overweight and obesity. According to Q1–Q2 2026 programme data, 1,074 children aged 0–59 months were admitted to malnutrition treatment programmes, compared with 751 admissions during the corresponding period in 2025. Admissions were concentrated primarily in Akkar, followed by Baalbek, Tripoli and Zahle, with displaced Syrian children accounting for the majority of admissions. Admissions among pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) also increased during the reporting period.

While these trends warrant continued attention, treatment data should be interpreted cautiously, as they do not represent population-level prevalence and may also reflect improvements in service availability and case detection. The number of supported treatment centres increased from 39 to 43 between December 2025 and July 2026.

Beyond treatment admissions, accumulating evidence points to growing concerns regarding the quality of diets consumed by children and families. Infant and young child feeding (IYCF) surveillance conducted among 3,306 children under two years of age found that only approximately 15 percent met the Minimum Dietary Diversity (MDD) threshold, while 25 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed two or fewer meals per day. Financial constraints were frequently reported as barriers to appropriate feeding, with 21 percent of caregivers reporting insufficient financial resources and 10 percent reporting inadequate access to complementary foods.[11] These findings suggest that worsening economic conditions are affecting not only access to food, but also access to diverse and nutrient-rich diets.

Recent national assessments of retail and public-school food environments highlight how children's diets in Lebanon are shaped by affordability, availability, taste, and the widespread promotion of unhealthy foods. Unhealthy and ultra-processed products, including sugary drinks, sweets and packaged snacks, were widely available and more prominently displayed than healthier alternatives. School assessments also found low dietary diversity, frequent consumption of ultra-processed foods, and overweight or obesity affecting approximately one-third of students. These findings underscore how poor dietary quality, financial barriers and unhealthy food environments contribute to Lebanon's triple burden of malnutrition: undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, and overweight and obesity.

Food security outcomes

Food security outcomes were classified through convergence of evidence across food consumption, consumption-based coping, livelihood coping, and humanitarian food assistance. These indicators should be interpreted together, as acceptable food consumption may be maintained through negative coping strategies or assistance and may not, on its own, indicate secure or sustainable food access.

Lebanese households: Food consumption remained broadly stable in 2026, with 88 percent of households reporting acceptable consumption and 12 percent reporting borderline or poor consumption, compared with 13 percent in 2025. However, coping indicators deteriorated. Severe consumption-based coping increased from 11 percent in 2025 to 19 percent in 2026, while households using crisis or emergency livelihood strategies increased from 13 to 17 percent. The highest food consumption and coping concerns were concentrated in Akkar, El Minieh-Dennie, Baalbek-El Hermel, Zahle, and parts of northern Lebanon. Overall, stable food consumption masks increasing pressure on households' ability to maintain adequate diets.

Syrian refugees: Food security outcomes deteriorated in 2026. Approximately 33 percent of households reported borderline or poor food consumption, including 12 percent with poor consumption, compared with 5 percent poor consumption in 2025. Nationally, 42 percent used severe consumption-based coping, while 30 percent relied on crisis or emergency livelihood strategies. Cross-tabulation confirms that inadequate diets are generally associated with more severe coping. Severe food-based coping affected 52 percent of households with poor or borderline consumption, compared with 36 percent among households with acceptable consumption. Nevertheless, negative coping was also widespread among households with acceptable food consumption, indicating that many households were sustaining their diets through increasingly fragile or unsustainable means. Humanitarian assistance remained an important mitigating factor, reaching an estimated 321,000 long-staying Syrian refugees, equivalent to 54 percent of the planning population.


11. *Microsoft Power BI dashboard, Nutrition Data Report*

Palestine refugees: Approximately 35 percent of households reported borderline or poor food consumption, including 11 percent with poor consumption, up from 8 percent in 2025. Around 63 percent used stress or severe consumption-based coping, while 38 percent relied on crisis or emergency livelihood strategies. The convergence of these indicators points to continued pressure on food access and household resources, despite limited change in the overall prevalence of inadequate food consumption.

Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria: Approximately 23 percent of households reported borderline or poor food consumption, while 78 percent reported acceptable consumption. However, 96 percent used stress or severe consumption-based coping, including 55 percent using severe strategies, and 47 percent relied on crisis or emergency livelihood coping. Assistance reached an estimated 51,000 people, equivalent to 45 percent of the planning population. These findings indicate that relatively favourable food consumption outcomes coexist with exceptionally high coping and significant assistance coverage. The results should also be interpreted cautiously because of registration limitations and possible selection bias in the assessed sample.

Across all population groups, food security outcomes highlight an increasing disconnect between food consumption and household resilience. While food consumption remained broadly stable among Lebanese households and comparatively favourable among post-December 2024 arrivals, these outcomes were frequently associated with high reliance on consumption-based coping, livelihood coping, and humanitarian assistance. Among Syrian and Palestine refugees, deteriorating food consumption indicators were accompanied by widespread coping behaviours, reflecting persistent constraints on food access. The convergence of evidence indicates that many households are maintaining current food consumption levels through strategies that may not be sustainable over time.

Figure 3: Food consumption and coping indicators by population group (2026)



Current Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA) as a mitigating factor in acute food insecurity

HFSA remained an important mitigating factor during the current analysis period, when households continued to face the combined effects of economic deterioration, elevated living costs, limited income opportunities, and the consequences of displacement and return movements.

Humanitarian access remained challenging in parts of southern Lebanon, where insecurity, damaged roads and infrastructure, unexploded ordnance risks and localised movement restrictions constrained and delayed humanitarian movements. Reaching affected communities therefore required coordinated logistics and access arrangements, including the use of humanitarian convoys, limiting the predictability and flexibility of assistance delivery in some locations.

Based on overlap-adjusted programme estimates, assistance coverage reached around 23 percent in Lebanese, 50 percent in long-staying Syrians and 45 percent in post-December 2024 arrivals. Assistance therefore remained particularly relevant for Syrian populations, whose food security outcomes were more dependent on humanitarian support. However, assistance covered only part of minimum food needs, with the food component of cash transfers estimated to cover approximately 46 percent of the food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB). Consequently, while assistance contributed to maintaining food consumption and reducing reliance on negative coping strategies among assisted households, it was insufficient on its own to offset broader economic pressures.

Coverage estimates were calculated using the 2027 planning population denominators adopted for the IPC analysis and therefore reflect the population assumptions described elsewhere in the report. For long-staying Syrians and post-December 2024 arrivals, beneficiary figures represent unique individuals derived through district-level deduplication of cash and school-meals assistance and capped at the corresponding district population to avoid double counting.

For Lebanese households, assistance modalities were aggregated across programmes and may retain some overlap between interventions; consequently, coverage estimates represent programme reach rather than fully deduplicated beneficiary counts. Coverage levels should therefore not be compared directly across population groups.

