IPC ■■■■ **I**ntegrated **F**ood **S**ecurity **P**hase **C**lassification
Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions

IPC GUIDANCE NOTE
CONFLICT ANALYSIS

April 2025

WHAT DOES THE IPC TECHNICAL MANUAL V3.1 SAY ABOUT CONFLICT ANALYSIS?

Conflict analysis is an essential component of IPC analysis. The IPC Technical Manual v3.1 includes multiple references to conflict, including in the Conceptual Framework (p.11), as a Key Driver of Food Insecurity and an aggravating factor (p. 41 and p. 59), and as an impediment to humanitarian assistance (p.63).

WHAT DOES THIS RESOURCE ADD TO THE MANUAL?

This document provides guidance on how to conduct conflict analysis within the context of IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis. This document is for use while the analysis is being planned and underway. A fuller explanation of Conflict Analysis is provided in the Conflict Reference Document, which should be used as a resource by all interested IPC stakeholders.

SECTION CONTENTS

CONTACTS

For queries or to request support, contact the IPC Global Support Unit at info@ipcinfo.org

1. Key parameters of conflict analysis

Resource use

This Guidance Note serves two main groups: IPC practitioners at all levels of certification and conflict analysts. The expectations for using this guidance are based on an individual's functional role in an analysis. It is strongly recommended that lead facilitators read the complete Conflict Reference Document, which is available on the IPC website. If additional support is needed for conflict analysis, please seek support from the IPC GSU as early as possible.

Introduction

Armed conflict and organised violence are major causes of life-threatening food insecurity in most of the world's hunger hotspots. The purpose of conflict analysis within the IPC is to support the process of classification for current and projected acute food insecurity. This entails the integration of conflict analysis into Acute Food Insecurity analysis, especially in areas where conflict is a major driver of acute food insecurity.

All IPC Acute Food Insecurity analyses use the IPC Food Security Analytical Framework. The framework situates contributing factors, causal factors and impacts on food security, and food security outcomes within the overall framework. In line with the IPC Food Security Analytical Framework, conflict analysis to support IPC analysis consists of three components that fall under analysis of contributing factors:

1. Vulnerability to conflict

2. Conflict as a hazard

3. Impact across food security dimensions

Figure 1: IPC Food Security Analytical Framework and links to Conflict Analysis

Part 2
Vulnerability
to Conflict

Part 1
Conflict as a
Hazard

Part 3
Impact across
Food Security
Dimensions

Food security contributing factors

Causal factors

Vulnerability, resource and control
(exposure, susceptibility and resilience to
specific hazards or ongoing conditions)
• Livelihood strategies (food and income
  sources, coping and expenditures)
• Livelihood assets (human, financial, social,
  physical and natural)
• Policies, institutions and processes
• Gender and other socio-economic
  inequalities and discrimination
• Mitigating factors

&

Acute events or ongoing conditions
(natural, socio-economic, conflict, disease and others)

Impact

Food security dimensions

Availability	**Access**	**Household utilization**
• Production	• Physical access	• Food preferences
• Wild foods	• Financial access	• Food preparation
• Food reserves	• Social access	• Feeding practices
• Imports		• Food storage
• Markets		• Food safety
• Transportation		• Water access

Stability (at all times)

Feedback

Food security outcomes
(directly measured or inferred from contributing factors)

**Non-food security
specific contributing
factors** (factors directly
affecting outcomes)
• Disease
• Water/sanitation
• Conflict
• Others

**Second-level
outcomes**

Nutritional status	**Mortality**

First-level outcomes

Food consumption Quantity and nutritional quality	**Livelihood change** Assets and strategies

**Classification of acute phase (current or
projected) and chronic level**

How does the IPC define conflict?

Conflict refers to a situation involving the armed and organised use of violence. In this context, 'armed' refers to the use of weapons, and 'organised' refers to action by a group beyond a single event. Groups using armed violence (also known as armed actors) may range from local militia to criminal groups to state militaries. No type of armed actor is automatically more important than another for conflict analysis in the IPC.

For the IPC, conflict analysis is concerned with the humanitarian consequences of the risk and use of organised violence. Conflict analysis as part of an IPC analysis looks at conflict as a hazard – the occurrence or risk of organised violence– and its humanitarian consequences rather than any formal classification of a situation as an armed conflict or a specific type of conflict. Consideration of organised violence – however it manifests – as a hazard enables analysis of its impact on food security.

Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must consider active conflict as well as the risk of conflict to inform the classification and projections of acute food insecurity. The forward-looking nature of IPC projection analysis requires that consideration is also given to how a situation may evolve.

Conflict analysis should also consider other events related to conflict, including but not limited to coups, civil unrest, elections, peace negotiations, and constitutional changes (Box 1).

Box 1: Organised Violence and Food Security in Haiti, 2022

Concentrated in the neighbourhood of Cité Soleil in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, extreme food insecurity driven by organised violence resulted in a classification of some household groups in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in September 2022. Armed actors (generally referred to as gangs) gained control of significant territory, including most of Port-au-Prince, several major highways, and the country's main oil terminal. Conflict analysis that focused only on an acknowledged civil war would have failed to appropriately consider the impact that organised violence was having on food security.

Organised violence may also be direct or indirect. Both forms of violence can cause (or contribute to) acute food insecurity. Direct violence includes violence against people, assets, and activities and the resultant impact of this. Indirect violence includes perceptions of the risk of violence, including threats or expectations of organised violence. These perceptions may be the result of armed actor presence without direct violence, past usage of violence, or generalized anxiety about anticipated violence. This may cause changes to civilian behaviour, even without violence in the present moment.

Pathways between organised violence and food insecurity may not always be obvious, linear, and immediately visible. Long delays may occur between the use of organised violence and its full impact on food security, including due to seasonality. Thus, organised violence can act as both shock and stressor, with the mechanisms of impact and humanitarian consequences shifting over time and space.[1]

While a detailed understanding of the impacts of organised violence on food security may often be hard to achieve due to an over reliance on dominant narratives in conflict analysis, it is important to engage in such an analysis and try to gain this understanding. Narratives, meaning the story or collection of stories told to explain events and processes, can become a frame through which new information is interpreted; and dominant narratives end up substituting the analytical process, which presents risks to the IPC and for risk monitoring and early warning (Box 2).

Box 2: Dominant narratives inhibit early warning

A Famine Likely event was classified by the IPC Famine Review Committee for a sub-area of one county in South Sudan's Jonglei State in late 2020. This classification came after an approximately eight-month period of organised violence that did not directly involve any of the signatories to the country's recent national peace agreement. At its height, as many as 17,000 fighters may have been directly engaged in organised violence, including in operations demonstrating significant capacity.

The situation was most frequently analysed in terms of whether it constituted armed conflict and consequently whether it should be considered 'political' violence. It was frequently labelled intercommunal or communal violence, tribal violence and cattle raiding despite the absence of mass cattle seizure. These labels led many humanitarian and other actors to conclude that the humanitarian consequences of this organised violence were likely to be less severe than if war as occurring. The result was a lack of Famine early warning for what was likely the first Famine event since 2017, when a Famine was declared through in-country IPC analysis for another area in South Sudan.

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[1] Elaborating on the definition of shocks in IPC Manual 3.1, **shocks** are external short-term deviations from long-term trends that have substantial negative effects on people's current state of well-being, level of assets, livelihoods, or safety, or their ability to withstand future shocks. **Stressors** are long-term trends or pressures that undermine the stability of a system and increase vulnerability within it. See Choularton, R. et al, *Measuring Shocks and Stressors as Part of Resilience Measurement.* (Rome: Food Security Information Network, September 2015). https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/paragraphs/documents/FSIN_TechnicalSeries_5.pdf.

When to conduct conflict analysis in IPC

The decision to conduct conflict analysis as part of an IPC analysis (or not) should be evidence-based, based on technical consensus, and documented for the record.

