THE GAZA STRIP

RISK OF FAMINE AS 495,000 PEOPLE FACE CATASTROPHIC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY (IPC PHASE 5)

Overview

A high risk of Famine persists across the whole Gaza Strip as long as conflict continues, and humanitarian access is restricted. About 96 percent of the population in the Gaza Strip (2.15M people) face high levels of acute food insecurity through September 2024. While the whole territory is classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), over 495,000 people (22 percent of the population) are still facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5). In this phase, households experience an extreme lack of food, starvation, and exhaustion of coping capacities. Another 745,000 people (33 percent) are classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Current Acute Food Insecurity | 1 May - 15 June

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
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<td>Phase 3</td>
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PROJECTED: 16 JUNE – 30 SEPTEMBER 2024

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<th>Phase</th>
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Some areas are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) despite the prevalence of households in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) exceeding 20 percent. Households may be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), but the area may not be classified as IPC Phase 5 (Famine) if widespread deaths and acute malnutrition have not yet materialised at area level. I Disclaimer: The information shown on the maps does not imply official recognition or endorsement of any physical and political boundaries! For more information please contact ipc@fao.org.

Key Drivers

Hostilities

Widespread, intense, and sustained ground and air operations and clashes continue and have resulted in over 37,000 deaths and injured 85,000 people, displaced nearly 2 million people, damaged or destroyed almost 60 percent of the buildings, and devastated assets and infrastructure indispensable to survival, including across the food, health and water systems.

Restricted humanitarian access

Despite some improvements throughout March and April, hostilities in the northern governorates and the Rafah offensive resulted in very limited humanitarian access to and within the Gaza Strip, especially in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah, impeding the safe and equitable delivery of life saving multi-sector humanitarian assistance.
In the northern governorates, despite some disruptions, in March and April the amount of food deliveries and nutrition services provided increased, allowing for nutrition prevention and treatment programmes to start. These evolutions appear to have temporarily alleviated conditions. In this context, the available evidence does not indicate that Famine is currently occurring. However, ground operations continued and displaced around 100,000 people, over a third of the remaining population, and more recent data shows that in the last weeks of May and early June the percentage of households having received humanitarian assistance decreased by more than 20 percent compared to mid-April.

In the southern governorates, the situation deteriorated following the start of the Rafah offensive on 6 May, which displaced about one million people, and the closure of the Rafah crossing point, which led to a reduction of the humanitarian deliveries, including food and other commodities. Humanitarian access to the almost two million people in the southern governorates has notably reduced. Further concentration of displaced populations into areas with significantly reduced water, sanitation, hygiene (WASH), health and other essential infrastructures, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks, which would have catastrophic effects on the nutritional and health status of large segments of the population.

The conflict also continues to cause widespread damage to assets and infrastructure that are critical for survival. By the end of May, around 60 percent of all buildings, including dwellings, shops and infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools. Nearly 70 percent of WASH facilities across the Gaza Strip were damaged or destroyed, as well as 57 percent of agricultural land, significantly affecting the food system’s functionality.

The latest data show that, to be able to buy food, more than half of the households had to exchange their clothes for money and one third resorted to picking up trash to sell. More than half also reported that, often, they do not have any food to eat in the house, and over 20 percent go entire days and nights without eating.

The humanitarian space in the Gaza Strip continues to shrink and the ability to safely deliver assistance to populations is dwindling. The recent trajectory is negative and highly unstable. Should this continue, the improvements seen in April could be rapidly reversed.
CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLE (1 MAY - 15 JUNE)

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

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POPULATION TABLE FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION: 1 MAY - 15 JUNE 2024

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Total population analysed</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
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<td>963,301</td>
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CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (15 FEBRUARY - 15 MARCH 2024)

Overall
Despite improvements from previous analyses, nearly the entire population of the Gaza Strip (2.13 million people or 95 percent of the total population) were still experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity in the period 1 May to 15 June 2024, classified in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse) and were in urgent need of humanitarian food assistance. Of this, over 343,000 people (15 percent) were classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), over 643,000 people (29 percent) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 1.15 million people (51 percent) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis).

Vulnerabilities and Acute Events
Prior to the current hostilities, vulnerability was high in the Gaza Strip due to prolonged blockade and periodic escalations in hostilities that severely damaged the food system in the area. At 5,900 residents per square kilometre, one of the most densely populated area in the world even before the Gaza Strip population is extremely reliant on the cross-border movement of goods and utilities like electricity and water. In 2022, nearly 45 percent and, by September 2023, the poverty rate was at 60 percent, among a population that included nearly 70 percent of refugees. Due to severely constrained livelihood opportunities, in 2022, over half of the population was relying on humanitarian assistance as their main income source and about one-third on casual labour, with 70 percent of the population food insecure.

Conflict. As of 19 June 2024, the ongoing hostilities have reportedly caused nearly 37,400 fatalities and over 85,500 injuries, totalling over 6 percent of the total population in the Gaza Strip, while women (above 20 percent) and children (above 30 percent) account for more than half of all fatalities or injuries.

The escalation of hostilities within the Gaza Strip began with a heavy bombardment on 7 October 2023. On 27 October, major ground operations and clashes reportedly began within the Gaza Strip. These started in the northern governorates and continued through 23 November, with a humanitarian pause from 24 November through 30 November. Hostilities subsequently resumed at high intensity, with major ground operations and bombardment by air, land, and sea. This included the continued expansion of a ground operation in Khan Younis Governorate, centred on Khan Younis city.

Another large ground operation began in Deir al-Balah governorate on 24 December 2023, expanding across multiple though not all refugee camps and urban areas in the governorate. These operations were accompanied by continued clashes among armed actors. Clashes in the northern governorates, especially some neighbourhoods of Gaza city like Zeitoun, re-escalated in late February 2024. Bombardment by air, land, and sea of all areas of the Gaza Strip has continued throughout this period, intensifying particularly before and during major ground operations.
On 7 May 2024, another large ground operation began in Rafah, covering areas including Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings and a 31 square kilometre area from which residents were ordered to evacuate on 6 May 2024. The Kerem Shalom crossing was closed on 5 May 2024, and the Rafah Crossing was closed for goods and people on 7 May 2024. However, the Kerem Shalom Crossing was reopened by Israeli authorities on 8 May 2024, while the Rafah crossing remained closed to date.13

On 6 May 2024, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order to the population sheltering in nine blocks in eastern Rafah to temporarily move to an expanded humanitarian area in Al Mawassi. An approximately 31 square kilometre area, including Al Shokat municipality, As Salam neighbourhood, Al Juneineh, Tal Azar’a, and Al Bayuk, was evacuated. The evacuated zone encompassed nine sites hosting internally displaced persons (IDPs), three clinics, and six warehouses.14 On 11 May, the Israeli military issued additional evacuation orders for 22 neighbourhoods in Jabaliya (covering 12.6 square kilometres) and 12 neighbourhoods in Rafah covering six square kilometres.15

Moreover, on 1 June an evacuation order was issued to vacate two blocs in Beit Hanoun, in North Gaza Governorate, encompassing an area of two square kilometres, including two UNRWA schools, one UNRWA distribution centre, and one health facility. Currently, 285 square kilometres, accounting for around 78 percent of the Gaza Strip, are under evacuation orders from the Israeli military. This includes all areas north of Wadi Gaza, evacuated in late October 2023, and specific areas south of Wadi Gaza where evacuation orders have been issued since 1 December 2023.16 To date, ground invasions and intense fighting persist in various locations including in Beit Hanoun, south of Gaza city, eastern Deir al-Balah, northeastern Khan Younis, in addition to central and southern Rafah resulting in fatalities and injuries.17 For instance, on 8 June 2024 the Israeli military operation in An Nuseirat Refugee Camp, which involved intensive land and air strikes, resulted in the deaths of 274 Palestinians and injuries to 698 others.18

In a survey conducted in March 2024, it was reported that 51 percent of women have lost at least one family member, more than 3,000 women have been widowed, and more than 10,000 children have been orphaned, and it is estimated that more than 17,000 children are unaccompanied or separated.19 The ongoing conflict has precipitated a severe humanitarian crisis, with a multitude of vulnerable population facing heightened protection risks where women, men, and children experience distinct threats to their safety. Humanitarian actors on the ground bear witness to a catastrophic escalation of hardships, including a surge in individuals acquiring disabilities, the separation of children from their families, and a rampant increase in Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). Furthermore, individuals with pre-existing mental health conditions, formerly detained persons, and those traversing conflict lines face serious risks and protection concerns. In addition, healthcare facilities are facing an overwhelming burden due to conflict-related injuries, and the severely hindered access to essential care for chronic conditions.

**Damages.** The damage and destruction of buildings as a result of bombardments by air, land and sea is evident in all governorates. According to the recent satellite assessments, by late May 2024, at least 58 percent of all buildings in the Gaza Strip were likely damaged or destroyed. The largest scale destruction is in Gaza Governorate where almost 74 percent of buildings are estimated to be destroyed, followed by North Gaza (70 percent), Khan Younis (56 percent), Deir al-Balah (50 percent), and Rafah (40 percent).20 This has included dwellings, shops and various types of infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and other public buildings, as well as WASH infrastructure and storage facilities, among others.

**Displacement.** Displacement continues to be driven by the conflict, the intensification of hostilities and the evacuation orders starting on 6 May 2024. As per the Site Management Working group remote sensing and satellite imagery

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Map 1. Comprehensive damage assessment from February and May 2024. Source: Oregon State University and City University New York
analysis, central and southeast Rafah hosting sites have been abandoned or have been destroyed as of 15 May 2024. As of 9 June 2024, nearly 1 million individuals have moved from Rafah with around 200,000 individuals moving between 19 May and 9 June 2024, while it is estimated that less than 100,000 people remained in Rafah.

Households have moved in the western and northern areas of Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah Governorates and others to the northwest parts of Rafah. The sudden surge of people in these areas has overwhelmed the existing essential services and infrastructure. These systems were already strained and heavily reliant on a steady flow of incoming supplies from Rafah and Karem Shalom crossings. As per the Site Management Working Group, from the 47 location reports received across the Gaza Strip from 14 to 16 May, 51 percent reports stated that households were displaced in new sites, 31 percent displaced in existing sites and 16 percent returned to destroyed buildings.

The displaced population, already facing high security and safety risks due to the ongoing conflict, is encountering additional risks as displacement continues and IDP sites expand into flood-prone areas.

According to the Site Management Working Group, remote sensing data reveals a significant shift in the distribution of shelters and makeshifts sites in Rafah governorate. Many areas that were previously densely populated now appear to be abandoned or evacuated. Conversely, an increase in number of sites in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah is noted. As shown in Map 3, new arrivals are primarily concentrated in the coastal areas around Khan Younis, with some also setting in Deir Al al-Balah and northwest Rafah.

Conversely, an increase in number of sites in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah is noted. As shown in Map 5, new arrivals are primarily concentrated in the coastal areas around Khan Younis, with some also setting in Deir Al al-Balah and northwest Rafah.

Map 2. GAZA STRIP Internal Displacement from Rafah Governorate, 9 June 2024. Source: OCHA.

