

The IPC Global Initiative is issuing this alert based on the latest evidence available to draw urgent attention to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in parts of the Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, both in areas where risk of Famine was identified in a worst-case scenario between October 2026 and January 2027 and additional locations. This Alert was produced by the IPC Global Initiative and does not necessarily reflect the views of individual agencies or the Government of Sudan.

- Conflict, displacement and drought are driving an increased risk of Famine in parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan.
- New data indicates rising and alarming levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in several localities.
- Severe drought across most of Greater Darfur and the combined impacts of conflict and drought in Greater Kordofan will accelerate depletion of food stocks.
- Unimpeded access in conflict areas of Greater Kordofan and additional funding to scale up humanitarian assistance are urgently needed to avoid catastrophic consequences and further loss of lives.

Nationwide key figures



8.58 MILLION
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)



2 IDP CAMPS IN SOUTH DARFUR
WITH ACUTE MALNUTRITION ABOVE FAMINE THRESHOLDS



50% OF CROPLAND
SHOWS POOR VEGETATION GROWTH ACROSS SUDAN



57% FUNDING GAP
OF THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND RESPONSE PLAN (HNRP)

The risk of Famine is growing in many conflict-affected areas of Sudan, with the impact of El Niño-induced drought compounding already dire conditions. The situation in most areas that were classified as at risk of Famine in the May 2026 IPC analysis¹ remains extremely concerning, while new evidence indicates worsening acute malnutrition in additional localities. Although signs of catastrophic deterioration are growing, humanitarian response efforts are increasingly limited due to critical underfunding and insecurity, along with access constraints across Greater Kordofan.

In Greater Darfur, 13 of the 17 SMART surveys conducted since January 2026 recorded a Critical level of global acute malnutrition (GAM), indicative of IPC Acute Malnutrition (AMN) Phase 4, with six of the surveys recording a weight-for-height Z-score (WHZ) prevalence above 20 percent. In **South Darfur**, nutrition screenings and surveys revealed worsening conditions, especially among internally displaced persons (IDPs). A September SMART survey in Eastern Jebel Marra² identified a GAM prevalence above Famine thresholds in two IDP camps (38 and 30.8 percent GAM WHZ); alarmingly, this is occurring alongside severe hunger and elevated mortality levels. Nutrition conditions in Kas, Beliel, and Nyala localities deteriorated markedly, according to evidence from key informants. Between January and August, the percent of children accessing nutrition services that were admitted for severe acute malnutrition (SAM) doubled (5 to 11 percent) in Nyala, and the proportion of children dying within 24 hours of admission remained elevated, indicating dramatic conditions on arrival. SAM admissions increased four-fold (4 to 17 percent) in Kas between January and June.³

Acute food insecurity remains severe in **North Darfur**, where delayed rains had a devastating impact on crop cultivation, forcing many displaced farmers to rely on markets for food rather than their own production.⁴ Food stocks in North Darfur are critically low, and high food prices reflect increased scarcity. While a July SMART survey⁵ in Tawila detected a prevalence of GAM slightly below the Critical level, displaced populations still face food shortages due to recent funding cuts,⁶ raising concerns of further deterioration. With the growing drought in nearby areas, the town of Tawila, already hosting over 650,000 IDPs, could see a surge in arrivals as people seek access to food, water and other basic services. Critical gaps remain in areas previously identified as at risk of Famine—At Tina, Kernoi and Um Baru localities—with only about 27,000 people reached by Humanitarian Food

Assistance since March 2026.⁷ SAM admissions in Um Baru remain nearly double the levels observed in 2025, with At Tina and Kernoi also reporting high admissions.

In Greater Kordofan, over 300,000 people have been displaced since October 2025.⁸ Intense fighting in **North Kordofan** has driven many agricultural communities into El Obeid city,⁹ with little prospects of resuming livelihood activities unless access and security conditions improve. In **South Kordofan**, conflict in Heiban locality and Kauda town forced thousands to flee to remote and isolated areas of the Nuba Mountains, now affected by below-average rainfall and conflict, which are together driving reductions in harvests.¹⁰ In **Western Kordofan**, where households already face difficult access to markets and basic services, rainfall levels are indicative of one of the worst droughts since 2004.