Furthermore, because coverage rates are sensitive to both beneficiary numbers and population denominators, revisions to population estimates may affect reported assistance coverage even where programme caseloads remain unchanged.

Overall, HFSA helped mitigate a further deterioration in acute food insecurity during the current period, particularly among Syrian households and other populations highly dependent on humanitarian support.

PROJECTION SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (MARCH – JULY 2027)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS
PROJECTED AFI: March - July 2027

805,000
21% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	49,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	756,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	1,524,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	1,535,000 People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES
PROJECTED AFI: March - July 2027

192,000
32% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	13,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	179,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	296,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	106,000 People in Food Security

PALESTINE REFUGEES
PROJECTED AFI: March - July 2027

94,000
40% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	24,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	70,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	94,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	47,000 People in Food Security


POST-DECEMBER 2024 ARRIVALS FROM SYRIA
PROJECTED AFI: March - July 2027

56,000
50% of the population analysed

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	11,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	45,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	45,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	11,000 People in Food Security



POPULATION TABLE FOR THE PROJECTION PERIOD (MARCH - JULY 2027)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Akkar	Lebanese	270,910	67,728	25	121,910	45	67,728	25	13,546	5	0	0	3	81,274	30
	Syrian ref.	79,286	7,929	10	39,643	50	27,750	35	3,964	5	0	0	3	31,714	40
	Total	**350,196**	**75,657**	**22**	**161,553**	**46**	**95,478**	**27**	**17,510**	**5**	**0**	**0**		**112,988**	**32**
Aley	Lebanese	188,556	75,422	40	84,850	45	28,283	15	0	0	0	0	2	28,283	15
	Syrian ref.	37,322	11,197	30	18,661	50	7,464	20	0	0	0	0	3	7,464	20
	Total	**225,878**	**86,619**	**38**	**103,511**	**46**	**35,747**	**16**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**35,747**	**16**
Baabda	Lebanese	365,773	109,732	30	164,598	45	91,443	25	0	0	0	0	3	91,443	25
	Syrian ref.	54,127	16,238	30	24,357	45	13,532	25	0	0	0	0	3	13,532	25
	Total	**419,900**	**125,970**	**30**	**188,955**	**45**	**104,975**	**25**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**104,975**	**25**
Baalbek & El Hermel	Baalbek & El Hermel Lebanese	201,020	60,306	30	80,408	40	50,255	25	10,051	5	0	0	3	60,306	30
	Baalbek Syrian ref.	68,566	6,857	10	37,711	55	20,570	30	3,428	5	0	0	3	23,998	35
	El Hermel Syrian ref.	8,812	1,322	15	3,965	45	3,084	35	441	5	0	0	3	3,525	40
	Total	**278,398**	**68,485**	**25**	**122,084**	**44**	**73,909**	**27**	**13,920**	**5**	**0**	**0**		**87,829**	**32**
Bcharre & Zgharta	Bcharre & Zgharta Lebanese	84,267	46,347	55	29,493	35	8,427	10	0	0	0	0	2	8,427	10
	Bcharre Syrian ref.	687	172	25	412	60	103	15	0	0	0	0	2	103	15
	Zgharta Syrian ref.	9,914	2,479	25	4,957	50	2,479	25	0	0	0	0	3	2,479	25
	Total	**94,868**	**48,998**	**52**	**34,862**	**37**	**11,009**	**12**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**11,009**	**12**
Beirut	Lebanese	167,656	75,445	45	67,062	40	25,148	15	0	0	0	0	2	25,148	15
	Syrian ref.	19,726	5,918	30	8,877	45	4,932	25	0	0	0	0	3	4,932	25
	Total	**187,382**	**81,363**	**43**	**75,939**	**41**	**30,080**	**16**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**30,080**	**16**
Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Hasbaya, Rachaya & Sour	Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Lebanese	55,174	11,035	20	24,828	45	16,552	30	2,759	5	0	0	3	19,311	35
	El Nabatieh Lebanese	161,759	32,352	20	72,792	45	48,528	30	8,088	5	0	0	3	56,616	35
	Hasbaya & Rachaya Lebanese	64,837	25,935	40	22,693	35	16,209	25	0	0	0	0	3	16,209	25
	Sour Lebanese	293,816	73,454	25	132,217	45	73,454	25	14,691	5	0	0	3	88,145	30
	Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Hasbaya, & Sour Syrian Ref.	24,708	3,706	15	12,354	50	7,412	30	1,235	5	0	0	3	8,647	35
	Rachaya Syrian Ref.	2,903	435	15	1,887	65	581	20	0	0	0	0	3	581	20
	Total	**603,197**	**146,917**	**24**	**266,771**	**44**	**162,736**	**27**	**26,773**	**4**	**0**	**0**		**189,509**	**31**