Determining if conflict analysis is needed to support IPC analysis will likely require a preliminary analysis and discussion within a Technical Work Group (TWG) prior to an analysis workshop. TWGs must consider if organised violence is or could reasonably become a driver of acute food insecurity in any units of analysis for a potential or planned analysis workshop. IPC does not use any quantitative thresholds (such as battle-related deaths) for triggering conflict analysis.[2]

This decision should be undertaken during the planning and preparation stages of IPC Function I. The guiding questions, outlined in blue below, can help to determine whether to conduct a conflict analysis as part of the IPC analysis.

Analysis of organised violence within the country

Current period

- Has organised violence been a driver of acute food insecurity historically, such as in the last five years?

- Is organised violence a driver of acute food insecurity now, at the time of analysis?

Projection period

- Could organised violence become a driver of acute food insecurity in the short to mid-term future, coinciding with the IPC projection analysis period?

Updates

- Have any assumptions in the most recent IPC projection analysis available regarding organised violence within the country being analysed been invalidated, with implications for food security?

Analysis of organised violence outside the country: cross-border spread and critical supply chains

Current period

- Is organised violence and its humanitarian consequences in a different country spreading to the country of analysis?

  Examples: Spread of active conflict, refugee arrival, negative economic impact

- Is there organised violence along an international supply chain critical for food security and livelihoods within the country being analysed?

  Examples: Conflict within a country supplying a large part of the analysed country's cereals

Projection period

- Is there a reasonable chance that organised violence and its humanitarian consequences in a different country could spread to the country being analysed?

- Is there a reasonable chance that organised violence could start along an international supply chain critical for food security and livelihoods in the short to mid-term future?

Updates

- As above, have any assumptions in the most recent IPC projection analysis available regarding organised violence outside the country being analysed been invalidated, with implications for food security?

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[2] This is not done due to the varied definitions of conflict and organised violence used across common conflict event data providers, the risk of gaps in conflict event data, including precise fatality counts, especially soon after events occur, and the risk of excluding situations lacking robust and frequent public reporting on fatalities or other quantifiable aspects of conflict, including due to limited media coverage in inaccessible areas. High and/or sustained fatalities are also not necessary for organised violence, and a wider situation of conflict, to negatively impact food security.

When answering these questions for organised violence within the country being analysed, consider organised violence at different levels, including in its geographic scope and objectives. It may be national, subnational, or local. Levels may or may not correspond with the units of analysis selected by a TWG for an analysis workshop. These levels are not mutually exclusive and may overlap.

If any of the guiding questions above are answered positively, even for only a limited geographic area, then the TWG should take steps to include conflict analysis as part of their IPC analysis.

How to conduct conflict analysis at each stage

Conflict analysis needs to be included at every stage of the analysis cycle, including planning, preparation, analysis and communication, and learning. Throughout the analysis cycle, TWGs and Analysis Teams (AT) must maintain a conflict-sensitive approach, including in data collection, analysis, and communication. The first goal of conflict analysis in IPC is to fully adhere to Do No Harm principles and take all needed measures to ensure that conflict analysis does not negatively impact individuals, organizations, and the wider situation.

Function One: including conflict analysis in building technical consensus

Prepare for conflict analysis within IPC analysis: If conflict analysis is needed, a TWG must take the below actions.

- **Evaluate potential sensitivities:** The TWG must review how conflict analysis may be seen as sensitive by all involved actors within a planned workshop, including how conflict analysis can be discussed within the workshop, ensuring the safety and security of analysts and key informants, expressed and latent biases that may need to be addressed, and TWG and workshop composition itself.

- **Prepare mitigation measures:** As much as possible, the TWG should prepare to mitigate any such sensitivities identified above, such as by using anonymization and data protection tools for providing input or reaching consensus.

- **Identify and engage supporting analysts:** The TWG should engage analysts that can support all stages of the analysis cycle, including preparation, analysis and communication, and invite them to support conflict analysis preparation. These analysts may already be engaged in conflict analysis for other purposes, like security or conflict sensitivity.

- **Ensure the collection of any needed primary data** and gathering of secondary sources to enable conflict analysis. The best source of information regarding how organised violence is interacting with mobility comes from the affected population themselves.

Function Two: Including conflict analysis in classifying severity and identifying key drivers

- **Integrate conflict analysis into Acute Food Insecurity analysis:** The TWG and AT should ensure that conflict analysis is integrated into broader acute food insecurity analysis across all units of analysis for which it is relevant.

- **If the TWG has conducted conflict analysis previously, the most recently available analysis should be reviewed and updated as needed.**

  - If real-time monitoring of conflict and other data collection related to conflict have occurred, the TWG should ensure this data is summarized and available in an accessible format.

  - If assumptions and/or risk factors related to conflict were set in the last analysis, these must be compared against actual events in the period after the last analysis.

Function Three: Communication for action to include conflict analysis

Communicate conflict analysis: The TWG and AT should communicate the findings of its conflict analysis in the communication brief, potentially including greater detail for units of analysis where organised violence is causing more severe food insecurity. Communication should explicitly mention that the conflict analysis tool was used and include key assumptions made about organised violence, positive or negative.

Function Four: including conflict analysis in quality assurance

Discuss conflict analysis in the mandatory Self-Assessment Tool at the end of each analysis workshop involving conflict analysis. This means, for example, ensuring that expertise on conflict is included in the analysis team (1.1 in the SAT), if necessary, and (1.2 of the SAT) if there is disagreement about conflict analysis and assumptions. Consider conflict analysis in any lessons learned exercises held after an analysis workshop.

Who conducts conflict analysis to support IPC analysis

TWGs should map the conflict analysis capacity of their member organizations, taking into account different offices within those organizations. This may include the identification of different teams or functional roles that exist in these organizations that engage in conflict analysis in some form and may have staff able to support the TWG in various roles.

TWGs are encouraged to maintain an updated roster of analysts skilled in conflict analysis regardless of whether these individuals become regular analysis workshop participants or are employed by IPC partner organizations. Some analysts may be more familiar with specific areas or armed actors, and this should be considered when establishing a roster.

TWGs and ATs should recognize that staff from the context in which IPC is being conducted are likely the best placed to support conflict analysis. This is particularly true if those staff have professionally engaged with conflict analysis previously. Equally, national (or locally based) analysts are likely to have particular biases and allegiances, requiring that a plurality of perspectives is convened. The feasibility of different forms of participation must be carefully reviewed and planned for by a TWG, in line with the Special Considerations section below.

Special considerations for conflict analysis in IPC

Conflict sensitivity, particularly Do No Harm, is a fundamental component of all IPC analysis. Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must not cause harm, including to participating individuals and organisations or in any way contribute to a wider conflict situation.

There is potential for significant bias and potential risks to individuals and organisations conducting conflict analysis in support of IPC analysis. These are sensitivities which may not be encountered in other aspects of IPC analysis, and which need to be handled with care.

In some contexts, conflict analysis may be conducted in a free and open manner, but in others, it may be conducted with resistance due to differing views. If this is the case, please seek support from the IPC GSU.

The absense of analysts recognised as "experts" should not prevent efforts to conduct conflict analysis. When analysts skilled in conflict analysis are unavailable, a TWG should delegate conflict analysis to the next best analysts available within the TWG or AT, including TWG members or other potential IPC analysis participants.

TWGs must also consider the sensitivities which may lead to some analysts declining to support a TWG or participate openly in an IPC analysis workshop. Similarly, conflict analysis may generate unique challenges for the analysis lead and co-facilitators.

Conflict analysis, as guided by the key questions below, is intended to be iterative. IPC analysts are strongly encouraged to use the tool (Annex I) and address the key questions to the best of their ability and the available evidence, but to accept that it may not be possible or necessary to exhaustively answer each question.