Conditions in shelters. More than 1.7 million people—75 percent of Gaza’s population—have been displaced as of late May 2024, with most displaced people currently concentrated into a small geographical area in central Gaza with limited access to essential services, leading to increased levels of humanitarian need and physical insecurity. The shelter type varied between governorates and throughout the conflict period, with the northern governorates’ population sheltering in damaged apartment or house, while the population in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah resides mainly in tents.

According to the Rapid population needs and location tracking report,27 53 percent of respondents were displaced to newly established sites, 29 percent to existing sites and 16 percent returned to destroyed homes. More than two-thirds (77 percent) of new arrivals accessed water only every two days, and less than half (44 percent) were able to carry shelter material during their last displacement. Additionally, about 44 percent of respondents were unable to carry food items, resulting in very high declared food needs, particularly for fresh food, dry food, bread and cooking oil and flour.

According to WFP,28 three quarters of the households interviewed in northern Gaza governorates are sheltering in a damaged house or apartment, while about one-third in Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah are seeking refuge in a tent group or random tents. On average there is 1 square meter space per person in the IDP shelters, with 41 percent of shelters lacking sufficient ventilation and 57 percent affected by rain and water infiltration.29

As per OCHA, a rapid assessment conducted by humanitarian organizations within two Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps, each housing an estimated 500-700 tent-sized shelters, identified concerning living conditions.30 These camps exhibited a prevalence of makeshift dwellings constructed from blankets, nylon sheeting, and scavenged materials. Furthermore, tents situated directly on the beach slope displayed a marked lack of stability and inadequate protection from the elements. Solid waste generated from the elevated surrounding areas was observed accumulating within the camp and polluting the adjacent sea. Critically, the sites lacked sufficient water storage capacity, designated water distribution points, and access to affordable potable water. The absence of electricity, coupled with the prohibitive cost of cooking gas and firewood, necessitated burning trash and plastic for food preparation. Finally, the sanitation infrastructure was found to be deficient, relying on rudimentary pits and buckets as makeshift latrines.

Health organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO), have identified a heightened risk of communicable disease outbreaks directly attributable to insufficient sanitation infrastructure and the consumption of contaminated water. The prevalence of such diseases is projected to escalate with the absence of electricity or fuel provision to facilitate the resumption of operations within water treatment and sanitation facilities.31

Humanitarian access. Safe and unrestricted humanitarian access is essential for response efforts to serve the population in need of humanitarian assistance throughout the Gaza Strip. However, conflict continues to place severe limitations on the ability of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving food, nutrition, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, and other life-saving assistance to populations across all governorates.

As shown in the map,32 since February 2024 (date of the previous IPC analysis), additional crossing points have been established, in addition to Rafah crossing border that was operational at that time. In the northern governorates, new crossing points include Erez and Gate 96, alongside the establishment of a Joint Logistics Over-the-Should (JLOTS) and the initiation of airdrops.
In the southern governorates, a new crossing point, Kerem Shalom, was opened. Reversely, Rafah crossing point has been closed on 7 May 2024, following the intensified military operations in the area. Per OCHA, the Kerem Shalom Crossing was designated as the primary crossing for humanitarian cargo, food, fuel, and other critical supplies. However, the crossing remained overcrowded with private sector trucks throughout the month.

Shipments entering through Kerem Shalom must be approved by Israeli authorities and undergo multiple checks before being permitted to transport commodities across the Gaza Strip. Once cleared, trucks must travel either through the road crossing Rafah governorate, where conflict intensity remains high and requires authorization from the Israeli military, or via the Salah Ad Din Road crossing Khan Younis, which is also considered high risk. Both routes are deemed high-risk by OCHA.

Movement of people and commodities between the northern and southern governorates is minimal to nonexistent, effectively dividing the Gaza Strip into two by the Israeli military road. Erez, Gate 96, and JLOT are exclusively used for the entry of commodities into the northern governorates, while Kerem Shalom serves the southern and central governorates.

According to OCHA, in May numerous constraints continued to limit the ability of affected communities to access essential services, while also impeding humanitarian organizations to reach the affected communities. These include volatile security conditions, complex and inconsistent movement notification and coordination procedures, damaged and overcrowded roads, and inconsistent checkpoint procedures. Particularly, frequent impediments, delays, and denials significantly restricted the movement of humanitarian personnel and the delivery of assistance throughout May 2024.

As such, movement restrictions and military operations in southern Gaza obstructed critical humanitarian missions throughout the month, leading to challenges in delivering essential supplies including food, fuel, and medical supplies from Kerem Shalom Crossing, the primary entry point for humanitarian aid. Moreover, the breakdown of law and order within Gaza due to the prolonged conflict, including the theft of relief supplies from convoys, as well as the administrative restrictions imposed by authorities undermined response efforts and posed security risks to affected communities and humanitarian personnel.

Furthermore, restrictions and prevailing security conditions continued to undermine the vital operational function of rotating humanitarian personnel into and out of Gaza during May.

According to OCHA, a significant number of missions are still being denied by the Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) or impeded by the Israeli army preventing them from fully or partially achieving their objectives. Additionally, a smaller number of missions are withdrawn due to internal reasons.
**Food Availability**

**Production.** The escalation of hostilities and mass displacements have caused food shortages and unavailability throughout the Gaza Strip as the food system and agriculture value chains have collapsed or are marginally surviving through the informal market. A significant portion of agriculture land, encompassing orchards, greenhouses, and farmlands has suffered extensive destruction. According to the UNOSAT, the percent of damaged agriculture land has increased from around 13 percent to 57 percent, between November 2023 and May 2024.36

According to the FAO Damage to agricultural wells assessment of May 2024, almost half (46 percent) of the agricultural wells are damaged in the Gaza Strip, with Gaza Governorate recording the largest number of damaged wells (n=351) followed by North Gaza (n=305). In terms of percentage of damaged wells, around 58 percent of the agricultural wells are damaged in Gaza Governorate, 51 percent in Khan Younis, 50 percent in North Gaza, 32 percent in Deir al-Balah and 21 percent in Rafah.37

More than 57 percent (8,660 ha) of all croplands has been damaged since 7 October. The largest area of damaged cropland was recorded in Khan Younis Governorate (2,340 ha; 55.1 percent), while the area of damaged cropland more than doubled in Rafah, increasing from 452 ha in February to 922 ha in May 2024. North Gaza Governorate recorded the highest percentage of damaged cropland (68 percent) followed by Gaza city (61 percent).38 A total of nearly 5,230 ha (59.1 percent) of orchards and other trees, nearly 1,750 ha (59.3 percent) of field crops, and nearly 1,680 ha (52.2 percent) of vegetables were damaged.39

The most heavily damaged agricultural infrastructures were home barns (537), broiler farms (484), sheep farms (397), and agricultural warehouses (256) based on the extent of damage recorded. Moreover, Khan Younis Governorate had the largest number of damaged agricultural infrastructures (1,405).40

Other assets and infrastructure necessary for food production and distribution have also been destroyed or severely damaged, extremely limiting the functionality of the food system. Although some local production, primarily of vegetables, is still ongoing, it is very limited. Lack of access to land and destruction of crops are compounded by a lack of access to essential agriculture inputs (fuel, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides).

Most livestock were abandoned during the large-scale displacement in October 2023. Remaining livestock is being slaughtered or sold due to the lack of fodder and water or due to the need for cash or other resources. Similarly, poultry lack animal feed, and the availability of poultry meat and eggs is reduced throughout the Gaza Strip, as also portrayed by the food consumption indicators.

The comparison among the preliminary reports from the FAO Loss and Damage assessment and the baseline figure from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), shows that about 70 percent of livestock and other animals have been lost since 7 October 2024. Fishing production is largely halted due to the damage of boats, lack of fuel, in addition to security and safety concerns. Some fishing is still happening, but it is only available to those who still possess equipment and have access to fuel.

The Gaza farmers damages and needs assessment conducted by Action Against Hunger41 in the Middle Area of Gaza between 19 May and 27 May 2024 with 48 men and 2 women farmers, highlighted the challenges faced by 90 percent of farmers interviewed who have currently partial or full access to their farmlands and greenhouses. All farmers reported that their crops have sustained either partial or total damage, with 65 percent reporting total damage to assets and 33 percent reporting partial loss. From these farmers, 31 percent of those who have access to their agricultural property reported that they are able to obtain water for irrigation, out of which 29 percent manage to obtain water fully and 2 percent partially. Farmers reported facing numerous obstacles in watering their crops. Farmers highlighted that water and fuel unavailability, and increased prices pose significant burden. Nearly all respondents (98 percent) pointed to water quality as a major irrigation issue. Finally, deficiency in electricity access constituted a constraint for 93 percent of the surveyed farmers and nearly a third (29 percent) of respondents reported the inability to harvest their crops.
Humanitarian, privately contracted and commercial food commodities supply. The entry of humanitarian and commercial trucks into Gaza continues to be limited compared to pre-escalation levels. A thorough monitoring of the commodities entering the Gaza Strip is extremely complex due to the number of entry points and the units reported by different sources.

For the southern governorates, for instance, the UNRWA supply and dispatch dashboard provided updated figures only up to April, detailing deliveries from Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings. However, monitoring of commercial inflows has been discontinuous, and there has been significant disruption of monitoring capacities following the Rafah offensive and the closure of this crossing point. From May onwards, individual agencies such as COGAT, FEWS NET, OCHA, WFP and UNRWA have reported more recent updates. However, these reports remain somehow partial due to the challenges in measuring and estimating net metric tonnages, especially for mixed commodities trucks.

Figure 5a. Reported MT of food commodities entering the southern governorates by different sources from March to May 2024. Source: GSU reanalysis of COGAT, OCHA, UNRWA and WFP.
Due to discrepancies detected among monitoring systems, the analysis team has focused primarily on month-to-month trends for the IPC analysis, where feasible. This approach involves considering reported metric tons of food from various sources across different entry points. An attempt was done to calculate caloric coverage attributing different caloric values for different commodities. However, the interval ranges resulting from conversion have proven too wide among sources to be used directly as indicators of food availability.

Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 5, there was a significant increase in shipments (commercial, private, and humanitarian via air, land, and sea) entering both the northern and southern governorates in March and April 2024. Deliveries in May, however, are reportedly showing a decrease across all sources except for COGAT. It should be noted that all sources confirm a decrease in humanitarian deliveries in May, in the southern governorates.

According to the Cash Working Group, canned food is generally available in markets across all governorates. Bread is available in the southern governorates, while staple food is available in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis. However, the availability of fresh food is low to non-existent in all governorates, and water appears scarce in North Gaza Governorate.

According to WFP Market monitoring, the commercial food trucking contents has been primarily flour, fruits, vegetables, salt, egg, rice and vegetable oil. Very little quantity of meat has been imported and this can be observed also through disaggregation of the Food Consumption Score of the WFP CATI survey.

The lack of electricity is affecting storage of items and reducing the shelf life of products. It is important to highlight that only 29 percent of fuel allocations (1 million litres) entered the Gaza Strip, which inhibited the work of the bakeries, hospitals, water wells and other critical infrastructure.