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Chouf & Jezzine	Chouf & Jezzine Lebanese	208,571	93,857	45	83,428	40	31,286	15	0	0	0	0	2	31,286	15
	Chouf Syrian ref.	30,397	6,079	20	18,238	60	6,079	20	0	0	0	0	3	6,079	20
	Jezzine Syrian ref.	1,653	248	15	992	60	413	25	0	0	0	0	3	413	25
	Total	**240,621**	**100,184**	**42**	**102,658**	**43**	**37,778**	**16**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**37,778**	**16**
El Batroun & El Koura	El Batroun & El Koura Lebanese	110,959	72,123	65	33,288	30	5,548	5	0	0	0	0	2	5,548	5
	El Batroun Syrian ref.	6,348	1,587	25	3,491	55	1,270	20	0	0	0	0	3	1,270	20
	El Koura Syrian ref.	8,758	1,752	20	4,817	55	2,190	25	0	0	0	0	3	2,190	25
	Total	**126,065**	**75,462**	**60**	**41,596**	**33**	**9,008**	**7**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**9,008**	**7**
El Meten	Lebanese	364,067	218,440	60	109,220	30	36,407	10	0	0	0	0	2	36,407	10
	Syrian ref.	28,648	8,594	30	14,324	50	5,730	20	0	0	0	0	3	5,730	20
	Total	**392,715**	**227,034**	**58**	**123,544**	**31**	**42,137**	**11**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**42,137**	**11**
El Minieh-Dennie	Lebanese	112,501	39,375	35	50,625	45	22,500	20	0	0	0	0	3	22,500	20
	Syrian ref.	32,383	6,477	20	12,953	40	11,334	35	1,619	5	0	0	3	12,953	40
	Total	**144,884**	**45,852**	**32**	**63,578**	**44**	**33,834**	**23**	**1,619**	**1**	**0**	**0**		**35,453**	**24**
Jbeil & Kesrwane	Lebanese	301,918	196,247	65	75,480	25	30,192	10	0	0	0	0	2	30,192	10
	Syrian ref.	16,514	4,129	25	7,431	45	4,954	30	0	0	0	0	3	4,954	30
	Total	**318,432**	**200,376**	**63**	**82,911**	**26**	**35,146**	**11**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**35,146**	**11**
Saida	Lebanese	549,737	192,408	35	219,895	40	137,434	25	0	0	0	0	3	137,434	25
	Syrian ref.	26,315	2,632	10	15,789	60	6,579	25	1,316	5	0	0	3	7,895	30
	Total	**576,052**	**195,040**	**34**	**235,684**	**41**	**144,013**	**25**	**1,316**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**145,329**	**25**
Tripoli	Lebanese	175,404	70,162	40	70,162	40	35,081	20	0	0	0	0	3	35,081	20
	Syrian ref.	24,687	4,937	20	11,109	45	7,406	30	1,234	5	0	0	3	8,640	35
	Total	**200,091**	**75,099**	**38**	**81,271**	**41**	**42,487**	**21**	**1,234**	**1**	**0**	**0**		**43,721**	**22**
West Bekaa	Lebanese	62,467	24,987	40	24,987	40	12,493	20	0	0	0	0	3	12,493	20
	Syrian ref.	33,213	4,982	15	14,946	45	13,285	40	0	0	0	0	3	13,285	40
	Total	**95,680**	**29,969**	**31**	**39,933**	**42**	**25,778**	**27**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**25,778**	**27**
Zahle	Lebanese	124,904	49,962	40	56,207	45	18,736	15	0	0	0	0	2	18,736	15
	Syrian ref.	79,033	7,903	10	39,517	50	31,613	40	0	0	0	0	3	31,613	40
	Total	**203,937**	**57,865**	**28**	**95,724**	**47**	**50,349**	**25**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**		**50,349**	**25**
Total	**Lebanese**	**3,864,296**	**1,535,317**	**40**	**1,524,143**	**39**	**755,704**	**20**	**49,135**	**1**	**0**	**0**		**804,839**	**21**
	Syrian Ref.	**594,000**	**105,573**	**18**	**296,431**	**50**	**178,760**	**30**	**13,237**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**191,997**	**32**
	Post-December 2024 Arrivals	**113,000**	**11,300**	**10**	**45,200**	**40**	**45,200**	**40**	**11,300**	**10**	**0**	**0**		**56,500**	**50**
	Palestine Ref.	**234,276**	**46,855**	**20**	**93,710**	**40**	**70,283**	**30**	**23,428**	**10**	**0**	**0**		**93,711**	**40**
	Grand Total	**4,805,572**	**1,699,045**	**35**	**1,959,484**	**41**	**1,049,947**	**22**	**97,100**	**2**	**0**	**0**		**1,147,047**	**24**

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore, they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

PROJECTION SITUATION OVERVIEW (MARCH - JULY 2027)

Between March and July 2027, approximately 1.15 million people, representing 24 percent of the total population analysed, are projected to experience Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). This includes approximately 97,000 people likely to be in Phase 4 and 1.05 million people likely to be in Phase 3. Compared with the current period, the population facing Crisis or worse outcomes is projected to increase by approximately 97,000 people, from 1.05 million to 1.15 million. This represents a 9 percent increase in Phase 3 or above.

The severity of acute food insecurity is also projected to deepen, with the number of people in Phase 4 increasing by 86 percent from 52,000 to 97,000. Acute food insecurity is also projected to deteriorate across all four population groups. A further 1.96 million people across the four population groups are projected to be classified in Phase 2. Overall, approximately 3.11 million people, or nearly 65 percent of the analysed population, are projected to be in Phase 2 or above. This indicates that most of the analysed population will continue to experience acute food insecurity or remain vulnerable to deterioration during the projection period.

Lebanese residents: Approximately 805,000 Lebanese residents, representing 21 percent of the analysed Lebanese population, are projected to face Phase 3 or above. This includes approximately 49,000 people likely to be in Phase 4, and 756,000 people likely to be in Phase 3. The population in Phase 4 is projected to increase sharply from 11,000 to 49,000, primarily due to a rise in the share of the population classified in Phase 4 in Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel and Sour, from near zero to 5 percent.

Lebanese residents will continue to account for the largest absolute caseload, representing approximately 70 percent of the overall population projected to face Crisis or worse outcomes. Of the 19 units analysed, 11 are projected to be classified in Phase 3 between March and July 2027, compared with nine units in the current period. These include eight districts: Akkar, Baabda, El Minieh-Dennie, El Nabatieh, Saida, Sour, Tripoli and West Bekaa; and three district clusters: Baalbek and El Hermel, Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun, and Hasbaya and Rachaya. The remaining eight units of analysis are projected to remain in Phase 2.

The highest prevalence of acute food insecurity is projected in El Nabatieh and the Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun cluster, where 35 percent of Lebanese residents are expected to face Phase 3 or above. These are followed by Akkar, Sour, and the Baalbek and El Hermel cluster, where 30 percent of the analysed Lebanese population is projected to face Crisis or worse outcomes. The largest absolute caseload is projected in Saida, with approximately 137,000 people in Phase 3 or above, followed by Baabda with 91,000 people, Sour with 88,000 people, and Akkar with 81,000 people.

Syrian refugees: Among Syrian refugees, approximately 192,000 people, or 32 percent of the analysed Syrian refugee population, are projected to face Phase 3 or above. This includes approximately 13,000 people likely to be in Phase 4, and 179,000 people likely to be in Phase 3. A further 296,000 Syrian refugees are projected to be in Phase 2, indicating that a large proportion will remain vulnerable to further deterioration should anticipated conditions worsen beyond the most likely scenario.

Of the 21 units analysed, 20 are projected to be in Phase 3 between March and July 2027, compared with 17 units in the current period. Bcharre is the only unit projected to remain in Phase 2. The highest prevalence of acute food insecurity is projected in Akkar, El Hermel, El Minieh-Dennie, West Bekaa and Zahle, where 40 percent of Syrian refugees are expected to face Phase 3 or above. These areas are followed by Baalbek, Tripoli, and the combined Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Hasbaya and Sour cluster, where 35 percent of the analysed Syrian refugee population is projected to face Crisis or worse outcomes.

Aley, Chouf, and El Batroun, which are classified in Phase 2 during the current period, are projected to deteriorate to Phase 3 in the projection period. The largest absolute caseloads of Syrian refugees in Phase 3 or above are projected in Akkar and Zahle, with approximately 32,000 people each, followed by Baalbek with 24,000 people, Baabda and West Bekaa with around 13,000 people each, and El Minieh-Dennie with approximately 13,000 people.

Palestine refugees: Approximately 94,000 Palestine refugees, representing 40 percent of the analysed Palestine refugee population, are projected to face Phase 3 or above. This includes approximately 24,000 people likely to be in Phase 4, and 70,000 people likely to be in Phase 3.

Palestine refugees are therefore projected to experience a notable increase in the severity of acute food insecurity, with the population in Phase 4 doubling from 12,000 in the current period to 24,000 in the projection period. This deterioration in the projection period is mainly driven by the reduction of food assistance. For Palestine refugees, no HFSA is currently confirmed for the projection period, further reducing the protective effect of assistance for a population already facing high levels of vulnerability and acute food insecurity.

Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria: Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria are projected to remain the population group with the highest relative prevalence of acute food insecurity. Approximately 56,000 people, representing 50 percent of the analysed population group, are projected to face Phase 3 or above. This includes approximately 11,000 people likely to be in Phase 4, and 45,000 people likely to be in Phase 3. This means that one in every two post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria is projected to experience Crisis or worse outcomes.

While Lebanese residents are projected to account for the largest absolute number of people requiring urgent action, the relative prevalence of acute food insecurity will remain substantially higher among refugees and recently arrived populations. The proportion facing Phase 3 or above is projected to reach 21 percent among Lebanese residents, 32 percent among Syrian refugees, 40 percent among Palestine refugees, and 50 percent among post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. A further 1.96 million people across the four population groups are projected to be classified in Phase 2. Overall, approximately 3.11 million people, or nearly 65 percent of the analysed population, are projected to be classified in Phase 2 or above. This indicates that most of the analysed population will continue to experience acute food insecurity or remain vulnerable to deterioration during the projection period.

Key Assumptions

Conflict: Security incidents, including intermittent airstrikes, drone strikes, shelling, and demolitions, are expected to continue during the projection period, primarily in and around the IDF declared military zone, with occasional strikes elsewhere. As UNIFIL progressively draws down and withdraws during 2027, its reduced presence is expected to constrain monitoring capacity and increase uncertainty around conflict dynamics in south Lebanon. However, large-scale internal conflict is not considered the most likely outcome, and no major escalation is expected along the Syrian border.

Displacement: Sustainable returns to the most conflict-affected southern areas are expected to remain delayed due to continued hostilities, demolitions, damaged housing, and insecurity. Localised or temporary new displacement may occur following escalations, airstrikes, or evacuation orders.

Reconstruction: No large-scale reconstruction breakthrough is expected during the projection period. Recovery will remain dependent on external financing, improved security, reforms, and diplomatic progress, while continued demolitions and the political stalemate over disarmament will delay implementation. Localised rehabilitation and household-level repairs may occur, but these interventions will not restore housing, infrastructure, livelihoods, or local demand at the scale required for broad recovery.

Economic growth and livelihoods: No broad-based economic recovery is anticipated during the projection period. Employment opportunities and income-generating activities are expected to remain constrained, particularly in conflict-affected areas, due to persistent insecurity, weak investment, high fuel and energy costs, access restrictions, and limited reconstruction. Tourism recovery is expected to remain partial and geographically uneven. Remittances will continue to be an important source of household income but are expected to stagnate or decline moderately.

Exchange rate: The Lebanese pound is expected to remain broadly stable under the most likely scenario, conditional on adequate Central Bank foreign-exchange reserves and the absence of a major political, security, or financial shock. A major conflict escalation, rapid reserve depletion, or renewed political instability could place renewed pressure on the exchange rate.

Inflation: Domestic prices are expected to remain elevated despite exchange-rate stability, with higher international oil prices feeding into fuel, transportation, electricity generation, food production, and service costs. Generator expenses and seasonal heating needs will add pressure on households and businesses, potentially reducing disposable income available for food and other essential needs.

Humanitarian food security assistance (HFSA): HFSA is expected to decline during March-July 2027, with no secured assistance currently reflected for June-July. Reduced assistance is expected to weaken an important buffer for vulnerable households, particularly where livelihoods and food access remain constrained.

Key Assumptions

Political developments: Limited government fiscal capacity will constrain public services, social protection, livelihoods support, and reconstruction, resulting in occasional social protests. Authorities are expected to continue diplomatic efforts to maintain an international presence in southern Lebanon following changes to UNIFIL's mandate.

UNFIL drawdown and withdrawal from South Lebanon: The progressive reduction of UNIFIL's presence and activities in south Lebanon is expected to reduce associated local economic activity and support to communities. This may negatively affect income-earning opportunities and the recovery of services and infrastructure in UNIFIL-hosting areas, including parts of Sour, Bent Jbeil and Marjayoun, with potential implications for household purchasing power and resilience. The magnitude of these impacts remains uncertain and will depend on the scale of operational changes and the extent of replacement support from other actors.

Tensions: Political and security tensions related to non-state groups disarmament are expected to persist, with localised unrest or security incidents remaining possible even though large-scale internal conflict is not the most likely scenario.

Market functionality: National food availability is not identified as the principal food-security constraint, but market and livelihood access will remain uneven in conflict-affected areas. Hostilities, damaged roads and infrastructure, unexploded ordnance, evacuation orders, and changing security arrangements may restrict access to markets, workplaces, agricultural land, and services. At the same time, high fuel, transport, and generator costs will weaken economic access even where markets remain physically operational.

Agriculture and domestic food supply: Agricultural recovery is expected to remain limited and uneven, particularly in conflict-affected southern areas. Damage to productive assets and infrastructure, insecurity, access constraints and elevated input costs will continue to constrain production, employment and agricultural incomes, weakening households' economic access to food.

Food insecurity is expected to increase slightly during the projection period due to persistent insecurity in conflict-affected areas, protracted displacement, constrained livelihood opportunities, restricted agricultural recovery, and continued pressure on household purchasing power. While national food availability is expected to remain broadly adequate through commercial imports and functioning markets, localised access constraints are likely to persist in parts of southern Lebanon. Elevated living costs, reduced income-earning opportunities, and declining humanitarian food assistance are expected to constrain household food access and limit recovery among affected populations.

The most affected populations are expected to include conflict-affected residents of southern Lebanon, displaced households, returnees facing shelter and livelihood recovery challenges, agricultural households and labourers in affected rural areas, refugees with limited livelihood opportunities, and poor households dependent on irregular income sources and assistance. These groups are expected to face continued difficulties meeting essential food and non-food needs due to accumulated debt, asset losses, displacement-related costs, and limited opportunities to restore livelihoods and income sources.

Compared with the current analysis period, conditions are expected to deteriorate slightly, with continued displacement-related needs, constrained livelihood opportunities, pressure on household budgets, and declining humanitarian food assistance. While no major climate shock is currently anticipated, localised flooding and storm-related impacts associated with El Niño phenomenon, during the spring season remain a potential risk, particularly in areas with vulnerable infrastructure and limited drainage capacity. Although widespread market disruptions are not anticipated, localised access constraints are expected to persist in conflict-affected areas. Consequently, the most vulnerable households are expected to have limited capacity to recover from previous shocks or absorb additional shocks during the projection period, reducing the likelihood of significant improvements in food security outcomes.