Conflict analysis in the IPC analysis process

Conflict analysis begins with a series of 10 questions, which seek to explore and understand the conflict context as it applies to food security. This is outlined in the diagram below.

Figure 2: Key questions of conflict analysis

KEY QUESTIONS 1-3: ANALYSING THE CONFLICT LANDSCAPE	KEY QUESTIONS 4-7: ANALYSING THE USE OF ORGANISED VIOLENCE	KEY QUESTIONS 8-10: THE INTERACTIONS OF ORGANISED VIOLENCE AND FOOD SYSTEMS
1: Which actors are using organised violence? 2: What is the scope of the organised violence? 3: What is the purpose of the organised violence?	4: What forms of organised violence are being used by different armed actors? 5: How is organised violence being targeted? 6: How is organised violence interacting with civilian mobility? 7: How are organised violence and humanitarian programming interacting?	8: Looking at the situation broadly, how is organised violence interacting with the national food system? 9: Are there ways in which the impact of organised violence on food security may be disconnected from the location or timing of organised violence? 10: How is organised violence interacting with gender and age?

Next, the impacts of conflict on the four dimensions of food security are considered for the conclusions of the current and projected classifications, as per the diagram below. These two processes are then brought together in the Conflict Analysis Tool, included as an annex.

Figure 3: Food security dimensions in relation to conflict analysis

Food Security Dimensions

Availability	Access	Utilization
How is organised violence impacting food availability, including: • Domestically produced food • Imported food for sale • Alternative or supplemental food sources (i.e. hunting, fishing and wild foods), especially those obtained through common coping strategies.	How is organised violence impacting food access, including changes in : • Household food stocks • Household income and purchasing power • Humanitarian food security assistance • Civilian mobility • Indirect impacts, like increased taxation, disruption to transfers through social networks, and changes in household labour capacity.	How is organised violence impacting food utilization, including: • Safe water availability, access, and utilization • Household food storage (including access to electricity) • Household food preparation • The health environment, including Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF), drivers of infectious disease, and healthcare availability, access, and utilization

Stability

2. Hazard analysis (current)

This section uses a series of key questions to help analysts consider organised violence as a hazard, including some of its key characteristics, to support a shared understanding of the hazard before analysing its current and likely impact on food security through use of the IPC Conflict Analysis Tool.

Key questions 1-3: analysing the conflict landscape

Key Questions 1-3 help to establish an understanding of organised violence in context.

Outcomes from Key Questions 1-3 include:

1. A consensus view of the key actors involved in organised violence and some basic characteristics (such as actor profile, group leadership, chain of command and control, constituencies, funding, affiliation and allies) of those actors.

2. A shared understanding of the geographic areas and groups affected by organised violence.

3. Clarify on what information will be needed to enable a discussion of organised violence in context.

Key Question 1. Which armed actors are using organised violence?

The main inclusion criteria for armed actors in conflict analysis is the use of organised violence: the inclusion of an actor is contingent on evidence of their activities, rather than how the situation or the actor(s) are categorised (state security forces, militia, criminal group, etc.).

Analysts should ensure that the identification of armed actors includes consensus about what to call them, without violating the Communications section of the IPC Style Guide.

Armed actors may show different degrees of unity and coherence internally. Analysts need to consider if some parts of an armed actor group are acting independently and need to be considered as a separate armed actor (Box 3).

Box 3: Armed Actor Fragmentation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Implications for Food Security

In the Lake Chad Basin, and particularly in northeast Nigeria, armed actors launched a rural insurgency that began using organised violence against Nigerian security forces and the civilian population. That initial group then fragmented several times. After over a decade of conflict, at least three distinct armed actors are known to have formally broken away from the original armed actor, *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna Li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad* (JASDJ, commonly referred to as JAS). Breakaway groups, including Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), *Jama'at Ansaril Muslimin fi Bilad as-Sudan*, commonly known as Ansaru, and a group often referred to as the Bakura Faction, have all utilized different tactics, occupied different territory, and achieved widely varying degrees of success in conflict with each other and government security forces. Humanitarian and other actors often refer to all these groups using the umbrella term Boko Haram, a common nickname for JASDJ. This over-aggregation of armed actors leads to simplified and often incorrect conflict analysis.

Analysts may need to prioritise a) the most important armed actors, including those most commonly engaged in organised violence, b) actors engaging in the organised violence with the most impact on food security, and c) armed actors engaged in organised violence with the largest scope. There may also be other ways of categorising armed actors, such as by profiling all armed actors within a geographic area.

Key Question 2. What is the scope of the organised violence?

There are four categories of scope to consider: geographic, social, temporal, and armed actor control.

Geographic scope includes the administrative units and geographic areas where organised violence is occurring as well as having indirect impact. Geographic scope also includes livelihood zones and the natural environment.

Social scope refers to the social groups involved in organised violence, including those most impacted.

Possible social groups to consider include but are not limited to:

- Kinship-based ties, such as a system of clans and their sub-groups.
- Religious affiliation, including those linked to different sects or denominations or specific religious institutions.
- Livelihoods as a component of identity, such as pastoralism, agriculture, waged labour, market traders, etc.

Temporal scope covers the timing and duration of specific events or periods of organised violence. Seasonality is best defined by the population living in the areas being analysed, including for the names and number of seasons, as well as the activities and hazards associated with different seasons and other time periods (Box 4).

Armed actor control refers to geographic areas where an armed actor has some degree of control over any territory and/or population. Areas of control may not neatly correspond with administrative units. Control should be considered by degree; analysts may find it useful to use categories for control, such as high/complete, medium/partial, and low/none. Analysts may also find it helpful to identify attack zones, or areas where an armed actor frequently uses organised violence, even if they do not exert any meaningful degree of control there.

Box 4: Common Misconceptions about the Seasonality of Organised Violence

It is commonly assumed that organised violence increases in the driest parts of the year and decreases in the wettest parts of the year, largely for logistical reasons. Yet evidence often does not always support this assumption. From 2014 through 2018, recorded ceasefire violations in South Sudan most commonly occurred in June, during the main rainy season. In one analysis, organised violence involving armed actors categorized as 'rebels' in East Africa increased during drier periods, while organised violence involving armed actors considered 'communal' increased during wetter periods. Across Africa and South Asia, numerous studies have found increases in organised violence during harvest and post-harvest periods, especially when harvests are good. Counter examples can be found in Syria, where organised violence to destroy or capture agriculture increased most during growing periods. The point to make here is that analysis of seasonality should be based on observed evidence, not assumptions.

Key Question 3. What is the purpose of the organised violence?

Armed actors use organised violence in pursuit of issues connected to political and economic power. In this context, power may refer to control over one or more of the following:

- Territory
- People
- Economic and natural resources, including humanitarian assistance
- Political systems, institutions, and related resources.
- Political power does not apply only to the national political context. If organised violence is used to contest control of resources at any geographic or administrative level, it is political.

Analysis of purpose is important for two reasons:

• Purpose may inform tactics, including forms and targeting of violence.

• Understanding purpose is essential for scenario-building and making assumptions about an armed actor's most likely behaviour within a projection period.

Purpose is articulated through a range of armed actor positions and interests:

• **The public position or agenda:** what is the publicly stated goal of the group? Why are they using violent means to achieve this?

• **Interests or inferred goals:** the long-term objective of the group, irrespective of what is stated publicly.

• **Core values/non-negotiables:** what are the fundamental beliefs of the group, which they will not compromise on?

For each armed actor identified under Key Question 1, analysts should identify at least one position and at least one interest. While these may be the same or overlap, they often diverge.

Key questions 4-7: analysing the use of organised violence

Key Questions 4-7 focus on the use of organised violence.

Outcomes from this set of questions include:

• A consensus understanding of the forms and targeting of organised violence, including identifying any key patterns by armed actors or geographic areas.