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Figure 5b. Reported MT of food commodities entering the northern governorates by different sources from March to May 2024. Source: GSU reanalysis of COGAT, OCHA, UNRWA and WFP.

Figure 6. Reported Food and NFI availability by governorate in April 2024. Source, Cash Working Group.
Food Access

The increased availability of food in March and April, still somehow sustained but at a lower level in May, does not directly translate into improved access to food for households. It is crucial to consider various factors related to physical, social, and financial access that are extremely important to avoid establishing a direct link among imports inside the Gaza Strip and individual’s food intake.

Physical access. In all the Gaza Strip, the security and safety concerns as well as the risks associated with movement are some of the challenges hindering physical access. Conflict intensity is still extremely high and unpredictable, hindering the capacity of households to safely access food distribution points and markets. Recent attacks in densely populated areas have demonstrated that no area can be considered safe and movements from the house or shelter pose critical risks. According to WFP survey, in the northern governorates, 84 percent of the surveyed households declared facing safety risks and challenges to access food, compared to 75 percent in Deir al-Balah and 63 percent in Rafah. Additionally, transportation of items and people movement has been hindered by the lack of fuel and the impediment of the public transportation especially for people living far from the market.

According to the Cash Working Group survey, the main challenge to market access across all governorates in April 2024 was insecurity, reported by 47 percent of respondents. This was followed by market access issues, cited by 40 percent of respondents, particularly in Khan Younis (80 percent). The high cost of items, which was the main barrier identified in March 2024, was reported as only the third most significant barrier in April. Insecurity was further highlighted when respondents were asked about feeling safe while traveling to receive assistance. For instance, 41 percent of the respondents who were residing in Deir al-Balah reported feeling unsafe, followed by 39 percent of respondents in Rafah, 35 percent in Khan Younis and North Gaza, and 32 percent in Gaza Governorate.

Financial access. The scarcity of items has resulted in increased food prices, and reduced households' purchasing power. As a result of improved availability in March and April, prices of various commodities such as wheat flour (Egyptian), rice, sugar, vegetable oil, onions, and eggs decreased in May compared to March 2024. However, a reverse trend was noted for the prices of other food items including lentils, salt and tomatoes. Generally, there has been significant price increase compared to pre-crisis levels, as the prices of some of the key commodities like wheat flour, fresh vegetables and eggs increased by ten folds. Price levels vary between northern and southern governorates, with most commodities showing higher prices in the northern governorates.

Despite what could be cautiously defined as a decrease in price levels, the purchasing power of the households is extremely limited. A significant proportion of the population in Gaza has lost employment as a direct consequence of the conflict, relying solely on the liquidity that might be generated through cash transfer and remittances to access food on the market.

Social access. Eight months of conflict has put at strain the very interconnected society in the Gaza Strip. Civil unrest has become significantly high, and competition for limited resources, including food, has often left the most vulnerable unable to access food. This is particularly the case for unaccompanied children, elderly, pregnant women, and people living with disabilities. Attacks on convoys, looting of both private and humanitarian trucks, diversion of aid during civil unrest episodes and other violent incidents have limited, at times, the effectiveness of humanitarian deliveries and left individuals that were not physically strong to compete with others with less access to food.

Access to humanitarian food security assistance. The humanitarian assistance provided is through the form of Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance or in-kind support through food parcels or cooked meals.
Figure 8. Comparison and trends of price of key commodities in the Gaza Strip. Source: WFP.

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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chickpeas</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>150%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice*</td>
<td>25 KG</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>668%</td>
<td>186%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1233%</td>
<td>158%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable oil</td>
<td>3 Liter</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>697%</td>
<td>241%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>496%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onion</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>660%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken eggs</td>
<td>Carton/2 KG</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>587%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned meat</td>
<td>400 G</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned beans</td>
<td>400 G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The available rice now is Egyptian rice.

Figure 9. Comparison of price of key commodities among northern and Southern governorates. Source: WFP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Northern Governorates</th>
<th>Southern Governorates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour (White Flour - Al Salam Mills - Local)</td>
<td>50 KG</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Flour (Egyptian)</td>
<td>50 Kg</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chickpeas</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice*</td>
<td>25 KG</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable oil</td>
<td>3 Liter</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onion</td>
<td>1 KG</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomato</td>
<td>1 Kg</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken eggs</td>
<td>Carton/2 KG</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned meat</td>
<td>400 G</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned beans</td>
<td>400 G</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The available rice now is Egyptian rice.

**Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA).** Although cash-based programmes have been crucial in sustaining households’ access to food in the market, their effectiveness is significantly limited by electricity and connectivity constraints, as well as the extremely challenging context of moving money across the Gaza Strip to various withdrawal points. Per the Cash Working Group, 46 of the 56 bank branches and 91 ATMs functioning prior to October 2023, only five branches and seven ATMs were operational in April, mostly located in Rafah. As per the Cash working group, since the onset of the conflict, nearly 173,000 households received emergency multipurpose cash assistance with a cash out rate standing at 72 percent and only one functioning Financial Service Provider.49 Residents prefer unrestricted cash for basic needs, and disruptions in infrastructure hinder aid distribution and monitoring. According to the most recent survey, 20 percent of the respondents reported that the MPCA helped them cover all their urgent needs, and 62 percent reported that it helped them cover some of their urgent needs in March and April 2024. In April, most of the cash received has been employed to purchase food and water, especially in Rafah. The low use of cash in the northern governorates is reflective of the scarce liquidity in this area.
According to the Cash Working Group monthly analysis, nearly all respondents in April 2024 reported using cash to access food. The second most frequently purchased commodities with the MPCA were water and medicines across all governorates. In Khan Younis, 47 percent of respondents allocated a substantial portion of the MPCA to purchase fuel and gas. Additionally, many respondents in northern governorates and Khan Younis used the MPCA to cover transportation. Between 15 and 36 percent of respondents also used MPCA to repay debts, indicating their ability to purchase on credit.

Figure 10. Reported MPCA expenditure by governorates, 1 to 30 April 2024. Source: Cash Working Group

In-kind food assistance. In-kind support was provided as well to bakeries and community kitchens distributing bread and hot meals. Moreover, the Gaza Strip has seen an increase in the provision of aid through airdrops though it is not quite clear which population had access to them and in which quantities. The expanding conflict, restrictions on movement, and population displacement are causing a continual shrinkage of the operational space for humanitarian organizations. Consequently, the distribution of humanitarian food assistance is becoming increasingly uneven across different areas. According to the Food Security Sector dashboard, about 800,000 food parcels were distributed during the last two weeks of May. The majority of food parcels were distributed in UNRWA shelters (421,000), followed by makeshift camps (213,000), and about 100,000 parcels distributed in public shelters, while the remaining were provided to non-IDP or IDP in host families. Food security sector partners have also provided hot meals throughout the Gaza Strip, with 67 cooking points in Rafah, 36 cooking points established in Deir al-Balah, 23 in Khan Younis and 3 in Gaza city. Although monitoring the number of people served is complex, estimates for the first 15 days of May indicate that the highest number of meals were served in Deir al-Balah, followed by Rafah, North Gaza, Khan Younis, and Gaza Governorates. Approximately 1.8 million hot meals were distributed, mainly to people hosted in UNRWA shelters (1.5 million) and makeshift camps (972,000). This figure represents unique meals provided, making it difficult to determine how many people regularly access hot meals twice a day. Overall, considering 15 reporting days, 120,000 people could have been served one meal per day.

Although bread is not distributed for free but at subsidized price, bakeries also represent a key contribution to the population's access to food, although the number of functioning bakeries is extremely low. As of 19 May 2024, the Food Security Cluster reported that only ten bakeries receiving humanitarian assistance remain operational, with six located in Deir al-Balah (for a displaced population of over one million people), four in Gaza City, and none in Rafah. Fuel, electricity and water are essential for bakeries functioning, and these are all available in limited quantities. According to the Food Security Sector, in the last two weeks of May about 536,000 people received bread (as a unique event).

The main driver of improvement recorded for the food security outcome indicators is the increased availability and access as a result of humanitarian assistance. For instance, according to WFP CATI survey, the Humanitarian Food Security Assistance (HFSA) in northern Gaza governorates increased from 0 to around 80 percent between November 2023 and May 2024. Whereas the number of beneficiaries in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah has been consistently between 60 and 75 percent since January 2024. In Rafah, HFSA beneficiaries rose from 66 percent to 82 percent between December 2023 and April 2024, followed by a sudden decrease to around 65 percent in May 2024 due to the increasing access challenges that persist at the time of writing of this report.
As per the same WFP CATI survey, respondents who declared to have received humanitarian assistance in the previous month peaked to 80 percent in mid-May in the northern governorates, which then dropped to 57 percent in the period from May to mid-June, representing a significant decline. In Rafah, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis after a positive response to receiving humanitarian assistance peaked in mid-April to 82 percent and 75 percent respectively, this percentage dropped to around 65 percent in both Governorates in the period from mid-April to mid-May and to 25 percent and 48 percent in the period from mid-May to mid-June. This decrease is extremely concerning and is an immediate reflection of the drop in humanitarian supplies after the Rafah offensive.
The same decline can be observed when disaggregating by the main typologies of food assistance provided to respondents: the percentage of respondents having received cooked meals started to decrease in March in Rafah and Deir al-Balah and in April in the northern governorates. The percentage of respondents having received food parcels started dropping in the period from mid-April to mid-May in the southern governorates and in the period from mid-May to mid-June in the northern governorates.

Figure 13. Trends in of respondent to WFP CATI survey having received cooked meals. Source: WFP

Figure 14. Trends in of respondent to WFP CATI survey having received food parcels. Source: WFP
Utilization

In IPC terms, food utilization refers to the ability of households to fully utilize accessible food for adequate nutrition and energy intake. Food utilization is usually a factor of food preferences, preparation, storage, and access to adequate quantity and quality of water. While this last element is analyzed in the WASH session of this report, it is important to highlight the extreme criticalities the population is facing in finding adequate and sufficient cooking sources. According to the WFP CATI survey, the most employed source for cooking is firewood and wood residues, followed by waste burning. There are not significant differences among governorates, however the trends in employing these two cooking energies, as opposed to electricity and gas are showing an alarming increase, considering both of these are finite resources in the Gaza Strip.

Electricity. In the Gaza Strip, electricity was unreliable and only available for few hours each day before the October escalation. The World Bank\(^5\) estimated that currently the damage to the Gaza Strip's electricity infrastructure exceeds USD 400 million. The impairment encompassed damages to the electricity distribution network, the ground-based utility scale and off-grid distributed rooftop solar photovoltaic electricity supply systems, specific equipment like demineralized water tanks, high voltage electricity connection points, the warehouses, offices and other assets of the Gaza electricity distribution company. The lack of reliable electricity significantly affects food storage and food security, as it hampers the ability to preserve perishable goods and maintain stable food supplies.

Fuel, gas and cooking energy source. Diesel and petrol imports into the Gaza Strip has fluctuated throughout the months with May showing a drop in Diesel import and a lack of cooking gas import as of 6 May 2024. Previously, UNRWA established a minimum daily fuel requirement of 160,000 litres to support its core humanitarian activities. Although UNRWA reporting might be incomplete for the month of May, owning to the closure of the Rafah crossing, the graphs below show insufficient and decreasing quantities of diesel and petrol imported.

