# IPC

**IPC** **I**ntegrated **F**ood **S**ecurity **P**hase **C**lassification
*Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions*

# IPC CONFLICT ANALYSIS REFERENCE DOCUMENT

## Supplementary Information for the IPC Conflict Analysis Guidance Note

### October 2024

## WHAT DOES THE IPC TECHNICAL MANUAL V3.1 SAY ABOUT CONFLICT ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT IPC ANALYSIS?

Conflict analysis is an essential component of IPC analysis. The IPC Technical Manual v3.1 includes multiple references to conflict, including in the Conceptual Framework (p.11), as a Key Driver of Food Insecurity and an aggravating factor (p. 41 and p. 59), and as an impediment to humanitarian assistance (p.63).

## WHAT DOES THIS RESOURCE ADD TO THE MANUAL?

This document provides guidance on how to conduct conflict analysis within the context of IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis. It provides detailed information for use at Technical Working Group level, focusing specifically on the food security and nutritional impacts of conflict. It should be of particular interest for lead and co-lead analysis facilitators.

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## CONTACTS

For queries or to request for support contact the IPC Global Support Unit at info@ipcinfo.org.

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# 1. Key parameters of conflict analysis

## Resource use

Analysis of conflict and its interactions with food security is critical for timely and effective early warning.

This document serves as a supplement to the Conflict Analysis Guidance Note, which represents the formal technical guidance and analytical tool for application in IPC Analysis.

The present publication, referred to the Reference Document, expands upon the contents of the Guidance Note, providing additional detail which may be of interest for developing conflict analysis. The Reference Document should not be considered as a standalone resource.

This Reference Document is intended to support IPC Technical Working Groups (TWG) and Analysis Teams (AT) in conducting conflict analysis and integrating it into broader IPC analysis. It offers additional information on conflict analysis across the IPC analysis cycle, including on: when conflict analysis is needed, who conducts this analysis, how to conduct it, and how to incorporate conflict analysis into IPC communication products.

It is intended for senior IPC practitioners, including IPC facilitators, co-facilitators, and analysis group leads. Secondary audiences may include conflict analysts interested in understanding how the IPC incorporates conflict analysis. It is intended for use in IPC trainings, in-depth analysis within Famine reviews, ad hoc support by GSU and IPC Global Partners to national and other IPC analyses.

IPC analysis workshop participants do not need to read this entire Reference Document to be able to meaningfully contribute to conflict analysis within IPC analysis. This document is intended as a reference tool, and users should feel free to read sections only as and when necessary.

The "Workshop Participant Overview and Tool" section covers the most important information for general IPC participants, including Level 1 Acute Food Insecurity Analysts. Workshop participants should jump to that section now, though engaging with the wider Reference Document will also be helpful.

**Table 1: Finding the right section of the reference document**

| Audience | Role in IPC Analysis | Key Sections | Expectations |
|---|---|---|---|
| **IPC Practitioners** | Participant (Level 1) | • Overview and Tool for Workshop Participants | Able to use/contribute to use of tool |
| | **Resource Person / Analysis Group Lead** (Level 2) | • Introduction<br>• Analytical Sections (5-7) | Able to lead Analysis Group in use of tool |
| | Facilitator (Level 3) | • All Sections | Able to facilitate conflict analysis and its integration into IPC analysis |
| **Conflict Analysts*** | Thematic Resource | • Introduction<br>• Skim Analytical Sections (5-7) for Key Questions and Working Definitions<br>• Impact of Organised Violence on Food Security | Able to support IPC practitioners in conducting conflict analysis and integrating it into IPC analysis |

*IPC practitioners and conflict analysts may overlap. This suggests key sections for conflict analysts that may not be an IPC analyst.

## Introduction

Armed conflict and other organized violence were a major cause of life-threatening food insecurity in most of the world's hunger hotspots by the end of 2023.[i] They have also been one of the main causes of famine risk and occurrence in the last 20 years, leading or contributing to nearly all of the 15 activations of the IPC Famine Review Committee since its creation in 2014. Every classified famine since IPC's launch in 2004 has been heavily driven or entirely caused by conflict, including Somalia in 2011,[ii] Nigeria in 2016,[iii] and South Sudan in 2017[iv] and 2020.[v] Conflict is one of the most important hazards considered in IPC analysis globally.

The purpose of conflict analysis within IPC is to support the process of classification for current and projected acute food insecurity. This requires the integration of conflict analysis into acute food insecurity analysis instead of stand-alone analysis of conflict. Rather than a comprehensive conflict analysis guide, this resource covers key aspects of conflict analysis and how it may be connected to broader acute food insecurity analysis. It may also support acute malnutrition and chronic food insecurity analysis, though this document does not address these topics in detail.

All IPC Acute Food Insecurity analyses use the IPC Food Security Analytical Framework. The framework relates contributing factors, including causal factors and impacts on food security, to food security outcomes. Contributing factor analysis involves determining how causal factors, including hazards – acute events or ongoing conditions – and a population's vulnerability and resilience in relation to specific hazards, may be interacting to impact food security.

In line with the IPC Food Security Analytical Framework, conflict analysis to support IPC analysis requires two main parts that largely fall under contributing factor analysis:

1. Analysis of conflict (Hazard analysis)

2. Analysis of the interactions of conflict with food security

    a. Population vulnerability to conflict

    b. Impact of conflict on food security dimensions

Beginning with analysis of conflict as a hazard can support identification of the degree to which a population is exposed and susceptible to conflict as observed in each place and time. Conflict may take many forms and vulnerability to it may look different across contexts and over time. A population may be vulnerable to one situation of conflict based on political or social identity, while in another situation that same population may be more resilient because of that same identity. A strong hazard analysis, followed by consideration of population vulnerability, can then be used to assess impact across the food security dimensions and ultimately support classification of acute food insecurity.

**Figure 1: IPC Food Security Analytical Framework and links to conflict analysis**



## What does IPC mean by conflict?

Conflict refers to a situation involving the armed and organized use of violence.[1] Armed refers to the use of weapons and organized refers to action by a group beyond a single event. Groups using armed violence, or armed actors, are highly diverse across contexts and the full definition used for them is covered under the section "Analysing the Conflict Landscape". They may range from the most local militia or self-defense group to criminal groups to rebels and state militaries – or a blend of several types. No type of armed actor is automatically more important than another for conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. Organized violence is used in the rest of this document, though it always refers to armed organized violence.

Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must consider active conflict as well as the risk of conflict to inform the current classification and projection of acute food insecurity. Active conflict includes organized violence that is ongoing or frequently occurring. Analysing conflict risk often involves consideration of latent conflict, which is a situation where little to no active organized violence is occurring, but the root causes of organized violence remain or worsen, making organized violence likely in the future. While conflict analysis in IPC may most commonly focus on active conflict, the forward-looking nature of IPC projection analysis requires that consideration is also given to how a situation may evolve and organized violence may begin, end, restart, increase or decrease, and spread or contract in coverage over time.

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[1] "Violence refers to the intentional or unintentional use of force whether physical or psychological, threatened or actual, against an individual, oneself, or against a group of people, a community, or a government." See See UNDRR and ISC. *Hazard Information Profiles – Supplement to UNDRR-ISC Hazard Definition and Classification Review – Technical Report*. (New York City: UNDR and ISC, 2021).

Together, this requires analysis of how past, present, and future organized violence, as well as other violent and non-violent events related to conflict, are impacting or will most likely impact food security. This means that conflict analysis will often need to consider organized violence even if it is not happening in a given area at the time of an IPC analysis, as well as other related events, potentially including but not limited to political events and processes like coups, civil unrest, elections, peace negotiations, and constitutional changes that may impact ongoing conflict or the risk of conflict.

Ultimately, conflict analysis that supports IPC acute food insecurity analysis is concerned with the risk and use of organized violence and its current as well as most likely humanitarian consequences. IPC uses this definition of a hazard and its impact irrespective of how conflict, armed or otherwise, is formally defined in other settings and frameworks, like International Humanitarian Law (IHL). While essential to consider in analysis of the hazard, there are no inclusion criteria for a situation based on the degree of organisation or level of intensity observed. Armed conflict under IHL falls within the IPC definition of conflict, alongside many situations that may not meet the IHL definition of conflict or similar definitions.

While there is broad agreement on a general definition of conflict,[vi] challenges to humanitarian analysis occur when there are differing interpretations of what is and is not violent or armed conflict and, based on this, which situations should even be considered or eligible for conflict analysis by humanitarian and other organisations.[2] These interpretations can vary widely by individual, organisation, and context, leading to disagreements and costly delays in analysis, or no analysis at all, including within IPC.

