# LEBANON

## ALMOST 1.2 MILLION PEOPLE EXPERIENCING HIGH LEVELS OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY DESPITE CEASEFIRE

**IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS**

**APRIL 2025 - OCTOBER 2025**

**Published on 21 MAY 2025**

**CURRENT PERIOD: APRIL – JUNE 2025 (Lebanese Residents, Syrian Refugees, Palestine Refugees)**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **1.17M** 21 percent of the population analysed. People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| | Phase 4 | 55,000 People in Emergency |
| | Phase 3 | 1,118,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 2,257,000 People in Stressed |
| | Phase 1 | 2,058,000 People in Food Security |

**PROJECTED PERIOD: JULY 2025 – OCTOBER 2025 (Lebanese Residents, Syrian Refugees, Palestine Refugees)**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **1.24M** 23 percent of the population analysed. People likely facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| | Phase 4 | 41,000 People in Emergency |
| | Phase 3 | 1,200,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 2,168,000 People in Stressed |
| | Phase 1 | 2,078,000 People in Food Security |

### Overview

Despite the November 2024 ceasefire, about 1.17 million Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees and Palestine refugees continue experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and June 2025. Among them, around 55,000 people are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) while 1.1 million people are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). The situation is mainly driven by the prolonged impact of conflict, continued displacement, and the reduction of humanitarian food security assistance.

The areas facing the highest incidence of acute food insecurity are Baalbek, El Hermel, Baabda, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Sour, and Akkar. Out of the total populations analysed, 591,000 Lebanese residents (15 percent of the resident population), 515,000 Syrian refugees (37 percent of the total Syrian refugee population in Lebanon), and 67,000 Palestine refugees (30 percent of the total Palestine refugee population in Lebanon) are facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) and require urgent action to keep conditions from worsening.

The current situation represents a reduction in food insecurity compared to the previous IPC analysis of November 2024, when 1.65 million people in Lebanon were classified in IPC Phase 3 or above. The reduction of food insecure populations is mainly attributed to the enforcement of the November 2024 ceasefire, followed by a temporary surge in Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA) targeting the most vulnerable households. However, the impacts of conflict and the economic crisis continue to threaten recovery efforts, as infrastructure remains damaged, the economy remains stagnant, inflation continues rising, and funding prospects for HFSA in 2025 are negative (In total, 2.84 million people received HFSA in 2024, while in 2025 and until the end of the projection period, 1.83 million people are expected to receive assistance). For these reasons, food insecurity was expected to rise during the projection period and to affect 1.24 million people equivalent to 23 percent of the total analysed population between July and October 2025.

**Current Acute Food Insecurity: April - June 2025**




**Projected Acute Food Insecurity: July - October 2025**



## KEY DRIVERS

**Prolonged impact of conflict:** Despite a significant de-escalation of conflict following the ceasefire, the repercussions of the conflict persist, with approximately USD $14 billion worth of damage severely constraining local economies and household livelihoods particularly in the most conflict-impacted governorates, along with an estimated recovery need of USD $11 billion.

**Continued displacement:** Displacement-related vulnerabilities continue to affect a significant number of returnees (around 967,000 people returned in total as of early April 2025) and approximately 100,000 remaining internally displaced people (IDPs). There are additional pressures as well due to new refugee arrivals from Syria compounding humanitarian needs and straining available resources.

**Agricultural deterioration in southern governorates:** Agricultural production activities have been severely eroded due to the conflict, especially in the South, severely affecting rural livelihoods dependent on agriculture. Damage to critical agricultural infrastructure, limited access to inputs, and disruptions to farming cycles have resulted in significantly reduced crop yields, negatively influencing local food availability, market supply, and household incomes.

**Reductions in Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA):** Humanitarian Food Security Assistance, initially scaled-up during the peak conflict and immediate post-ceasefire periods, has subsequently faced considerable funding shortfalls and reductions. Syrian refugees and other highly vulnerable groups have been disproportionately impacted by these cuts, undermining their ability to meet basic food needs. Continued reductions in assistance levels are expected to further deteriorate food security conditions, significantly contributing to the projection of increased acute food insecurity.

## POPULATION

In the previous round of the analysis conducted in November 2024, the IPC Technical Working Group (TWG) endorsed the use of population figures provided by the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) and the Inter-Agency coordination system (ISCG) for Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees.

Given the continuously evolving situation, for the current and projection periods of this analysis, the LRP 2025 post-ceasefire planning figures of Lebanese residents per district were updated with the latest displacement figures (IOM DTM - Round 84). For Syrian refugees, while the overall population has been adjusted to 1.4 million by the ISCG, accurate and up-to-date disaggregated data at the district level were not made available during the analysis. Accordingly, the population of Syrian refugees per district from the previous analysis was proportionately decreased across all units of analysis. For Palestine refugees, the previous IPC analysis figure was used at the national level. It is important to note that these estimates account only partially for population movements outside the country.

This approach ensures coherence with established frameworks but is subject to severe limitations as the lack of updated and reliable official population statistics and significant population movements within and beyond Lebanon have substantially changed the geographical distribution of the population. Discrepancies in the available estimates further highlight the challenges in estimating the scale of displacement and baseline population figures. For instance, the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) continues to estimate the Lebanese population at 3.86 million, while the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon is currently estimated at 1.4 million, despite the ongoing crossings of people back and forth from Syria. This ongoing movement underscores the fluidity of population dynamics. In addition, following the latest developments in Syria in the past few months, over 110,000 individuals were estimated to have been displaced from Syria into Lebanon between early December 2024 and end of March 2025, including both Lebanese and Syrian nationals (Lebanese Red Cross (LRC), UNHCR), and were not included as part of the population figures used in this report, as there is still no official consensus on their geographical distribution and nationality segregation.

## DISCLAIMER

*This report incorporates population figures based on the data endorsed by the LRP and inter-agency coordination systems and updated based on the latest displacement data for Lebanese residents as per the IOM DTM report. These figures were utilized in recognition of the inherent challenges in accurately estimating population numbers during this fluid and evolving period. Factors influencing this decision include the lack of reliable baseline population figures, significant cross-border movements between Lebanon and Syria, and discrepancies in existing estimates of displacement and population movements, as highlighted above.*

*The report acknowledges the provisional nature of these figures and will review them in subsequent IPC rounds, as soon as greater clarity and updated data becomes available. This approach aims to ensure alignment with ongoing planning and coordination mechanisms in Lebanon, avoiding divergence that could hinder collective response efforts.*

# CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (APRIL – JUNE 2025)

| LEBANESE RESIDENTS - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: APRIL – JUNE 2025 | | |
|---|---|---|
| **591,000** | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| **15 percent of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | 0 People in Emergency |
| People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | 591,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 1,569,000 People in Stressed |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | 1,705,000 People in Food Security |

| SYRIAN REFUGEES - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: APRIL – JUNE 2025 | | |
|---|---|---|
| **515,000** | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| **37 percent of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | 44,000 People in Emergency |
| People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | 471,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 588,000 People in Stressed |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | 297,000 People in Food Security |

| PALESTINE REFUGEES - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: APRIL – JUNE 2025 | | |
|---|---|---|
| **67,000** | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| **30 percent of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | 11,000 People in Emergency |
| People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | 56,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 100,000 People in Stressed |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | 56,000 People in Food Security |



# POPULATION TABLE FOR THE CURRENT PERIOD (APRIL – JUNE 2025)

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | | #people | % |
| Akkar | Lebanese | 298,340 | 59,668 | 20 | 164,087 | 55 | 74,585 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 74,585 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 146,202 | 21,930 | 15 | 65,791 | 45 | 51,171 | 35 | 7,310 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 58,481 | 40 |
| | **Total** | 444,542 | 81,598 | 18 | 229,878 | 52 | 125,756 | 28 | 7,310 | 2 | 0 | 0 | | 133,066 | 30 |
| Aley | Lebanese | 216,890 | 119,290 | 55 | 75,912 | 35 | 21,689 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21,689 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 82,083 | 24,625 | 30 | 32,833 | 40 | 24,625 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 24,625 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 298,973 | 143,914 | 48 | 108,745 | 36 | 46,314 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 46,314 | 15 |
| Baabda | Lebanese | 409,486 | 163,794 | 40 | 163,794 | 40 | 81,897 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 81,897 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 136,196 | 27,239 | 20 | 54,478 | 40 | 54,478 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 54,478 | 40 |
| | **Total** | 545,682 | 191,034 | 35 | 218,273 | 40 | 136,376 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 136,376 | 25 |
| Baalbek & El Hermel | Baalbek & El Hermel Lebanese | 221,748 | 55,437 | 25 | 110,874 | 50 | 55,437 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 55,437 | 25 |
| | Baalbek Syrian Ref. | 174,508 | 26,176 | 15 | 69,803 | 40 | 69,803 | 40 | 8,725 | 5 | | | 3 | 78,528 | 45 |
| | El Hermel Syrian Ref. | 12,274 | 1,841 | 15 | 4,910 | 40 | 4,910 | 40 | 614 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5,524 | 45 |
| | **Total** | 408,530 | 83,454 | 20 | 185,587 | 45 | 130,150 | 32 | 9,339 | 2 | 0 | 0 | | 139,489 | 34 |
| Beirut | Lebanese | 240,126 | 132,069 | 55 | 84,044 | 35 | 24,013 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 24,013 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 32,649 | 8,162 | 25 | 14,692 | 45 | 9,795 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9,795 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 272,775 | 140,232 | 51 | 98,736 | 36 | 33,807 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 33,807 | 12 |
| Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun & El Nabatieh | Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Lebanese | 108,011 | 21,602 | 20 | 64,807 | 60 | 21,602 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 21,602 | 20 |
| | El Nabatieh Lebanese | 159,148 | 31,830 | 20 | 87,531 | 55 | 39,787 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 39,787 | 25 |
| | Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun & El Nabatieh Syrian Ref. | 56,214 | 8,432 | 15 | 28,107 | 50 | 16,864 | 30 | 2,811 | 5 | | | 3 | 19,675 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 323,373 | 61,864 | 19 | 180,445 | 56 | 78,253 | 24 | 2,811 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 81,064 | 25 |
| Chouf | Lebanese | 210,110 | 115,561 | 55 | 73,539 | 35 | 21,011 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21,011 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 63,719 | 15,930 | 25 | 28,674 | 45 | 19,116 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 19,116 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 273,829 | 131,490 | 48 | 102,212 | 37 | 40,127 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 40,127 | 15 |
| El Batroun & El Koura | El Batroun & El Koura Lebanese | 125,888 | 81,827 | 65 | 37,766 | 30 | 6,294 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6,294 | 5 |
| | El Batroun Syrian Ref. | 17,041 | 4,260 | 25 | 7,668 | 45 | 5,112 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5,112 | 30 |
| | El Koura Syrian Ref. | 20,745 | 4,149 | 20 | 9,335 | 45 | 7,261 | 35 | 0 | 0 | | | 3 | 7,261 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 163,674 | 90,236 | 55 | 54,770 | 33 | 18,667 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 18,667 | 11 |
| El Meten | Lebanese | 399,794 | 239,876 | 60 | 119,938 | 30 | 39,979 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 39,979 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 48,407 | 14,522 | 30 | 21,783 | 45 | 12,102 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12,102 | 25 |
| | **Total** | 448,201 | 254,399 | 57 | 141,721 | 32 | 52,081 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 52,081 | 12 |
| El Minieh-Dennie | Lebanese | 122,174 | 42,761 | 35 | 54,978 | 45 | 24,435 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 24,435 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 71,580 | 10,737 | 15 | 35,790 | 50 | 25,053 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 25,053 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 193,754 | 53,498 | 28 | 90,768 | 47 | 49,488 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 49,488 | 26 |