Declining HFSA weakens a critical buffer against acute food insecurity

For the projection period (March–July 2027), HFSA is expected to decline substantially. Based on secured resources available at the time of analysis, average monthly assistance is projected to reach approximately 247,000 Lebanese people, 200,000 long-staying Syrians and 31,000 post-December 2024 arrivals, equivalent to 6.4 percent, 34 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of the corresponding 2027 planning populations. These estimates incorporate explicit assumptions of zero secured assistance in June and July 2027, reflecting the absence of confirmed funding beyond May 2027. For Palestine refugees, no specific humanitarian food security assistance is currently confirmed for the projection period. As a result, humanitarian assistance is expected to provide a significantly smaller protective effect than during the current period, reducing support to population groups that continue to face constrained purchasing power, limited livelihood opportunities, and elevated expenditure requirements.

In accordance with IPC protocols, HFSA was assessed as a mitigating factor when projecting acute food insecurity outcomes; however, assistance coverage alone does not determine IPC classifications. Its likely effect was assessed in relation to coverage, adequacy, duration, regularity and funding certainty, and through convergence with evidence on food consumption and livelihood change. The projected reduction in assistance is particularly relevant because a share of households currently classified in Phase 2 continue to rely on humanitarian support to maintain minimally adequate food consumption. As assistance contracts, some of these households may face increased difficulty meeting essential food needs and may become more vulnerable to deterioration into Phase 3, particularly in areas where livelihood recovery remains limited and food expenditures continue to account for a high share of household spending.

Overall, HFSA is expected to remain a critical buffer against acute food insecurity during the projection period. However, at the time of the analysis, the projected decline in coverage and the absence of secured funding beyond May 2027 are likely to weaken this protective effect, increasing the risk of deterioration among vulnerable households that currently depend on humanitarian assistance to meet their minimum food needs.


IPC trends

During September 2026–February 2027, approximately 1.05 million people, or 21 percent of the population analysed, are classified in Phase 3 or above, including 52,000 people in Phase 4. Lebanese residents account for the largest number of people in Phase 3 or above, at approximately 686,000 people (18 percent). The prevalence is 28 percent among Syrian refugees, 35 percent among Palestine refugees and 45 percent among post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. For March–July 2027, the proportion of the analysed population classified in Phase 3 or above is projected to increase from 21 to 24 percent, corresponding to approximately 1.15 million people. The proportion classified in Phase 4 is projected to increase from 1 to 2 percent, with the number rising from approximately 52,000 to 97,000.


Compared with the April–August 2026 projection update, which estimated 24 percent of the overall analysed population in Phase 3 or above, the current period (September 2026- February 2027), estimates 21 percent of the population facing acute food insecurity. This needs to be interpreted in the context of the significant shifts in the security and displacement situation. During the March 2026 escalation of hostilities, more than 1.1 million people were displaced, amid widespread insecurity, damage to infrastructure and livelihoods, and severe disruptions to economic activity and market access, particularly in southern Lebanon. While some markets have resumed operations, market functionality remains uneven across affected areas, with continued disruptions to supply chains, transport costs and households' purchasing power. In particular, in the South, market recovery remains uneven, with residual conflict-related damage, disrupted livelihoods, elevated transport and fuel costs, and constraints on purchasing power continuing to affect households' access to food. The decline in acute food insecurity therefore reflects, in part, a changed operating context and reduced displacement compared with the peak of the conflict, rather than a full recovery in household food security. Persistent socioeconomic pressures and the lasting effects of conflict continue to leave vulnerable households at risk, with approximately one in four people still projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity.

Figure 4: Trends of IPC Phase 3 or above among population groups


TOTAL POPULATION




LEBANESE RESIDENTS




SYRIAN REFUGEES



PALESTINE REFUGEES



POST-DECEMBER 2024 ARRIVALS FROM SYRIA



**IPC trends across previous analysis rounds should be interpreted with caution because the population denominators are not fully comparable. The current (September 2026- February 2027) period uses the 2026 addendum long-staying Syrians Refugees population estimates prepared by the Inter-Agency Sector Coordination Group (ISCG), while the projected period (March -July 2027) uses the 2027 inter-agency planning populations. Comparisons between IPC rounds should consider revisions to population estimates, particularly for Syrian populations, as well as changes in the geographic allocation of the Lebanese population.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Sustain urgent food assistance and prevent a break in the response:** Maintain and, where resources permit, expand HFSA through July 2027 to address the projected increase in acute food insecurity from 1.05 million to 1.15 million people in Phase 3 or above, with priority given to the most vulnerable, particularly as the population in Phase 4 is expected to increase from 52,000 to 97,000. Urgently secure funding and operational arrangements for June and July 2027, when assistance is not yet secured. Regularly monitor assistance coverage, adequacy, duration, delivery and funding certainty, ensuring transfer values remain sufficient to meet food needs and adjusting targeting or delivery where declining assistance coincides with worsening food consumption or coping strategies. Wherever market functionality and access conditions allow and no protection risk is identified, food assistance should be prioritised through cash-based modalities, taking into consideration the severe pressure on livelihoods, multidimensional deprivation, limited access to services, and constrained purchasing power and coping capacity. To maintain efficiency, effectiveness and agility, existing transfer mechanisms should be leveraged to the extent possible, rather than promoting the set up parallel systems. This should align with the government's return, early recovery, and restoration of basic services strategy in war-affected areas, including Shock-Responsive Safety Nets (SRSN) and Multi-Purpose Cash.
- **Apply dynamic, population-specific targeting:** Ensure flexible targeting based on a combination of IPC severity, absolute caseload, prevalence, household vulnerability, assistance dependence, exposure to conflict, displacement or livelihood loss, and operational access. While Lebanese residents account for the largest projected caseload, the prevalence is higher among Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees and post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria. Assistance should therefore balance the scale of need among Lebanese residents with the greater relative severity among refugee and recently arrived populations, while respecting population-specific units of analysis and avoiding direct comparisons of district-level IPC classifications across groups assessed at different geographical levels.
- **Adapt support to displacement, return and access dynamics:** Maintain flexible assistance and delivery arrangements that respond to the distinct needs of internally displaced people and returnees. Return should not automatically trigger the withdrawal of support, as access to adequate housing, livelihoods, services, markets and agricultural land may remain constrained. Contingency arrangements should allow assistance to adapt rapidly to renewed displacement, interrupted returns and localised access disruptions.
- **Adapt transfer adequacy and delivery arrangements to purchasing power, markets and access:** Review transfer adequacy as living costs rise and household incomes decline, while adapting delivery modalities to local market functionality and access constraints. Prioritise affordability challenges nationally and weaker market functionality in El Nabatieh, ensuring adjustments reflect local conditions rather than imposing a nationwide modality change.
- **Protect livelihoods and restore productive capacity based on assessed needs:** Complement food assistance with livelihood protection for households facing documented loss of employment, earnings or productive assets. Priority should be given to displaced and returning households whose livelihoods have not recovered, conflict-affected agricultural households, casual or irregular workers and households facing several overlapping vulnerabilities.