The IPC recognizes that organized violence may take many forms and that all forms have the potential to cause, worsen, and sustain acute food insecurity, including famine, as well as acute malnutrition and chronic food insecurity. This document deliberately does not offer a conflict typology and strongly encourages IPC practitioners not to attempt to categorize conflict and then make assumptions about its key characteristics and likely impact based on that categorization. Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis is about analysis of a broadly defined hazard – the occurrence or risk of organized violence as an event or sustained situation – and its humanitarian consequences rather than any formal classification of a situation as an armed conflict or a specific type of conflict. Consideration of organized violence – however it manifests – as a hazard enables analysis of its actual and potential impact on food security.[3]

This view of conflict includes organized violence committed by criminal groups, though not necessarily all generalized criminality. While the actions of an armed actor like a gang may involve organized violence capable of causing, sustaining, or intensifying humanitarian consequences like acute food insecurity,[vii] any given violent criminal act like an assault or homicide committed by an individual or as a spontaneous group in a one-off event are not covered by this document. This does not mean that crime or one-off events do not or cannot cause, sustain, and intensify food insecurity – they can – but these issues are not included in this document.

IPC also recognizes that many armed actors cannot be categorized as purely criminal or purely non-criminal and strongly recommends that IPC practitioners not attempt to categorize armed actors as exclusively one or the other, nor is this a requirement of conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. Many armed actors engage in a wide range of illicit activities to generate revenue, even if they have broader strategic goals beyond only this revenue generation. Many seemingly criminal groups also engage in organized violence more commonly associated with rebellion, like sustained anti-state violence.[viii]

Although there are no precise boundaries between general criminality, especially when frequent and violent, and a criminal group consistently using organized violence in a way that meets the conflict definition used in this document some general indicators focused on when criminal groups directly, violently, and consistently challenge state authority may be used when deciding what may require some level of conflict analysis. These may include the exercise of some degree of control over territory by a criminal group, particularly at the exclusion of formal state authorities, recurrent battles with state security forces, recurrent targeting of state authorities including politicians and other civil servants as well as state infrastructure and symbols, like police stations and courts, and public displays of violence readily attributed to the criminal group.  IPC acknowledges that criminality impacts food security in diverse ways and that conflict analysis may sometimes be a useful analytical perspective and sometimes not.

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[2]  In general, conflict can be defined as a situation in which two or more actors hold incompatible views or goals. This situation may or may not involve violence and some level of conflict is unavoidable in society.

[3]  In IPC analysis, trauma-related deaths, including those resulting from violence, are not considered as direct evidence for phase classification. Trauma-related mortality may be used in other aspects of IPC analysis, such as contributing factors and vulnerability.

**Figure 2: Organized Violence and Food Security in Haiti, 2022**

For the first time since the adoption of IPC in Haiti in 2013, a classification of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was made for a small portion of the population in September 2022. Concentrated in the neighbourhood of Cité Soleil in the capital, Port-au-Prince, this extreme food insecurity was heavily driven by organized violence.[x] Armed actors generally referred to as gangs gained control of significant territory, including most of Port-au-Prince, several major highways, and for several months in the latter half of 2022, the country's main oil terminal. Conflict analysis that focused only on certain forms of organized violence – like a recognized civil war – would have failed to appropriately consider the impact that organized violence was having on food security.[xi]

This Reference Document and the Guidance Note may also support analysis of civil unrest, including events like riots and demonstrations, especially as they relate to a situation of organized violence.[4] Armed actors may initiate, collaborate with, or otherwise participate in events like riots and protests within a wider conflict that involves organized violence. However, this will not necessarily address all forms of civil unrest and their impact on food security. While civil unrest is a common feature of conflict situations, and may involve sporadic or limited organized violence, there are forms of civil unrest that do not meet the IPC definition of conflict. While all civil unrest may be a hazard warranting analysis under the IPC Food Security Analytical Framework, this guidance is not intended to fully address this hazard, especially when not directly linked to active conflict.[xii]

As in Figure 2, IHL-defined armed conflict falls within the definition of organized violence, alongside a broader range of situations that may not meet this definition, but still involve the sustained use of organized use violence in a way that can cause, sustain, and intensify acute food insecurity, including famine. Organized violence and armed conflict may also overlap with civil unrest, such as when an armed actor initiates, collaborates with, or otherwise becomes involved in events like protests and riots, but civil unrest may also be completely separate from organized violence and armed conflict. Similarly, sporadic and apparently unorganized violence, though important to consider as a hazard in general, is considered beyond the scope of this document, though it may still be useful in considering this issue. The dashed lines of each circle signify the real-world lack of exact boundaries between these categories that IPC practitioners may encounter.

Organized violence may also be direct or indirect, which are both capable of causing or contributing to acute food

**Figure 3: The Relationship Among Definitions of Armed Conflict, Organised Violence, and Civil Unrest in IPC**



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
4   Under the Sendai Framework, the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the International Science Council (ISC) define  as a hazard that may include "limited political violence (such as acts of terrorism, individual assassinations, etc), sporadic violent collective action (such as riots), or nonviolent and mildly violent collective action (such as protests, demonstrations, etc.) – all of which tend to take place in times of peace". Civil unrest also commonly occurs within conflict, as well. The hazard profile used for conflict only includes IHL definitions of conflict and so is not adopted for this guidance. See UNDRR and ISC. *Hazard Information Profiles – Supplement to UNDRR-ISC Hazard Definition and Classification Review – Technical Report*. (New York City: UNDR and ISC, 2021).

**insecurity.** For IPC, direct violence includes the use of violence against people, assets, and activities and the impact of this usage, while indirect violence includes perceptions of the risk of violence, including resulting from acts and threats of organized violence. These perceptions may come from armed actor presence without direct violence, past usage of violence, and other origins, causing civilians to change their behaviour without any or additional direct violence. When needed, such as for deeper analysis of the root causes of food insecurity, indirect violence can also extend to structural violence, or when harm is caused through social structures and institutions rather than a direct violence committed by a readily identifiable actor.[xiii] Analysis of structural violence is more relevant for chronic food insecurity analysis than acute food insecurity analysis, however.

**Pathways between organized violence and food insecurity may not always be highly visible, linear, and immediately legible to outsiders.** While a pathway may sometimes involve the widespread, systematic destruction of livelihoods, such as burning standing crops and destroying irrigation systems, it may also – or instead – involve less visible actions and impacts, like disrupted supply chains, mass forced labour, and systematic taxation by armed actors. There may also be long delays between the use of organized violence and its full impact on food security, including due to seasonality. In these ways, organized violence can act as both shock and stressor, with the mechanisms of impact and humanitarian consequences shifting over time and space.[5] Food insecurity may also cause or exacerbate conflict,[xiv] such as when exclusive control of resources is contributing to food insecurity.[xv]

**A key reason that pathways may be hard to identify or go overlooked entirely is the role of dominant narratives in conflict analysis.** Narratives – the story or collection of stories told to explain events and processes – can become a frame through which new information is interpreted or even made to fit.[xvi] While narratives can be helpful to develop through analysis, they can also become entrenched, or dominant, and make the incorporation of contradictory information difficult. Dominant narratives can end up substituting for new analysis, which presents serious risks to IPC analysis and famine early warning generally.[xvii]

**Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis does not automatically follow any dominant narratives, but instead considers organized violence and its humanitarian consequences based on available evidence.** Dominant narratives may be thematic, such as that certain forms of organized violence always impact food insecurity more than other forms regardless of the intensity and scope of the organized violence actually occurring. They may also be specific to a given context, such as a narrative about how organized violence in a given location does not involve any form of politics and is so localized and long-running as to not be worth analysis, even within IPC. While some narratives can be helpful in supporting analysis, any narrative can be revised or even invalidated with new information and analysis. More detail on biases and mitigation can be found in the "Special Considerations" section of this document.

IPC also recognizes that conflict analysis is a critical input for activities across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, or Triple Nexus. Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis should contribute to and draw on conflict analysis that supports these activities, including through overlap with the context analysis needed for the full spectrum of conflict sensitivity and protection. While intended primarily to support analysis of acute food insecurity, this Reference Document may also support analysis of the root causes of acute malnutrition and chronic food insecurity.

Although this document continues to use the terms conflict and organized violence, they refer to the same hazard. In general, this Reference Document maintains the definitions of key terms found in Annex 3: Glossary of the IPC Manual Version 3.1. Where needed, some key definitions are provided in footnotes throughout.