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | | #people | % |
| Jbeil | Lebanese | 116,086 | 75,456 | 65 | 29,022 | 25 | 11,609 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11,609 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 10,104 | 2,526 | 25 | 5,557 | 55 | 2,021 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2,021 | 20 |
| | **Total** | 126,190 | 77,982 | 62 | 34,579 | 27 | 13,629 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 13,629 | 11 |
| Jezzine | Lebanese | 27,257 | 9,540 | 35 | 16,354 | 60 | 1,363 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1,363 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 3,901 | 975 | 25 | 2,146 | 55 | 780 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 780 | 20 |
| | **Total** | 31,158 | 10,515 | 34 | 18,500 | 59 | 2,143 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 2,143 | 7 |
| Kesrwane | Lebanese | 230,819 | 150,032 | 65 | 69,246 | 30 | 11,541 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11,541 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 18,855 | 5,657 | 30 | 9,428 | 50 | 3,771 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3,771 | 20 |
| | **Total** | 249,674 | 155,689 | 62 | 78,673 | 32 | 15,312 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 15,312 | 6 |
| Rachaya & Hasbaya | Lebanese | 57,177 | 25,730 | 45 | 22,871 | 40 | 8,577 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8,577 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 14,882 | 2,976 | 20 | 6,697 | 45 | 4,465 | 30 | 744 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5,209 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 72,059 | 28,706 | 40 | 29,568 | 41 | 13,041 | 18 | 744 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 13,785 | 19 |
| Saida | Lebanese | 216,472 | 75,765 | 35 | 108,236 | 50 | 32,471 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 32,471 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 56,056 | 11,211 | 20 | 25,225 | 45 | 16,817 | 30 | 2,803 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 19,620 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 272,528 | 86,976 | 32 | 133,461 | 49 | 49,288 | 18 | 2,803 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 52,091 | 19 |
| Sour | Lebanese | 201,117 | 60,335 | 30 | 100,559 | 50 | 40,223 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 40,223 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 37,695 | 5,654 | 15 | 18,848 | 50 | 11,309 | 30 | 1,885 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13,194 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 238,812 | 65,989 | 28 | 119,406 | 50 | 51,532 | 22 | 1,885 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 53,417 | 22 |
| Tripoli | Lebanese | 201,499 | 90,675 | 45 | 80,600 | 40 | 30,225 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 30,225 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 54,172 | 13,543 | 25 | 21,669 | 40 | 16,252 | 30 | 2,709 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 18,961 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 255,671 | 104,218 | 41 | 102,268 | 40 | 46,476 | 18 | 2,709 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 49,185 | 19 |
| West Bekaa | Lebanese | 67,902 | 27,161 | 40 | 27,161 | 40 | 13,580 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13,580 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 89,254 | 22,314 | 25 | 35,702 | 40 | 26,776 | 30 | 4,463 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 31,239 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 157,156 | 49,474 | 31 | 62,862 | 40 | 40,357 | 26 | 4,463 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | 44,820 | 29 |
| Zahle | Lebanese | 140,211 | 70,106 | 50 | 49,074 | 35 | 21,032 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21,032 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 229,623 | 57,406 | 25 | 80,368 | 35 | 80,368 | 35 | 11,481 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 91,849 | 40 |
| | **Total** | 369,834 | 127,511 | 34 | 129,442 | 35 | 101,400 | 27 | 11,481 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | 112,881 | 31 |
| Zgharta & Bcharre | Lebanese | 94,025 | 56,415 | 60 | 28,208 | 30 | 9,403 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9,403 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 23,840 | 7,152 | 30 | 8,344 | 35 | 8,344 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8,344 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 117,865 | 63,567 | 54 | 36,552 | 31 | 17,747 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 17,747 | 15 |
| Palestine Refugees | Palestine Ref. | 223,000 | 55,750 | 25 | 100,350 | 45 | 55,750 | 25 | 11,150 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 66,900 | 30 |
| Total | **Lebanese** | **3,864,280** | **1,704,930** | **44** | **1,568,601** | **41** | **590,753** | **15** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | | **590,753** | **15** |
| | **Syrian Ref.** | **1,400,000** | **297,417** | **21** | **587,848** | **42** | **471,193** | **34** | **43,545** | **3** | **0** | **0** | | **514,738** | **37** |
| | **Palestine Ref.** | **223,000** | **55,750** | **25** | **100,350** | **45** | **55,750** | **25** | **11,150** | **5** | **0** | **0** | | **66,900** | **30** |
| | **Grand Total** | **5,487,280** | **2,058,097** | **38** | **2,256,796** | **41** | **1,117,693** | **20** | **54,694** | **1** | **0** | **0** | | **1,172,387** | **21** |

*Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.*

## CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (APRIL – JUNE 2025)

Three population groups are covered in this IPC analysis: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees. The analysis was carried out for 21 units of analysis for Lebanese residents (16 districts and five clusters), 22 units of analysis for Syrian refugees (19 districts and three clusters), and one national unit of analysis for Palestine refugees. The analysis covered over 99 percent of the estimated population living in the country and produced the IPC current (April to June 2025) and projected (July to October 2025) acute food insecurity phase classification.

The period from late November 2024 to April 2025 has seen a gradual recovery in food security conditions toward pre-war levels. Compared to the peak food insecurity experienced during the conflict period of October-November 2024, the overall situation has become less severe, with a steady reduction in populations classified in IPC Phase 3 or above. The de-escalation of hostilities enabled most internally displaced people (IDPs) to return to their communities, while market functionality recovered to pre-conflict levels, particularly in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, as well as in most conflict affected areas.

A temporary surge in humanitarian food security assistance (HFSA), peaking during and immediately after the conflict, significantly supported the most vulnerable Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, and displaced persons, helping them to meet food and other essential needs. In 2024, over 2.8 million people benefited from HFSA throughout the year. A total of 1.78 million individuals received assistance between January and September 2024, prior to the escalation of the conflict. This number increased to around 2.8 million individuals between October and December 2024, following the escalation of the conflict. The scale up of assistance provided much-needed support to the most vulnerable populations impacted by the conflict. However, for 2025, a major reduction in HFSA is to be expected: while a total of 1.83 million individuals are expected to receive some sort of assistance throughout the year until October 2025, specifically, 1.5 million individuals are expected to be assisted in the current period of April till July 2025, and around 1.05 million people are expected to be assisted in the projection period of July till October 2025.

Inflation, while remaining high, has also shown signs of gradually reverting to pre-escalation trajectory. Political advancements, including filling key institutional positions and government re-engagement with international partners, have stimulated renewed private sector activity and boosted tourism during the Christmas and Ramadan holiday seasons.

Nevertheless, food insecurity remains significant across the country due to extensive damage, economic losses, and significant recovery needs in the food and agriculture sectors caused by the conflict. Additionally, pre-existing factors such as the ongoing economic crisis, reductions in humanitarian aid, and continuing hostilities in the southern and eastern border regions continue to undermine food security.

The highest incidence of acute food insecurity was observed in districts affected by the conflict (including Baalbek, El Hermel, Baabda, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, and Sour) as well as Akkar. Baalbek district had transitioned out of IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) between October 2024 and December 2024 and remained in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) in April 2025 for both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees. This is mainly due to a de-escalation in conflict, which allowed people displaced by fighting to return home, and lessened the burden on host communities as well as improved market access and supply.

Lebanese residents: Of the 21 units of analysis, eight are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) including six districts (Akkar, Baabda, El Minieh-Dennie, El Nabatieh, Sour, and West Bekaa), and two clusters of districts (Baalbek & El Hermel, and Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun). Some 25 percent of Lebanese residents are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) in three units of analysis (Akkar, El Nabatieh, and Baalbek & El Hermel). The highest occurrence of acute food insecurity is observed in the districts of Baabda (82,000 people) and Akkar (75,000 people), and the cluster of Baalbek & El Hermel (55,000 people). No Lebanese residents are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).

Syrian refugees: All units of analysis, 19 districts and three clusters, are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) for the current period. Overall, a total of 54,000 Syrian refugees are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). The highest prevalence of acute food insecurity is observed in the districts of Baalbek (79,000 people), and El Hermel (6,000 people) where 45 percent of the population is classified in IPC Phase 3 or above, with 5 percent in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), and 40 percent in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). This is followed by Zahle (92,000 people), Akkar (58,000 people) and Baabda (54,000 people), with 40 percent of the population classified in IPC Phase 3 or above, including 35 percent in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and 5 percent in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) in Akkar and Zahle, while 40 percent of the population is in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) in Baabda.

Palestine refugees: Palestine refugees in Lebanon (both residing in and outside camps) and Palestine refugees from Syria are analysed as a single unit of analysis at the national level. Overall, 30 percent of the Palestine refugee population, representing 67,000 individuals, is classified in Phase 3 or above, out of which 25 percent (56,000 people) are in Phase 3 and 5 percent (11,000 people) are in Phase 4.

# CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO FOOD INSECURITY

Following the ceasefire in late November 2024, the de-escalation of hostilities allowed hundreds of thousands of IDPs, both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees, to return to their communities; which is a factor in improving food security levels. In parallel, major milestones were achieved at the political level such as the election of a President of the Republic, the formation of a government and the restoration of Parliamentary confidence following plans for economic and financial reform, the cabinet's approval of the 2025 budget, and timely nominations for high-ranking administrative and security posts (including Army Chief and Central Bank governor). However, damage to infrastructure during the conflict will have a lasting impact on food insecurity and compound pre-conflict factors, including the country's severe economic, and social crisis.

## Lasting impact of conflict despite de-escalating hostilities

The ceasefire agreement implemented in late November 2024 significantly improved security and facilitated the return of a majority of IDPs. Market functionality and basic services began to resume operations, notably in previously isolated areas such as southern Lebanon, Baalbek-El Hermel, and Bekaa. This reopening of market routes and restored mobility allowed households to gradually resume livelihood activities, contributing to a reduction in acute food insecurity compared to the peak of conflict.

However, the improvements in the food security situation because of the ceasefire remain fragile and uneven. Fourteen months of conflict, which peaked between October and November 2024, resulted in widespread destruction of farms, homes, and infrastructure particularly in southern and eastern Lebanon. Many farmers missed harvests or lost livestock during the fighting, and they now face the costly challenge of clearing rubble and unexploded ordnance from their fields. Agricultural activity is resuming only gradually – for example, banana and citrus growers in the South can access their orchards again, but irrigation systems and roads still need repairs. Moreover, market access has also not fully normalised in conflict-affected areas. In addition, humanitarian access remains challenging in some conflict-affected areas, especially in the South. Despite the cessation of large-scale military operations, ongoing security incidents, unexploded ordnance, and damaged infrastructure continue to impede the delivery of aid.

In addition to access challenges, the scale of destruction has been substantial. The World Bank's 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) estimates that the conflict has caused USD $14 billion in physical damage and economic losses and that the country requires approximately USD $11 billion for recovery and reconstruction. The food security and agriculture sector alone sustained USD $79 million in physical damages, including damaged irrigation networks, livestock shelters, food storage units, and marketplaces, and USD $742 million in economic losses, mostly in unsold crops. The reconstruction and recovery needs for the sector are estimated at USD $412 million, mainly to provide emergency food assistance for the most vulnerable in conflict-affected regions.

## Displacement

Although the displacement of people has reduced since the ceasfire, with around 967,000 IPDs returning to their communities as of April 10, 2025, around 92,000 individuals remain displaced, primarily concentrated in southern Lebanon, Bekaa, and Baalbek-El Hermel. Returnee households frequently face significant barriers to reintegration, including severely damaged housing, depleted financial resources, and limited access to essential services such as healthcare, water, and education. The IOM Return Intention Survey (March 2025) found that nearly 47 percent of displaced households reported their properties or assets were lost or damaged, and nearly half required financial assistance for repairs.

While the relative burden on host communities due to the reduction in IDPs overall is expected to decrease, the strain on host communities persists, especially in urban centres and certain governorates such as Beirut, Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa, where rental markets remain highly strained, further exacerbating economic vulnerability for both displaced and host households. Although most IDPs have transitioned out of collective shelters, a portion remain in crowded or temporary housing, with continued dependence on humanitarian support.

In addition to internal displacement, population movements from Syria into Northeastern and Northern Lebanon have increased since early 2025, further intensifying pressure on services and exacerbating community-level tensions, especially in the districts of Tripoli, Akkar and El Hermel. The combined effects of protracted displacement, incomplete recovery, and rising competition for assistance and services remain a major contributor to acute food insecurity, particularly in areas with large populations of returnees and refugees.

### Lingering economic crisis

Lebanon's prolonged economic crisis remains a key driver of food insecurity across the country, further compounded by the 2023–2024 conflict and its lasting impact on livelihoods, services, and macroeconomic stability. According to the World Bank's March 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), real GDP is estimated to have declined by 7.1 percent in 2024, compared to a pre-conflict growth projection of 0.9 percent. This brings the cumulative GDP decline since 2019 to nearly 40 percent, with sharp declines in private consumption, investment, and sectoral productivity.

The economic downturn has hit already vulnerable households the hardest. Private consumption, which represents a significant share of GDP, has continued to fall, undermining the ability of families to purchase basic goods, including food. The collapse of Lebanon's financial system, limited banking access, and a growing reliance on a cash-based, dollarised economy have widened disparities.

Despite a budget surplus in 2024, public revenues remain inadequate to support large-scale recovery and social protection, and the 2025 budget reflects persistent fiscal constraints. High debt levels and limited reforms continue to deter international support, and although a new government has improved institutional functioning, progress on key reforms remains slow.

As households face higher service costs, transportation expenses, and inflationary pressures—particularly for non-food essentials—access to sufficient and nutritious food remains jeopardized, especially among low-income Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees. Without a scale-up in economic support and targeted recovery investments, the economic crisis will remain a key driver of food insecurity throughout 2025.

### Market situation

Market functionality significantly improved post-ceasefire, with the World Food Programme (WFP)'s Market Functionality Index (MFI) assessment reaching an average of 7.5 nationally by February 2025, highlighting an increased prevalence of shops being able to operate efficiently, improved supply chains, and improved price predictability. In previously hard-hit areas, improvements were particularly notable. The South and El Nabatieh, which had recorded MFI scores of 1.7 and 1.1, respectively, in November 2024, both saw sharp increases to 6.3 and 6.3 by February 2025. Baalbek-El Hermel similarly improved from 2.7 to 6.3. These gains were largely driven by the reopening of shops, restocking of essential goods, and restoration of supply routes.

The March 2025 Market Monitor reinforced these trends, where 96 percent of WFP-contracted shops were operational nationwide, compared to 80 percent in November 2024. Retailers continued to report significant improvements in supply chain performance: 100 percent received goods on time and in full, and over 90 percent reported stock levels sufficient for at least two weeks. Price predictability also improved markedly, with only 8 percent of retailers reporting difficulties in forecasting prices, down from 43 percent in November. However, regional disparities persist, particularly regarding elevated transportation costs and localized infrastructure constraints. Peripheral regions remain vulnerable to disruptions due to dependency on limited wholesalers and logistical bottlenecks. Elevated prices, especially for fresh food and essential non-food items, persistently limit purchasing power among vulnerable groups, particularly households reliant on fixed incomes, informal labour, or reduced humanitarian assistance, thereby sustaining food insecurity risks despite broader market improvements.

### Inflation

Inflation, while moderate compared to peak crisis years, remains problematic, especially for households with fixed incomes in Lebanese Pounds (LBP). Following four consecutive years of triple-digit inflation, Lebanon saw a relative moderation starting in 2024. According to official data, year-on-year general inflation stood at 16 percent as of February 2025, while food inflation reached 20 percent—down significantly from the 215 and 220 percent levels recorded in October 2023, respectively. This improvement is largely attributed to the continued stabilization of the LBP, which has remained anchored at around LBP 89,700 to $1 USD since October 2023, and the relative containment of global commodity prices.

Despite this macro-level stabilisation, household-level inflation remains pronounced, particularly for non-food essentials. The March 2025 WFP Market Monitor highlights that the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) for a family of five reached USD $454, reflecting a 13 percent year-on-year increase. The food SMEB per person rose to USD $38.1, a 10 percent increase from February 2024. These increases have outpaced income growth for the majority of vulnerable households, especially those reliant on humanitarian assistance or informal labour. Non-food expenditures have also continued to climb. Between February 2024 and February 2025, the non-food SMEB rose by 14 percent, driven by increases in generator electricity costs, healthcare expenses, and rent, particularly in displacement-affected areas.

### Job opportunities

The protracted economic crisis and the compounding effects of the conflict have disrupted formal employment, accelerated the shift toward informal and insecure labour, and reduced income-generating opportunities across key sectors. As a result, access to stable livelihoods remains a major determinant of household food security, particularly for displaced populations and low-income groups.

According to WFP mVAM real-time monitoring (RTM) data, employment conditions between December 2024 and February 2025 remained volatile. Monthly employment rates among individuals aged 18–64 reached an average of 53 percent. Unemployment averaged 24 percent, while gender disparities persist: only 31 percent of women were employed compared to 74 percent of men, while female unemployment reached 39 percent, more than double that of their male counterparts (15 percent).

The March 2025 RDNA confirms that job losses were concentrated in areas most affected by the conflict, particularly in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and small-scale retail. The conflict destroyed or disrupted business operations across Southern Lebanon and Baalbek-El Hermel, causing long-term employment shocks in already fragile districts, due to damaged infrastructure, asset losses, and reduced demand.

Informal labour has become increasingly prevalent but offers limited income stability or protection. Daily wage and seasonal employment opportunities, while providing short-term relief, are insufficient to meet the rising cost of living, particularly given increasing competition from displaced populations and refugees. Without broader economic recovery initiatives and targeted employment programs, households continue to face precarious livelihood situations, sustaining their vulnerability to food insecurity.

### Social and humanitarian assistance

In the wake of the late-2024 conflict, humanitarian food assistance (HFA) was scaled up significantly, playing a critical role in stabilising food security outcomes during and immediately after the conflict. National and international authorities and agencies mounted an emergency response to address the needs of displaced and affected populations. The Ministry of Social Affairs, with World Bank support, resumed emergency cash transfers (AMAN program) by October 2024, and WFP rolled out a Shock Responsive Safety Net (SRSN) to assist vulnerable families in conflict-affected areas. During the height of the crisis, food relief reached a large share of those in need: in late October, over 170,000 IDPs in shelters (nearly 90 percent of shelter residents) were receiving food rations as part of a coordinated response.

As the ceasefire took hold, humanitarian agencies shifted to supporting returnees and host communities through both in-kind food distributions and cash-based assistance. By the start of 2025, partners were delivering monthly food support to Lebanese residents Syrian, and Palestinian households across the country, helping to prevent hunger rates from spiralling. In fact, humanitarian aid has been a decisive factor in the improvement of IPC food security outcomes from December 2024 to April 2025 – effectively buffering millions of people from food consumption gaps during the post-conflict winter. The surge of HFA has helped bring down the share of populations facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) to 21 percent by preventing many at-risk households from sliding into a more severe situation, at least temporarily.