• An understanding of the impact of organised violence on civilian mobility and humanitarian programming.

Analysts should incorporate identified patterns in the form and targeting of organised violence and how this interacts with civilian mobility and humanitarian assistance into armed actor profiles.

Key Question 4. What forms of organised violence are being used by different armed actors?

Analysts should develop a basic understanding of the capacity of each armed actor to use organised violence. Capacity refers to the ability of an armed actor to use organised violence to achieve their aims. Analysis of capacity is particularly important when making assumptions for projections, as what an armed actor will do, is constrained by, and what that actor can do. This can include estimation of armed actor capacities including number of members, funding, arms available, effectiveness of organisation, etc.

Forms refer to the ways in which organised violence is used. Forms may differ widely among armed actors and for any given armed actor over space and time. Common forms include, but are not limited to:

• Armed clashes or battles between the fighters of two or more armed actors

• Raids

• Explosions/Remote Violence, including different forms of indirect fire, including explosive attacks by artillery on land, strikes by manned and unmanned aircraft as well as ships and boats, landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[3]

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[3] Explosive remnants of war refer to any "unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance" left by an armed actor, though deviates from a common international definition in that this definition is applied to armed conflict as well as organised violence more broadly, rather than armed conflict alone. Explosive ordnance refers to conventional munitions containing explosives. This typically includes IEDs, though mines are often referred to separately. See Enke, Thomas. *Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War, and IED Safety Handbook* (New York City: United Nations Mine Action Service, 2015). https://www.unmas.org/sites/default/files/handbook_english.pdf.

- Killings, whether discriminate or indiscriminate, from singular to mass

- Sexual and gender-based violence

- Sieges/blockades

Additional detail on establishing a pattern of forms of violence for an armed actor can be found in the Conflict Reference Document.

Key Question 5. How is organised violence being targeted?

Key considerations here may include how organised violence is being used against: military[4] or civilian[5] targets, including civilian livelihoods[6] or humanitarian operations.

Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis is especially concerned with food-related organised violence. This includes organised violence that occurs within key locations of a food system, where the goals of the organised violence involve control over key elements of or an entire food system, or that directly targets key components of a food system. This includes the targeting of the assets and activities involved in the delivery of humanitarian food assistance.

This form of targeting can occur in several potentially overlapping ways, including:

- **Removal of assets**, e.g., looting and asset-stripping, such as the taking of grain from storage facilities or livestock from grazing areas.

- **Destruction of these assets**, e.g., Burning of standing crops, using explosive weapons on fishing boats, killing livestock.

- **Separation of civilians from these assets**, e.g., sieges, planting landmines in agricultural fields, threatening civilians with violence if they enter an area or engaging in an activity, forcibly displacing a population away from their assets and the locations of their typical livelihoods and coping activities.

While any degree of this kind of targeting would have consequences for food security, a pattern of systematic removal, destruction, and/or separation is of greatest concern. When organised violence is being used to target civilian livelihoods and coping capacity, as well as humanitarian programming, analysts should consider if this rises to the level of comprehensive livelihoods targeting, that is: the systematic targeting, destruction, damage, or restriction of all aspects of livelihood options with organised violence.

Gender and age must be considered throughout any analysis of the targeting of organised violence. Men, boys, women, and girls are likely to have both shared and divergent experiences of organised violence. This is particularly true in the context of sexual and gender-based violence. These issues should be considered here and will be revisited in the context of food system impact in Key Question 10.

Key Question 6. How is organised violence interacting with civilian mobility?

Mobility is a critical intersection between organised violence and food security. It is also often about perceptions of mobility, including how civilians view the costs and benefits of undertaking different forms of movement.

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[4] **Military** here refers broadly to anything directly connected to armed actors, like their fighters and assets. Assets may include infrastructure like armed actor bases and camps as well as supplies like ammunition. In this instance, it refers to any type of armed actor, not only state armed actors. IPC fully recognizes that precise distinctions between military and civilian are not always possible or analytically necessary within IPC across contexts.

[5] **Civilian** here refers broadly to all targets not of a military nature. It includes civilians themselves, their property, and their activities, as well as other public property like infrastructure.

[6] In this section, the focus is on physical and natural assets, though analysts may find many ways to consider all forms of assets when analyzing the targeting of organised violence. In the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, assets are defined under the following five categories: **Human:** health and nutrition status; physical capacity; skills; level of education; etc. **Social:** household, gender, kinship and other networks; community groups; values and attitudes; etc. Financial: income; credit and loans; savings; liquid assets; etc. **Physical:** productive assets, such as tools and equipment; stores; housing; livestock; infrastructure; etc. **Natural:** land; water; forests; etc. (WFP. Food Security Assessment Learning Repository)."

- Livelihoods: Analysis should consider the most common and important strategies used to produce food and/or earn income to meet basic needs and what activities, assets, pathways, and locations are needed to operationalise these strategies. These may range from agriculture to more urban livelihoods. While subsistence agriculture may depend on factors like the availability and accessibility of rural labour, water, and arable land, urban employment may depend more on the availability of electricity and internet.

Several potential interactions between civilian mobility and organised violence are described below.

Potential interactions between civilian mobility and organised violence

Forced displacement:

A population may be forced to displace to one or multiple locations, leading to a displaced population that is dispersed or concentrated:

- **Dispersion:** Civilians may be forced through the use and threat of organised violence to leave an area through any available route. This population may become dispersed or scattered across multiple destinations and may move multiple times.

- **Concentration:** The use and threat of organised violence to leave one area and concentrate in another area.

Forced displacement may also vary by distance and duration in different combinations, including micro-displacement and major displacement:

- **Micro-displacement:** This may involve short-distance, short-duration movement, potentially at high frequency, as displaced people expect (or hope) to quickly return to their area of habitual residence. This may lead to reduced or minimal impacts on livelihoods (if livelihood activities are not also targeted by organised violence), or it may severely disrupt their livelihoods and other activities needed for survival. Impact on food security cannot be automatically assumed.

- **Major displacement:** This may involve long-distance, long-duration displacement. The provision of humanitarian food and other assistance at destination areas may heavily influence the impact of displacement on these populations. Impact on food security cannot be assumed automatically.

- **Route viability:** This refers to how and where to migrate to and is strongly impacted by elements of population vulnerability, including gender and age. Route viability only exists if the affected civilian population perceives a route as viable. Even if it may appear so on a map to outsiders, a route with a perceived risk of death or other significant harm from organised violence or environmental factors for those engaged in distress migration would generally not be considered viable.

Forced immobilisation and sieges

- **Immobilisation** is where a population is forced to remain in place, potentially including restrictions on movement for even essential activities like accessing food, water, and medicine.

- A common form of forced immobilisation is a siege, sometimes also referred to as besiegement or siege-like conditions.

- For IPC, the most important considerations for determination of whether a siege exists are the degree to which:

  - Civilians can exit an area.

  - Food and other resources crtical to survival, like water, are available and accessible within the area.

Extensive additional details on sieges can be found in the Reference Document.

> ### *Distress migration*
>
> **Distress migration** may be considered a coping strategy; it is a likely, though not automatic, sign of coping collapse. Rapid, voluntary return is not typically expected.

Key Question 7. How are organised violence and humanitarian programming interacting?

Conflict analysis for the IPC considers two groups of actors – humanitarian and civilian – and three components. Both types of actors must be **uninhibited**, able to engage **safely**, and this must be **sustained** over time.

Analysts must consider: (1) The impact of **organised violence on humanitarian access**, versus (2) the impact of **humanitarian programming on organised violence**.

How is organised violence, directly and indirectly, affecting:

- the ability of humanitarian actors (including for food security, nutrition, health, and WASH) to enter an area, conduct their activities to completion, and exit that area?

- the ability of civilians to reach an area where humanitarian activities are occuring?