Figure 15: Quantity of Diesel and Domestic Gas imported per day. Source: GSU reanalysis based on UNRWA supply and dispatch dashboard.

Stability

Continued conflict and worsening acute food insecurity and nutritional status can contribute to civil unrest, which lowers the stability of all food security dimensions. Civil unrest is a major challenge to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and it hampers the ability of the humanitarian staff to reach the people in need as well as the most vulnerable to access and make full use of assistance.

In the current conditions, individuals or groups have little to no agency. The population's capacity to act independently to make choices about what they eat, the foods they produce, how that food is produced, processed, and distributed is minimal. As well as their engagement into policy process that shape the food system. The systematic damage to agricultural land, assets, production facilities and the supporting infrastructure significantly impairs the sustainability of current food system practices. The scale of destruction and presence of contaminants, from high intensity conflict and other sources like sewage, chemicals, and other pollutants, may have impacts on the long-term regeneration of natural, social, and economic systems to fulfill future food needs.
Food security outcomes

The most recent WFP survey relied on data collected through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) between 1 and 23 May 2024, with 1,996 complete questionnaires collected by WFP since the last IPC analysis between 20 February and 23 May 2024. The survey was administered to randomly selected respondents from an updated master list used in the previous rounds of the CATI survey, which include former, current, and potential WFP beneficiaries, and comprising more than 80 percent of households in Gaza. Between 20 February and 23 May 2024, a total of 3,493 calls were made, with a success rate reaching 57 percent.

In this analysis, the most recent data collected between 1 and 23 May 2024 was considered to capture the impact of recent conflict and displacement events that hit Rafah and other southern governorates. The total number of observations was 488, of which 131 in the northern governorates (23 in North Gaza Governorate and 108 in Gaza Governorate), 254 in the Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates (164 and 90, respectively) and 103 in Rafah Governorate. Three food security outcome indicators were collected including 1) Food Consumption Score (FCS); 2) Household Hunger Scale (HHS); 3) reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI)- alongside additional indirect evidence and contributing factors. Figures 16 to 20 show the results from the latest round (1-23 May).

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Figure 16. Trends in Food Consumption Score from November 2023 to 23 May 2024 by governorate. Source: WFP.

Figure 17. Trends in Reduced Coping Strategy Index from November 2023 to 23 May 2024 by governorate. Source: WFP.
The highest prevalence of poor FCS – indicative of IPC Phase 4 or 5 - is observed in the northern governorates (13 percent), against 7 percent in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah and 2 percent in Rafah. Similarly, 15 percent of households in northern Gaza governorates face the highest category of severity according to the Household Hunger Scale - very severe hunger, indicative of IPC Phase 5 – compared to 8 percent in Rafah and 4 percent in Deir Al-Balah and Khan Younis. The rCSI shows a more homogeneous picture, with the vast majority of households from the three units of analysis (85 to 87 percent) in the highest cohort of severity, indicative of IPC Phase 3 or above. The rCSI is a less sensitive and informative indicator compared to the FCS and HHS in the context of high severity. When isolating values of rCSI above 42, the prevalence reduces to around 30 percent in all the three units of analysis, maintaining a uniform level of severity as far as rCSI is concerned.

Statistically significant correlations among the highest (most severe) categories of indicators within the same population are noted particularly in northern Gaza governorates and Rafah Governorate. In northern Gaza governorates, for instance, seven percent of the sample faced poor FSC, severe hunger (HHS) and rCSI above score of 18. The results are indicative of the convergence of severity for each indicator within the same households, corroborating the results of the survey and highlighting the proportion of the population facing the highest levels of food insecurity from all perspectives reported by the three indicators.

The CATI survey also collected information on Livelihood Coping Strategies (LCS). While the module employed does not meet the IPC requirements for direct evidence, the individual categories, mainly depicting emergency coping strategies, have been analysed and utilised as indirect evidence of changes in livelihoods.

Trends (November 2023-May 2024). Trends of key outcome indicators extracted from the WFP CATI survey since November 2023 are highlighted below. The trends present the monthly evolution of vulnerability in each one of the three IPC units of analysis considered.

Northern Governorates. According to the survey results from 27 November 2023 to 23 May 2024, the proportion of households reporting Poor food consumption score (indicative of Phase 4-5) has been decreasing across all governorates, and most notably in the northern governorates where a peak was reached in February 2024 (85 percent), followed by a significant decrease to 13 percent in May 2024. In the same period, the proportion of people facing very severe hunger according to the HHS (indicative of IPC Phase 5) increased from 38 percent in November 2023, to reach a peak of 84 percent in January 2024, then decreasing to 15 percent in May 2024.
Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates. Despite a small deterioration in the FCS outcomes in March 2024, there has been continued improvement till May 2024. The highest prevalence of poor FCS in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah was recorded in December 2023 (38 percent), which decreased afterwards to reach 7 percent in May 2024. Comparably, the proportion of households with very severe hunger as per the HHS decreased from 61 percent in January 2024 to 4 percent in May 2024.

Rafah Governorate. Similarly, HHS most severe category decreased from a peak recorded in December 2023 (70 percent) to 8 percent in May 2024, and FCS followed very similar trends as a peak in poor FCS was recorded in December 2023 (42 percent) and decreased to 2 percent in May 2024.

The trends of rCSI corroborate the indications of the other indicators, with some little, tangible improvements across the three governorates in April and May 2024. In May 2024, for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, between 13 and 15 percent of the population shifted to rCSI values indicating IPC Phase 2 (Stress). This is an encouraging sign given that rCSI is valued for its accuracy particularly on the lower phases and levels of severity.

Food groups consumed. A more detailed analysis on food types consumed in the Gaza Strip shows a good degree of convergence within the three units, with cereals and pulses being the main food items as part of the main ingredients of the ration received by HFSA beneficiaries. Cereals are consumed almost daily (6.6 to 6.7 days per week, on average), while pulses are consumed 4 days per week (3.7 to 4.2 days per week, on average). Dairy products are consumed around 2 days per week, and animal proteins around 1.5 days per week. Similarly, the consumption of fresh vegetables is low particularly in northern Gaza governorates (less than one day per week, versus two days per week in the middle and southern governorates).

In the middle and southern governorates, the average weekly consumption of cereals and pulses increased linearly since the beginning of the conflict in November 2023 through 23 May 2024, due to the use of existing stocks in the markets and humanitarian support afterwards. In northern Gaza governorates, cereal consumption (a proxy of food consumption as a whole) was extremely low in the aftermath of the peak of hostilities due to the protracted impact of conflict on stocks and access. In February 2024, the average weekly consumption reached a lowest point of 2.8 days, then increased steeply to reach a normal consumption pattern of daily consumption of cereals in May 2024.

Trends observed after the period of analysis (24 May to 2 June 2024) - although only representative for Khan Younis and Deir Al-Balah broadly confirm the results shown in the first part of May, with cereal consumed on a daily basis (6.5 to 6.7 days/week) and pulses 4 days per week in northern Gaza and Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah. Conversely, the limited sampled cases in Rafah (n=20) recorded a decrease from 4.5 days of pulses weekly consumption between 1 and 23 May 2024 to 3.1 days per week in the 10 days following 23 May 2024. Considering the 7-day day recall period for this specific question, the reduction in food consumption (and access constraints related to it) arguably started at least one week before 24 May 2024, confirming that the current situation is having a toll on people who are left behind in Rafah governorate.

Figure 19. Average weekly consumption of food groups, November to May trends by governorate. Source: WFP.
Health

The prevalence of communicable diseases remains high across all governorates, according to recent monitoring, and is particularly concerning given the degraded health system functionality, coverage, and additional risks from the severely damaged WASH infrastructure. According to the Health Cluster Dashboard, since the escalation of hostilities, the most common communicable disease in the Gaza Strip has been Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI), with 886,000 cases, especially concentrated in Rafah Governorate. Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) also shows a very high number of cumulative cases reaching 500,000 cases. While most of the disease curves are showing a downward trend, it is difficult to attribute this entirely to the improved conditions; in fact, supply and service disruptions may also be contributing to fewer people seeking treatment at health points.

When looking at cases of communicable diseases by governorates, trends show that in Rafah Governorate, there is a decrease in cases of Acute Watery Diarrhoea, Acute Respiratory Infection, Acute Jaundice Syndrome (suspected Hepatitis A), and Bloody Diarrhoea (suspected Shigellosis). However, this has been primarily due to significant reduction in the number of surveillance sites following recent increase in combat activities. In Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates, there is an increase in the weekly trends of Acute Watery Diarrhoea, Acute Respiratory Infection, Acute Jaundice Syndrome (suspected Hepatitis A) and Bloody Diarrhoea (suspected Shigellosis). In North Gaza and Gaza Governorates, the incomplete reporting does not allow appreciation of historical trends.
Per the Public Health Situation Analysis (dated from 2 May 2024), there are 28 health risks that could result in excess mortality or morbidity in the upcoming months. Eleven of these are identified as very high risk that could result in high levels of excess mortality or morbidity, seven that could result in considerable levels of excess mortality or morbidity, five that could make a minor contribution and another five that will probably not result in excess mortality or morbidity, as detailed in the table below:

| Health response. | Per recent WHO reports, on 23 May 2024, around 65 percent of all hospitals and primary health centres (PHC) across all governorates are not functional or inaccessible. In North Gaza Governorate, no hospitals or PHCs were functional or accessible, while 32 percent (6) hospitals and 30 percent (7) PHCs were functional in Gaza Governorate. Nearly all (4) of the hospitals 39 percent (9) of PHCs are functional in Deir al-Balah, while 62 percent (5) of hospitals and 42 percent (8) of PHCs are functional in Khan Younis Governorate. In Rafah, 56 percent (5) of hospitals are functional or accessible and 43 percent (6) of PHCs are functional or accessible. By the end of May 2024, due to the military operations in Rafah three major hospitals (The Kuwait Hospital, Al Helal Al Emarati Hospital, and Al Najjar Hospital) were evacuated or longer functional. Similarly in the northern governorates, the SAM SC in Kamal Adwan hospital became out of service by end of May 2024.

Attacks on healthcare facilities continued in May 2024, further impeding the functionality of the healthcare system. According to the Health cluster dashboard, since the escalation of hostilities in October, there has been 950 attacks on health, affecting 465 facilities, 391 health transportation and 435 ambulances. There has been 743 fatalities and 1,000 injuries from attacks to health facilities and transport.

**Figure 21. Gaza communicable disease surveillance trends. Source: Health Cluster.**
Border crossings closure and restrictive measures also impacted the functionality of the healthcare system. First, the medical evacuations of patients have ceased since 7 May 2024, while estimates suggest nearly 14,000 patients require medical evacuation. Rafah border crossings closure resulted in shortages of fuel, medical supplies, and equipment, which further hindered the operation and functionality of remaining health facilities. Recent reporting that commercial or privately contracted trucks are prioritized over humanitarian trucks or shipments indicates difficulties in restocking medical supplies. In addition to the lack of medicine and fuel, there is also a lack of tents and building equipment to expand or relocate temporary health facilities.