Since early 2025, however, funding shortfalls have led to a significant reduction in humanitarian assistance. By February 2025, approximately 330,000 Syrian refugees previously receiving cash assistance from WFP were removed from aid programs, representing a 40 percent reduction from previous coverage. Similar reductions in assistance for vulnerable Lebanese households have also begun, coinciding with a period where many families typically face heightened vulnerability due to depleted savings and limited seasonal work opportunities. These cuts have contributed to the persistent high rates of food insecurity, particularly affecting households in regions such as the Bekaa, northern Lebanon, and southern districts heavily reliant on humanitarian support. This raises the risk that the improvements observed since late 2024 will stall or even reverse, with many households currently in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) at risk of deteriorating back into Crisis.

### Overstretched public services

Lebanon's public service systems remain overstretched following the conflict escalation in late 2024, with health, water, sanitation, electricity, and education infrastructure sustaining widespread damage. The resulting service gaps continue to affect hundreds of thousands of people, particularly returnees and displaced households in Southern Lebanon, Baalbek-El Hermel, and Bekaa. These gaps have been exacerbated by critical funding shortfalls, with many local authorities and humanitarian actors reporting limited capacity to sustain essential operations.

[1] calculated using the ILO relaxed definition

The conflict has resulted in estimated losses of USD $700 million to Lebanon's health sector, including USD $208 million worth of physical damage to 298 health facilities. As of March 2025, 17 primary health care centres and one hospital remain closed, primarily in conflict-affected areas, according to the Ministry of Public Health. Damaged infrastructure, shortages of staff, medications and supplies, disrupted supply chains, and the suspension of key donor-funded programs have limited the provision of essential services. Damage to 45 water facilities and extensive sections of wastewater networks has affected over 1.5 million people, particularly in the South and Bekaa. The total estimated cost of damage in the water sector is USD $356 million, with additional losses of USD $171 million from higher operating costs and revenue losses (World Bank RDNA). Inadequate electricity supply has also continued to limit the functioning of pumping stations, creating a widespread reliance on private water trucking providers.

Access to electricity remains highly unequal and has caused a dependence on costly private generators. According to WFP data, households received an average of 16.5 hours of electricity from different power sources each day in March 2025, up from 13 hours in late 2024. This recovery was uneven across regions, with conflict-affected areas such as El Nabatieh and South Lebanon still facing unstable supplies.

Across all sectors, service provision remains constrained by funding shortfalls and logistical barriers. The shrinking humanitarian space, combined with the suspension of major international funding, has severely hampered the scale and continuity of recovery services. Essential public services are expected to remain under significant pressure throughout the projection period, with vulnerable populations facing the greatest risk of exclusion.

### Deteriorated livelihoods of farmers

The FAO DIEM-monitoring survey, conducted in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) between November 8 and December 1, 2024, highlights the severe impact of the conflict on agricultural households. The survey found that 39 percent of agricultural households were directly affected, with the districts of Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, and Sour being the hardest hit.

Key findings include:

- Crop producers are particularly affected, with 98 percent anticipating significant production losses, and 79 percent expecting major losses.
- Income reductions were reported by 49 percent of agricultural households, with the Baalbeck district experiencing the highest impact.
- The livestock sector has also been severely affected, with 80 percent of households facing challenges due to high feed prices, inaccessible pastures, and limited veterinary services.
- Insecurity has further exacerbated the situation, with 83 percent of respondents reporting unsafe access to fields and 68 percent experiencing reduced market access.
- Nearly 30 percent of agricultural households are experiencing moderate to severe food insecurity, particularly in Baalbeck and Marjaayoun.

In response, 91 percent of households have resorted to coping mechanisms, including cutting back on agricultural inputs (75 percent) and drawing on savings (59 percent), underscoring the urgent need for targeted support.

Additionally, FAO, in collaboration with MoA and the National Council for Scientific Research-Lebanon (CNRS-L), conducted an agricultural damage and loss assessment to estimate the extent of damages and losses within Lebanon's agricultural sector due to the conflict between October 2023 and November 2024. This assessment also identified key recovery, and reconstruction needs to inform future response efforts. The assessment found that Lebanon's agriculture sector has incurred an estimated USD $704 million in damages and losses (USD $118 million in damages and USD $586 million in losses), primarily concentrated in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. The most severely affected subsector is crops, particularly olives, citrus, and tobacco, due to widespread orchard destruction. The livestock, forestry, fisheries, and aquaculture sectors have also been heavily impacted.

The agricultural sector requires a total of USD $263 million for reconstruction and recovery, with USD $32 million allocated for emergency assistance to restart farming, livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture production. An estimated USD $135 million is needed to rebuild and restore agricultural assets, including the replacement of perennial crops, restocking livestock, and rehabilitating farms and essential infrastructure such as greenhouses, irrigation systems, machinery.

### Risk of rising malnutrition

Malnutrition remains a notable concern, particularly among vulnerable groups such as children and displaced people, though the situation has not significantly deteriorated compared to previous periods. Wasting surveillance data collected and analysed throughout 2024 by the Ministry of Public Health and Nutrition Sector indicate persistent gaps in the provision of nutritional support: of the 8,731 cases of malnutrition with children experiencing wasting identified across Lebanon each month, only 2,215 were admitted into treatment programs. Admission rates were particularly highest in Akkar, with 1,672 children identified and 491 admitted, followed by the North with 1,672 children identified and 491 admitted. Cure rates also varied widely: while 6 percent of children under the age of five were admitted into care recovered nationwide, regions like Beirut recorded 0 percent cure rates among this age group despite 36 admitted cases, compared to 81.7 percent in Baalbek-Hermel.

Dietary diversity remains limited, particularly among children in economically vulnerable households, with significant numbers reporting diets lacking essential nutrients. Although overall malnutrition rates remain manageable at the national level, localised pockets of concern persist, especially in conflict-affected regions. Continued monitoring and targeted nutritional interventions remain essential to ensuring vulnerable populations, particularly young children, maintain adequate nutrition during Lebanon's ongoing recovery period. This is especially important given the recent aid cuts, as nutrition sector response partners has been compelled to reduce programs in Lebanon, leaving over half a million children and their families at risk of losing critical support.

### Food systems and domestic food supply

Lebanon remains heavily dependent on imports for staple foods, with domestic agricultural production insufficient to meet national demand. The 2024 cereal harvest was significantly below average, affected by adverse weather conditions and compounded by disruptions due to conflict, limiting national grain reserves and increasing reliance on continuous wheat imports. Production of other key staples such as potatoes, vegetables, and pulses also faced constraints due to conflict-related disruptions, particularly in Bekaa and southern agricultural areas.

Fruit production in Lebanon was heavily impacted by the 2024 conflict, with significant losses in the south due to shelling, the displacement of farmers, in addition to wildfires. Olives, a key crop for exports, were particularly affected, with an estimated 12% drop in harvest and $58 million in lost revenues, alongside widespread damage to other fruit and vegetable crops. Livestock sectors, particularly poultry and dairy production, sustained heavy losses due to limited access, asset destruction, and disrupted supply chains during conflict months. Recovery remains constrained by economic instability, limited investment in agricultural infrastructure, and ongoing challenges accessing markets. Addressing these constraints through targeted interventions will be critical for stabilising Lebanon's food supply and improving long-term food security outcomes.

# FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES

## Food Consumption Score (FCS)

The adequacy of diets in Lebanon, as measured by the Food Consumption Score (FCS), continue to reflect significant disparities among population groups. As of March 2025, 11 percent of Lebanese residents had inadequate diets—10 percent classified as borderline and one percent as poor. This is an improvement compared to August 2024, when 17 percent of Lebanese households were unable to maintain an adequate diet. Among Syrian refugees, 27 percent reported inadequate food consumption (22 percent borderline, 5 percent poor), also marking progress from 2024 when 39 percent had unacceptable FCS scores. Palestine refugees remain the most vulnerable group, with only 67 percent reporting acceptable food consumption, with 33 percent classified as borderline or poor. These figures highlight a modest overall improvement in food consumption trends since 2024, particularly among Lebanese and Syrian populations, while underscoring persistent vulnerabilities among refugee communities.

The highest diet inadequacy rates among Lebanese residents in March 2025 was observed in Akkar (19 percent borderline and 3 percent poor FCS), and Baalbek & El-Hermel (14 percent borderline and 3 percent poor FCS). For Syrian refugees, the highest prevalence of inadequate food consumption was reported in El Batroun (31 percent borderline and 7 percent poor FCS), followed by El Hermel (28 percent borderline and 7 percent poor FCS), and Akkar (28 percent borderline and 6 percent poor FCS).

## Coping strategies

When households do not have enough food or lack resources to buy food or to access other essential items, they adopt strategies and behaviours to manage the food shortages. Food coping strategies imply changes in food consumption patterns such as relying on less expensive foods or reducing the number of meals or portion sizes.

As of March 2025, updated data on reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) reveals continued improvement in coping patterns among Lebanese and Syrian refugee households. Among Lebanese residents, 52 percent reported no or low coping strategies, a marked improvement from August 2024 when 45 percent were still resorting to medium coping strategies. The share of households using high coping strategies has dropped significantly—from 31 percent in August 2024 to just 9 percent in March 2025—indicating a reduced reliance on severe consumption-based strategies. For Syrian refugee households, 23 percent reported high usage of coping strategies in March 2025, down from 30 percent in 2024 and a sharp decline from 44 percent in 2022. Medium coping strategies remain consistent at 51 percent, while 27 percent are now classified as using no or low coping strategies—suggesting a gradual but encouraging shift in resilience.

Palestine refugees continue to face high levels of stress, with 16 percent reporting high coping strategies and 49 percent facing medium levels, while only 34 percent fall into the no or low coping category. This underscores persistent vulnerability among this group, though their coping profiles appear slightly more favourable than Syrian refugees in 2022.

The highest rates of high food coping strategies in March 2025 is observed in Akkar (18 percent), Baalbek & El Hermel (17 percent), and Zahle (15 percent) among Lebanese residents and in Baabda (30 percent), Akkar (27 percent), Zgharta & Bcharre (26 percent), and Tripoli (26 percent) among Syrian refugees.

## Livelihood coping strategies

Livelihood coping strategies are behaviours that cause changes in income-earning activities or involve responses to food insecurity such as asset sales that affect household resilience. Livelihood coping strategies are categorised as stress, crisis, or emergency. While stress strategies indicate a reduced ability to deal with future shocks, crisis and emergency coping strategies reduce future productivity, hindering resilience.