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[5]  Elaborating on the definition of shocks in IPC manual 3.1, **shocks** are external short-term deviations from long-term trends that have substantial negative effects on people's current state of well-being, level of assets, livelihoods, or safety, or their ability to withstand future shocks. **Stressors** are long-term trends or pressures that undermine the stability of a system and increase vulnerability within it. See Choularton, R. et al, *Measuring Shocks and Stressors as Part of Resilience Measurement*. (Rome: Food Security Information Network, September 2015). https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/paragraphs/documents/FSIN_TechnicalSeries_5.pdf.

> **Figure 4: Famine Likely in South Sudan, 2020 - Dominant Narratives Inhibited Famine Early Warning**
>
> A Famine Likely event was classified by the IPC Famine Review Committee for a sub-area of one county in South Sudan's Jonglei State in late 2020. This classification came after an approximately eight-month period of organised violence over an area the size of Ireland or Sierra Leone that did not directly involve any of the signatories to the country's recent national peace agreement, including government security forces and the main recognized rebel groups in the country, as principal belligerents.[xviii] Yet at its height, as many as 17,000 fighters may have been directly engaged in organised violence, including in operations demonstrating significant capacity.[xix]
>
> The situation was most commonly analysed in terms of whether it constituted armed conflict and consequently whether it should be considered political violence. It was frequently labelled intercommunal or communal violence,[xx] tribal violence,[xxi] and cattle raiding,[xxii] despite the seeming absence of mass cattle seizure during some of the largest operations undertaken and clear inter-ethnic cooperation in the perpetration of some of the highest intensity and largest scale organised violence. These labels led many humanitarian and other actors to conclude that the humanitarian consequences of this organised violence were likely to be less severe than if another type of conflict was occurring, such as national-level civil war. The result was a complete lack of Famine early warning for what was likely the first Famine event since 2017, when a Famine was declared through in-country IPC analysis for another area in South Sudan.

## When to conduct conflict analysis in IPC

The decision to include – or not – conflict analysis as part of an IPC analysis should be evidence-based, documented, and based on technical consensus. Determining if conflict analysis is needed to support IPC analysis will likely require at least some preliminary analysis discussion within a TWG prior to an analysis workshop. TWGs must consider if organized violence is or could reasonably become a driver of acute food insecurity in any units of analysis for a potential or planned analysis workshop. IPC does not use any quantitative thresholds – such as battle-related deaths – for triggering conflict analysis.[6] The process of determining whether to include conflict analysis can begin by using the following general questions:

*Analysis of organized violence within the country*

### Current period

- Has organized violence been a driver of acute food insecurity historically, such as in the last five years?
- Is organized violence a driver of acute food insecurity now, at the time of analysis?

### Projection period

- Could organized violence reasonably become a driver of acute food insecurity in the short to mid-term future, such as in the next year?

### Updates

- Have any assumptions in the most recent IPC projection analysis available regarding organized violence within the country being analysed been invalidated to the extent that the severity of acute food insecurity has likely changed for any unit of analysis?
  - This includes not having made any assumption about organized violence, but it is now a relevant hazard, and potential positive or negative changes in the severity of acute food insecurity.

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[6] This is not done due to the varied definitions of conflict and organised violence used across common conflict event data providers, the risk of gaps in conflict event data, including precise fatality counts, especially soon after events occur, and the risk of excluding situations lacking robust and frequent public reporting on fatalities or other quantifiable aspects of conflict, including due to limited media coverage in inaccessible areas. High and/or sustained fatalities are also not necessary for organised violence, and a wider situation of conflict, to negatively impact food security.

**Figure 5: Organized Violence and Critical Supply Chains – Black Sea Region Agricultural Exports**

The onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in early 2022 led to a sharp reduction in the export of grain and edible oil from the Black Sea region, contributing to sharp rise in the global prices of these commodities. Countries reliant on grain and edible oil imports from Russia and Ukraine consequently saw domestic prices rise, creating or worsening a major challenge to food access. The Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) and a related agreement fostered the renewed export of Ukrainian and Russian agricultural commodities for about one year until the BSGI was suspended as of July 2023. IPC analysis in countries around the world, in attempting to analyse domestic market dynamics, had to consider Black Sea region agricultural exports. This meant analysing issues like the continued functionality of the BSGI, which required some level of analysis of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, even if the country that was the focus of an IPC analysis was far removed from the Black Sea region.[xxiii]

*Analysis of organized violence <u>outside</u> the country: cross-border spread and critical supply chains*

Current period

- Is organized violence and its humanitarian consequences in a different country spreading to the country being analysed?

- Examples: Spread of active conflict, refugee arrival, negative economic impact

- Is there organized violence along an international supply chain critical for food security and livelihoods within the country being analysed?

  ○ Examples: Conflict within a country supplying a large part of the analysed country's cereals

Projection period

- Is there a reasonable chance that organized violence and its humanitarian consequences in a different country could spread to the country being analysed?

  ○ Examples: Spread of active conflict, refugee arrival, negative economic impact

- Is there a reasonable chance that organized violence could start along an international supply chain critical for food security and livelihoods in the short to mid-term future?

  ○ Examples: Conflict within country supplying a large part of analysed country's cereals

Updates

- Have any assumptions in the most recent IPC projection analysis available regarding organized violence internationally been invalidated to the extent that the severity of acute food insecurity has likely changed for any unit of analysis within the country being analysed?

  ○ This includes not having made any assumption about organized violence, but it is now a relevant hazard, and potential positive or negative changes in the severity of acute food insecurity.

When attempting to answer these questions for organized violence within the country being analysed, it can be helpful to consider organized violence at different levels, including in its geographic scope and objectives.[xviii] It may be national, subnational, or local. Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis considers organized violence at any level to be a hazard that may require analysis. Organized violence at any level can cause, sustain, and contribute to acute food insecurity, including famine. Levels may or may not correspond with the units of analysis selected by a TWG for an analysis workshop. These levels are not mutually exclusive and may overlap. The end or pause of conflict at one level may not automatically mean the end or pause of another. In some cases, a pause or cessation at one level may contribute to the initiation of a new conflict at the same or a different level now that resources can be reallocated. Annex III offers full definitions and examples for organized violence at the national, subnational, and local levels.

Addressing these questions is likely to require at least some preliminary answers to Key Questions 1-3 under the section Analysing the Conflict Landscape. TWGs and Analysis Teams (AT) are recommended to consider these questions during the planning stage of a potential analysis workshop. Conflict landscape questions may apply to organized violence within and outside of the country being analysed.

When considering the possibility of IPC updates due to the invalidation of assumptions related to organized violence, this generally involves the invalidation of an assumption to the extent that the severity of acute food insecurity would likely change if new analysis was undertaken. This can apply to cases where assumptions were made about the frequency, intensity, or scope of organized violence increasing, remaining the same, or decreasing. For example, if an AT assumed an increase in organized violence and this was part of the basis for a higher phase classification, but then this did not occur, they may need to update analysis that showed higher-phase AFI based on that assumption. Whenever assumptions are invalidated, even if an update is not triggered, a TWG and AT in a subsequent analysis workshop should work to understand how and why previous assumptions did not hold and what needs to be done differently.

If any of these guiding questions are answered positively, even for only a limited geographic area, then the TWG should take steps to include conflict analysis as part of their IPC analysis.

Conflict analysis needs to be included at every stage of the analysis cycle, including planning, preparation, analysis and communication, and learning (IPC Manual 3.1, pg. 16). Throughout the analysis cycle, TWGs and ATs must maintain a conflict sensitive approach, including in data collection, analysis, and communication. The first goal of conflict analysis in IPC is to fully adhere to Do No Harm principles and take all needed measures to ensure that conflict analysis does not negatively impact individuals, organizations, and the wider situation.

Plan

- **Assess the need for conflict analysis:** The TWG should consider recent IPC analyses it has conducted and determine if organized violence is relevant to their context, including any assumptions and risk factors used in the most recent IPC analysis conducted.

  ○ If organized violence is generally relevant, or there is a possibility that it may become so, then the TWG should add conflict analysis to their annual planning and other work plans, including identification, rostering, and invitation of expertise, data collection and collation of secondary sources, additional support for analysis workshops such as from GSU, and inclusion in learning activities.

  ○ As needed, the TWG should review its composition and ensure that the needed expertise is available for workshop preparation and participation.

- **Ensure availability of data related to conflict and its humanitarian consequences:** In a context where organized violence is already a recognized hazard, a TWG should ensure all plans for data collection and analysis outside of analysis workshops incorporates organized violence. Any plans for real-time monitoring outside of analysis workshops and large-scale household surveys should include attention to organized violence and conflict-sensitive approaches.