Across all governorates, near half or more of shelters do not have medical service points, with 39 percent (n=50) of shelters in the northern governorates, 66 percent (n=114) in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and 48 percent (n=73) in Rafah Governorate. The number of people reached by the Health Cluster activities in the northern governorates have significantly reduced between early April and late May 2024. Similar trends can be observed in Rafah Governorate. The number of people reached in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates has reportedly increased from the mid-April to late May period, in line with the displacement trends.
Water, sanitation, and hygiene

Water, sanitation, and hygiene situation. The damage to water, sanitation and hygiene facilities continues across the Gaza Strip. According to satellite imagery analysis, the total number of damaged or destroyed water facilities rose from 263 in February to 323 in May, an increase of 23 percent (n=60). Only around 102 facilities in May were observed to have no visible damage.

The number of sewage facilities destroyed rose from 9 in February to 22 in May. The total number of damaged or destroyed sewage facilities rose from 68 in February to 77 in May. Only 29 sewage facilities were observed to have no visible damage in May.

In North Gaza Governorate, 40 percent of WASH facilities are severely damaged (20 percent) or destroyed (20 percent), an increase of 6 percentage points from March 2024. In Gaza Governorate, 68 percent of WASH facilities are severely damaged (33 percent) or destroyed (35 percent), an increase of 6 percentage points from March 2024. In Deir al-Balah Governorate, 30 percent of WASH facilities are severely damaged (14 percent) or destroyed (16 percent), an increase of 8 percentage points from March 2024. In Khan Younis Governorate, 50 percent of WASH facilities are severely damaged (22 percent) or destroyed (28 percent), an increase of 5 percentage points from March 2024. In Rafah Governorate, 17 percent of WASH facilities are severely damaged (7 percent) or destroyed (10 percent), an increase of 16 percentage points from March 2024.

It is expected that the damage to water and sewage facilities continues in June 2024, considering the monthly trends and recent expansion of hostilities in the northern and Rafah governorates. Limited repair and restoration efforts have become infeasible following the closure of the border crossings and the multiple challenges faced (shortages of supplies, lack of power, and damage/destruction of warehouses and assets) and are unlikely to resume at similar levels for some time. This is especially concerning as large movements of the population have been reported into locations with no or limited infrastructure.

Water availability and drinking water. Prior to the escalation of hostilities in 2023, most of the water supply in the Gaza Strip came from groundwater sources and the rest (around 20 percent) from desalination plants and cross border pipelines. The over pumping of groundwater in Palestine led to severe water pollution and salinization, especially in the Gaza Strip. More than 97 percent of the water pumped from the coastal aquifer in the Gaza Strip did not meet the water quality standards set by WHO (PCBS and PWA, 2021). Nitrate levels already exceeded 150 mg/litre in most areas of the Gaza Strip, which made the water undrinkable, given the World Health Organization (WHO) acceptable limit of 50 mg/litre. In 2019, the daily allocation of water per capita for domestic purposes was 77 litres/capita in the Gaza Strip. As of 13 May 2024, all three Mekorot lines are providing water per recent reports. The Bani Said line in Deir al-Balah Governorate is only providing 8,000 litres per day of the 14,000 possible. The Bani Suheila line in Khan Younis Governorate has recently been repaired and is providing 8,000 litres per day (out of a capacity of 14,000 cubic metres per day), though damages to the delivery and distribution network...
prevent full utilization of this line. The Al Mentar line in Gaza Governorate only supplies Gaza city with a production capacity of around 20,000 cubic metres per day (out of 24,000 cubic metres per day capacity). Desalination plants and water trucking are reportedly operating in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah Governorates in addition to some wells in Khan Younis Governorate. Additional water is being redirected into the Deir al-Balah network from the South Gaza desalination plant.

Between 15 May and 29 May, the average daily water production was 80,000 cubic metres for domestic and safe drinking water. As a result of the increase of hostilities in early May in Rafah Governorate, an estimated 3,300 m$^3$/day of water production was destroyed, damaged or no longer accessible. Other estimates suggest that the only three of the seven wells in Jabaia camp are functional or accessible following recent military activities and associated displacements.

Per the continuous CATI data collection from November 2023 to early June 2024, the monthly trends regarding available water used by households indicate lowest access in January 2024 and peak access in March 2024 across all governorates. Currently, trends are downward for the northern and Rafah governorates, and this is also expected in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governors due to recent displacements. Especially considering the rapid displacement reported, with near one million individuals on the move in a few weeks.

**Solid waste management.** Prior the escalation in late 2023, the Gaza Strip produced 1,700 tons of waste daily and previously available landfills were operating beyond capacity. The situation concerning solid waste and other contaminations has only worsened. The destruction and damage to sewage facilities continues to erode the capacity of humanitarian partners to collect and treat solid waste and other contaminant. Fuel shortages, which were common in the pre-May period, are now worse as the ability to restock has plummeted. Over 100 waste collection vehicles are damaged along with additional equipment to operate landfills or treatment services at medical and non-medical facilities. An estimated 340,000 tons of waste is being stored across 30 official temporary collection points that are full or overflowing. An unknown number of unofficial dumps are developing and will continue to do so until access to the landfills is secured.

Treatment operations are limited by additional access constraints, the ability of vehicles to reach dump sites along with the growing challenge to maintain safe locations to dispose. There is also a dwindling supply of treatment chemicals and materials to effectively treat waste and other contaminant. These limitations were exacerbated with the arrival of around one million individuals into Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates which not only increased the overall risk of spreading contaminant though also the ability to find safe locations to dump/move waste. There are about 30 temporary collection points in the southern governorates. Some are not accessible as they are too close to ongoing military activities, while others are full. There are an unknown number of unofficial dump sites.

By mid-May, Rafah waste transfer station was closed, and waste collection services were paused in Rafah and Khan Younis Governorates with many services/assets relocating away from risk zones to avoid looting or damage. Some equipment may have been lost during recent relocation due to direct damage or feasibility or ability to relocate assets.

Increasing temperatures are compounding the health risks associated with solid waste and other contaminant. Fuel shortages, which were common in the pre-May period, are now worse as the ability to restock has plummeted. Over 100 waste collection vehicles are damaged along with additional equipment to operate landfills or treatment services at medical and non-medical facilities. An estimated 340,000 tons of waste is being stored across 30 official temporary collection points that are full or overflowing. An unknown number of unofficial dumps are developing and will continue to do so until access to the landfills is secured.

**Hygiene.** A severe sanitation and hygiene crisis continues and extends beyond water scarcity, encompassing a critical shortage of appropriate sanitation infrastructure such as showers, latrines, and basic hygiene products. The shortage of supplies or delayed restocking is exacerbating the already dangerous overcrowding of toilets, latrines, and other facilities. Displaced populations lack the materials to rebuild or restore facilities due to continued displacement and the shortage of supplies. In some areas recent estimates suggest that one toilet or latrine may be available for hundreds of individuals (600 – 850) and only one shower may be available for more than 1,000 people.

**WASH response.** Since April 2024, WASH cluster partners have built on the previous months to ensure water supply continues to be available through operation of the desalination plants and operation of selected, [Map 6. Gaza Strip: Status of random dumpsites May 2024. Source: OCHA.]
Accessible groundwater wells and advocating for the full supply of water through the Mekerot supply lines. Water distribution is provided following repeated repairs to the water network and water trucking to neighbourhoods that no longer are connected including many of the IDP sites (average 1,259 m$^3$/day). The access levels to safe water for drinking and adequate quantities for hygiene vary considerably across and between governorates.

For sanitation, the WASH partners are constructing a range of latrine types for IDP shelters and supporting communities to build family or shared latrines in IDP locations however resources are stretched, and the re-displacement of the Rafah population means that much of this work needs to be repeated. Sludge and wastewater are being pumped in hotspots where sewage leaks and overflows are close to or in communities, however the main infrastructure for sewage treatment is non-operational due to their fuel demand or lack of access to the facility to conduct operations. For hygiene at an institutional level, health facilities, UNRWA camps, the WASH partners support with cleaning kits and cleaning contracts, at a family level the distribution of family hygiene kits.

**Nutrition Situation**

**Dietary intake.** According to the Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis (NVA)$^{77}$ conducted by the SoP National Nutrition Cluster in May 2024 and covering the period from 1 April to 24 May 2024, the dietary diversity among children between 6 and 23 months, and pregnant and breastfeeding women remains dramatically worrying. Despite a slight improvement observed in April, the situation has reversed backwards in May. In April, across the Gaza Strip, 85 percent of children 6-23 months (N=993) and 88 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women (N=573) consumed only two food groups or less in the 24 hours preceding the surveys (6 to 17 April). However, in May (20 to 24 May) those proportions increased to 93 percent (N=1718) and 96 percent (N=956), respectively. In northern Gaza governorates (North Gaza and Gaza City), the proportion of young children consuming less than two food groups remains extremely critical not showing any changes from one month to another (93 percent (N=69) and 94 percent (N=90)). However, in southern Gaza (Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah), a deterioration has been observed between the two data collection periods, with 84 percent of children 6-23 months consuming two food groups or less in April (N=924) up to 92 percent in May (N=1628). Results also show a lower number of respondents from Rafah in May, highlighting the movement of the population from one governorate to another since the military incursions in Rafah. Overall, breastmilk remains the main food group consumed by young children in both northern and southern Gaza in both April and May, followed by grains. The consumption of all the other food groups as vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables, other vegetables, meat, and dairy products, remains quasi-absent from the daily diet.$^{78}$

Among pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBWs), the dietary diversity continues to show extremely critical level across the Gaza Strip with 96 percent of respondents (N=956) in May 20-24th consuming two or less food groups, highlighting a slight deterioration when compared to April (6-17th), with a proportion of 88 percent (N=573). This deterioration is observed in both Gaza areas, with an increased proportion of PBWs eating two or less food groups ranging from 88 percent in April to 100 percent in May in northern Gaza governorates and from 89 percent in April up to 96 percent in May in southern Gaza governorates. Overall, whatever the period (April vs. May) and the areas (northern vs. southern Gaza governorates), the ‘pulses’ is the food group mostly cited by the PBWs, followed by ‘grains’. While in North Gaza, a sharp increase in ‘pulses’ consumption has been reported from April to May, a decrease in ‘grains’ consumption has been observed. In southern Gaza, a drop is recorded in ‘grains’ and in ‘eggs’ consumption from one data collection period to another.

The high level of diet diversity deprivation faced by young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women continues to imply important micronutrient gaps, which can seriously affect both women’s health and their children’s development.