As of March 2025, the latest Livelihood Coping Strategy Index (LCSI) data reveals a stabilization in coping patterns among Lebanese households. Half of Lebanese residents reported no coping strategies, while 32 percent employed stress-level strategies and 16 percent relied on crisis strategies—closely aligned with 2024 trends, when crisis-level coping ranged between 14 and 19 percent. The use of emergency coping strategies remained low at just 1 percent, mirroring the levels observed in January and June 2024. This suggests that while economic stressors persist, the overall reliance on extreme coping mechanisms among Lebanese residents has not worsened.

Among Syrian refugee households, however, the share using crisis strategies rose significantly to 32 percent in March 2025, reversing the gradual decline seen through 2023–2024 when crisis coping stood at 19 percent. Emergency coping also declined slightly from 7 percent in 2024 to 4 percent in 2025. These figures reflect heightened vulnerability and deteriorating economic conditions among Syrian refugees, likely tied to reduced humanitarian support and inflationary pressures.

Critical livelihood coping strategies (crisis and emergency) was most prominent in West Bekaa (32 percent, of which 4 percent are Emergency), Baalbek & El Hermel (31 percent, of which 4 percent are Emergency), and Akkar (27 percent, of which 3 percent are Emergency) among Lebanese residents. For Syrian refugees, the highest critical coping was found in Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun & El Nabatieh cluster (46 percent, of which 14 percent are Emergency), El Hermel (42 percent, of which 5 percent Emergency), and Zahle (41 percent, of which 5 percent Emergency).

# PROJECTION SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (JULY – OCTOBER 2025)

**LEBANESE RESIDENTS – PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: JULY - OCTOBER 2025**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **705,000** | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| **18 percent of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | 0 People in Emergency |
| People likely facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | 705,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 1,436,000 People in Stressed |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | 1,723,000 People in Food Security |

**SYRIAN REFUGEES - PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: JULY - OCTOBER 2025**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **458,000** | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| **33 percent of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | 30,000 People in Emergency |
| People likely facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | 428,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 643,000 People in Stressed |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | 299,000 People in Food Security |

**PALESTINE REFUGEES - PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: JULY - OCTOBER 2025**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **78,000** | Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| **35 percent of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | 11,000 People in Emergency |
| People likely facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | 67,000 People in Crisis |
| | Phase 2 | 89,000 People in Stressed |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | 56,000 People in Food Security |



# POPULATION TABLE FOR THE PROJECTION PERIOD (JULY – OCTOBER 2025)

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | | #people | % |
| Akkar | Lebanese | 298,340 | 59,668 | 20 | 149,170 | 50 | 89,502 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 89,502 | 30 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 146,202 | 21,930 | 15 | 73,101 | 50 | 43,861 | 30 | 7,310 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 51,171 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 444,542 | 81,598 | 18 | 222,271 | 50 | 133,363 | 30 | 7,310 | 2 | 0 | 0 | | 140,673 | 32 |
| Aley | Lebanese | 216,890 | 119,290 | 55 | 75,912 | 35 | 21,689 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21,689 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 82,083 | 24,625 | 30 | 36,937 | 45 | 20,521 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 20,521 | 25 |
| | **Total** | 298,973 | 143,914 | 48 | 112,849 | 38 | 42,210 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 42,210 | 14 |
| Baabda | Lebanese | 409,486 | 163,794 | 40 | 143,320 | 35 | 102,372 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 102,372 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 136,196 | 27,239 | 20 | 61,288 | 45 | 47,669 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 47,669 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 545,682 | 191,034 | 35 | 204,608 | 37 | 150,040 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 150,040 | 27 |
| Baalbek & El Hermel | Baalbek & El Hermel Lebanese | 221,748 | 55,437 | 25 | 88,699 | 40 | 77,612 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 77,612 | 35 |
| | Baalbek Syrian Ref. | 174,508 | 26,176 | 15 | 78,529 | 45 | 61,078 | 35 | 8,725 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 69,803 | 40 |
| | El Hermel Syrian Ref. | 12,274 | 1,841 | 15 | 6,137 | 50 | 4,296 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4,296 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 408,530 | 83,454 | 20 | 173,365 | 42 | 142,986 | 35 | 8,725 | 2 | 0 | 0 | | 151,711 | 37 |
| Beirut | Lebanese | 240,126 | 144,076 | 60 | 84,044 | 35 | 12,006 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 12,006 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 32,649 | 9,795 | 30 | 14,692 | 45 | 8,162 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8,162 | 25 |
| | **Total** | 272,775 | 153,870 | 56 | 98,736 | 36 | 20,169 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 20,169 | 7 |
| Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun & El Nabatieh | Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun Lebanese | 108,011 | 21,602 | 20 | 54,006 | 50 | 32,403 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 32,403 | 30 |
| | El Nabatieh Lebanese | 159,148 | 31,830 | 20 | 79,574 | 50 | 47,744 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 47,744 | 30 |
| | Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun & El Nabatieh Syrian Ref. | 56,214 | 8,432 | 15 | 30,918 | 55 | 16,864 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 16,864 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 323,373 | 61,864 | 19 | 164,498 | 51 | 97,011 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 97,011 | 30 |
| Chouf | Lebanese | 210,110 | 115,561 | 55 | 73,539 | 35 | 21,011 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21,011 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 63,719 | 15,930 | 25 | 31,860 | 50 | 15,930 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 15,930 | 25 |
| | **Total** | 273,829 | 131,490 | 48 | 105,398 | 38 | 36,941 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 36,941 | 13 |
| El Batroun & El Koura | El Batroun & El Koura Lebanese | 125,888 | 88,122 | 70 | 31,472 | 25 | 6,294 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6,294 | 5 |
| | El Batroun Syrian Ref. | 17,041 | 4,260 | 25 | 8,521 | 50 | 4,260 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4,260 | 25 |
| | El Koura Syrian Ref. | 20,745 | 4,149 | 20 | 11,410 | 55 | 5,186 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5,186 | 25 |
| | **Total** | 163,674 | 96,531 | 59 | 51,402 | 31 | 15,741 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 15,741 | 10 |
| El Meten | Lebanese | 399,794 | 239,876 | 60 | 119,938 | 30 | 39,979 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 39,979 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 48,407 | 14,522 | 30 | 21,783 | 45 | 12,102 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12,102 | 25 |
| | **Total** | 448,201 | 254,399 | 57 | 141,721 | 32 | 52,081 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 52,081 | 12 |

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | | % | | #people | % |
| El Minieh-Dennie | Lebanese | 122,174 | 42,761 | 35 | 48,870 | 40 | 30,544 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 30,544 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 71,580 | 10,737 | 15 | 39,369 | 55 | 21,474 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 21,474 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 193,754 | 53,498 | 28 | 88,239 | 46 | 52,018 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 52,018 | 27 |
| Jbeil | Lebanese | 116,086 | 75,456 | 65 | 29,022 | 25 | 11,609 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11,609 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 10,104 | 2,526 | 25 | 6,062 | 60 | 1,516 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1,516 | 15 |
| | **Total** | 126,190 | 77,982 | 62 | 35,084 | 28 | 13,124 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 13,124 | 10 |
| Jezzine | Lebanese | 27,257 | 9,540 | 35 | 16,354 | 60 | 1,363 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1,363 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 3,901 | 975 | 25 | 2,341 | 60 | 585 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 585 | 15 |
| | **Total** | 31,158 | 10,515 | 34 | 18,695 | 60 | 1,948 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1,948 | 6 |
| Kesrwane | Lebanese | 230,819 | 150,032 | 65 | 69,246 | 30 | 11,541 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11,541 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 18,855 | 5,657 | 30 | 10,370 | 55 | 2,828 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2,828 | 15 |
| | **Total** | 249,674 | 155,689 | 62 | 79,616 | 32 | 14,369 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 14,369 | 6 |
| Rachaya & Hasbaya | Lebanese | 57,177 | 25,730 | 45 | 20,012 | 35 | 11,435 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 11,435 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 14,882 | 2,976 | 20 | 6,697 | 45 | 5,209 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5,209 | 35 |
| | **Total** | 72,059 | 28,706 | 40 | 26,709 | 37 | 16,644 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 16,644 | 23 |
| Saida | Lebanese | 216,472 | 75,765 | 35 | 97,412 | 45 | 43,294 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 43,294 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 56,056 | 11,211 | 20 | 28,028 | 50 | 16,817 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 16,817 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 272,528 | 86,976 | 32 | 125,440 | 46 | 60,111 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 60,111 | 22 |
| Sour | Lebanese | 201,117 | 60,335 | 30 | 90,503 | 45 | 50,279 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 50,279 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 37,695 | 5,654 | 15 | 20,732 | 55 | 11,309 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 11,309 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 238,812 | 65,989 | 28 | 111,235 | 47 | 61,588 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 61,588 | 26 |
| Tripoli | Lebanese | 201,499 | 90,675 | 45 | 70,525 | 35 | 40,300 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 40,300 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 54,172 | 13,543 | 25 | 24,377 | 45 | 13,543 | 25 | 2,709 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 16,252 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 255,671 | 104,218 | 41 | 94,902 | 37 | 53,843 | 21 | 2,709 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 56,552 | 22 |
| West Bekaa | Lebanese | 67,902 | 27,161 | 40 | 23,766 | 35 | 16,976 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 16,976 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 89,254 | 22,314 | 25 | 40,164 | 45 | 26,776 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 26,776 | 30 |
| | **Total** | 157,156 | 49,474 | 31 | 63,930 | 41 | 43,752 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 43,752 | 28 |
| Zahle | Lebanese | 140,211 | 70,106 | 50 | 42,063 | 30 | 28,042 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 28,042 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 229,623 | 57,406 | 25 | 80,368 | 35 | 80,368 | 35 | 11,481 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 91,849 | 40 |
| | **Total** | 369,834 | 127,511 | 34 | 122,431 | 33 | 108,410 | 29 | 11,481 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | 119,891 | 32 |
| Zgharta & Bcharre | Lebanese | 94,025 | 56,415 | 60 | 28,208 | 30 | 9,403 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9,403 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 23,840 | 7,152 | 30 | 9,536 | 40 | 7,152 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7,152 | 30 |
| | Total | 117,865 | 63,567 | 54 | 37,744 | 32 | 16,555 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 16,555 | 14 |
| Palestine Refugees | Palestine Ref. | 223,000 | 55,750 | 25 | 89,200 | 40 | 66,900 | 30 | 11,150 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 78,050 | 35 |
| Total | **Lebanese** | **3,864,280** | **1,723,232** | 45 | **1,435,655** | 37 | **705,398** | 18 | **0** | 0 | **0** | 0 | | **705,398** | 18 |
| | **Syrian Ref.** | **1,400,000** | **299,050** | 21 | **643,220** | 46 | **427,506** | 31 | **30,225** | 2 | **0** | 0 | | **457,731** | 33 |
| | **Palestine Ref.** | **223,000** | **55,750** | 25 | **89,200** | 40 | **66,900** | 30 | **11,150** | 5 | **0** | 0 | | **78,050** | 35 |
| | **Grand Total** | **5,487,280** | **2,078,032** | 38 | **2,168,075** | 40 | **1,199,804** | 22 | **41,375** | 1 | **0** | 0 | | **1,241,179** | 23 |

*Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore, they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.*

# PROJECTION SITUATION OVERVIEW (JULY – OCTOBER 2025)

During the projection period of July to October 2025, an estimated 1.24 million people, or 23 percent of the analysed population, is expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity and be classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. This represents a slight increase from the 1.17 million people (21 percent of the analysed population) estimated in IPC Phase 3 and above during the current period (April to June 2025). While several districts are expected to maintain their classification compared to the current period, the overall increase in the number of people in need is primarily attributed to anticipated reductions in humanitarian assistance, combined with the ongoing strain on livelihoods among vulnerable and displaced populations.