  ○ Draw on ongoing conflict analysis, including any previous work of the TWG and TWG member organizations

- **Maintain conflict sensitivity throughout the analysis cycle:** If the TWG will conduct conflict analysis in support of an upcoming analysis workshop, or sees this as likely to occur, it should review its approach to maintaining conflict sensitivity throughout the analysis cycle, including in data collection, engagement of external analysts, conduct of the analysis workshop, and communication of conflict analysis. The TWG may need to request support from conflict sensitivity specialists and should consider this in its planning.

Prepare

- **Prepare for conflict analysis within IPC analysis:** If conflict analysis is needed, a TWG must take the below actions.

  ○ **Evaluate potential sensitivities:** The TWG must review how conflict analysis may be seen as sensitive by all involved actors within a planned workshop, including how conflict analysis can realistically be discussed within the workshop and key biases that may need to be addressed, including as found in TWG and workshop composition.

- ○ **Prepare mitigation measures as feasible:** The TWG should prepare to mitigate the sensitivities identified, such as through the use of anonymization tools for providing input or reaching consensus. Request any needed external support in advance, including on how to maintain conflict sensitivity throughout this process. More detail on these issues can be found in the section "Special Considerations for Conflict Analysis".

- ○ **Identify and engage supporting analysts:** The TWG must find analysts that can support the preparation as well as analysis and communication stages and invite them to support a TWGs conflict analysis preparation. These analysts may already be engaged in conflict analysis for other purposes, like security or conflict sensitivity.

- ○ **Ensure the collection of any needed primary data and gathering of secondary sources** to enable conflict analysis. This may include additions to existing data collection tools, such as household survey or rapid assessment questionnaires, expert and other consultations, and desk review. Further detail on this is provided in Annex 1.

- • **If the TWG has conducted conflict analysis previously, the most recently available analysis should be reviewed and updated as needed.** Where relevant, conflict analysis should continually build on previous and ongoing analysis over successive workshops rather than being a one-off exercise only considered within single analysis workshops and then abandoned.

- ○ If real-time monitoring of conflict and other data collection related to conflict have occurred, the TWG should ensure this data is summarized and available in an accessible format.

- ○ If assumptions and/or risk factors related to conflict were set in the last analysis, these must be compared against actual events in the period after the last analysis. This comparison should be summarized and made available in an accessible format for upcoming workshop participants. Additional detail on setting and tracking assumptions and risk factors can be in the section "Conflict Analysis to Support IPC Projections".

## Analyse and Communicate

- • **Enable Conflict Analysis within the Analysis Workshop:** The TWG and AT should ensure that experts and other analysts have the time, space, and support to conduct conflict analysis during the analysis workshop, making use of this Reference Document and other resources as needed.

- • **Integrate Conflict Analysis into Acute Food Insecurity Analysis:** The TWG and AT should ensure that this conflict analysis is integrated into broader acute food insecurity analysis across all units of analysis for which it is a relevant hazard.

- • **Communicate Conflict Analysis As Needed:** The TWG and AT should communicate the findings of its conflict analysis as needed within the communication brief, potentially including greater detail for units of analysis where organized violence is causing more severe food insecurity. Communication should explicitly include any key assumptions made about organized violence, whether positive or negative. Additional detail can be found in the "Communication of Conflict Analysis" section.

## Learn

- • **Incorporate Conflict Analysis into Learning Activities:** When conflict analysis has been conducted, including at the planning, preparation, and analysis and communication stages, the TWG should ensure that conflict analysis is included in all learning activities, including:

- ○ Discuss conflict analysis in the mandatory Self-assessment Tool at the end of each analysis workshop involving conflict analysis.

- ○ Consider conflict analysis in any lessons learned exercises held after an analysis workshop.

It is much more effective and efficient to synthesize ongoing, in-depth analysis of conflict for use in IPC analysis than it is to conduct a new conflict analysis for each IPC analysis. If a TWG or AT begins conflict analysis only once an analysis workshop has begun, it is unlikely that they will have the needed expertise, data, and time to properly conduct conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. This will hinder the completeness and quality of a TWGs and/or AT's conflict analysis and communication of that element of the wider IPC analysis. Conflict analysis, like other forms of analysis, is best treated as an iterative and ongoing process conducted at some level throughout the entire analysis cycle, with in-depth exploration within IPC workshops of conflict-affected areas of concern for acute food insecurity.

Figure 6 visualizes how conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis can draw on the ongoing conflict analysis that humanitarian and other organizations, including TWG members, routinely undertake to meet conflict sensitivity, safety and security, and other operational needs. An IPC TWG should identify what conflict analysis is ongoing in their context, especially within TWG member organizations, and take this as their starting point for conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. TWGs and ATs can then focus on identifying gaps in this ongoing analysis and on integrating it into broader IPC analysis.

TWGs should also continue to engage with this ongoing analysis, and conduct their own real-time monitoring of conflict, to ensure they are prepared to incorporate robust conflict analysis into IPC analysis and to determine if an IPC update is required, such as through identification of previously identified risk factor that has occurred.

**Figure 6: Links between IPC analysis and conflict analysis**



It is essential to ensure that at least some IPC Technical Working Group member staff, or the relevant staff of participating organisations, are tasked with collecting the data and updating the analysis needed for IPC conflict analysis outside of analysis workshops. While "quick and dirty" analyses may be achievable within a single analysis workshop, they may not lead to substantive outputs and contribute little to broader IPC analysis.[xix]

Conflict analysis should be conducted for any unit of analysis where organized violence is a hazard or potential hazard. In some analysis contexts, multiple forms of organized violence may be occurring simultaneously across wide geographic areas, while in another context it may be geographically concentrated and occurring at one level. Generally, conflict analysis should begin with a broad understanding across a TWG and AT, such as an overall view of organized violence at its highest level, and then work down to lower levels as applicable by individual analysts or workshop analysis groups, such as for subnational or local areas of concern for acute food insecurity.

The depth and breadth of additional analysis should correspond to the severity of current, previously projected, or potential acute food insecurity. Conflict analysis would be expected to be most detailed where food insecurity is already leading to the greatest loss of life or presents the highest risk of significant loss of life – including Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), Famine (IPC Phase 5), and Risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) – and conflict is a key driver.

This analysis, as guided by the questions below, is intended to be iterative. IPC analysts are strongly encouraged to engage with each question and address them to the best of their ability and the available evidence, but to accept that it may not be possible or necessary to exhaustively answer each question. The analysis process may involve moving between sections, comparing answers across questions, and looking for patterns and contradictions. This further underlines the need to document the discussions around conflict analysis in good detail.

TWGs may also decide to conduct analysis of the root causes of acute food insecurity, chronic food insecurity, or acute malnutrition. Where organized violence has been identified as a driver of acute food insecurity, a TWG should also incorporate conflict analysis into their deeper root causes analysis. More in-depth conflict analysis may seek to answer the guiding questions of this Reference Document more comprehensively than for a typical IPC analysis workshop. It may also make greater use of supplementary material included here, including the annexes.

## Who conducts conflict analysis to support IPC analysis

All TWGs should consider if organized violence is a hazard relevant to their context when initially forming a TWG or reviewing TWG composition under Function 1. Tool 1: Composition Matrix for the Analysis Team should be used to help TWGs identify available analysts with the needed expertise (IPC Manual 3.1 p.27).

TWGs should map the capacities in conflict analysis of their member organizations, including at different levels within those organizations. This may include the identification of different teams or functional roles that exist in these organizations that engage in conflict analysis in some form and may have staff able to support the TWG in different ways.

TWGs should also map available resources and capacity in conflict analysis in non-TWG member organizations. These resources and capacities may include staff able to directly contribute to conflict analysis in preparation for or during an analysis workshop, staff that can provide briefings or reviews of TWG conflict analysis, and organizations that can share data, analysis, and research related to conflict.

TWGs are strongly encouraged to maintain an updated roster of analysts skilled in conflict analysis regardless of whether these individuals become regular analysis workshop participants. Some analysts may be more familiar with specific areas or armed actors, and this should be considered when establishing an expert roster.

TWGs should consider the perspectives and potential biases of their own members and the analysts skilled in conflict analysis that may support IPC and ensure a diversity of backgrounds, opinions, and approaches among the expert support sought out to the extent feasible. This is one of the most important mitigation measures against highly biased conflict analysis that can be taken early in the process and revisited whenever needed. As a conflict situation evolves, so too may individual and organizational biases.