The outlook is increasingly alarming as **severe El Niño-induced drought conditions** are widespread across more than half of Sudan, resulting in localised crop failures and loss of household food and income. Sixty-four percent of croplands in North Darfur and about 50 percent in South Darfur, West Kordofan and South Kordofan have poor plant biomass.¹¹ Severe water deficits are observed in all or nearly all croplands in North Darfur, South Darfur, West Kordofan and South Kordofan. Opportunity for agricultural recovery is now very limited, even for those who replanted.¹² With harvest prospects deteriorating, it is highly likely cereal prices will continue to rise until the harvest period and remain high due to very limited supplies.¹³ Failed rains are also likely to reduce agricultural labour demand in the harvest period and heavily impact the livestock market, both important sources of income for poorer households.

Despite local organisations and operational partners' efforts, the response is outpaced by the scale of needs, severe funding shortages and access constraints persisting in conflict-affected areas. The environment remains extremely dangerous for aid providers, with two UN World Food Programme (WFP)-contracted trucks carrying lifesaving assistance coming under fire on 2 and 3 October, resulting in at least one death.¹⁴ As of 8 October 2026, funding of the HNRP remains below 50 percent,¹⁵ significantly limiting the scale of the response.

Conflict, displacement, severe drought, and inadequate funding are driving a growing risk of Famine in parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. An immediate, significant scale-up of assistance is urgently needed. Without this,

catastrophic food insecurity, acute malnutrition, and excess mortality will likely intensify, placing countless lives at risk.

Map 1. IPC Acute Food Insecurity second projection period, October 2026 - January 2027. Source: IPC Global Initiative, May 2026



Disclaimer: This is not a new map; it corresponds to the second projection period (Oct 2026–Jan 2027) of the previous analysis of acute food insecurity in Sudan.

Recommended actions



End hostilities, safeguard civilians, and protect food, water and health systems. Cease all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure and ensure safe movement for people fleeing conflict.



Secure safe and sustained humanitarian access in frontline areas, especially in North and West Kordofan. Maintain and protect achievements in cross-border and crossline humanitarian and commercial movements.




Scale up integrated, lifesaving humanitarian response through emergency food assistance and re-establishing critical nutrition, health, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services.



Provide at-scale, flexible and predictable funding that allows operational partners to respond swiftly to changing conditions. This includes addressing current needs and the expected impact of the failing agricultural season.

Map 2. **Locations of IDPs and returnees in Sudan, 26 August 2026.**

Source: [DTM](#)



This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the IOM.

Frontlines: Escalating hostilities and displacement disrupt farming activities

Conflict is razing villages, damaging critical infrastructure, and displacing communities, thereby depriving the civilian population of goods and services essential for survival. Fighting has intensified sharply since August across frontline areas of Blue Nile and Greater Kordofan, especially North Kordofan. Agricultural production is expected to be severely disrupted by lack of access to agricultural lands and continued conflict and insecurity.

The Kordofan region remains the epicentre of Sudan's conflict.¹⁶ In **North Kordofan** alone, over 60,000 people were displaced during the 2026 planting season. More than 170 airstrikes, looting events or armed clashes have been recorded this year in markets across Greater Kordofan, with conflict concentrated on communities with livestock, herder communities and agrarian settlements.¹⁷

With conflict and insecurity in the rural, agricultural areas, populations are fleeing agricultural assets and livelihoods for safer urban areas, such as El Obeid city. The city's capacity to absorb the growing influx is severely constrained by degraded services,¹⁸ fragile humanitarian access through a single-entry route, and an elevated risk of disease outbreaks, including cholera.¹⁹ While the risk of a full-siege or sustained assault on El Obeid has lessened, attacks have damaged essential infrastructure—such as electricity, water supply systems, medical and educational facilities and markets—and left both host communities and displaced populations highly vulnerable and reliant on available assistance or markets.²⁰

In **South Kordofan**, conflict is pushing displaced populations into areas where agricultural production has already been undermined by conflict, displacement and poor rainfall. Heiban locality has become a new flashpoint of violence between armed groups, with at least seven market bombardments this year and attacks on Kauda town and surrounding villages displacing thousands of people during the critical planting season.