The projected increase also reflects the residual impact of returnee populations moving into areas with higher severity levels of food insecurity, particularly in the South and parts of Baalbek-El Hermel, where recovery remains limited, and livelihoods are still heavily disrupted. These areas continue to face challenges related to infrastructure damage, restricted access, and limited-service availability, which in turn affects household food access.

Although the ceasefire is expected to continue holding throughout the projection period, the persistence of localised insecurity, reduced assistance coverage, and seasonal pressures on essential services and prices are likely to counterbalance expected improvements in market functionality and agricultural activity. As such, food security outcomes are projected to remain fragile, with minimal gains expected in the absence of scaled-up support or structural recovery.

**Lebanese residents:** During the projection period (July to October 2025), 18 percent of Lebanese residents are expected to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), an increase from 15 percent in the current period (April to June 2025). Similar to the current period, no Lebanese residents are projected to be in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) in the projection period.

The number of districts classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) increased from six districts and two clusters in the current period to nine districts and three clusters in the projection. These include Baalbek & El Hermel (35 percent), Akkar (30 percent), El Nabatieh, Bent Jbeil & Marjaayoun (30 percent), Baabda, El Minieh-Dennie, Sour, and West Bekaa (25 percent), and Saida, Tripoli, Zahle, Rachaya & Hasbaya (20 percent).

Meanwhile, seven districts and two clusters are classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed), compared to 10 districts and three clusters in the current period. Districts such as Beirut, Jezzine, Kesrwane, and El Koura & El Batroun remain in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed), though their IPC Phase 3+ shares are relatively low (5–10 percent).

**Syrian refugees**: Syrian refugees continue to experience some of the highest levels of food insecurity in the country. In the projection period, 33 percent are expected to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, down from 37 percent in the current period. Those in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) are expected to decline from 44,000 to 30,000 individuals.

The number of districts classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) increased slightly from 19 districts and three clusters in the current period to 16 districts and three clusters in the projection, but with shifts in severity levels. Key districts where 30 percent or more of the Syrian refugee population are expected to be food insecure include Baalbek and Zahle (40 percent), followed by Akkar, Baabda, El Hermel, Rachaya & Hasbaya (35 percent). Other areas such as El Minieh-Dennie, Saida, Sour, Tripoli, and West Bekaa also remain classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), with 30–35 percent in Phase 3 or above.

Some improvement is visible in coastal and central districts such as Beirut, Aley, Chouf, El Batroun, El Koura, and El Meten, which are now classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), with projected Phase 3+ shares of 25 to 30 percent. Jbeil, Jezzine, and Kesrwane remain the least affected, with populations in Phase 3 and above between 15 to 20 percent.

**Palestine Refugees**: A total of 78,000 Palestine refugees (35 percent of the analysed population) are expected to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above during the projection period, compared to 67,000 (30 percent) in the current period—an increase of 11,000 individuals. Of these, 67,000 are expected to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), while 11,000 (5 percent) remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), unchanged from the current period.

## Key Assumptions

### Conflict

The ceasefire is expected to hold throughout the projection period, contributing to a reduction in large-scale hostilities. However, localised security incidents, particularly along the southern and eastern borders, are expected to continue. Restricted access in limited border areas is likely to persist.

### Displacement

As of April 2025, approximately 92,000 individuals remain displaced, while over 967,000 have returned to their communities. Return movements are expected to continue gradually but remain uneven and reversible, particularly in areas with severe damage or security concerns. As such, the current level of displacement is expected to persist. In addition, cross-border arrivals from Syria are expected to continue increasing pressure on populations in northern areas.

### Economic growth

Lebanon's economy is expected to remain in contraction through the projection period. Real GDP declined by 7.1 percent in 2024, and only marginal growth is expected in 2025, contingent on reconstruction and external financing. Recovery is expected to be localised and uneven. Moreover, during the Summer season, drought and water scarcity may affect agricultural production due to limited precipitation throughout the year.

### Currency depreciation

The exchange rate is expected to remain stable, anchored by Central Bank interventions, increased USD liquidity, and continued use of foreign currency in public sector payments. Stability is anticipated to continue throughout the projection period.

### Inflation

Inflation is expected to remain within the last six months' averages, given the anticipated exchange rate stability and steady global outlook of commodities in the international market for the next year. Service-related costs and structural bottlenecks will sustain inflationary pressure. Food SMEB costs in USD increased by 10 percent over the past year and are expected to remain high.

### Humanitarian assistance

Reductions in humanitarian assistance are anticipated to impact both Lebanese residents and Palestine refugees due to funding constraints. Assistance to Lebanese residents is expected to decrease from a total of 1.2 million individuals during the current period to around 500,000 individuals in the projection period due to the end of major social assistance programs. Syrian refugee assistance is projected to increase following the drop in the current period, from 320,000 individuals to 650,000 individuals, however, this remains much lower than during the escalation of conflict period when 1.1 million individuals received assistance. Minimal assistance is expected for Palestine refugees, with less than 2,000 individuals expected to be assisted.

### Recovery plans

A fully functioning executive government was formed in early 2025, ending the political vacuum in the country. Key leadership positions have been filled, and municipal elections are scheduled for May. Despite improved institutional functioning, implementation of structural reforms remain limited and are unlikely to accelerate significantly during the projection period.

### Tensions

Social tensions are expected to persist, particularly in economically-strained areas, and areas hosting large populations of displaced people. Competition over reconstruction, aid, and jobs will likely continue. Public discourse around arms outside state control may further inflame divisions.

### Market functionality

Market functionality has significantly improved nationwide and is expected to remain stable or continue improving throughout the projection period. While disparities persist in some conflict-affected districts, most regions have regained stable access and supply chain reliability.

### Conflict and security

While the nationwide ceasefire agreement reached in late November 2024 and initially extended until February 18, 2025, continues to hold, the overall security situation in Lebanon is expected to remain fragile throughout the projection period (July-October 2025). While large-scale hostilities have ceased, sporadic attacks continue to regularly occur in areas both South and North of the Litani river, as well as along the eastern borders, including the districts of Hasbaya, Marjaayoun, Bent Jbeil, Baalbek, El Hermel, as well as the Southern Suburb of Beirut. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimated in mid-April 2025 that at least 71 civilians, of whom 14 were women and nine were children, had been killed since the ceasefire took effect on November 27, 2024. These incidents are anticipated to continue, affecting civilian safety, mobility and livelihoods, as well as delaying recovery efforts in high-risk areas. Ongoing clearance operations in the southern governorates will restrict access in certain locations, limiting both humanitarian response and economic activity.

Along the northeastern border with Syria, intermittent clashes between armed groups and the Lebanese Armed Forces have been reported in recent months. Although these incidents have remained localised, the risk of renewed confrontations remains high during the projection period. Continued insecurity in these areas may hinder access to agricultural lands, restrict movement, and contribute to localised displacement and further disruption of livelihoods.

### Persistent displacement and population movements throughout the projection period

While the level of people returning to their communities is expected to reduce during the projection period, the current level of displacement at around 92,000 individuals as of early April 2025 (IOM – DTM) is expected to persist. A considerable number of households are expected to remain in protracted displacement due to unresolved housing, safety, and livelihood constraints. In some areas, returns may also prove temporary, with households likely to relocate again if local conditions deteriorate or basic needs cannot be met.

In parallel, population movements from Syria into northern Lebanon have increased since the start of the year, particularly in Akkar and parts of the North governorate. These arrivals are largely driven by deteriorating security and economic conditions in coastal Syria. The continued inflow of individuals into already vulnerable host communities is expected to exert additional pressure on services and livelihoods, contributing to rising tensions and localised instability.

### Prolonged economic fragility with limited prospects

Lebanon's economy is projected to remain in a state of contraction throughout the projection period (July to October 2025), reflecting the lingering effects of the 2023–2024 conflict, coupled with persistent structural challenges. Although the country entered a post-ceasefire phase in late 2024, signs of economic recovery remain limited and uneven. While some sectors have shown marginal gains in early 2025, the overall business environment remains fragile. Investor confidence is low, and operational costs remain elevated due to inflation and infrastructure gaps, particularly in areas impacted by the conflict.

Tourism, which typically contributes significantly to Lebanon's GDP, is expected to witness a relative boost during the summer season. Arrivals during the Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr holiday were encouraging, with February 2025 witnessing a 10 percent increase in airport arrivals year-on-year. Hotel occupancy in parts of Beirut reached 70–80 percent despite ongoing security concerns. While travel bans from several Gulf countries persist, Lebanese expatriate arrivals are expected to drive seasonal tourism, providing some relief to the services sector.

Overall, job and income opportunities across sectors are expected to remain constrained during the projection period. Informal and seasonal labour opportunities may increase modestly in the summer months, especially in the construction, hospitality, and retail sectors. However, these are unlikely to compensate for widespread losses in agriculture, trade, and tourism. Competition over low-skilled and daily-wage work, particularly in areas hosting large numbers of returnees or displaced populations, is expected to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and intercommunal tensions. The government's ability to respond remains constrained by fiscal limitations. Despite a nominal budget surplus in 2024, high public debt, weak tax revenues, and limited foreign reserves continue to hinder effective policy implementation. The IMF has acknowledged some progress in monetary discipline, yet broader reforms under the 2022 staff-level agreement remain largely unimplemented. Without a clear reform path and external financial support, Lebanon's economic stagnation is expected to persist well into 2025.