To the extent possible, conflict analysis is best supported by skilled and experienced analysts. Analysts skilled in conflict analysis may be dedicated conflict analysts, more general context analysts, or not currently be full-time analytical staff but have relevant experience. Their knowledge may be based on broad professional experience, their own lived experience, or may be highly specific to a given conflict. They may be humanitarian or non-humanitarian staff, and may have a variety of professional backgrounds, including food security, nutrition, protection, security, conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding, and other specialties. These staff may come from different levels of TWG member organizations or other organizations, including area/field offices, country offices, regional offices, and headquarters.

TWGs and ATs should view conflict analysis as an opportunity in localization and recognize that staff from the context in which IPC is being conducted are likely the best placed to support conflict analysis. This is particularly true if those staff have professionally engaged with conflict analysis previously. However, the feasibility of different forms of participation must be carefully reviewed and planned for by a TWG, in line with the "Special Considerations" section.

However, TWGs must remember that all conflict analysis in a context should not be solely the responsibility of 1-2 "experts". All TWG and AT members have a role to play in conflict analysis, despite not necessarily specializing in conflict. Leaving all conflict analysis to one or a few individuals with the label "expert" will likely lead to stand-alone conflict analysis that does not meaningfully support broader IPC analysis.

There is a high degree of overlap between conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis and the context analysis done to support conflict sensitive programming and protection, including across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. The expertise a TWG draws on may include practitioners from organisations and programming across this nexus. However, this expertise is not always available. Where necessary, additional support from IPC partner agencies and the Global Support Unit should be sought. Where possible, partner agencies and the GSU will provide additional expertise as available.

Not having analysts considered "experts" should not on its own prevent efforts to conduct and utilize conflict analysis, even if only to a limited extent. When analysts skilled in conflict analysis are unavailable, a TWG should delegate conflict analysis to the next best analysts available within the TWG or AT, including TWG members or other potential IPC analysis participants. TWGs should consider which of their members or other analysis workshop participants have experience in conflict analysis as well as those with the greatest general contextual knowledge for units of analysis affected by organized violence.

TWGs must also consider the sensitivities of conflict analysis, which may lead to some analysts declining to support a TWG or participate openly in an IPC analysis workshop. Similarly, conflict analysis may generate unique challenges for the analysis lead and co-facilitators. There are many factors that determine if analysts and facilitators feel safe and able to openly contribute to an IPC analysis workshop and TWGs must account for this when trying to identify and engage with analysts skilled in conflict analysis.

## Special considerations for conflict analysis in IPC

Conflict sensitivity, particularly Do No Harm, is a fundamental component of all IPC analysis, including analysis of conflict. Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must not cause harm, including to participating individuals and organisations as well as for a wider conflict situation.

There is potential for significant bias and potential risks to individuals and organisations conducting conflict analysis in support of IPC analysis. These are sensitivities which may not be encountered in other aspects of IPC analysis, and which need to be handled with care.

In some contexts, conflict analysis may be conducted in a free and open manner, but in others, it may need to be conducted under resistance to any such analysis. This section describes some of the possible risks and biases as well as potential safeguards, but other issues may occur. Governance issues, including the chairing of TWGs and the number of participating agencies required to conduct IPC in a country, is covered in the IPC Manual and additional GSU support is also available.

### *Personal and Organizational Risks*

TWGs and lead facilitators must first consider personal dignity and well-being as well as the safety, operational, and reputational risks for participating organisations. The personal dignity and well-being of all individuals involved in an entire cycle of IPC activities must always be ensured. An individual may participate in an IPC workshop without necessarily conducting or contributing to conflict analysis. IPC TWG members, particularly facilitators, must be aware that there are many possible reasons that an IPC analyst may decline to participate in conflict analysis.

Individuals may feel at-risk contributing information or analysis related to conflict in some contexts, depending on factors including but not limited to nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, geographic origins, and professional background. This may be especially true where government or other non-humanitarian actors chair a TWG. It may also depend on the general composition of a given workshop and the background of analysts attending, rather than only staff holding senior TWG positions.

Detailed discussion of organized violence and its humanitarian consequences can also be difficult due to the traumatic nature of the events and outcomes. Participating individuals may be directly affected by the dynamics being discussed, which may involve them as individuals, family members, or members of a wider community with which they identify. Other participating individuals may have personal experience of similar issues from another context.

Participants may react to the issues being discussed within conflict analysis in a variety of ways, some of which may negatively impact other participants. Some analysts may cope through humour, including 'dark' or 'gallows' humour. This form of coping can cause offense. No participant should openly make light of the issues being discussed.

Conversely, participants may attempt to remain emotionally detached by using highly technical language, which can be misconstrued as not appreciating the gravity of what is being discussed. Where one analyst may refer to a set of events as insignificant, another analyst may see the label of insignificant as trivializing organized violence and its humanitarian consequences.

TWG leadership and facilitators must remain aware of these issues and become familiar with workshop participants and how conflict is and is not discussed in each context. Conflict analysis must also remain completely voluntary. No individual can be compelled to participate in conflict analysis in IPC.

### *Identifying Bias*

Bias can be a significant obstacle to effectively conducting conflict analysis, including within IPC. Bias may be personal or organizational. In this context, bias does not refer only to perceptions of motives and actions of the parties to violence, but also the tendency to adhere to received assumptions about conflict itself.

Examples of bias may include, but are not limited to:

- **Making a moral or ethical judgment about an actor's actions:** An armed party may be perceived as morally good or bad, and consequently assumed to be having a positive or negative impact on populations in their area of operation.

- **Relying on stereotypes or assumptions about a group:** An ethnic or other group may be stereotyped as 'raiders' or 'troublemakers,' implying that they are necessarily administering, rather than recipients of, acts of violence and less vulnerable to organized violence themselves.

- **Prioritizing working relationships over evidence and analysis:** Systemic power imbalances mean that organisations with dependent relationships with government, UN, and other institutions may feel unable to publicly disagree with these actors, and any narratives they promote, without compromising their current and future ability to operate, including through access, funding, and permissible types of programming.

- **Limiting analysis participation because of organizational status:** A humanitarian organisation may have deep understanding of local context, but may feel exposed in the political context, and therefore perceive commenting on organized violence as a direct risk to the organisation and its staff.

While these biases cannot be fully eliminated, they can be mitigated. While a perfectly unbiased analysis is not possible, TWGs should work to ensure that minimum representation of a range of key perspectives is included. In analysis workshops, mitigating bias is first the responsibility of lead facilitators. Workshop facilitators, however, are not immune to bias themselves. Careful consideration should be given to how different potential facilitators may view the situation and be perceived by workshop participants.

### *Safeguards for Conflict Analysis*

Options for safeguarding staff and organisations while ensuring that their views are incorporated include:

- To the extent possible, sources of evidence to be used in conflict analysis for IPC should be third-party and public If concerns emerge about sourcing data and data protection during conflict analysis, especially for data which can be plausibly traced back to its source, the TWG should consult with protection leads within their organisations and the Protection Cluster. If additional support on protecting data sources is needed, an IPC TWG should request this support. For details of open-source information on conflict analysis, see Annex 1.

- Prior to a workshop, TWGs can collect data and analytical input from individuals and organisations that are unable or unwilling to contribute publicly, including within an IPC workshop. This may involve identifying trusted members of the TWG to handle outreach. After assessing submitted data for reliability, the TWG can identify the source of this evidence and other inputs as the TWG itself.

- During a workshop, analysis of sensitive issues may need to be passed through TWG member organisations with the most protected political status. In some cases, this may be United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes, rather than non-governmental organisations. In other situations, this may involve foreigners – or just certain nationalities – speaking on sensitive issues rather than host-country nationals or nationalities perceived as partisan or sympathetic to one of the parties to organized violence in that context.

- Mechanisms for anonymous input during a workshop may be used to protect staff and organizational identity while allowing for substantive participation. To the extent possible, any issue that may arise should be anticipated, and advance discussions undertaken to plan out how to deal with such issues as they arise. The IPC Analysis Platform includes a feature that allows participants to provide anonymous feedback on any issue to facilitators. Online platforms like Mentimeter can also be used for this purpose.

**Utilize additional data protection measures as needed:** When planning and preparing for an IPC analysis where conflict analysis will be included or is likely to be included, TWGs and ATs should consult staff with data protection expertise in their organizations to review existing measures and determine if any additional actions may be needed for safeguarding individuals and organisations. These additional measures could include a dedicated data protection assessment that informs a risk mitigation plan as well as more specific actions like the use of secure messaging services like Signal. TWGs and ATs may already have some key measures in place, like the deidentification of all data from household surveys and other assessments but should review the implementation of these measures to ensure they are fully adhered to. All or nearly all personally identifiable information, even from public sources, is not typically needed in conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. The collection, retention, and use of personally identifiable information should be avoided to the greatest extent feasible in context and done only in relation to genuine analytical needs for humanitarian purposes. When used, anonymization protocols should be maintained.