  Agricultural support should protect remaining productive assets, sustain seasonal production and restore agricultural outcomes where security and safe access permit. The CNRS/MoA rapid Needs Assessment identifies approximately 56,264 hectares of affected agricultural land, displacement of nearly 78 percent of farmers in southern Lebanon, while damage and loss document impacts on perennial crops, irrigation systems, greenhouses, livestock, poultry and beekeeping. With national food availability remaining broadly adequate, agricultural assistance should focus primarily on protecting household livelihoods, incomes and access to food. High production costs, limited access to affordable agricultural inputs and irrigation, weaknesses in rural infrastructure, climate-related hazards such as flooding and drought, and difficulties accessing markets can reduce agricultural productivity, increase post-harvest losses and weaken farmers' income.

  Provide timely assistance through cash, vouchers and/or in-kind agricultural inputs, tailored to assessed household needs, seasonal requirements and market functionality. Prioritise irrigation and water access, harvesting support, fodder and animal-health services, alongside progressive rehabilitation of damaged productive assets where security conditions and safe access permit. Adapt targeting and delivery schedules to verified damage, livelihood activities and access conditions. Monitor changes in land access, irrigation, input availability, planting, harvesting and agricultural employment, and adjust assistance promptly to prevent further livelihood losses.
- **Strengthen complementary nutrition actions to address food insecurity and malnutrition risks:** Strengthen nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions to improve dietary quality, dietary diversity, and access to affordable,

nutrient-rich foods among vulnerable households, particularly those with young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women. Nutrition objectives should be systematically integrated into food security, social protection, and humanitarian responses, with greater emphasis on diet quality and the prevention of all forms of malnutrition, rather than food quantity or undernutrition alone. In parallel, enhance routine surveillance and monitoring of dietary quality, food environments, and all forms of malnutrition to facilitate the early identification of emerging nutrition risks and vulnerabilities and inform evidence-based, targeted responses.

- **Establish a formal trigger-and-review mechanism:** During the projection period, the IPC Technical Working Group and operational actors should periodically review whether programme delivery and observed conditions remain consistent with the assumptions underpinning the analysis. Monitoring should cover food consumption and coping; assistance coverage, adequacy, duration, regularity and funding; displacement and return; market functionality and delivery; food, fuel, transport and generator costs; income and employment; agricultural access and seasonal production; and conflict and humanitarian access. If several key assumptions change significantly and food security conditions worsen, the IPC projection may need to be updated or reassessed.

Risk factors to monitor

- **Conflict, insecurity and humanitarian access:** Monitor ongoing hostilities, movement restrictions and access disruptions, particularly in southern Lebanon, El Nabatieh and areas around the IDF declared military zone. Any renewed or expanded conflict, beyond the assumed most likely scenario, could restrict access to homes, markets, farmland, livelihoods, services and humanitarian assistance, worsening food security. Security incidents, evacuation orders, road closures and aid delivery disruptions need to be continuously monitored to assess whether developments differ significantly from the assumptions underlying the IPC projection.
- **Displacement, return and recovery conditions:** Renewed localised displacement following airstrikes, escalation or evacuation orders, and any interruption to safe return, should be monitored alongside households' actual restoration of shelter, employment, markets and essential services.
- **UNIFIL transition and southern recovery:** The projection period overlaps with the scheduled UNIFIL transition: Security Council resolution 2790 extends the mandate to 31 December 2026 and provides for drawdown and withdrawal beginning from that date within one year. Monitor whether alternative arrangements sustain essential monitoring, liaison, coordination and facilitation of humanitarian movement, as gaps could make access less predictable, affect perceptions of safety and delay durable returns and recovery. The transition will also reduce direct employment, contracting, procurement and demand for accommodation, transport, retail and other services in southern border districts. The magnitude of these effects remains uncertain and should be assessed against the actual pace, geographic concentration and functional scope of the drawdown and the extent of replacement support.

  The future of UNIFIL's presence in southern Lebanon remains uncertain as its current mandate, extended by UN Security Council Resolution 2790, is due to expire on 31 December 2026. It is not yet clear whether the mandate will be renewed, modified, or allowed to lapse. Should UNIFIL's presence be significantly reduced or withdrawn, security risks for civilians could increase due to the loss of key monitoring, liaison, and deconfliction functions that currently help contain tensions and facilitate humanitarian movement. Deteriorating security conditions would likely further disrupt livelihood activities, restrict access to agricultural land and markets, limit humanitarian access, and discourage private investment and economic recovery. In turn, these factors could reduce household incomes, constrain food access, and increase the risk of food insecurity among vulnerable populations in southern Lebanon.
- **HFSA coverage and adequacy:** Monitor the actual levels of HFSA including monthly reach and any change in transfer adequacy, duration, regularity, delivery or funding. The analysis reflects no secured assistance for June–July 2027; unless additional resources are confirmed and delivered, households currently buffered by assistance, including at-risk households in Phase 2, may face worsening food consumption, increased coping and deterioration into Phase 3.
- **Purchasing power, livelihoods, prices and localised market access:** Economic access is expected to remain the principal constraint for most households. Monitor employment and earnings, debt and depleted savings, the food and non-food SMEB, food-price inflation, fuel, transport, generator and service costs, and any pressure on the exchange rate or foreign-exchange reserves. Physical market access and delivery conditions should be monitored separately in conflict-affected areas, particularly El Nabatieh, where retailer functionality and access remain weaker.

- **Political, fiscal and reconstruction constraints:** Monitor tensions surrounding the disarmament of non-state armed groups, localised unrest or protests, implementation of financial-sector reforms, government fiscal capacity and progress in mobilising external reconstruction financing. Limited fiscal space, incomplete financial-sector reform and constrained institutional capacity may restrict public services, social protection, livelihood support and reconstruction.
- **Agriculture and rural livelihoods:** Monitor safe access to agricultural land; unexploded ordnance; damage to land, irrigation, orchards, greenhouses, livestock and other productive assets; and seasonal planting, production, harvesting and marketing conditions in conflict-affected areas. During the current period, flooding or severe winter weather should be monitored specifically in Akkar, where damage to vulnerable irrigation networks, rural roads, crops, agricultural assets or market access could reduce production and household income. During March–July 2027, monitoring should emphasise crop development, harvesting, agricultural employment and whether land and productive assets become safely usable. FAO estimates national 2026 cereal production near the five-year average but confirms localised harvesting constraints in conflict-affected areas and continued dependence on imports.
- **Social tensions, services and protection-related access:** Localised social tensions, service disruptions and protection-related constraints may restrict access to employment, markets and assistance, particularly for refugees and recent arrivals from Syria. These pressures should be monitored where they increase household expenditures, disrupt livelihoods or constrain access to food.
- **Diet quality and emerging nutrition risks:** Continue monitoring dietary diversity and quality, screening and referral, treatment admissions and emerging nutrition risks, particularly among young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
- **Monitoring across these risks should be interpreted through convergence with food consumption and coping outcomes:** A material departure from several projection assumptions particularly if accompanied by worsening food consumption, livelihood coping or assistance delivery should prompt review of programme targeting and transfer adequacy and, where warranted, an update or reassessment of the IPC projection.

PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

Scope of the analysis

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis covered two periods: the current period from September 2026 to February 2027 and the projection period from March to July 2027. Four population groups were analysed separately: Lebanese residents, long-staying Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, and people who arrived from Syria after December 2024. The analysis used the population estimates endorsed through the 2027 inter-agency planning process.

Population framework

The current analysis for September 2026 to February 2027 uses the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) 2026 addendum long-staying Syrian refugees population estimates prepared by the Inter-Agency Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) and the Projection from March to July 2027 uses the population estimates of the 2027 LRP.

	April 2025 analysis	October 2025 analysis	April 2026 updated projection	October 2026 analysis
Total population	5,487,280	5,191,667	5,191,667	5,031,585
Lebanese residents	3,864,280	3,864,296	3,864,296	3,864,296
Syrian refugees	1,400,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	820,013
Palestinian refugees	223,000	231,515	231,515	234,276
Post- December 2024 arrivals	*	95,856	95,856	113,000

The population database used for this analysis estimates 5.49 million people in 2025, 5.19 million in 2026 and 4.81 million in 2027. These changes should be interpreted as revisions to a multi-source planning denominator, rather than as observed demographic change alone. In Lebanon's conflict and economic-crisis context, displacement, return, onward movement, population projection assumptions and changes in source coverage may all affect the annual totals.

Lebanese population: The national Lebanese population is held constant at 3,864,296 in the 2027 planning projections; however, its geographic distribution changes substantially compared with 2026. For example, the Lebanese population allocated to Saida increases from 233,189 people in 2026 to 549,737 in 2027 (+136 percent), while the population allocated to Sour increases from 181,467 to 293,816 (+62 percent). If the estimated number of acutely food-insecure people remained unchanged in these districts, the proportion of people classified in IPC Phase 3 or above would decrease simply because the denominator is larger. Similarly, the Lebanese population allocated to Beirut decreases from 237,027 to 167,656 (-29 percent), and El Nabatieh decreases from 206,128 to 161,759 (-22 percent). In these cases, the proportion of people in IPC Phase 3 or above could increase even if household food security conditions remained unchanged, because the denominator is smaller.

These changes therefore affect both the proportion and the estimated number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above and reduce comparability with previous IPC rounds that used different population allocations. The largest increases are projected in Saida, Sour and Hasbaya, while the largest declines are projected in Beirut, El Nabatieh and Baabda. Results in these districts should therefore be interpreted with caution and assessed using both prevalence and absolute numbers. The projected reallocations do not, by themselves, indicate changes in acute food insecurity, displacement or return patterns.

Syrians (long-staying and post-December 2024 arrivals): Unlike the Lebanese population, the Syrian population denominator has changed substantially over time, both nationally and geographically. The estimated population decreased from around 1.4 million in 2025 to approximately 953,000 in August 2026, with a further reduction to around 707,000 anticipated under the 2027 LRP planning figures.

For this IPC analysis, the population denominators reflect the LRP figures corresponding to each analysis period. The current period (September 2026–February 2027) uses the 2026 LRP adjusted population figures, while the projected period (March–July 2027) uses the 2027 LRP planning figures. Consequently, the reduction in the Syrian population denominator between the current and projected IPC periods reflects the anticipated population evolution incorporated into the LRP planning figures.

The approximately 707,000 displaced Syrians expected to remain in Lebanon under the 2027 planning figures include around 594,000 long-staying Syrians and 113,000 individuals who arrived after December 2024. The reduction in the long-staying

population from approximately 820,000 in 2026 reflects confirmed returns to Syria, prolonged absence or loss of contact, as well as individuals anticipated to return and be inactivated by UNHCR by mid-2027. The 2027 figures therefore represent planning assumptions for humanitarian programming and should not be interpreted as observed population movements or registration figures.

Palestine refugees: The 2027 planning package estimates a total population of 234,276 people, comprising 218,382 Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL) and 15,894 Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS). The PRL estimate is based on UNRWA-registered refugees and Palestinian non-refugees who completed Digital Identity Verification in Lebanon, together with their children up to age 16, projected from mid-2026 to mid-2027. The PRS estimate is based on members of families receiving PRS Emergency Cash Assistance and is similarly projected to mid-2027.

Compared with the previously used planning figure of 231,515 people, the 2027 denominator increases to 234,276 people, representing a net increase of 2,761 people, or approximately 1.2 percent. This net change reflects a projected increase of 8,531 Palestine refugees from Lebanon (PRL), partially offset by a projected decrease of 5,770 Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS). The higher population denominator also affects the estimated number of people classified in IPC Phase 3 or above: where the prevalence of acute food insecurity remains unchanged, applying the same prevalence to a larger population would result in a correspondingly higher estimated number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above

Unlike the Lebanese and Syrian population datasets, the Palestinian population package does not provide a 2026 district-level comparator, and the unit of analysis is at national level. However, the 2027 population is highly concentrated geographically: South (115,981 or 49.5 percent), Mount Lebanon (42,653 or 18.2 percent) and Akkar (28,412 or 12.1 percent), together, these three areas account for approximately 80 percent of the projected Palestine refugee population. Therefore, food-security outcomes and population assumptions in these locations have a disproportionate influence on national Palestine refugee IPC results.

Disclaimer: *This analysis uses population figures endorsed through the 2026 inter-agency planning process for current Syrian refugees and 2027 inter-agency planning process for the rest. The estimates represent planning denominators based on UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM DTM and inter-agency assumptions, rather than observed population counts. Revisions to Lebanese, Syrian and Palestine refugee population estimates directly affect both the proportion and estimated number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above. Consequently, changes between IPC rounds may reflect revisions to population denominators as well as changes in acute food insecurity outcomes and should be interpreted with caution.*

Population figures will be reviewed in future IPC rounds as updated population and displacement information becomes available.

Units of analysis: Lebanese residents were assessed across 19 units of analysis, comprising 12 individual districts and seven district clusters. Syrian refugees were assessed across 21 units, comprising 19 individual districts and two clusters. Clustering was used where the available sample did not support a separate district-level classification. Palestine refugees, including Palestine refugees in Lebanon and Palestine refugees from Syria, were analysed as one national unit. Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria were also analysed at national level. Results should therefore be interpreted at the geographic level at which each population group was classified; district-level conclusions cannot be inferred for the two populations analysed nationally.

Analytical process: The analysis was conducted in person in Beirut, over 7 days from 21 to 29 September 2026, with technical support from the IPC Global Support Unit. It brought together 43 analysts and subject-matter experts from government institutions, United Nations agencies, national and international non-governmental organizations, and specialised technical agencies. Evidence was organised and assessed in the IPC Analysis Platform. Classifications were agreed through technical consensus and convergence of evidence. Prior to the analysis, a Level 1 training was delivered virtually over 3 days between 16 and 18 September.