Modalities not requiring physical access to an area, such as the digital distribution of cash-based transfers, should also be considered in the context of humanitarian operations.

As with any resource in a conflict situation, humanitarian assistance may be instrumentalized by armed actors in pursuit of their positions and interests. Some of the ways that humanitarian operations may be exploited by armed actors and politicized include:

- **Population control,** such as through an armed actor requiring humanitarian assistance be delivered only to locations controlled by that actor or using assistance as a pull factor to draw populations to a specific location.

- **Revenue generation,** including a) directly through theft, diversion, and taxation of humanitarian assistance, and b) indirectly, such as through selling or renting infrastructure like compounds to humanitarian organizations. This may include pushing for aid actors to contract vendors, transport companies or engage with government personnel linked to them.

- **Provisioning,** or using humanitarian assistance to supply armed actor personnel.

- **Legitimation,** or the use of interactions with humanitarian organizations to project a narrative of successful and externally recognized control and governance within an armed actor's area.

3. Vulnerability to organised violence and the impact of organised violence on food system (current and projected)

Key questions 8-10: analysing the impact of organised violence on food security

This section covers the current and projection periods.

Key Questions 8-10 consider how organised violence may interact with population vulnerability and impact food security dimensions. Analysis in this step takes outputs from Key Questions 1-7 above as main inputs.

> **Outcomes from this part include:**
>
> - A consensus understanding of the impact of organised violence on food systems, in the current and the projection period(s).
>
> - A consensus view of population exposure, susceptibility, and resilience to organised violence, including key food sources and livelihoods for both the current and projection period.
>
> - Understanding of the impact of organised violence across the food security dimensions in the current and projection period.

Key Question 8. Looking at the situation broadly, how is organised violence interacting with the national food system?

As with any hazard, different populations may have different levels of vulnerability to organised violence, with varied impacts on food security.

Organised violence is also likely to bring costs and benefits to different actors within conflict over time, including across a food system. The benefits to some actors may even increase as food insecurity worsens, including the onset or intensification of famine.

Armed actor interactions with a food system may include the use or threat of organised violence to prevent an activity, reduce the frequency or output of an activity, change the costs of an activity, or change or redirect the output of an activity.

Armed Actor Interaction with a Food System	Example
Prevention of activity	Armed actor blocks roads into a market
Reduction of activity	Armed actor attacks prevent planting of staple crops
Changing the costs of an activity	Armed actor implements a tax on livestock herds
Changing or redirecting activity output	Armed actor forces planting of cash crops instead of staple crops in territory it controls

Interactions between organised violence and a food system may be negative, positive, or cause no major change. Armed actors may not only damage a food system, such as by destroying standing crops or looting harvested crops, but also leverage or exploit the food system in other ways, such as through the regulation and taxation of agriculture.

Armed actor members require access to food themselves. Even in situations where an armed actor has engaged in some degree of food-related violence, and caused harm to a food system, analysts must consider how the armed actor itself is surviving and what this means for civilian groups, including those living in areas under that armed actor's control.

Analysts should consider key foods that are mostly or entirely imported separately from those produced domestically. For each imported food, analysts should review the ongoing or potential interactions between that import pathway to consumers, including main consumer livelihoods in different areas, and organised violence.

For foods that are produced domestically or locally, analysts should consider how major production areas are impacted by organised violence, including agricultural land, water resources, and sources of agricultural inputs, and any needed processing facilities, roads, markets, and other infrastructure for distribution and storage.

How are key food sources impacted by changes in Policies, Institutions, and Processes (PIPs), including those of armed actors?

The PIPs environment refers to the diverse forms and institutions of public authority and policies regulating daily life. PIPs may change substantially as organised violence occurs.[7]

Armed actors also often seek to control territory and population through regulation of daily life, including the economic, social, and political spheres. Analysts need to understand how armed actors are exerting control, and how these efforts impact a food system.

Even without the direct use of organised violence, armed actors may prevent or inhibit the practice of common livelihoods and coping strategies. This may include restrictions of activities perceived to be associated with armed actor activity, such as bans on hunting or fishing, restrictions on assets like motorcycles, and more general restrictions on freedom of movement.

PIPs changes may also involve the systems that enable many livelihoods, coping strategies, and forms of accessing food. PIPs may inhibit the operation of financial, electrical, and telecommunications systems, preventing populations from accessing cash from their savings, livelihoods, remittances, and other sources, as well as reducing access to information.

Other common changes in the PIPs environment due to organised violence may come from outside the country being analysed, including in the form of sanctions and other international policies linked to organised violence. Such policy changes are also relevant given the potentially large impact they can have on food security, including through their effect on trade, domestic market prices, civilian mobility, and the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Additional factors affecting susceptibility include the Policies, Institutions, and Processes environment, especially how new, changed, or abandoned policies interact with a population's livelihoods. This may include different forms of armed actor revenue generation – which may affect some populations and livelihoods more than others – as well as policies reducing or preventing some livelihood and other activities, like grazing, fishing, hunting, firewood sales, and access to financial services.

Example Key PIPs Change	Potential Food Security Impact
Use of checkpoints on main road	Higher market prices due to checkpoint fees; reduced household, commercial, humanitarian traffic
Ban on fishing in contested area	Reduced availability of and access to fish, loss of livelihoods for households reliant on fishing.
Suspension of electricity transmission into conflict-affected area	Potential losses of employment opportunities, cold chain for food storage, night-time lighting for safer movement, potential rise in fuel prices due to shift to generators; reduction in telecommunications and financial services availability/access reducing access to information and digital/physical cash

One common shift in PIPs occurs when armed actors change or enact new forms of revenue collection, particularly the extraction of revenue from travel and transit. This may involve extracting payment from humanitarian programming, economic sectors like agriculture, transport, and mining, individual households, settlements, and businesses, and other forms of formal and informal transfers (Box 5). Analysts must consider how these forms of formal and informal revenue collection from civilian movement may interact with a food system.

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[7] Policies, Institutions, and Processes (PIPs) here refers to "the external governance environment through which households negotiate the use of their assets and the configuration of livelihoods strategies," though it also considers coping strategies. Lautze, Sue, and Angela Raven-Roberts. "Violence and complex humanitarian emergencies: Implications for livelihoods models." Disasters 30, no. 4 (2006): 383-401.

Example Food System Stage	Potential Form of Taxation
Food production	Harvest payments
Food processing	Payments from miller or other processing businesses
Food distribution	Payments on civilian mobility, including commercial traffic
Food preparation	Payments on cooking fuel or water access

Box 5: Informal taxation by al-Shabaab, 2021

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin, better known as al-Shabaab, an armed actor waging an insurgency against the Federal Government of Somalia, reportedly continued to generate most of its financing through diverse informal taxation mechanisms as of late 2021. Overseen by al-Shabaab's internal Ministry of Finance, these efforts include the informal taxation of road usage and the transport of goods, businesses, agricultural production and livestock, assessed individual wealth, and other aspects of daily life. Not unique to this armed actor or to Somalia, similar revenue generation by a variety of armed actors is common globally, from the mix of checkpoints across Central African Republic to the cities and highways of Haiti.

Key Question 9. How is the hazard of organised violence affecting a population's resilience? Are there ways in which the impact of organised violence on food security may be disconnected from the location or timing of organised violence?

The degradation of resilience is an essential concept when considering how organised violence impacts food security. Organised violence may interact with the resilience of a population in many ways. Three key interactions include: how assets may become liabilities, multi-sector coping, and interactions with seasonality.

The degree to which an asset or activity is essential to civilian survival may change over time and space when organised violence is used. It is tempting for analysts to consider some of the foundations of food security analysis, like livelihood zone baselines or profiles, as fixed and unchanging as organised violence occurs or continues. However, civilians cope with and adapt to organised violence, including through altering livelihood and coping strategies.