**More generally, some actors may incorrectly assert that any form of conflict analysis is 'not IPC' and therefore beyond the scope of what an IPC analysis can or should consider.** Although completely inaccurate, this may be raised by a specific individual or organisation and may be a consequence of wider discourse in a country, such as denial that any conflict or organized violence exists or is a "problem".[xx] No individual or single TWG member organization has a veto over any form of analysis in IPC, including for any specific hazard.

This issue must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Escalation out of the TWG should not be the first reaction to this. If it can be resolved within the TWG, it should be. Discussions on what is (and what is not) within the purview of the IPC may begin by noting that IPC analysis considers all hazards relevant to a context and does not single out any one hazard over others. It should be emphasized that conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis is not about making any values-based judgement related to organized violence and its impacts, including assigning blame or assessing accountability for any individuals or groups: the focus is on the food security impacts of organized violence.

TWGs, facilitators, and analysts are also encouraged to avoid terminology that overlaps with other frameworks and areas of work that may unintentionally generate confusion or foster greater resistance to conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. This may include terms like "armed conflict" and "combatant," which have specific legal definitions in other settings. For the hazard or a wider situation around the hazard, "organized violence" and "conflict" are preferred, while for an individual directly using organized violence, "fighter" is preferred. Questions regarding which situations rise to the level of armed conflict or which individuals are acting as combatants are beyond the mandate of the IPC.

# 2. Hazard analysis (current)

This section uses a series of key questions to help analysts consider organized violence as a hazard, including some of its key characteristics, to support development of a shared understanding of the hazard before analysing its current and likely impact on food security.

This section assumes that broader contextual information is known by the TWG and/or AT, including livelihood zones and broader knowledge of the national food system, administrative units and major aspects of topography, population distribution and settlement patterns, major infrastructure, seasonality, and other key topics or thematic areas outside of but necessary for the analysis of conflict. Analysis of these and similar topics are largely outside the scope of this document.

**Figure 7: Links between IPC analysis and conflict analysis**

## Key questions 1-3: analysing the conflict landscape

Key Questions 1-3 are purely for conflict analysis and help to establish a consensus understanding of organized violence in a context. This is mainly for analysts that focus on conflict, though all IPC analysts are encouraged to become familiar with these questions and basic answers to them for their context, as well as to review them and identify any gaps in or points of disagreement with analysis done by others.

Outcomes from 1-3 include:

1. A consensus understanding of the key actors involved in organized violence and some basic characteristics of those actors.

2. A consensus understanding of the geographic areas and groups affected by organized violence.

3. Information needed to enable a discussion of organized violence in context.

Key Questions 1-3: profiling armed actors and the scope of organized violence

Analysts must identify and develop a basic profile of key armed actors and some of their important characteristics, including:

- Official names and/or consensus designations to enable discussion

- Positions and interests

- Key elements of their capacity to use organized violence

- The geographic areas where they operate or exercise some degree of control over territory and/or population and the main populations they interact with

This profile will be built on throughout the key questions covered in each section of the Guidance Note and the current document, including any patterns in an armed actor's forms and targeting of organized violence as well as in their interactions with civilian mobility and humanitarian programming.

Analysts must also develop a shared understanding of the geographic, social, and temporal scope of organized violence, including where armed actors exercise some degree of control over territory and/or population.

Using the Key Questions 4-7 on the forms and targeting of violence as well as the interaction of organized violence with civilian mobility and humanitarian programming, analysts can also build on this basic profile of key armed actors by adding analysis of patterns of armed actor activity.

Which actors are using organized violence?

- Armed actors use organized violence in pursuit of issues connected to political and economic power. In this context, power may refer to control over one or more of the following:

  o Territory

  o People

  o Economic and natural resources, including humanitarian assistance

   ◦ Political systems, institutions, and related resources.

While the use of organized violence is a necessary activity for inclusion as an armed actor, it is not the only tool these actors use to contest, gain, and exercise political authority. Many non-violent tools are also likely to be used.

- Political authority does not apply only to the national political context. If organized violence is used to contest control of resources at any geographic or administrative level, it is political. The lack of direct involvement of a state armed actor, such as the national army, does not make organized violence any less political.[7]

- The main inclusion criteria for armed actors in conflict analysis is the use of organized violence: the inclusion of an actor is contingent on evidence of their activities, rather than on how the situation or the actor(s) are categorized (state security forces, militia, criminal group, etc.).

   ◦ While it may be helpful to distinguish between state and non-state armed actors, analysts should treat this as a spectrum rather than two fully distinct categories. Organized violence also remains a hazard worth analysing even if an identified conflict only involves non-state armed actors. See Figure 6 and Table 2 for one example of the spectrum of armed actor relationships with a state, considering the degree to which armed actor and state positions and interests align, the degree of control a state has over an armed actor if any, and the actual activity of a state and an armed actor.

   ◦ Rather than attempting to fit all armed actors into a specific category, analysts should consider how different armed actors may operate along this spectrum, with their actions aligning with different categories over time as the context changes.

   ◦ Analysts should also note that nominally non-state armed actors may also undertake state-like roles and functions as they exercise control over territory and population.

**Figure 8: A State/Non-State Spectrum for Armed Actors**



**A State/Non-State Spectrum for Armed Actors**

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
[7] This broad and flexible definition of armed actors uses key elements from the definition given by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, though also builds on it. ACLED, (2023). "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook."

## Table 2: Armed actor categories

| Category | Definition |
|---|---|
| **State Security Services (Eg military, intelligence, law enforcement)** | Armed actor recognized by a state as its own security services, primarily funded by and obedient to entities of that state |
| **Paramilitary** | Armed actor fully or heavily funded by and obedient to entities of that state and recognized by that state as linked to its security services |
| **Proxy[8]** | Armed actor supported by a state (or other sponsor) in exchange for sup-porting the sponsor's objectives, including with violence; may lack public recognition |
| **Affiliated** | Armed actor informally linked to state, though degree of state support and obedience to that state may vary |
| **Cooperating** | Armed actor largely without concrete links to state, such as material support, but cooperating with achievement of a state's objectives, including with vio-lence |
| **Tolerated** | Armed actor not sharing objectives with state, but generally no violence be-tween the armed actor and the state |
| **Competing** | Armed actor competing with state for pursuit of same objectives, such as resource control, though without consistent, direct, violent challenge to state authority |
| **Challenging** | Armed actor consistently, directly, and violently challenges state authority in pursuit of anti-state objectives |

- Analysts should ensure that the identification of armed actors includes a consensus way of talking about each armed actor, including what to call it, without violating the communications section of the Guidance Note. It is important that every analyst knows which group is being referred to by other analysts throughout an analysis cycle. Labels for armed actors may use a name that the armed actor has given itself or a more general term like a reference to an administrative area or topographic feature relevant to the group. There are likely to be sensitivities surrounding names, however, and TWGs should review how states and de facto authorities name different armed actors before discussing armed actor names openly in an analysis workshop.

- Armed actors may also show different degrees of unity and coherence internally. What appears to be a single armed actor may function as multiple armed actors due to a variety of factors, including challenges in controlling key personnel, an intentionally decentralized organizational structure, or internal disagreement. Analysts may need to consider if some parts of an armed actor are acting independently and need to be considered as a distinct armed actor.

- Armed actors may also cooperate in different ways, some of which may change the unit of analysis for profiling. Armed actors may merge together to form one new organization, collectively form an umbrella group but retain some independence, form an alliance or coalition where they work towards the same overarching goals but remain fully independent organisations, and cooperate or collude without any formal arrangements. Analysts may take a grouping of armed actors as the unit of analysis for armed actor profiling if needed.

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[8]  **Sponsor-proxy relationships** can be defined "as informal collaborative arrangements between asymmetrically capable parties, in which one party (the sponsor) utilizes another party (the proxy) to reach its strategic goals in exchange for tangible assistance. The types of assistance provided by the sponsor and  the exact services rendered by the proxy differ from case to  case, but the sponsor's assistance typically includes a combination of the following: provision of weapons and equipment; financial assistance; training; intelligence; operational planning; the provision of a safe haven; political cover; or some combination thereof. The proxy's services usually comprise a combination of the  following: fighting a common adversary; collecting intelligence; patrolling and holding rear areas; and/or exerting governance on behalf of the sponsor." Moghadam, A., & Wyss, M. (2020). The political power of proxies: Why nonstate actors use local surrogates. *International Security*, 44(4), 119-157.