Humanitarian access and funding remain critically inadequate to meet escalating needs

While cross-border and crossline operations have generally improved, enabling the transport of over 200,000 metric tons of food across frontlines within Sudan and more than 60,000 metric tons across international borders this year, large populations remain isolated or out of reach, particularly in Greater Kordofan. Insecurity, siege tactics, shifting frontlines, and fragmented approval mechanisms drive disruptions of aid delivery.²¹ **West Kordofan** remains isolated by a long route from Nyala and severe movement constraints from Khartoum/Ad Dabbah, leaving communities highly isolated and vulnerable to worsening food insecurity. As armed clashes move westward, conflict risks are intensifying further along the Al Rahad road. Access to markets and basic services is already extremely limited, and households increasingly depend on wild foods for survival. In North Kordofan, access to El Obeid has improved slightly, yet the sole Kosti–El Obeid supply route remains vulnerable to drone strikes. Kadugli and Dilling towns in South Kordofan remain at risk of full siege, while attacks on aid convoys have made humanitarian delivery increasingly dangerous.

Considerable gaps in service delivery and coverage of acute malnutrition remain, particularly in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. For example, 26 of the 188 localities in Sudan have poor-to-no coverage of treatment of SAM. As of August, only 26 percent of the expected cases of SAM with medical complications received treatment, indicating as many as two thirds of these children face potential death due to lack of treatment.²²

As of 8 October 2026, the HNRP had received less than half the funds requested, with significant shortfalls in food security (funded at 42 percent), nutrition (30 percent) and WASH (23 percent).²³ Many of the critical gaps in assistance, particularly in accessible areas, could be reduced with immediate and increased funding.

Figure 1. Trends in reported funding in Sudan, October 2026. Source: [FTS](#)




Severe and widespread El Niño-induced drought threatens to further worsen already catastrophic food security conditions

Below-average rainfall, low soil moisture, record high temperatures, and reduced vegetation biomass—all driven by the impacts of El Niño—point to drought conditions across nearly half of Sudan's agricultural lands. Currently, in North Darfur, South Darfur, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan, at least half of croplands have poor vegetation growth and all or nearly all croplands show severe water deficits.²⁴ In parallel, water availability and seasonal grazing lands are also heavily affected and likely to impact overall herd size, livestock body conditions, sources of animal proteins, and income. Increased September rains arrived too late to support most cereal production as crops widely failed and germinated poorly, while many replanting efforts have little chance of reaching maturity. Having lost their livelihoods, many displaced farmers have become dependent on markets and assistance.²⁵

A drought of this severity will likely deepen acute food insecurity among millions of people already facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) conditions across Sudan, particularly households dependent on rainfed agriculture and harvest-driven declines in food prices. The interaction of drought and conflict increases the likelihood of an increase in the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and expands the risk of Famine in the worst-affected areas.

Map 3. **Areas affected by poor vegetation growth, September 2026.**

Source: JRC



Insight from the Famine Review Committee

The IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) fully supports the Alert and is gravely concerned about the humanitarian situation throughout Sudan. While there is insufficient survey data to conduct an IPC Analysis, other evidence about the humanitarian situation in multiple areas at risk of Famine is available and indicates a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Famine is the collapse of systems. Systems necessary to support life in conflict-affected areas have been systematically targeted. Healthcare is extremely limited, often entirely inaccessible, while clean water is becoming increasingly scarce, leaving a poorly nourished population vulnerable to disease and death. Cultivation and trade have been systematically inhibited, now compounded by El Niño. The long duration of these deprivations has drained resources and coping strategies, not just of households, but of entire communities and extended family networks. Displacement to safe places where aid can be found is a final desperation strategy that is simply unavailable to many.

GAM and even SAM prevalence coupled with food insecurity exceeding crisis levels has become commonplace even where humanitarian assistance does arrive. The drivers of disease, food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality are becoming more severe and generalized over larger populations.

We are witnessing a humanitarian catastrophe, already of historic proportions, which appears to be on a worst-case trajectory as we enter the dry season following a near record-poor harvest, the effects of which are already being felt and which will continue throughout 2026 and early 2027. In many of the affected areas, local mutual aid groups have been at the forefront of the response, and these efforts should be supported by the international humanitarian community. International agencies should also be provided with adequate funding to ramp up responses in areas they are able to access alongside local responders.