Organised violence may cause an inversion of community and household resilience. Markers of resilience, such as productive cropland, livestock, and all-weather roads may attract armed actors that seek to take control of or otherwise exploit these assets, rapidly increasing the vulnerability of households or communities that were previously more resilient.

Are there trade-offs among the strategies that households use to cope with organised violence, food insecurity, and other threats to their survival?

Civilians cannot be viewed as passive victims in conflict analysis. Even in the face of organised violence, civilians retain agency and will work to protect themselves and improve their situation. Analysts should consider how civilians are cooperating with, resisting, or avoiding armed actor activities, including organised violence and non-violent activities, that affect the food system.

Individuals, households, and communities also use coping strategies when faced with any threat to their survival – not only food insecurity. While IPC analysis primarily focuses on coping strategies related to food security, conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must consider multi-sector coping in recognition of the complicated decision-making that civilians are forced to make regarding organised violence as a shock and stressor.

Civilian perception of the risk of organised violence is most important when considering how coping with protection risks may lead to reductions in other essential activities, like those needed to access food. Risks may be highly visible – such as active conflict involving frequent, large clashes between armed actors – and much less obvious, such as from the contamination of agricultural fields with explosive remnants of war and landmines or from frequent but seemingly unpredictable indirect fire, like drone strikes.

Finally, the relationships of armed actors with different populations may change over time and should not be assumed to be rigid or operate strictly along identity lines, like ethnicity.

As the relative importance of assets and activities changes over time and space due to organised violence and its consequences, the seasonality of typical livelihoods, coping strategies, and hunger may also shift from a typical year in that context. Seasonal calendars may need to be revised due to organised violence.

Consider if and how some or all of the impact of organised violence on food security may happen sometime after a conflict event or set of events. One form of delay could be seasonality, where organised violence disrupts a planting season. The greatest impact on food security may not be felt by the affected population until the next post-harvest period.

If delays in the impact of organised violence on food security are expected, this expectation should be incorporated into IPC projections and future updates.

Organised violence may also inhibit or prevent food production in one area, leading to heightened reliance on markets for food access by the affected population. This increased demand may then raise prices throughout part or all of a market system, including in areas not directly affected by organised violence (Box 6).

Box 6: Inverted Resilience in Tigray, 2021-2022

Within the Tigray Region of Ethiopia, significant advances in resilience were made in recent decades, through the extension of the road network throughout the region, the establishment of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), and the growth of sesame production in low-lying areas like Western Tigray zone. During an extended period of peace, this contributed to reducing household, community, and regional vulnerability, especially for the densely populated highland areas in central and eastern Tigray Region. However, when conflict broke out in 2021, these foundational components of regional resilience became liabilities. Roads facilitated military offensives throughout the region, with the civilian population closest to roads exposed to organised violence. Budgetary transfers for the PSNP ceased, abruptly ending what had previously been consistent support for the most vulnerable households in the region. Lowland, sesame-producing areas had previously been annexed from a neighboring region and control remained contested. When these areas were forcibly taken during the conflict, the densely populated areas of central and eastern Tigray suddenly lost access to the lucrative seasonal employment needed to remain food secure.

Key Question 10. How is organised violence interacting with gender and age? Are any groups more susceptible than others?

Organised violence is highly gendered in its forms, targeting, and impact across all age groups. The gendered nature of organised violence interacts with the gendered nature of livelihoods and coping.

It should not be assumed that the lived experience of organised violence across genders and ages (and over time) is uniform. Fixed narratives for gender and age to be aware of include the idea that only men perpetrate violence, that women are only passive victims, and that social and livelihoods roles by gender and age do not change during conflict.

Different populations are likely to be susceptible to organised violence to varying degrees and this may change over time. Some key reasons for different degrees of susceptibility to organised violence include answers to key questions from Part 1:

• **Armed actor interests and capacity:** Armed actor interests may make them likely to take certain actions, or to conduct themselves with violence.

- **Social scope of organised violence:** Armed actor interactions with different social groups vary. One example can occur when an armed actor's personnel are drawn from a particular social group. This could lead to positive interactions between that armed actor and that population, such as compromises on armed actor revenue generation, recruitment, and uses of violence.

- **Forms and targeting of organised violence:** When armed actors have or seek control of an area or population to some degree, they make choices about the forms of violence to use and how these forms will be targeted.

The IPC Resource on Gender-sensitive IPC analysis should also be consulted for additional detail.

Mobility

Men and boys may be suspected of being involved in organised violence directly or indirectly, and their movement may be inhibited to a greater degree than for women and girls. They may face a greater risk of physical harm, including death, than women and girls.

Women and girls may have greater nominal or actual freedom of movement. Armed actors may permit them to engage in livelihoods and coping activities more freely. However, women and girls may face lower risks of some types of physical harm, but far greater risks of other types of harm, like rape and sexual assault. Men and boys also face a risk of sexual and gender-based violence. Relative risk may vary significantly across contexts.

Livelihoods and Coping Capacity

Organised violence may prompt changes in gender and age roles in livelihoods and coping. Men may be diverted from typical livelihoods roles to security roles, such as patrolling the perimeter of a community or launching attacks. This diversion of labour may force women, boys, and girls to undertake different roles in their households and communities. As household members seek to fill gaps in activities critical for survival, there may be reduced or no time for other activities or these activities may be done ineffectively.

Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) and Other Care Practices

Organised violence may have direct and indirect impacts on household care and feeding practices for infants and young children, especially those under five years of age and at risk of acute malnutrition.

Pathways may be direct, such as when protection risks may lead to displacement to areas with a poor health environment and limited access to clean drinking water. The use of different forms of organised violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, may directly target caregivers like women and older girls.

Some of the most common pathways from organised violence to deteriorating care and feeding practices include the trade-offs that households and caregivers may be forced to make.

In combination, direct and indirect impacts may lead to a deterioration in care and feeding practices as resources, including time, are reallocated according to the most urgent basic needs.

4. Assess impact by food security (current and projection)

Conflict analysis to support IPC current classifications

Use the analysis of the hazard of organised violence and the vulnerability of the population to describe key impacts across the food security dimensions.

How is organised violence impacting food availability and its stability?

- How is the availability of domestically produced food impacted by organised violence?
  - What production is exposed to organised violence?
  - Whose production is this and how is that population susceptible to organised violence?
  - Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction?
  - Are there indirect impacts, like disruption to a supply chain for inputs into food production?

- How is the availability of imported food for sale impacted by organised violence?
  - What points and pathways in the entry, storage, processing, distribution, and sale of foods are exposed to organised violence?
  - Who is engaged in these activities, especially the purchase of imported food?
  - Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets, like markets being destroyed?
  - Are there indirect impacts, like in-kind taxation?

- How is the availability of humanitarian food assistance (imported and/or sourced locally) impacted by organised violence?
  - What points and pathways in the entry, storage, processing, and distribution of ongoing humanitarian food assistance are exposed to organised violence?
  - Who is engaged in these activities, especially the recipient population of humanitarian food assistance, and how is that population susceptible to organised violence?
  - Are there direct impacts, like humanitarian warehousing being destroyed or looted?
  - Are there indirect impacts, like in-kind taxation?

- How is the availability of alternative or supplemental food sources (i.e. hunting and wild foods), especially those obtained through common coping strategies, impacted by organised violence?
  - What alternative or supplemental food sources are exposed to organised violence?
  - Who relies on these alternative or supplemental foods?
  - Are there direct impacts?

How is organised violence impacting food access and its stability?

With the additional dimensions of food security below, the questions listed above should be reformulated along similar lines, to consider the same sources of food (domestic, imported, humanitarian food assistance, alternative sources) in terms of access, utilization and stability. Additional points of clarification are listed for each dimension.