**Figure 9: Armed Actor Fragmentation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Implications for Food Security**

In the Lake Chad Basin, and particularly in northeast Nigeria, the armed actor that launched a rural insurgency that began using organized violence against Nigerian security forces and the civilian population fragmented several times. After over a decade of conflict, at least three distinct armed actors are known to have formally broken away from the original armed actor, *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna Li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad* (JASDJ, commonly referred to as JAS). Breakaway groups, including Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), *Jama'at Ansaril Muslimin fi Bilad as-Sudan*, commonly known as Ansaru, and a group often referred to as the Bakura Faction, have all utilized different tactics, typically occupied different territory, and achieved widely varying degrees of success in conflict with each other and government security forces. Humanitarian and other actors often refer to all these groups as Boko Haram, a common nickname for JASDJ. This over-aggregation of armed actors leads to simplified and often incorrect conflict analysis, given the many differences across these armed actors, including in the forms of violence they most commonly use, the territory they have controlled, and the way they interacted with the food system.[xxviii]

Profiling of each distinct armed actor in a context may not be needed. Analysts will likely need to review which armed actors need profiling and how in-depth profiling of each needs to be several times as they work their way through the key questions.

- Analysts may need to prioritize the most important armed actors, including those most commonly engaged in organized violence, engaging in the organized violence that appears to be the most impactful on food security, and armed actors engaged in organized violence with the largest scope. There may be other ways of prioritizing armed actors profiling, such as by profiling all armed actors within a geographic area of concern for high levels of acute food insecurity. This prioritization may also apply to situations with unclear armed actor structure or independence, adding difficulty to the process of determining what counts as a distinct armed actor for conflict analysis.

- This may include situations involving large numbers of armed actors, including some contexts where there may be from dozens to hundreds, an exhaustive profiling is likely neither needed nor possible. Identifying these situations is important on its own, as a high number of armed actors can make conflicts less likely to end through negotiation and involve higher levels of civilian targeting.

Analysts should also develop at least a basic understanding of the capacity of each armed actor to use organized violence. Capacity refers to the ability of an armed actor to use organized violence to achieve strategic goals and tactical objectives. While capacity also includes the use of other means to achieve goals, the main focus here is on the use of organized violence. Capacity involves many attributes that can be assessed separately. While a comprehensive analysis of armed actor capacity is neither necessary nor likely possible within IPC analysis, a basic understanding of capacity is needed to understand the most likely impact of organized violence on food security. Analysis of capacity is particularly important when making assumptions for projections, as what an armed actor will do is constrained by what it is capable of doing. Annex X provides additional detail regarding armed actor capacity to use organized violence.

Some key elements of capacity may include:

- The approximate size of the armed actor, at least by order of magnitude (tens, hundreds, thousands of personnel)

- The broad types of weapons used by the armed actor, including if it has access to any heavy weapons

- The operational reach of the armed actor, including if it has access to means of transportation other than walking sufficient for its size

- Key sources of weapons and supplies, including third-parties that provide direct material support

Analysts must also consider armed actor capacity in relation to other armed actors, rather than in isolation. An armed actor's ability to achieve its goals depends more on its capacity relative to the armed actors it is in conflict with than just that armed actor's capacity alone.

### What is the purpose of the organized violence?

Armed actor profiles should include the purpose of organized violence from the perspective of all the armed actors using it, beginning with the most active armed actors.

Analysis of purpose is important for two reasons:

- Purpose may inform tactics, including forms and targeting of violence.

- Understanding purpose is essential for scenario-building and making assumptions about an armed actor's most likely behaviour within a projection period.

For example, an armed actor that primarily seeks to control a revenue source, like taxation of a major transportation corridor, may use organized violence differently than an armed actor that seeks to establish its authority throughout the entirety of that same territory and over the population within it.

Purpose covers positions and interests:

- Consider the position, or claimed goals, of an armed actor. What goal or goals do they claim to be pursuing through organized violence?

  ○ This may include open-source information from publicly available sources such as government and other armed actor publications, media reports, social media, and specialist analysis of the conflict (see Annex for details of common data sources).

  ○ Positions may reflect domestic or international goals, including if the armed actor has any kind of transnational affiliation with a broader group or if it supports the objectives of a different actor, such as due to being a proxy of another actor.

- Compared stated goals to analysis of armed actor **interests, or inferred goals**. These are armed actor goals determined through analysis of what is achieved or made possible through the use and threat of organized violence by each group. These goals may align or differ from an armed actor's stated goals. Armed actor goals may also change over time.

  ○ What are the consequences so far of the organized violence being used? What is actually happening as a result – politically, socially, economically, environmentally – of the organized violence being used by each armed actor? Is organized violence being used in a way that is consistent with an armed actor's stated goals or potentially with other goals?

  ○ Where data is available, local population perceptions of armed actors and their stated goals, and how these populations view armed actor interests, is vital to include in this analysis.

  ○ Interests may reflect domestic or international goals, including if the armed actor has any kind of transnational affiliation with a broader group or if it supports the objectives of a different actor, such as due to being a proxy of another actor.

- Consider the geographic ambition of stated and inferred goals: do these goals relate to the entire country, such as national government, or a more limited area?

For each armed actor identified under Key Question 1, analysts should identify at least one position and at least one

interest. While these may be the same or overlap, they often diverge.

*What is the scope of the organized violence?*

There are four categories of scope to consider: geographic, social, temporal, and armed actor control.

**Geographic scope** includes the administrative units and geographic areas where organized violence is occurring as well as having indirect impact. Geographic scope also includes livelihood zones and the natural environment.

**Social scope** refers to the social groups involved in organized violence, including those most impacted.

Possible social groups to consider include but are not limited to:

- Kinship-based ties, such as a system of clans and their sub-groups.

- Religious affiliation, including those linked to different sects or denominations or specific religious institutions.

- Livelihoods as a component of identity, such as pastoralism, agriculture, waged labour, market traders, etc.

**Seasonality is best defined by the population living in the areas being analysed,** including for the names and number of seasons as well as the activities and hazards associated with different seasons and other time periods. As analysis

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**Figure 10: Common Misconceptions about the Seasonality of Organised Violence**

In some contexts, it is commonly assumed that organized violence increases in the driest parts of the year and decreases in the wettest parts of the year, largely for logistical reasons. Yet evidence often does not always support this assumption. From 2014 through 2018, recorded ceasefire violations in South Sudan most commonly occurred in June, or during what would typically be part of the main rainy season.  Across East Africa, including Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, the seasonality of organized violence has historically diverged across armed actors operating at different levels of organized violence. In one analysis, organized violence involving armed actors categorized as rebel increased during drier periods, while organized violence involving armed actors considered communal increased during wetter periods from 1997 through 2009.[xxxii] Across Africa and South Asia, numerous studies have found increases in organized violence during harvest and post-harvest periods, especially when harvests are considered good.  However, in Syria, organised violence to destroy or capture agriculture increased most during growing periods.[xxxiv]

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of the Sahel has shown, assumptions of two seasons – dry and rainy – and their relationship the seasonality of acute malnutrition and organized violence are often incorrect and likely obscuring important aspects of the context.

Armed actor control refers to geographic areas where each armed actor profiled has some degree of control over any territory and/or population.[9] Areas of control should be defined by the most applicable area, which may not neatly correspond with administrative units. Control should be considered by degree, rather than only control or no control. Although no typology of armed actor control is prescribed here, analysts may find it useful to use categorical designations for control, such as high, medium, and low. Analysts may also find it helpful to identify attack zones, or areas where an armed actor frequently uses

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[9]  The International Committee of the Red Cross reports, using a comparable definition of armed groups, "As of July 2022, a total of at least 175 million people are estimated to live in areas controlled by armed groups. 64 million of those live in areas that are fully controlled by armed groups and 111 million live in areas that are contested or fluidly controlled by armed groups." See Bamber-Zyrd, M., "ICRC engagement with armed groups in 2022," International Committee of the Red Cross, 12 January 2023, https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2023/01/12/icrc-engagement-armed-groups-2022/#_ftn3.

organized violence, even if they do not exert any meaningful degree of control there. If a deeper analysis of armed actor control is needed, see Annex 5 for a summary of an analytical framework to support this analysis.

## Key questions 4-7: analysing the use of organized violence

Key Questions 4-7 focus on the use of organized violence, including its forms and targeting, as well as interactions between organized violence and civilian mobility and humanitarian programming. Impact on civilian mobility and humanitarian programming are key inputs for analysis of population vulnerability and the impact of conflict across the food security dimensions. Analysts that work primarily on conflict as well as IPC analysts generally are encouraged to make use of this section.