To effectively change the current downward trajectory, the international response cannot be limited to the provision of aid. Diplomatic pressure on all conflict actors and their external supporters is crucial to averting the worst outcomes of the current trajectory. This should focus on reversing policies that systematically target objects indispensable to survival, and which inhibit the movement of populations, commerce and humanitarian assistance.

Recent data from operational partners confirm severe food security and nutrition conditions

Jebel Marra (South Darfur): An August–September SMART survey in four IDP camps revealed alarming levels of GAM among children aged 6–59 months. The overall GAM prevalence was estimated to be 26.7%, with two camps crossing the 30% Famine threshold, at 38% and 30.8%. Nearly one-fourth of households reported severe hunger and two-thirds reported a poor Food Consumption Score. Death rates were at Emergency levels, with a crude death rate (CDR) at 1.34 (0.93-1.92, 95% CI) and an under-five death rate at 2.14 (1.17-3.90, 95% CI). Key informants reported a double increase in SAM rates in primary healthcare clinics in Tonga, Kalokitting, Dilli, and Sulil towns.

Nyala (South Darfur): Nutrition screenings of approximately 21,000 children aged 6 to 59 months between January and August indicated a two-fold increase in SAM from 5.2% to 11.4% among those accessing services.²⁶ In June, 25.6% of women screened at antenatal care visits were nutritionally at risk, an over two-fold increase from January. Cure rates in August remained below 50%. One third of deaths among children admitted since mid-May occurred in August alone, indicating a sharp increase.

Tulus, As Salam, Al Sunta, Kubum, Shataya and Kas localities (South Darfur): In comparison to SAM admissions in the same period of 2025, Tulus recorded a sharp 410% increase, while As Salam rose by 35%. Significant increases were also observed in other localities, particularly Al Sunta, Kubum and Shataya, where SAM admissions were approximately double 2025 levels. In Kas, there was a four-fold increase of SAM admissions from 4% in January to 17.4% in June.

Greater Darfur: SAM admissions nearly doubled from 2025 levels in Um Baru, and remain elevated in At Tina and Kernoi, with increases of 43% in Um Keddadah, 51% in Dar As Salam, and more than eleven-fold in Al Malha. Surveys in other localities in Greater Darfur confirm Critical levels of GAM, with 26.6% in Beida (West Darfur), 24.3% in Kutum (North Darfur), and 23.9% in Abu Karienk (East Darfur).

Greater Kordofan: While SAM admissions increased by 37% in West Kordofan, lower admissions in North and South Kordofan reflect lower access and reporting rather than improved nutrition status. West Kordofan remains the state most affected by cholera across Sudan.²⁷

What is an IPC Alert?

An **IPC Alert** is an exceptional, evidence-based communication product issued when a rapidly deteriorating food security or nutrition situation requires urgent attention, but a full IPC analysis cannot be conducted within the required timeframe. It serves as a last-resort mechanism to draw attention to crises that are at, or approaching, Famine levels, and to prompt timely humanitarian action.

An IPC Alert does not provide a new IPC classification or population estimates. Instead, it highlights key evidence, risks, and recommended actions to support timely decision-making. [More information.](#)

When is Famine Classified?


Famine (IPC Phase 5) is the highest phase of the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale, and is classified when an area has:

Widespread starvation and destitution




At least **1 in 5 households** or 20% of the population are facing **extreme lack of food**.

Widespread acute malnutrition



of children aged 6–59 months are suffering acute malnutrition by Weight-for-Height Z-score (WHZ).

or



of children aged 6–59 months are suffering acute malnutrition by MUAC with evidence of rapidly worsening underlying drivers of acute malnutrition.

Widespread deaths



2 or 4 deaths non-trauma deaths for every 10,000 per day, from the interaction between hunger, malnutrition and diseases.

For further information on how the IPC classifies Famine, please consult the [IPC Famine Fact Sheet](#).

Publication date: 12 October 2026 | Disclaimer: The information shown on the maps does not imply official recognition or endorsement of any physical and political boundaries | For more information please contact ipc@fao.org.

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