**Morbidity.** The health situation continues to be dire, in line with limited access to services across the Gaza Strip. According to the Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis, children under five continue showing extremely critical levels of morbidity. In southern Gaza (Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah), data from 1 April to 6 May revealed that 91 percent of children under 5 (N= 443) had experienced one or more diseases in the two weeks prior to the survey, with minimal differences between governorates. Out of the children under-5 surveyed, 62 percent had experienced diarrhoea and fever, 38 percent had vomiting episodes, and 15 percent had acute respiratory infections. In addition, it was reported that 36 percent of the under-5 children had other illnesses, of which some 64 children (40 percent) had acute jaundice syndrome. The situation was similar in the northern areas, with data from 1 April to 6 May showing that 85 percent of children under 5 had one or more diseases in the two preceding weeks (N=198). Of these, 53 percent had experienced fever within the past
two weeks, 51 percent had experienced diarrhoea, and 35 percent experienced vomiting, which shows the extremely critical health conditions children face, exposing them to high-risk for nutritional deterioration. A report from UN Women, from mid-April, reported suspected hepatitis A, diarrhoea, scabies, and lice outbreaks. This information is in line with data reported by the WHO and the National Health Cluster, showing peaks in cases of jaundice and watery diarrhoea in Rafah during week 14 (1 to 7 April), as well as in Deir al-Balah for watery diarrhoea only, and a peak in bloody diarrhoea in Khan Younis during the same week.

**Nutrition services.** The nutrition cluster partners in southern Gaza scaled up their interventions in March and April, but this has deteriorated in May 2024. By the end of April, approximately 259 operational nutrition service sites out of 300 (86 percent) across the Gaza Strip were in the three governorates (Rafah, Khan Younis, and Deir Al Balah), with Rafah accounting for the majority (163 sites). Those nutrition sites provide a range of services, from comprehensive programs to single interventions. These services may include malnutrition screening, outpatient and inpatient treatment of acute malnutrition, blanket supplementary feeding, micronutrient supplementation and Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) support.

Based on the Nutrition Cluster Dashboard, a total of 22 nutrition partners operates in these 3 governorates, allowing screening of 16,375 children 6-59 months in February, 27,017 in March and 24,293 in April. As a result, a total of 882, 2109, and 2762 children 6-59 months were identified as acutely malnourished respectively in February, March and April and enrolled into SAM and MAM treatment (figure 26). New admissions (SAM/MAM) in northern Gaza governorates have been impacted by the lack of supplies as a result of impeded humanitarian access over March and April. Prevention activities were scaled up across the Gaza Strip from 39,000 under-5 children and pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) reached in February to 68,000 in March and 138,000 in April.

In May, the recent military operation in southern Gaza impacted partners ability to maintain their nutrition assistance, having to relocate their operational centres which resulted in losing access to commodities and supplies. As a result, and while the number of children 6-59 months reached by screening continued to increase across the Gaza Strip, with 26,082 children 6-59 month screened for acute malnutrition in May, a decrease has been reported in new admissions with only 1,259 children admitted for treatment, as well as in prevention activities with only 70,000 children and PBWs reached.

New military developments have mainly impacted Rafah which has seen the majority of Outpatient Therapeutic Program (OTPs) closing, with others opening in the other governorates. During the second week of May, most partners suspended their programmes to relocate to new locations in the middle area, but the number of OTPs remains below the one achieved in April (65) with only 42 sites for southern Gaza at the end of May (table 5). During relocation, nutrition partners lost access to warehouses and supplies, facing civil unrest, while the treatment of under-5 children was interrupted. Furthermore, the stabilization centre (SC) of the Tal El Sultan hospital (Rafah) has closed, while IMC field hospital has evacuated the SAM SC and OTP to middle area, increasing the risk of mortality among complicated cases of severe acute malnutrition. Opening of new nutrition sites planned in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis has been delayed due to limited space and competing priorities in the functional health facilities.

In the northern governorates, better accessibility in nutrition services, both for prevention and treatment, were possible at the end of April/ beginning of May. The number of partners (Juzoor, UNRWA, IMC, WHO, Med Global) implementing nutrition services in northern Gaza increased, as well as the number of nutrition sites, especially OTP, passing from 1 in end-April to 16 in May.
Summary of acute malnutrition drivers. According to the Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis, over 90 percent of children aged 6-23 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women are eating two or fewer food groups each day, often those of the lowest nutritional value. Almost 90 percent of children under five have had at least one infectious disease, with 52 percent having had diarrhoea in the preceding two weeks. Water and sanitation access was also dire, with the NVA highlighting that around 80 percent of households listed "water" as a priority need. This situation is particularly worrying for formula-fed babies, and constitutes a proven risk for a rise in infectious diseases, including diarrheal illness and hepatitis A. With minor gains in humanitarian access, a modest improvement was reflected in food security indicators in April. However, such improvement is dependent on regular and continuous access to and availability of food and health services. In April, access and scale up of basic services certainly allowed for a stabilization of the nutrition situation in the South. However, the displacement of more than 1 million people in the south, and ground military operations in the north, reduced the minor gains achieved in April through the closure, disruption of services and displacement of nutrition sites located in shelters, health services, and hospitals.

Nutrition outcomes. The improved humanitarian response throughout March and April, albeit very modestly, with more food available in the markets, as well as higher coverage of micronutrients interventions, could have possibly stabilized the situation. Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screenings carried out in April by various partners, targeting children aged 6 to 59 months, at health service delivery points, shelters, and community level in the three governorates of Southern Gaza, show a proxy GAM corresponding to an equivalent of IPC Phase 2 for Acute Malnutrition - IPC AMN. The range is similar to data from February-March 2024, indicating some stabilization in the situation.

Recent MUAC screenings carried out between end of April up to 25 May 25 in the northern governorates show a proxy GAM corresponding to an equivalent of IPC AMN between Phase 1 and 2. These results cannot be directly compared with those of January and February because the screenings carried out previously were mainly targeting children under 2 years, as they were associated with vaccination activities. In May, screenings were held at community and shelter levels, with a higher proportion (2/3) of children over two years represented in the sample, and prevalence of low MUAC decreases sharply with increasing age.

However, there are concerns that the situation can still deteriorate rapidly, as it has it the past, but also that other vulnerable groups living in such a volatile environment may be at increased risk, such as infants under 6 months, children over 5 years, and the elderly. These groups often receive less attention in nutrition interventions focused primarily on children 6-59 months. The remaining screening datasets were analysed as follows:

Figure 28. Summary of Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis findings (NVA). Source: Nutrition Cluster.

Though not measured in this analysis, there is a real risk of growth faltering and consequently stunting as indicated by the significant proportion of children 6-23 months that are consistently reliant on breastmilk as their main food. An infant's energy and nutrient needs start to exceed those provided by breastmilk around the age of 6 months, hence the need for timely and appropriate complementary foods.
Figure 29. Trends of weighted GAM MUAC 6-59 months by governorate. Source: Nutrition Cluster.
### POPULATION TABLE FOR THE PROJECTED SITUATION: 16 JUNE - 30 SEPTEMBER 2024

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Total population analysed</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
<th>Phase 5</th>
<th>Phase 3+</th>
<th>Area Phase</th>
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<tr>
<td>Deir al-Balah &amp; Khan Younis governorates</td>
<td>1,751,457</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>70,000</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>913,156</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>745,437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.
PROJECTED SITUATION OVERVIEW
(16 JUNE – 30 SEPTEMBER 2024)

About 96 percent of the population in the Gaza Strip (2.15M people) face high levels of acute food insecurity through September 2024. While the whole territory is classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), over 495,000 people (22 percent of the population) are still facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5). In this phase, households generally experience an extreme lack of food, starvation, and exhaustion of coping capacities. Another nearly 745,000 people (33 percent) are classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Northern governorates

In the most likely scenario, the northern governorates are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) with the entire population (300,000 people) facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), of which around 25 percent (75,000 people) are likely to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), 50 percent (150,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 25 percent (75,000) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). This is a deterioration from the current period with 5 percentage point increase in both the populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).

In the projection period, continued hostilities will further increase the vulnerability of the population. Damage to infrastructure, facilities and services is likely to continue. Recently displaced populations, around one third of the remaining population, will face increasing difficulties to find safe shelters or materials to rebuild temporary shelters. Overall conditions are expected to deteriorate due to repeated displacements, asset loss and expanded damage to remaining accessible infrastructure. Populations in and outside of shelters are expected to face difficulties to meet basic needs.

Humanitarian access to provide food, water, medicines and the provision of health and WASH services will remain limited. Deliveries may continue through the maritime corridor and airdrops; however, the majority of imports will arrive through land crossings that are prone to intermittent closures. Food deliveries, commercial and humanitarian, are likely to remain around March/April levels and remain the major food source available.

Bakeries are likely to remain functional and continue to support large groups of the population, though with disruptions from shortages of fuel. Continued hostilities are likely to prevent some populations from having safe physical access to these locations every day. Additionally, limited storage capacity at the household level, particularly for displaced populations who lack access to cold chains and experience repeated displacement, will further exacerbate difficulties in securing and storing essential food supplies.

Price variations will continue and be heavily linked to the availability of commodities entering through crossings. The situation raises critical concerns about access to essential goods, particularly food, as limited income, disrupted informal markets, and a lack of domestic agricultural production or livestock assets create a heavy reliance on external food assistance. Financial access to food will likely remain a barrier for many households.

Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Northern governorates

**Primary Drivers**

**Conflict:** The entire population will likely remain fully exposed and highly susceptible to conflict. Multiple short-term ground operations are likely with periodic escalations. Attacks on military sites co-located with infrastructure serving a humanitarian purpose, including the pier and related storage areas, are likely to continue at least intermittently.

**Humanitarian access:** At least one of the crossings is likely to remain open with intermittent closures due to ground operations. Access from southern governorates is likely to remain low, especially for humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance likely to remain around levels in March and April. Airdrops to continue, maritime deliveries are likely to continue with disruptions and continued commercial deliveries.

**Secondary Drivers**

**Displacement:** Forced displacement is likely as ground operations continue. This displacement is likely to be localized and typically short distance. Conditions in shelters and or displaced populations will deteriorate.

**Civil unrest:** Overall a decline from peak in February. Civil unrest will likely continue with its intensity maintaining a roughly inverse relationship with the inflow of humanitarian assistance and other supplies. Assistance deliveries will continue to face civil unrest and especially those moving into the southern governorates.

**Services:** Limited functionality across Health, WASH, nutrition and other essential infrastructure or services with limited fuel or cooking gas deliveries far below minimum daily requirements. Market functionality is likely to remain consistent.
Beyond immediate food needs, there is a critical urgency to address parallel necessities. Large scale restoration of services, notably health and WASH, are unlikely due to the systematic damage and scale of repairs needed. Provision of healthcare will continue to remain low or may decline as more facilities are damaged or unable to restock critical supplies, fuel, or medicines. The increasing coverage of health and nutrition treatment observed in the post February period is likely to reverse and remain limited.

The WASH situation is likely to deteriorate as more people will depend on fewer functional or accessible facilities. Similar to the southern governorates, the concentration of populations is concerning due to the already poor WASH, health and shelter conditions. Health risks and more specifically disease outbreaks are of high concern. Increasing summer temperatures will exacerbate these risks and increase demands on water consumption.

Without continuous access and availability of safe, fresh, and nutritious food paired with adequate WASH, Health and nutrition services, improvements seen in the pre-May period are likely to reverse. Prolonged lack of access to a diversified diet rich in fresh fruits, vegetables, and protein sources will likely have a negative impact on both micro and macro-nutrient deficiencies. Nutritional status is likely to deteriorate in the projection period as due to changes in both food and non-food drivers. The prolonged exposure of populations to these extreme conditions highlights the extreme fragility and inability to cope with additional shocks.