How is organised violence impacting access to:

- Domestically produced food

- Imported food for sale

- Humanitarian food assistance (imported and/or sourced locally)

- Alternative or supplemental food sources, especially those obtained through common coping strategies

Including through:

- Any changes in availability?

- Any changes in civilian mobility, like an inability to travel to markets or fishing grounds?

- Any changes in indirect impacts, like increased taxation, disruption to transfers through social networks, and changes in household labour capacity?

- Any changes in household income and purchasing power, including due to the impact of organised violence?

How is organised violence impacting food utilization and its stability?

- How is organised violence affecting the ability of households to store, prepare, and metabolize food?

- ... affecting safe water availability, access, and utilization?

- ... household food storage (including access to electricity)?

- ... household food preparation?

- ... the health environment, including IYCF, drivers of infectious disease, and healthcare availability, access, and utilization?

Conflict analysis to support IPC projection classifications

Making predictions about organised violence is difficult. However, the best attempt possible should be made to build scenarios that include analysis of the occurrence of organised violence and the likely impact of that violence on food security.

As with current classification processes described above, conflict analysis to support IPC projections involves two components: Projecting the **occurrence and impact** of organised violence, making assumptions about the most likely **evolution and impact** of organised violence.

All the questions listed above in support of current classifications should be revisited for the projection classifications, considering the likelihood of future impacts of organised violence on food security.

Analysts should consider their conflict analysis for the current period, including how organised violence has interacted with the typical seasonality of food security, livelihoods, and coping. This analysis may have implications for the validity period of projections typically used if seasonality has changed.

For projection analysis, the occurrence of organised violence can refer to organised violence that is already ongoing, or the onset of organised violence where there had been none in the current period. As with other hazards, organised violence may be projected at different severities for different locations over time.

Per Manual V3.1, IPC updates should take place when previous scenario assumptions have been invalidated.

As with all IPC projection analysis, assumptions for a most likely scenario should include only those assumed events and outcomes that are more likely to occur than their alternatives.

Possible format: [Element of conflict] will likely [evolution] in [geographic areas] because [evidence/justification], impacting [who/how food security].

Example: Conflict will likely escalate in Unit of Analysis A because the de facto authorities will seek to regain full control of major highways and border crossings with Neighbouring Country, displacing populations along these routes and further disrupting their livelihoods during the planting season.

This section supplements IPC Guidance Resource 4: Projection Analysis. That resource should be referred to for general guidance on IPC projection analysis.

Projecting the occurrence of organised violence

Projections should consider how organised violence may change in the projection period, including beginning, restarting after a pause or stoppage, increase or decrease in frequency, intensity, and scope, or remain the same.

Wherever analysts identify some level of risk of organised violence, an assumption should explicitly be made and documented, regardless of whether organised violence is projected to occur or not. This ensures that there is still an assumption to be tracked and, if this assumption is invalidated, that a projection update can be considered.

Projections should be categorical in nature, rather than attempts to quantify most likely organised violence. Categorical projections may include designations like major, moderate, and minor organised violence and reference to specific events or types of events occurring when feasible.

Key questions to ask about armed actors in projection analysis

1. Considering an armed actor's stated goals and that armed actor's goals as assessed by analysts, what actions would bring these goals closer?

2. Considering the capacity of that armed actor, the broader conflict landscape and contextual factors like seasonality, which of the actions that might bring it closer to achieving its goals are feasible?

3. Taking the conclusions reached for question 1 and 2, what actions are most likely for this armed actor in the projection period?

Triggers for organised violence onset, continuation, or increase

Analysts may identify other triggers, or sudden or acute events that raise the likelihood of new or intensified organised violence. These may include a diverse range of political, social, and economic events that make organised violence more likely to begin, continue, and/or intensify. They tend to work in conjunction with longstanding issues.

Escalatory activities refer to actions that raise the likelihood of organised violence outside of an ongoing situation of violence. Escalatory activities may be non-violent or violent. Non-violent escalatory activities may include political actions, particularly those that indicate attempts to change power dynamics and access to resources. Violent escalatory activities could include a range of activities that involve violence, which may or may not be organised and do not necessarily indicate an ongoing situation of violence between two or more armed actors (Box 7).

Box 7: Armed Actor Integration and the Potential for Escalation

Several forms of non-violent escalatory activities preceded the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), that began on April 15, 2023. One of the final issues discussed between these armed actors before organised violence began was the potential integration of the RSF into the SAF. While integration was far from the only cause of the onset of new organised violence in Sudan, it did serve as an important catalytic issue. A non-state armed actor being integrated into state security forces might see its officers demoted or barred from senior positions, limiting their access to patronage networks. Its lower ranking members may be kept out of the best trained and equipped units like special forces or presidential guards, limiting the former group's ability to remobilize or launch a coup. Globally, even the integration of pro-government militias into state security forces has been found to increase the risk of civil war renewal.

Mitigating factors for organised violence

Mitigating factors for organised violence are processes and events that reduce the likelihood of new or increased organised violence and/or raise the likelihood of a decrease in organised violence.

The achievement of major goals – especially in terms of their actual interests and not only stated positions – may lead to reductions in their use of organised violence, at least in some areas or forms.

Other mitigating factors may involve a specific process or event, like the onset of a ceasefire that all or most armed actors may abide by, or ongoing peace negotiations that most or all armed actors may meaningfully engage in.

Analysts must consider the conflict landscape and broader context of any peace or other agreement regarding the use of organised violence. If the root causes of organised violence remain or have worsened, active organised violence may become temporarily latent, rather than concluded. Analysts must consider that the end of one situation of organised violence at one level is not necessarily the end of all organised violence at the same level or at other levels.

Projecting the impact of organised violence on food security

Assumptions on likely organised violence are the starting point of this section. Analysts must take their assumptions about the most likely evolution of organised violence – including any new onset, increases, and decreases – and review their analysis of the interactions of organised violence and the food system.

Assumptions about population vulnerability to organised violence

1. Review analysis of exposure, including interactions of calories and control.

2. Review analysis of susceptibility, including how different factors affect the extent to which populations and their sources of calories may be negatively impacted by organised violence.

3. Review analysis of other elements of vulnerability, including key ways in which organised violence will likely interact with the PIPs environment, gender and age, and resilience.

Following assumptions on organised violence and population vulnerability, analysts must make assumptions about the impact of organised violence across the food security dimensions. Analysts should take their analysis of impact in the current period as a starting point and determine if any changes in impact are likely based on their most likely scenario for organised violence and population vulnerability.

Supplemental section: organised violence and Famine

Conflict analysis in the context of the IPC can make use of a composite view – where famine is an event and a process – in assessing how quickly deterioration in outcomes occurs. It can also support analysis of how likely it is to occur, up to and including Catastrophe/Famine. The rate of deterioration will vary depending on the pre-conflict vulnerability, including health, livelihoods, and socio-economic structures. Communities already facing high levels of stress, food insecurity, or with limited coping strategies available to them – including distress migration – are likely to deteriorate more quickly.

Historically, famines driven by climatic shocks could take several livelihood cycles to occur, as two or more consecutive harvests were missed, such as due to drought, in the context of subsistence agriculture. A famine process might take two to three years. For famine driven by organised violence – as recent famines have been – there is a risk that a famine process could begin and accelerate rapidly, taking less than one livelihood cycle to occur, or potentially less than a year.

Some initial key questions to ask regarding organised violence and an accelerated famine process include the ones below. If there is any potential for famine to be ongoing or to occur in the short-term, the following key questions should be considered, as applicable.

1. Have any critical shifts in organised violence occurred in the last six months?

2. Has comprehensive livelihoods targeting started to be used by an armed actor against a specific area or population?

3. Have any large and sudden increases in the frequency and/or intensity of organised violence occurred in areas of concern, especially directed at livelihoods and coping strategies?