### Inflationary pressure to persist, albeit smaller in magnitude, despite exchange rate stability

The exchange rate is expected to remain broadly stable throughout the projection period (July to October 2025), supported by the Central Bank's ongoing currency management policies and a continued slowdown in monetary financing. Since mid-

October 2023, the parallel market exchange rate has held steady at approximately LBP 89,700 to USD $1. This relative exchange rate stability has helped contain imported inflation and prevent sharper spikes in food prices. Nonetheless, inflationary pressures are expected to persist throughout the projection period, primarily driven by elevated costs of services and rising operational costs, placing pressure on household purchasing power throughout the projection period. The cost of essential services continues to rise, - including electricity, rent and healthcare, pushing up non-food inflation, especially the non-food services SMEB, which remains 35 percent below its pre-crisis level of USD $403 in October 2019. These persistent costs are likely to force more households to adopt negative coping strategies, such as reducing meal quantity and diversity or delaying healthcare expenditure, thus deepening food insecurity risks. As such, while global commodity prices have largely stabilised, and exchange rate fluctuations have been minimal, structural price drivers within Lebanon—particularly in the services sector—are likely to keep overall inflation elevated through at least the end of the summer season.

### Strong post-conflict market recovery, with improvements observed across regions

Lebanon's markets have shown significant recovery following the cessation of hostilities in November 2024. Market functionality is expected to remain stable and continue improving during the projection period (July to October 2025), supported by restored access, resilient supply chains, and strong retailer operability across most governorates. WFP assessments from November 2024 to March 2025 indicate that 96 percent of shops were operational by March, up from 80 percent in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.

Despite overall gains, some disparities remain. Recovery in peripheral and rural areas—especially in border communities—continues to lag behind urban centers due to residual infrastructure damage and higher transport costs. However, even in these regions, improvements have been recorded, particularly in the assortment of items and restocking frequency. Looking ahead, markets in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and other urban hubs are expected to maintain high functionality due to robust infrastructure and trade linkages. Continued recovery is also anticipated in the South and East, contingent on the pace of reconstruction and sustained access. Targeted interventions to address remaining bottlenecks in transportation and pricing will be key to ensuring inclusive market recovery across all regions.

### Political breakthrough brings cautious optimism

Following over two years of institutional paralysis, Lebanon has witnessed a significant restoration of executive and political authority since the start of 2025. Municipal elections are scheduled to take place in May 2025—the first since 2016—representing a key milestone in reactivating local governance structures and restoring institutional legitimacy at the sub-national level. However, this progress has yet to translate into structural reforms. Fiscal, financial, and governance reforms tied to Lebanon's 2022 IMF staff-level agreement remain largely unfulfilled. While monetary policy discipline has improved, broader reform momentum is hindered by political fragmentation and competing post-conflict recovery priorities

Throughout the projection period (July to October 2025), Lebanon's new government is expected to maintain institutional continuity and deliver on basic administrative functions. However, significant legislative and structural reforms—such as financial sector restructuring, public administration reform, and anti-corruption measures—are likely to face delays due to political fragmentation, bureaucratic inertia, and the competing demands of conflict recovery. Overall, while the restoration of state institutions reduces political uncertainty and improves the enabling environment for policy action, the timeline for meaningful reform implementation remains protracted. Continued external engagement and domestic consensus will be critical to sustain progress beyond initial stabilization efforts.

### Heightened social pressures amid recovery and unresolved displacement dynamics

While the ceasefire has brought relative calm to much of Lebanon, social tensions remain elevated and are expected to persist throughout the projection period (July to October 2025), particularly in areas hosting displaced populations and affected by conflict-related recovery challenges. The compounding effects of economic hardship, strained services, and competition over limited assistance continue to place pressure on social cohesion at both the community and national levels. Although some stabilisation efforts and reconstruction have begun in very limited areas, the perception of unequal access to aid—especially between Lebanese host communities, IDPs, and Syrian refugees—continues to fuel grievances and mistrust. Tensions have also been influenced by the ongoing debate around the return of Syrian refugees particularly in northern and eastern districts where competition over housing, jobs, and aid has intensified.

In parallel, public discourse has become increasingly focused on the question of arms outside state control, which may deepen polarization. These dynamics are likely to be further compounded during the projection period, as reconstruction efforts potentially scale up and resource allocation becomes more visible. The risk of localized tensions may increase in areas where assistance is perceived as uneven or where recovery progresses at different speeds. Municipal elections planned for May 2025 may also heighten political sensitivities, particularly in regions with complex demographic and displacement dynamics. While no widespread unrest is anticipated, localised friction—particularly in urban peripheries, border communities, and governorates with high concentrations of displaced populations—is expected to continue, requiring sustained monitoring and efforts to promote inclusive recovery and mitigate the risk of social fragmentation.

### Anticipated reductions in humanitarian assistance to increase pressure on most vulnerable groups

Despite the continued scale of humanitarian needs, food and cash assistance levels are expected to decline for both Lebanese residents and Palestine refugees during the projection period (July to October 2025), primarily due to funding shortfalls and programmatic constraints. These reductions come at a time when recovery remains uneven and vulnerability levels are high, particularly among displaced and food-insecure households.

For Lebanese households, in-kind food assistance provided by WFP is expected to continue at current levels, reaching approximately 35,000 households through the projection period. However, no additional funding has been confirmed to expand emergency food assistance beyond this existing caseload. The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme, supported by the World Bank and implemented by WFP and the Ministry of Social Affairs, is expected to end before the start of the projection period, as no new funding under its existing loan structure has been confirmed yet. The Shock Responsive Social Safety Net (SRSN) programme, introduced in late 2024 in response to the conflict escalation, concluded during the first quarter of 2025 due to the absence of new funding.

For Syrian refugees, following the decrease of assistance levels since February 2025, due to funding shortfall, those are expected to increase again, but at a much lower level than during the temporary increase in coverage from November 2024 through January 2025. Transfer values have also remained below the cost of essential needs: by February 2025, food assistance for Syrian refugees covered only 52 percent of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB), while non-food assistance covered just 17 percent of essential goods and services needed for survival.

Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL) and Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS) continue to face deepening vulnerabilities in the face of declining assistance. For PRL households, a one-time cash transfer of USD $35 was confirmed for the first quarter of 2025, with no clarity on future rounds of assistance. For PRS households, no additional funding had been secured at the time of analysis, and assistance is expected to remain minimal during the projection period.

Overall, the projected reduction in humanitarian assistance is expected to heighten food insecurity among most targeted groups, particularly those with limited access to other forms of support or income. The situation remains fluid and highly dependent on the availability of additional funding and donor commitments.

## IPC trends

Since the beginning of IPC acute food insecurity analyses in Lebanon in September 2022, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) has consistently remained above one million, reflecting the compounded effects of the prolonged economic crisis and reductions in humanitarian assistance. The escalation of conflict in late 2024 further deepened food insecurity, leading to widespread disruption of livelihoods, displacement, and deterioration in access to services—factors which continue to shape outcomes in 2025. The IPC analysis conducted in October 2023 reported 1.05 million people (19 percent of the analysed population) in IPC Phase 3 or above, prior to the start of the localised conflict. According to the latest IPC analysis conducted in March 2025, 1.17 million people (21 percent of the analysed population) are currently classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) during the current period of April to June 2025. This represents a reduction in food insecurity levels from the 1.65 million people facing acute levels of food insecurity (30 percent of the analysed population) projected in December 2024 to March 2025, mainly due to the end of large-scale hostilities, improved access, some returnees going back to their communities, and seasonal factors. During the projection period of July to October 2025, the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse conditions is expected to increase slightly to 1.24 million people (23 percent of the analysed population), driven by anticipated reductions in humanitarian assistance, rising service costs, and continued displacement-related vulnerabilities. While market recovery and improved seasonal availability of food are expected to mitigate further deterioration, the absence of structural reforms and constrained recovery among the most vulnerable groups will continue to limit improvements. The number of people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity is projected to decline only slightly—from 55,000 people in the current period to 41,000 people in the projection period. This is notably lower than the 205,000 people reported at the peak of the conflict's impact in November 2024. These trends underscore a fragile recovery, heavily dependent on continued access to humanitarian assistance, functioning markets, and progress in reconstruction and economic stabilisation. Without sustained support, the risk of renewed deterioration remains, particularly among economically vulnerable and displaced populations.

**Classification comparison with previous rounds**



# RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

## Response Priorities

**Situation Monitoring:** In light of the evolving context, continuous monitoring remains essential to track food security trends, displacement dynamics, and intercommunal tensions, particularly in conflict-affected districts such as the South, El Nabatieh, and Baalbek-El Hermel. Strengthening early warning systems at the national and subnational levels—including real-time monitoring of price fluctuations, service access, and market disruptions—is recommended to ensure timely response and preparedness. Enhanced coordination between humanitarian, development, and government actors remains critical to anticipate emerging needs and inform decision-making.

**Lifesaving and humanitarian food assistance:** The provision of lifesaving and humanitarian food assistance during the conflict escalation and the period after it has played a critical role in reducing food insecurity needs in the country, as reported by this latest IPC analysis. However, urgent support continues to be required to address food consumption gaps for populations classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. Humanitarian food assistance should continue to prioritize returnees, and displaced populations residing in high-severity districts, with particular attention to areas with reduced assistance coverage. It is recommended to i) ensure food assistance levels are maintained in line with updated SMEB and MEB costs, especially as inflation and service-related costs remain elevated, ii) sustain multi-sectoral humanitarian operations in hard-to-reach and return areas, including through coordinated supply chain support and contingency planning for localized access disruptions, iii) advocate for predictable, multi-month funding commitments to minimize pipeline breaks and mitigate the projected reductions in assistance to refugees and other vulnerable groups.

**Social safety net systems:** Expanding and strengthening social assistance programmes remains essential to mitigate the effects of rising poverty and economic vulnerability. It is recommended to i) continue supporting the implementation of the ESSN/AMAN and seek additional funding for the resumption of the SRSN, particularly to assist Lebanese households impacted by the conflict, ii) provide technical and financial support to improve targeting systems and data integration between national and humanitarian programmes, ensuring equitable coverage and reducing inclusion and exclusion errors, iii) link social assistance with protection, legal aid, and service access, especially for individuals lacking documentation or legal residency.