The situation in the northern governorates is very fragile. Rapid or significant changes to the humanitarian access or conflict can quickly cause the situation to deteriorate rapidly and push the population into higher IPC Phases.

**Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates**

These governorates are projected to remain in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) in the most likely scenario with 95 percent of the population in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). Around 20 percent of the population (more than 350,000 people) are likely to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), 30 percent (more than 525,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 45 percent (more than 788,000 people) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). This corresponds to a deterioration from the current period with an increase of five percentage point in the population classified in both IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).

In the projection period, hostilities are likely to continue as additional military operations take place within the Gaza Strip. Hostilities will likely continue to damage infrastructure, health and WASH facilities along with disruptions to road and market functionality. Additional evacuations will likely continue to push the population, over 1.7 million people, into a smaller geographic area with alarming density.

The presence of unexploded remnants of war and rubble will continue to cause physical risks to populations on the move and their ability to find adequate shelter. Displaced populations will have great difficulty in meeting basic needs due to prolonged and repeated displacement in areas with extremely limited services or facilities. Displaced populations will continue to face shelter insecurity due to insufficient space in official shelters and shortages of materials to reconstruct temporary structures.

Humanitarian access will remain similar to the post-May period where one border crossing will be available with limited functionality. Disruptions or closures of border crossings will reduce the quantity of humanitarian and commercial goods allowed into the southern governorates; while the main roads used to reach populations remain in areas with active conflict.
Growing civil unrest and spreading hostilities will continue to erode the enabling environment for humanitarian activities and place additional barriers to accessing populations in need. Some deliveries into these governorates from airdrops is expected, however the overall mitigating factor on commodity shortages will be low. Prolonged periods with limited food and non-food deliveries will result in shortages. Food availability is expected to greatly decrease in this period.

Despite severe liquidity crises and limited physical access to cash, market operations are expected to persist, albeit with challenges. Shortages of commodities are likely due to decreases in the number of commercial and humanitarian deliveries and their ability to support a population over 1.7 million. Bakeries and other food distribution points with cooked meals will likely face some disruptions due to lack of fuel, though remain operational. Accessing food is likely to remain a difficulty for some populations due to asset loss or depletion, greater competition for limited livelihood opportunities and price variations that are dependent on external food deliveries.

The provision of health and WASH services will continue to decline due to direct damage from hostilities, growing civil unrest and the alarming concentration of people. Medical supplies and equipment, like food deliveries, are largely dependent on land crossings and any further disruptions will severely impact the availability and quality of care. Increasing temperatures and exposure to multiple compounding health, WASH, and physical hazards increase the risk of disease outbreaks within a very fragile population.

The improvements observed in nutritional status of the populations now located in these governorates are likely to reverse. The food-based drivers of acute malnutrition may exacerbate during this period as acute food insecurity in expected to increase and overall assistance to decline. A significant proportion of the population’s caloric intake is currently derived from humanitarian aid, reflecting the critical role of humanitarian food assistance in sustaining basic nutritional needs. However, the adequacy of this assistance in meeting the comprehensive nutritional needs of the population remains a concern, given the logistical challenges inherent in aid delivery within a conflict-affected area. Non-food based drivers of acute malnutrition are expected to remain critical with significant concerns on child morbidity and IYCF practices. Mitigating factors from nutrition centres and services are also expected to decline in the projection period and overall nutritional status is likely to deteriorate.

Like all areas in the Gaza Strip, the situation in the Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates is fragile. Rapid or significant changes to the humanitarian access or conflict can quickly cause the situation to deteriorate rapidly and push the population into higher IPC Phases.

**Rafah Governorate**

In the most likely scenario, Rafah Governorate is classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) with 95 percent of the population in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). Around 35 percent (70,000 people) are likely to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), 35 percent (70,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 25 percent (50,000 people) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). This corresponds to a deterioration from the current period with 25 percentage point increase in the populations classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) and no increase in the population classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).

In the most likely scenario for Rafah, a major deterioration in the food security and nutritional status of households is expected, with access constraints impacting the delivery of humanitarian services. Food availability will likely be an extreme limiting factor, with very limited production given the security and safety concerns associated with the recent ground operations.

Humanitarian access is likely to decline severely. Populations remaining within Rafah city are likely to be mostly inaccessible through the projection period, while the population remaining in coastal Rafah is expected to be intermittently accessible for humanitarian aid delivery with additional coverage through possible airdrops. The movement of trucks from other governorates into Rafah governorate is likely to remain severely inhibited by civil unrest. As such, there will be minimal entry of humanitarian assistance into Rafah during the projection period. Moreover, stocks from previous distributions or market purchases before the escalation will likely be depleted in the projection period. Bakeries will remain non-functional and will heavily depend on fuel availability.

During this period, movement from Rafah governorate to other areas is assumed to be possible. However, it is unlikely that there will be regular movement between the southern Governorates. With the mass movement of people out of Rafah at the start of the escalation on the 6 of May, the population that is expected to be left behind in Rafah by the end of the projection comprises primarily the most vulnerable populations who are unable to move due to disabilities or other physical impediments. Some populations may continue to move to the Middle areas of Deir al Balah and Khan Younis throughout the projection period, where there is considerably more delivery of humanitarian aid and substantially better access to services. The population remaining in Rafah is likely to be pushed almost entirely to the coastal area
of Al Mawasi, designated as a humanitarian safe zone, where some limited-service provision may still be possible.

Due to the high intensity of the conflict and the unavailability of agricultural inputs, own production will be extremely limited. No hunting or fishing activities are expected during this period. With the projection period spanning over the summer period, no wild food can be collected.

Food access will likely be an extreme limiting factor during the projection period as it will further deteriorate due to security concerns and the limited availability of commodities. Formal markets will continue to be mostly non-operational as few commercial trucks are expected to enter Rafah through the projection period. The primary market access will be through informal markets, which will continue to operate at limited capacity. Prices are expected to increase substantially as the availability of food and non-food items will be severely restricted in the projection period. While the entry of trucks will be limited, it is not likely to be at the low levels observed in the North in the early part of the year. Given the growing access limitations, the most vulnerable groups will be most likely impacted. Moreover, security and access issues will pose additional safety issues and may result in additional gender-based violence risks and incidents.

Food utilization will likely be an extreme limiting factor during the projection period. The entry of diesel and cooking gas is likely to be severely reduced through the projection, and even if limited fuel/cooking gas amounts entered Rafah, households will most likely still rely on burning wood and waste for food preparation. With the summer period characterized by increased temperature, the challenges associated with the storage and preparation of food, and the extreme lack of safe water access will result in increased risks of infectious diseases, including diarrhoea.

Health system functionality is expected to remain limited during the projection period. Only two field hospitals are operational in Rafah and face various challenges, such as a shortage of supplies and materials. Rafah will most likely witness an increase in communicable diseases due to limited access to sufficient WASH facilities and the projection period spanning over the summer season.

The availability and access to the means and mitigation factors (such as Lipid based nutritional supplements (LNS)) that prevented the surge of malnutrition in Rafah will decrease, which may lead to a deterioration of the situation. The deteriorations in contributing factors suggest a rise of malnutrition is expected due to disruptions in health and nutrition systems, exposure to hazards and vulnerabilities, the increase in communicable disease (i.e., diarrhoea, fever), and the absence of access to food and LNS. It is projected that acute malnutrition might be between IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious) and IPC AMN Phase 4 (Critical) for the most likely scenario.

Assumptions for the most likely scenario in Rafah governorate

Primary Drivers

Conflict: A major ground operation in Rafah governorate, including Rafah city, is likely to continue with geographic expansion. This is likely to be preceded and accompanied by intensified bombardment and a high level of building demolition. Attacks on military sites co-located with humanitarian or civilian infrastructure such as the southern land crossings, are likely to continue at least intermittently.

Humanitarian access: At least one of the crossings is likely to remain open, Kerem Shalom, with limited functionality due to hostilities and civil unrest on both sides of the crossing. Humanitarian access to remaining populations is likely to decline severely. Populations remaining in Rafah city are likely to be mostly inaccessible, while remaining populations in coastal Rafah are likely to be intermittently accessible. A portion of airdrops is likely to shift to support these populations and assistance from Northern routes is likely to be inhibited by civil unrest.

Secondary Drivers:

Displacement: Very high outward displacement will continue towards other governorates and into coastal areas. The escalation of conflict will likely result in the immobilization of pockets of the civilian population, including in some urban areas.

Civil unrest: Deteriorate since February period. Civil unrest will likely worsen due to intense and widespread conflict alongside severely insufficient service provision and humanitarian assistance delivery. Assistance deliveries will increasing face civil unrest.

Services: Limited functionality across Health, WASH, nutrition and other essential infrastructure or services with limited fuel or cooking gas deliveries far below minimum daily requirements. Market functionality is likely to decline severely.
In comparison to the previous analysis (projection period March – July 2024), the total share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe/Famine) across the Gaza Strip decreased from 50 percent to 15 percent in the current period (May 1 – 15 June 2024). In the northern Gaza governorates, the share of the population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe/Famine) decreased from 70 percent to 20 percent and from 47 percent to 15 percent in the southern governorates.
RISK OF FAMINE ANALYSIS

As per the IPC tools and technical guidance, an IPC statement on the risk of Famine differs from a Famine classification. While a projected Famine classification is based on the most likely scenario, the risk of Famine refers to the worst-case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening. The risk of Famine is only a statement and not a classification and was designed to complement the standard IPC projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of a potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated. The elements considered when developing the worst-case scenario, which could reasonably occur, are described below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis unit</th>
<th>Risk of Famine scenario assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern governorates</td>
<td><strong>Primary Drivers</strong>&lt;br&gt;Conflict: Ground operations would occur with higher frequency, duration, scope, lethality, and destructiveness than in the most likely scenario.&lt;br&gt;Humanitarian access: Little to no delivery would occur within these governorates, similar to the northern governorates in December 2023-February 2024. All northern land crossings would minimally function, with multiple closed at any given time. Low volume of deliveries from airdrops, with limited to no assistance from maritime and land crossings.&lt;br&gt;<strong>Secondary Drivers</strong>&lt;br&gt;Displacement: Additional displacement would occur, concentrating most of the remaining population in limited areas with some pockets of isolated populations.&lt;br&gt;Civil unrest: Public order collapse.&lt;br&gt;Services: Multi-system collapse would occur across all governorates, including for health, water, hygiene, and sanitation, and nutrition services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates</td>
<td><strong>Primary Drivers</strong>&lt;br&gt;Conflict: Ground operations would occur with higher frequency, duration, scope, lethality, and destructiveness than in the most likely scenario.&lt;br&gt;Humanitarian access: Little to no delivery would occur within these governorates, similar to the northern governorates in December 2023-February 2024. Rafah crossing would remain closed while Kerem Shalom crossing would operate at a low level of functionality. Attacks on crossing sites and surrounding areas would increase.&lt;br&gt;<strong>Secondary Drivers</strong>&lt;br&gt;Displacement: Further displacement into these areas with nearly all the population in Rafah prior May 6 with severe concentration and overcrowding.&lt;br&gt;Civil unrest: Public order collapse.&lt;br&gt;Services: Multi-system collapse would occur across all governorates, including for health, water, hygiene, and sanitation, and nutrition services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah Governorate</td>
<td><strong>Primary Drivers</strong>&lt;br&gt;Conflict: The ground operation in Rafah Governorate would escalate to an intensity comparable to previous major ground operations in the Gaza Strip since the start of the escalation, such as Gaza city. The ground operation would continue at a higher level of speed, lethality, and destructiveness.&lt;br&gt;Humanitarian access: Little to no delivery would occur within these governorates, similar to the northern governorates in December 2023-February 2024. Rafah crossing would remain closed while Kerem Shalom crossing would operate at a low level of functionality. Attacks on crossing sites and surrounding areas would increase.&lt;br&gt;<strong>Secondary Drivers</strong>&lt;br&gt;Displacement: Very small portion of non-displaced population would remain and some isolated populations within Rafah city.&lt;br&gt;Civil unrest: Public order collapse.&lt;br&gt;Services: Multi-system collapse would occur across all governorates, including for health, water, hygiene, and sanitation, and nutrition services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