4. Has a siege begun or has an ongoing siege intensified, leading to lower permeability of that siege?

5. Have major changes to a frontline occurred, such as a large breach or total collapse?

6. Has organised violence led to the loss of any critical mitigating factors?

7. Are there populations without viable distress migration routes?

8. Are there civilian populations that humanitarian actors do not have full access to, including any areas with a complete loss of humanitarian access for three or more months?

5. Annex I: Conflict Analysis Tool

Instructions: This is the tool for conflict analysis conducted as part of IPC analyses for Acute Food Insecurity. Key members of the Technical Working Group and the Analysis team in country should complete the below table for each unit of analysis and responding to the questions for each armed actor. For more information see: Conflict Analysis

Unit(s) of Analysis				
(1) Conflict Landscape: Analysing the conflict landscape				
1: Which actors are using organised violence?	**2: What is the scope of the organised violence?**			**3: What is the purpose of the organised violence?**
1.1. Who: Which groups (armed actors) are using organised violence?	**2.1. Where** is this organised violence happening?	**2.2. When** did this armed actor start using organised violence?	**2.3. What** is this armed actor doing at the time of analysis?	**3.1. Why:** What is this armed actor trying to achieve by using organised violence?
Official/consensus designation for armed actor	*Names of relevant geographic areas like administrative units, settlements, topographic features, etc.*	*Approximate period, season/ month and year*	*Active, with consistent violence* *Active, w/o consistent violence* *Largely inactive*	*Main interests of armed actor (natural resources, national govt, etc)* *May diverge from armed actor's claimed goals*

CURRENT CLASSIFICATION

(2) Use of Organised Violence: Analysing the use of organised violence

4: What forms of organised violence are being used by different actors?	5: How is organised violence being targeted?	6: How is organised violence interacting with civilian mobility?	7: How are organised violence and humanitarian programming interacting?
4.1. When this armed actor uses organised violence now (if active), **what forms does it take?** What other activities is the group engaged in (besides organised violence)?	**5.1.** When this armed actor uses organised violence, **what or who does it usually target** (e.g., armed actors, population groups, assets)?	**6.1.** How does this armed actor interact with **people's movement,** including their ability to engage in their livelihoods?	**7.1.** How does this armed actor interact with **humanitarian organisations**, including delivery of humanitarian food and other assistance*?
Most common forms of organised violence used by armed actor (raids, explosive weapons, ground offensive for territory etc)	*Patterns of military and/or civilian targeting, especially assets* *Consider differences depending on gender and age*	*Enables/does not interfere (which forms of movement)* *Taxes (which forms of movement)* *Blocks (which forms of movement)* *Consider differences depending on gender and age*	*Enables/ does not block (escorts, issues permits/approvals, limited/no taxation, etc)* *Inhibits (taxes, sets targeting, diversions, etc)* *Blocks (mostly/fully denies)* *Consider differences depending on gender and age*

(3) Current Interactions of Organised Violence and Food System: Analysing the interactions of organised violence and food systems				
8: Looking at the situation broadly, how is organised violence interacting with the food system?			**9: Are there ways in which the impact of organised violence on food security may be disconnected from the location or timing of organised violence?**	**10: How is organised violence interacting with gender and age?**
8.1. Consider the livelihood zone and broader food system for this unit of analysis. How does this armed actor interact with it (targets with violence, taxes, etc)?	**8.2. Where are the key sources of food** – domestic production, commercial or humanitarian imports - and the livelihoods needed to access them found in the same places as organised violence?	8.3. How are **key food sources impacted by any changes in PIPs**, including those of armed actors?	9.1. How is **organised violence interacting with the resilience of different populations**, including the transformation of any assets into liabilities or changes in seasonality?	10.1. Where populations and their key food sources are exposed to organised violence, **are any groups more susceptible than others?**
Exploits food system (feed personnel, tax for revenue, support local population) *Directly attacks food system* *Indirectly attacks food system (attacks enabling systems like electricity/water, food system damaged by organised violence but not main target of that violence, etc)* *Largely does not target, exploit food system*	*Exposure of locations/pathways for production, transportation, processing, sale of key food source to organised violence*	*Conflict-related policy changes (movement restrictions, livelihood bans/restrictions, taxes, shutting off electricity/ financial services, etc)*	*Asset to liability (livestock, high-value cash crop area, safety net programme, etc)* *Shift in livelihoods/coping strategies leading to different lean period* *Multi-sector coping and trade-offs with food security (water collection over food collection, prioritizing conflict avoidance or defence over livelihoods, etc)*	*Susceptibility of exposed locations/pathways for key food source what interactions with organised violence, differences across livelihoods/social groups/etc*

CONCLUSION: Current Classification - Considering your analysis of the hazard and population vulnerability:

How is the **availability** of food impacted by organised violence now?	How is **access** to food impacted by organised violence now?	How is the **utilisation** of food impacted by organised violence now?
Review exposure, susceptibility	*Review exposure, susceptibility, availability*	*Review exposure, susceptibility, including cooking fuel, safe water*
Interactions of production/import key food sources and organised violence	*Interactions of production/import key food sources, other livelihoods, and organised violence*	*Where, how, for whom any major changes in food utilization*
Where, how, for whom any major changes in food availability	*Where, how, for whom any major changes in food access*	

PROJECTION CLASSIFICATION

(4) Projected Organised Violence and Interactions

11. Given an armed actor's interests, **what actions does it likely want to take** in the projection period?	12. What actions does an armed actor have the **capacity to take** in the projection period?	13. Are armed actors engaged in any **preparatory activities?**	14. Have any **triggers or mitigating factors for organised violence** recently occurred or likely to occur in the projection period?
What does the armed actor likely want to do next? *Actions that bring armed actor closer to achieving assessed interests* *Attack certain targets, take specific territory or infrastructure*	*Which constraints does the armed actor face?* *Compare what an armed actor likely wants to do with what it is likely capable of doing?*	*Preparations for engaging in or resisting organised violence (mobilization and movement of fighters, stockpiling supplies, building fortifications, making agreements with other armed actors, etc)*	*Triggers: Sudden or acute events that raise the likelihood of new or intensified organised violence* *Non-violent events (constitutional change, national election, etc)* *Violent events (assassinations, riots, evictions, sporadic violence not yet linked to an armed actor)* *Mitigating factors (ceasefires, peace processes, military victory/defeat, etc)*

(5) Given assumptions about organised violence:		
15. How are **the susceptibility of different populations**, their key sources of food, and main livelihoods likely to change?	16. How are **key food sources and livelihoods likely to be impacted** by changes in PIPs, including those of armed actors?	17. How is organised violence likely to interact with the **resilience of different populations**, including the transformation of any assets into liabilities or changes in seasonality, such as the timing of a lean period?
Susceptibility of exposed locations/pathways for key food source – what interactions with organised violence, differences across livelihoods/social groups/etc	*Conflict-related policy changes (movement restrictions, livelihood bans/restrictions, taxes, shutting off electricity/financial services, etc)*	*Asset to liability (livestock, high-value cash crop area, safety net programme, etc)* *Shift in livelihoods/coping strategies leading to different lean period* *Multi-sector coping and trade-offs with food security (water collection over food collection, prioritizing conflict avoidance or defence over livelihoods, sale of food sources, etc)*

CONCLUSION: Projection Classification - Given assumptions about organised violence, exposure, and susceptibility		
How is the **availability** of food impacted by organised violence now?	How is **access** to food impacted by organised violence now?	How is the **utilisation** of food impacted by organised violence now?
Review exposure, susceptibility *Interactions of production/import of key food sources and organised violence* *Where, how, for whom any major changes in food availability*	*Review exposure, susceptibility, availability* *Interactions of production/import of key food sources, other livelihoods, and organised violence* *Where, how, for whom any major changes in food access*	*Review exposure, susceptibility, including cooking fuel, safe water* *Where, how, for whom any major changes in food utilisation*