**Livelihood assistance:** Sustaining and restoring livelihoods will be key to enhancing household resilience and reducing reliance on humanitarian assistance. It is recommended to i) scale up short-term employment and cash-for-work opportunities, with a focus on debris removal, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and public service support in return areas, ii) support conflict-affected micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) with asset replacement, grants, and access to inputs and credit, particularly in the agriculture, retail, and service sectors, iii) promote income-generating opportunities for women and youth through vocational training and inclusive livelihoods programming.

**Agricultural support and recovery:** Given the impact of the conflict on agricultural livelihoods, urgent support is required to rehabilitate productive assets and restore food production. Priorities include: i) Rehabilitating agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation systems, animal shelters, and pasturelands, particularly in the South, Baalbek-El Hermel, Bekaa, and El Nabatieh governorates; ii) Facilitating access to agricultural inputs for small-scale producers, including seeds, fertilizers, veterinary services, and feed; iii) Expanding asset creation activities, particularly in areas where a large share of households relies on food from own production and where IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) prevalence remains high; iv) Supporting livestock restocking and vaccination programmes to prevent disease outbreaks and stabilize herds, particularly in areas with significant animal loss or displacement; v) Promoting climate-resilient and diversified production systems to reduce risk and improve sustainability among smallholder farmers.

**Support to recovery of food systems:** Rehabilitating food systems is critical to ensuring sustainable access to food in conflict-affected areas. Recommended interventions include: supporting the recovery of food processing facilities, storage units, marketplaces, and bakeries through the provision of equipment, raw materials, and micro-grants or loans. Rebuilding feeder roads and transport infrastructure to facilitate the movement of goods and reintegrate rural production zones into national supply chains. Strengthening local food value chains through inclusive procurement practices, such as linking school feeding or institutional buyers to smallholder cooperatives.

**Education and school feeding programs:** To reduce negative coping mechanisms among children and adolescents, including school dropout and child labour, it is recommended to: Expand school feeding programmes targeting both displaced and host community children in priority districts. Promote linkages between school feeding and local food production, supporting both household food security and local livelihoods. Integrate school-based nutrition and psychosocial services into education responses to address the multidimensional impacts of the crisis on children's wellbeing.

**Integrate nutrition sensitive activities:** To effectively integrate nutrition into food security efforts, it is recommended to incorporate nutrition-sensitive interventions within all phases of food assistance and development programming. This includes promoting diverse food production, improving dietary practices through community education, and ensuring access to fortified-rich foods. Strengthening multi-sectoral collaboration among agriculture, health, and social protection systems will enhance the nutritional impact of food security initiatives.

### Situation Monitoring and Update

- **Conflict:** The nationwide ceasefire implemented on 27 November 2024 continues to hold, contributing to an overall improvement in security conditions. Nonetheless, the situation remains volatile, with sporadic incidents and localized insecurity, particularly along border areas in the South and East. The risk of renewed hostilities persists, underlining the importance of contingency planning and scenario-based preparedness to safeguard humanitarian access, ensure continuity of services, and protect affected populations.
- **Political developments:** The election of a new president in January 2025, followed by the swift nomination of a prime minister and the formation of a new government, has brought renewed optimism regarding governance and institutional stability. Early steps toward filling key leadership positions and planning for the first municipal elections since 2016 are encouraging. However, progress in implementing structural reforms remains slow, and continued monitoring of political dynamics is necessary to assess their impact on economic recovery, the rule of law, and the broader enabling environment for social protection and humanitarian interventions.
- **Humanitarian and social assistance:** Reductions in humanitarian assistance, including shortfalls in transfer values for food and non-food needs and limited funding for critical programs such as ESSN, AMAN, and SRSN, remain a key concern. These gaps, combined with rising living costs, risk deepening food insecurity and eroding household resilience, especially among returnees, refugees, and other vulnerable groups. Close monitoring of assistance coverage, beneficiary needs, and the operational environment is essential to support timely advocacy, resource mobilization, and program adaptation.
- **Prices and market dynamics:** While the informal exchange rate has remained broadly stable, prices for food staples and essential non-food goods continue to be elevated. The risk of further shocks—whether internal or regional—could lead to renewed volatility in market prices and further limit household access to basic commodities. Regular tracking of market trends, price fluctuations, and household purchasing power remains vital to guide program adjustments and safeguard food security outcomes.
- **Non-food expenditures:** The continued adjustments of essential non-food services prices, due to the ongoing dollarization in the country, as well as any potential new tariffs that might be introduced, and rising operation costs, may further increase the stain on households' purchasing power and expenditures in the coming year.
- **Nutrition:** In addition, monitoring of malnutrition is also necessary. The results from the first ever Integrated Micronutrient, Anthropometric and Child development Survey already highlight areas for intervention and can help the Ministry of Health and Nutrition partners ascertain the opportunity to conduct an IPC Acute Malnutrition (AMN).
- **Service delivery and funding:** Gaps in public service delivery, including health, WASH, and education, persist due to infrastructure damage and critical funding shortfalls. The suspension and reduction of key donor support in early 2025 have further limited the ability of humanitarian and government actors to sustain essential operations. Continued advocacy for predictable, multi-year funding is required to prevent further deterioration in basic service provision and ensure inclusive recovery.

### Risk factors to monitor

- Increased inter-community tensions and refugee dynamics
- Security situation, border and regional developments
- Renewed currency depreciation and exchange rate evolution
- Inflation and commodity prices both on the local and international markets.
- Market Functionality
- IDPs and displacement dynamics
- Malnutrition rates

# PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis was conducted for two periods: 1) Current: April 2025 – June 2025; 2) Projected: July 2025 – October 2025. The analysis covered all 26 districts of the country. Lebanese residents were analysed separately at the district level for 16 districts, while five clusters were created as follows: Baalbeck and El Hermel, Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun, Bcharre and Zgharta, Hasbata and Rachaya. Syrian refugees have been analysed separately at the district level for 19 districts, while 3 unit of analysis were created by clustering the following districts: El Nabatieh, Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun, Hasbaya and Rachaya, Bchare and Zgharta. Palestine refugees were analysed as one unit of analysis at the national level including Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) residing in camps, PRL residing outside camps and in gatherings, and Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS).

The analysis was held in person in Beirut, Lebanon, with the support of the IPC Global Support Unit (IPC GSU) The workshop was attended by 45 experts including Technical Working Group (TWG) members and analysts from UN organizations, local and international NGOs, technical agencies, and governmental institutions. Members have local expertise which better supported in understanding the overall context to ensure a contextualized and accurate reflection of food insecurity needs in Lebanon. The data used in the analysis was organized according to the IPC analytical framework and entails food insecurity contributing factors, outcome indicators, and multiple secondary sources.

The main sources of data used for the analysis of outcome indicators included:

1. Mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) conducted by WFP with data from December 2024 till March 2025 for the Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees.
2. Consolidated outcome monitoring data conducted by WFP and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in January 2025 for Syrian refugees.
3. Lebanon Vulnerability Assessment / Lebanon Household Survey conducted by UNHCR, WFP, and the World Bank and including data from January till May 2023, for the District of Jezzine.
4. The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) conducted jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR and WFP including data from June and July 2024, for the District of Jezzine.
5. Palestine refugees High Frequency Monitoring Survey conducted by The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) including data from December 2024.

Other data sources on the food security contributing factors included: UNHCR protection monitoring for the third and fourth quarter of 2024; Overview of communal relations in Lebanon (Tension monitoring) conducted by UNDP; Monthly Market monitors by WFP; Market Functionality Index Assessment by WFP; and Displacement Tracking Matrix by IOM.

Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) data was provided by the Food Security and Agriculture cluster with the support of all reporting partners. HFA that can be considered for an IPC analysis includes direct resource transfers that aim to reduce food gaps, protect, and save lives and livelihoods. Only transfers that are intended to have an immediate positive effect on access to food were considered in the analysis. Assessing the levels and the broader mitigating effect of HFA is a key component of an IPC analysis, as IPC is a snapshot analysis and integrates all aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the current and projected situation. However, IPC protocols are not designed (nor should they be used) to assess or evaluate the impact of any humanitarian food assistance on food insecurity, or to monitor achievements towards program level goals.

## Limitations of the Analysis

The IPC analysis for this round faced several limitations including:

**Evolving population figures and displacement dynamics:** The fluidity of population movements, both within Lebanon and across its borders, complicated the analysis. Discrepancies in population estimates, coupled with the absence of updated official figures, necessitated reliance on the population numbers endorsed by the LRP and inter-agency coordination systems. This decision, while pragmatic, underscores the inherent uncertainty in displacement and population data during such volatile periods.

**Data gaps in specific districts:** Some units of analysis for both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees did not meet the minimum requirements due to limited sample size. Alternative IPC protocols, such as historical trends for the district of Jezzine, and a clustering approach across the other districts where the sample size was insufficient, were applied to ensure a representative and reliable assessment. However, such adjustments may have influenced the granularity of findings for some regions, especially for the clustered areas. In addition, for Palestine refugees, due to discrepancies in the methodologies applied in data collection, some data – particularly on the livelihood coping – was unable to be used in the analysis.

**Security situation:** The plenary discussions on the final day of the IPC workshop were interrupted due to a security incident and localized strike in the suburbs of Beirut, which affected mobility and operational continuity. As a result, the plenary session had to be postponed and resumed the following week, leading to an extension of the analysis workshop and necessitating coordination across multiple sessions to ensure full participation in the final classification and consensus-building processes.

**HFA funding volatility and programmatic uncertainty:** The planning and assumptions underpinning the provision of HFSA were challenged by a lack of visibility on funding flows and implementation plans across key population groups. Recurrent adjustments from donor side, combined with shifting programmatic priorities and projected reductions in coverage, created difficulty in establishing consistent assumptions. These changes required repeated coordination with operational agencies to validate and confirm funding, and associated assumptions.

Despite these limitations, the IPC TWG employed rigorous protocols and methodologies to ensure the analysis reliability and relevance. Continuous monitoring and future IPC analyses will be critical in addressing these gaps and refining the understanding of food security dynamics in Lebanon.

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## What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

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Classification of food insecurity was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC , FAO, FEWSNET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP, UNICEF, the World Bank, WFP and WHO.

## IPC Analysis Partners:

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