The analysis team requested guidance to the Famine Review Committee, for the assessment of the plausibility of the risk of Famine. Here below the FRC conclusions on the risk of Famine:

For the Northern governorates, the FRC finds the risk of Famine to be plausible based on the assumptions set by the analysis team. A high risk of Famine persists as long as conflict continues, and humanitarian access is restricted. The speed of deterioration observed in previous months, compounded by the increased vulnerability of the population after more than eight months of inadequate dietary intake, WASH and health conditions, increase the probability that Famine could occur during the projection period.

For the Southern governorates, the FRC also finds the risk of Famine plausible based on the assumptions set by the analysis team. A high risk of Famine persists as long as conflict continues, and humanitarian access is restricted.

The size of the population at risk and the extreme population density that is expected within the IDF designated ‘humanitarian zone’, combined with inadequate supply lines and infrastructure, including water supply points, increase the risk of epidemic outbreaks and raises the possibility that the situation will rapidly deteriorate into a catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude compared to the suffering already witnessed in Gaza since October 2023.

In considering the risk of Famine for the combined middle and southern governorates, the considerations used by the FRC for the northern area also apply. However, there are some additional concerns for the southern area. These result from the high rate of displacement from Rafah and other areas and the extreme concentration of displaced people in the IDF designated “humanitarian zone” along the coast. In the coming weeks further, movements are expected from the areas adjacent to the designated ‘humanitarian zone’ into it, which will further increase the population density (Map 3).

On May 6th, the IDF instructed residents of southern Rafah to leave their homes and announced the expansion of the Israeli-designated “humanitarian zone”35. Examination of the dimensions of the expanded zone revealed it to be approximately 62 km² in area. If further evacuation to that zone were to continue and include most of the population living in the south and middle areas of the Gaza Strip, it is estimated that the population density within the zone could exceed 28,000 person/km². This would constitute the most densely populated area on earth. In this scenario, the FRC assesses that it would not be possible to provide adequate food and other essential supplies to the population within this zone given the current constraints experienced with aid shipments, and the existing levels of infrastructure within the zone. Given the projected concentration of people in the “humanitarian zone”, a failure to provide adequate humanitarian access or basic services could lead to a rapid deterioration and a catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude compared to the suffering already witnessed in Gaza since October.

While the FRC notes that no high-definition map of the Israeli designated “humanitarian zone” had been made publicly available, mapping of the Israeli designated “humanitarian zone” reveals that it has an area of approximately 62 km². If the expected population movements occur within the projection period, the Israeli designated “humanitarian zone” would become the most densely populated area on earth, and it would become impossible to provide adequate basic services to the population. A serious level of civil unrest in such a context is extremely likely. The ability to support displaced and resident people within the zone has already been degraded by high levels of destruction of WASH facilities, housing, and health facilities. A deterioration in the prevalence of GAM by MUAC can already be observed in the available screening data from Khan Yunis and Deir al Belah during April and May.

The shortage of supplies and services of all kinds, compounded with higher temperatures over the summer period, will increase the risk of epidemic outbreaks in a context where any response will be extremely difficult.

Given the rather unique set of circumstances pertaining in the south of the Gaza Strip, there is a risk that the situation may soon reach a tipping point that rapidly leads to a descent into Famine. If this were to occur, considering up to 1.8 M people may be located in this area, the magnitude of the humanitarian catastrophe would be of an unprecedented scale.
The IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) was activated on 6 June 2024 by the IPC Global Support Unit considering the difficulties faced by the IPC Analysis Team in reaching consensus over the risk of Famine in the areas analysed. The main FRC conclusions are presented below:

• The FRC found the Analysis Team's classifications in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) for the "current" period (1 May – 15 June) for all areas plausible. However, the convergence of evidence for Rafah Governorate would suggest slightly lower estimates in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), and the Analysis Team should consider revisiting these estimates.

• The FRC also considered the Analysis Team's classification in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) for the projection period (16 June – 30 September 2024) for all the areas plausible, based on the scenario and assumptions set by the analysis team. However, the FRC did not find plausible that the proportion of people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis will decrease. In contrast, the proportion and absolute numbers of households experiencing catastrophic food insecurity are expected to increase.

• The FRC finds the risk of Famine plausible for all areas, based on the assumptions set by the Analysis Team. A high risk of Famine persists as long as conflict continues, and humanitarian access is restricted. The FRC also considers that, due to a high level of population movements between the three southern governorates during the current and projection periods, it is appropriate to consider a risk of Famine analysis for the combined areas.

• The speed of deterioration observed in previous months, compounded by the increased vulnerability of the population after more than eight months of inadequate dietary intake, WASH, and health conditions, increase the probability that Famine could occur during the projection period. Given the unpredictability of the ongoing conflict and humanitarian access challenges, any significant change may lead to a very rapid deterioration into Famine.

Following the FRC restitution of their recommendations, the analysis team reconvene and discussed the findings. The FRC's recommendations on adjusting some of the estimates of populations in IPC Phase 4 and 5 were adopted by the analysis team. However, the analysis team preferred not to merge Rafah Governorate with the other southern governorates owing to the unique characteristic of the situation on the ground. This report incorporates all accepted recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Only the cessation of hostilities in conjunction with sustained humanitarian access to the entire Gaza Strip can reduce the risk of a Famine occurring in the Gaza Strip.

**Allow for humanitarian access.**

Ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian operations into the Gaza Strip and to all populations within the Gaza Strip. Provide lifesaving multi-sector humanitarian assistance.

Address the high severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity and alarming WASH and health conditions. Prevent and treat acute malnutrition through: (i) the restoration of health, nutrition, and WASH services and the protection of civilians; and (ii) the provision of safe, nutritious, and sufficient humanitarian food assistance to all the population in need. Supplies of sufficient aid commodities, including though not limited to food, medicines, nutrition products, fuel, and other necessities should be allowed to enter and move throughout the entire Gaza Strip by road in a sustained manner.

**Provide malnutrition prevention services and treatment.**

Deliver acute malnutrition treatment services, throughout the Gaza Strip, with an emphasis on maintaining and protecting stabilization centres and outpatient wasting treatment. Strengthen enabling environment to promote and support breast feeding of infants, provide ready to use infant formula (RUIF) for non-breastfed infants. Provide complimentary foods and micronutrient supplements for young children, as well as pregnant and lactating women, the chronically ill, and the elderly.

**Restore production and market systems.**

Restore the functioning of market infrastructures and bakeries, combined with cash-based interventions where feasible. Rehabilitate food production systems as soon as possible, including horticulture, livestock, and fishing. Commercial good delivery should continue, however not at the expense of humanitarian assistance.

**Situation Monitoring and Update**

Considering the volatility of the context and the changing environment, the following risk factor elements should be monitored continuously:

- Intensity and extension of hostilities
- Humanitarian access to supply food, water medicines, non-food items
- Functionality and access to the health system and WASH supplies and services
- Entry of commodities though the Gaza Strip whether through commercial trucks or food assistance by truck, airdrops and maritime deliveries
- Population displacements and conditions in collective centres and scattered sites
- Morbidity and disease outbreaks
- Acute malnutrition and mortality, with a distinction of the trauma and non-trauma causes
PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

Similar to the previous analyses conducted in December 2023 and February 2024, the IPC Global Partnership completed an IPC analysis for the Gaza Strip to inform critical humanitarian information needs. Country-led IPC analyses are the cornerstone of the IPC process and will continue to be so. In the case of the Gaza Strip, with the onset of the conflict and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe, there was a critical need for an IPC analysis. Without an active country Technical Working Group, the IPC Global Partnership made use of its non-TWG led analysis process to inform decision-making around the crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The analysis was conducted remotely from 27 May to 4 June by over 35 experts from 27 organizations, applying standard IPC protocols, and made use of publicly available data from a wide range of courses on the conditions in the Gaza Strip (see below). Based on IPC protocols, the level of evidence of this analysis was assessed as “Medium” (level 2) for each of the three units of analysis. At the analysis completion, the Famine Review Committee was activated to review the Analysis Team’s findings.

Sources

The main sources of data used to conduct this analysis include:

• Action Against Hunger, Gaza Farmers Damages and Needs Assessment Report, May 2024.

• CARE International, Rafah Governorate: Deception, Destruction & Death in the “Safe” Zone Rapid Gender Analysis, 21 May 2024.

• Cash Working Group, Gaza Strip – Market Overview and Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance Analysis period: 1 to 30 April 2024, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt); Reflecting on humanitarian cash response in Gaza - Insights and key takeaways- 9 May 2024; Gaza Strip – Market Overview and Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance Analysis, May 2024.

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• Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update, 26 December 2023.

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What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, acute food insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

Contact for further Information

IPC Global Support Unit
www.ipcinfo.org

IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in the Gaza Strip.

Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC, FAO, FEWS NET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and the World Bank.
Governorate, 9 June 2024; Gaza humanitarian access snapshot, 1-31 May, 2024; Humanitarian access constraints, 22 May and 9 June 2024;

- OCHA and REACH, Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2022 conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory, July 2022.
- Oregon State University and City University New York, Building damage assessment via satellite imagery analysis.
- WASH Cluster, Minutes of meetings May 13, 29.

Limitations of the analysis

Given the major access constraints, data on food security outcomes was collected using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). The Analysis Team concluded that the data meets the requirements set by the IPC and were used for this analysis, especially considering the number of observations. Through the efforts of partners, gaps in nutrition information were filled through screening information. The high degree of volatility around the conflict limits the ability to consider longer analysis periods. Scenarios on the evolution of the conflict were developed in conjunction with conflict experts to the best of their knowledge and expertise.
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Map 2. GAZA STRIP Internal Displacement from Rafah Governorate, 9 June 2024. Source: OCHA.
Map 5. Damage to Agriculture Areas Imagery Analysis Maps - December 2023 (left), January 2024 (middle), and May 2024 (right). Source: UNOSAT.
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