Convergence of evidence: For each unit of analysis, the team reviewed food-security outcome indicators together with contributing factors and humanitarian food assistance. Outcome evidence included food consumption, consumption-based coping and livelihood coping. These indicators were interpreted jointly: acceptable food consumption was not treated as evidence of food security where households were maintaining consumption through severe coping or humanitarian assistance. Contributing-factor evidence covered conflict and access, displacement and return, markets and prices, employment and income, household expenditure and debt, agriculture, public services, social protection and the wider macroeconomic environment.

Primary evidence

The main household-level sources used to assess food-security outcomes were:

- **Lebanese residents:** WFP mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (mVAM), covering April-September 2026, and the 2026 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA). These sources provided evidence on food consumption, consumption and livelihood coping, expenditure, income, debt, essential needs, services and other dimensions of vulnerability.
- **Syrian refugees:** the 2026 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR), conducted by UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP, with data collected in June-July 2026. VASyR provided evidence on food consumption, coping, income, expenditure, debt, employment and assistance.
- **Palestine refugees:** UNRWA's 2026 High Frequency Monitoring survey, covering Palestine refugees in Lebanon and Palestine refugees from Syria and providing national-level evidence on food consumption and coping.
- **Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria:** a dedicated national assessment providing evidence on food consumption, consumption and livelihood coping, income sources, assistance and household vulnerability.

Secondary evidence was used to interpret the drivers and context of acute food insecurity. This included WFP market monitoring and market-functionality assessments; IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix information; conflict and humanitarian-access information; UNDP tension monitoring; agricultural assessments and updates from FAO, the Ministry of Agriculture and CNRS-L; and official or institutional evidence on prices, labour markets, public services and macroeconomic conditions.

The evidence levels of the analysis are medium (**). The analysis was conducted using the IPC Analysis Platform (AP).

HFSA

Assistance data were provided by the Food Security and Agriculture Sector and WFP, with contributions from reporting partners. For long-staying Syrians and post-December 2024 arrivals, beneficiary estimates represented unique individuals derived through district-level deduplication of cash and school-meals assistance and were capped at the corresponding district population. For Lebanese residents, figures were aggregated across programme modalities and may retain some overlap; they therefore represent programme reach rather than fully deduplicated beneficiary counts. Coverage estimates are consequently not directly comparable across population groups.

For the projection period, only food security assistance considered planned and likely to be funded and delivered at the time of analysis was incorporated. The projected assistance estimates included no secured assistance for June and July 2027 because funding beyond May had not been confirmed. This was treated as an assumption for the projection, not as a statement that no assistance would ultimately be delivered. Actual funding and delivery should therefore be monitored against the assumptions used in the analysis.

Limitations of the Analysis

Population estimates and comparability: Lebanon's population remains difficult to measure in the context of conflict, internal displacement, return and cross-border movement. The analysis therefore relied mostly on 2027 inter-agency planning figures rather than an updated official population count. These estimates combine multiple data sources and assumptions and should not be interpreted as observed demographic change alone. The substantial reduction in the Syrian planning denominator and the redistribution of the Lebanese population across districts can mechanically alter IPC prevalence, caseloads and assistance-coverage rates. To capture the Syrian population dynamics in more accurate and timely manner, 2026 inter-agency planning figures were used for the current analysis while 2027 figures were used for the projection. Comparisons with earlier IPC rounds should therefore consider both changes in food-security conditions and revisions to the underlying population framework.

Rapidly changing displacement and access conditions: Displacement, return, security and physical access were changing during the analysis period. Available data represent conditions at particular points in time and may not fully capture subsequent movements, renewed displacement, evacuation orders or changes in access to homes, markets, work and services. Recorded return also does not establish that housing, livelihoods or essential services have been restored. These dynamics introduce uncertainty into both current estimates and the projection.

Data collection and sampling limitations: Some districts did not meet the sample requirements for separate analysis. Lebanese and Syrian units were therefore clustered in accordance with the analytical approach applied for this round. While clustering allowed available evidence to be incorporated into the analysis, it reduced geographic granularity and may mask differences between districts or localities within the same cluster. Palestine refugees and post-December 2024 arrivals were classified nationally, and the analysis therefore does not support district-level classifications for these groups.

The Lebanese mVAM relied on telephone interviews. In conflict-affected and border areas, particularly El Nabatieh, Marjaayoun and Bent Jbeil, unreliable network coverage, electricity interruptions, displacement, limited phone access and higher non-response may have excluded some of the most affected households. Refusals linked to security concerns and self-reporting may also have affected survey responses. In addition, some respondents may have assessed their circumstances relative to neighbouring households experiencing more severe losses, potentially contributing to underreporting of economic or food-security pressures. The direction and magnitude of any resulting bias cannot be quantified.

Similarly, the 2026 MSNA faced operational and access constraints. In some cases, households that declined participation were replaced by nearby households to maintain sample-size targets, introducing potential substitution bias if replacement households differed systematically from non-respondents. In addition, some insecure, difficult-to-access and dispersed rural areas were not fully covered within the sampling frame. Furthermore, not all households had the same probability of selection. These limitations may have affected the representation of some vulnerable household groups, particularly households in conflict-affected, insecure or remote locations, and may contribute to underestimation of food insecurity and coping outcomes in some areas.

Post-December 2024 arrivals from Syria: Evidence for post-December 2024 arrivals is subject to particular uncertainty. The group was analysed nationally, and the report identifies concerns about the completeness of registration information and possible selection bias towards households that were easier to contact and interview. Population figures are planning assumptions rather than a complete observed count, while mobility and documentation constraints may affect who can be reached. The comparatively favourable food-consumption result for cases where selected households declined to participate, replacement with a nearby household was permitte; this group must therefore be read alongside exceptionally high consumption and livelihood coping and substantial reliance on assistance; it should not be taken as evidence of broad or sustained recovery.

Differences in source timing and analytical scale: The analysis drew on datasets collected at different times and using different methods, reference periods and geographic levels. Household assessments were conducted between April and September 2026, while secondary evidence on conflict, displacement, prices, markets, agriculture and assistance was updated at different intervals. Conditions may therefore have changed between data collection, the September analysis workshop and publication. Indicators from different sources are complementary but are not always directly comparable across population groups or geographic units.

These limitations do not invalidate the analysis. They define the level of confidence and the care required when interpreting district differences, population-group comparisons, changes from earlier IPC rounds and projection-period results. The classifications were reached through convergence of available evidence and technical consensus; continued monitoring is necessary where population movements, access, programme delivery or projection assumptions change materially.

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What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of food and nutrition crises based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

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Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, IMPACT Initiatives, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and the World Bank.

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