Outcomes from this set of questions include:

- A consensus understanding of the forms and targeting of organized violence, including identifying any key patterns by armed actors or geographic areas.

- An understanding of the impact of organized violence on civilian mobility and humanitarian programming.

Analysts should incorporate identified patterns in the form and targeting of organized violence and how this interacts with civilian mobility and humanitarian assistance into armed actor profiles.

### *What forms of organized violence are being used by different armed actors?*

Forms refer to the ways in which organized violence is used. Forms may also be thought of as tools of violence. Forms may differ widely among armed actors and for any given armed actor over space and time.

Common forms include, but are not limited to:

- Armed clashes or battles between the fighters of two or more armed actors[10]

- Raids[11]

- Explosions/Remote Violence,[12] which may take many forms, including:

  - Different forms of indirect fire,[13] including explosive attacks by artillery on land, such as shelling from light weapons

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[10]  **Battle** refers to a violent interaction between two or more armed actors at a particular time and location. A violent interaction is considered as "an exchange of armed force, or the use of armed force at close distance, between armed groups capable of inflicting harm upon the opposing side". The definition of battles borrows from but does not fully use the ACLED definition, while the definition of a violent interaction is ACLED's definition verbatim. ACLED, (2023). "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook."

[11]  **Raids** involve the use of violence for a mobile attack on one or more distinct sites, such as villages, for asset-stripping, property destruction, and inflicting fighter and/or civilian casualties. Raids are not intended to achieve a lasting change in control of territory, though they may support this aim in degrading another armed actor's capacity. As a single tool of violence, the scale, intensity, and degree of civilian targeting varies widely across raids. Some raids may conclude after several hours while others may involve the establishment of a temporary staging area and a series of raids over a period of weeks before the departure of attacking forces.

[12]  **Explosions/Remote Violence** refers to "incidents in which one side uses weapon types that, by their nature, are at range and widely destructive. The weapons used in 'Explosions/Remote violence' events are explosive devices, including but not limited to: bombs, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), artillery fire or shelling, missile attacks, air or drone strikes, and other widely destructive heavy weapons or chemical weapons.". This is the event definition of ACLED. See ACLED, (2023). "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook."

[13]  **Direct fire** typically occurs when a "target is within line of sight, and the weapon can be aimed directly at the target." Indirect fire is "most commonly employed when the target is not within line of sight" or "when the target is visible from the weapon system, but where the direct 'vision link' between the operator and target is not used for aiming." See Dullum, Ove S. et al, *Indirect Fire: A technical analysis of the employment, accuracy, and effects of indirect-fire artillery weapons*, ed. N.R. Jenzen-Jones. Perth: Armament Research Services, 2017.

[14]  **Small arms** can be considered here as firearms operated by an individual, including handguns, rifles, and light machine guns. **Light weapons** can be considered here as weapons designed for use by a crew like heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres". *International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons* (New York City: United Nations, 8 December 2005). https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Firearms/ITI.pdf.

[15]  **Heavy weapons** can be considered as those too large or heavy for operation by one or several individuals on foot, including heavy mortars and towed or self-propelled artillery. See Jenzen-Jones, N.R. (ed.), The ARES Glossary, Version 1.1. (Perth: Armament Research Services (ARES). www.armamentresearch.com/ARCS.

or heavy weapons,[14] and strikes by manned and unmanned aircraft as well as ships and boats.

- The use of remotely activated or victim-activated explosives like mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of any kind.

- Killings, whether discriminate or indiscriminate, from singular to mass

- Sexual and gender-based violence[16]

- Sieges/blockades

- Sieges are covered in detail in the mobility section, while a blockage of movement may be considered at many different spatial scales, from a checkpoint on a forest path to the besiegement of a large urban area

These are only some of many possible examples, however. Any form can be used in different ways. In some situations, violent interactions between armed actors may be common. In others, they may be rare, as armed actors seek to avoid or collaborate with each other.

Analysis of the forms of organized violence should consider the claims of organized violence and its impact made by armed actors compared to available evidence. These may diverge for a range of reasons.

Analysts should try to identify patterns and trends in the forms of violence used by specific armed actors or in specific areas. Patterns and trends can help to identify more severe impact on food security as well as triangulate information regarding armed actor involvement in different events or areas. Analysts should not exclude non-lethal violence, as there are many forms of violence that may be used as armed actors seek to establish and exercise control over territory and population.

Additional detail on establishing a pattern of forms of violence for an armed actor can be found in Annex 6: Patterns of Violence. Some differentiating factors among the seemingly same form of violence include the weapons and tactics used, some aspects of which are covered in Annex 4: Armed Actor Capacity to Use Organized Violence.

### *How is organized violence being targeted?*

Targeting refers to the choices made by armed actors regarding the people, places, and things, including the activities and assets civilians need to survive, to use organized violence against. Targeting may vary within an armed actor and among different armed actors, as well as over space and time. Targeting may also vary with the forms of organized violence used (see Key Question 4 above).

Gender and age must be considered throughout any analysis of the targeting of organized violence. Men, boys, women, and girls are likely to have both shared and divergent experiences of some elements of organized violence. This is particularly true in the context of sexual and gender-based violence. These issues should be considered here and will be revisited in the context of food security impact in Key Question 10 below.

Key considerations here may include:

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[16] The United Nations generally uses **conflict-related sexual violenc**e to refer to "rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict". The IPC maintains this view of sexual violence in conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis, though broadens the applicability from armed conflict to situations of organised violence. See Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Conflict-related Sexual Violence Report of the United Nations Secretary-General (New York City: United Nations, 6 July 2023). https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/SG-REPORT-2023SPREAD-1.pdf.

[17] **Military** here refers broadly to anything directly connected to armed actors, like their fighters and assets. Assets may include infrastructure like armed actor bases and camps as well as supplies like ammunition. In this instance, it refers to any type of armed actor, not only state armed actors. IPC fully recognizes that precise distinctions between military and civilian are not always possible or analytically necessary within IPC across contexts.

[18] **Civilian** here refers broadly to all targets not of a military nature. It includes civilians themselves, their property, and their activities, as well as other public property like infrastructure. IPC fully recognizes that precise distinctions between military and civilian are not always possible or analytically necessary within IPC across contexts.

- How is organized violence being used against military targets, if at all?[17]

- How is organized violence being used against civilian targets, if at all?[18]

  ◦ How is organized violence being targeted at civilian livelihoods, including activities and assets, if at all?[19]

  ◦ How is organized violence being targeted at humanitarian operations, including humanitarian movements, personnel and assets, if at all?

Establishing a distinction between what is civilian and what is military may be difficult in some contexts, especially when armed actors are deeply embedded in local communities and armed actor personnel regularly alternate between civilian and military activities, such as by season. Analysis of targeting does not always need to be highly precise to support IPC analysis. As described below, broad patterns of targeting in specific geographic areas can be enough for flagging a likely negative, or severely negative, impact of organized violence on food security.

Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis is especially concerned with food-related organized violence. This includes organized violence that occurs within key locations of a food system, where the goals of the organized violence involve control over key elements of or an entire food system, or that directly targets key components of a food system. This includes the targeting of the assets and activities involved in the delivery of humanitarian food assistance.

Analysis must consider if and how the assets and activities civilians use to survive are being targeted with organized violence, including assets and activities related to humanitarian assistance. This form of targeting can occur in several potentially overlapping ways, including:

- Removal of assets

  ◦ Example: Looting and asset-stripping,[20] such as the taking of grain from storage facilities or livestock from grazing areas

- Destruction of these assets[21]

  ◦ Example: Burning of standing crops, using explosive weapons on fishing boats, killing livestock

- Separation of civilians from these assets[22]

  ◦ Example: Sieges,[23] planting landmines in agricultural fields, threatening civilians with violence if they enter an area or engage in an activity, killing a farmer to keep a wider community away from agricultural land, forcibly displacing a population away from their assets and the locations of their typical livelihoods and coping activities

The direct targeting of household assets will often involve a household's physical assets, like shelter, agricultural tools, livestock, and other tangible assets essential for their livelihoods and survival, as well as natural assets, like fertile land,

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[19]  In this section, the main focus is on physical and natural assets, though analysts may find many different ways to consider all forms of assets when analysing the targeting of organized violence. In line with IPC manual 3.1, "in broad terms, assets are considered to be anything that is valuable or useful, such as a skill, a quality, a commodity, etc. (Chambers Compact Dictionary). In the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, assets are defined under the following five categories: Human: health and nutrition status; physical capacity; skills; level of education; etc. Social: household, gender, kinship and other networks; community groups; values and attitudes; etc. Financial: income; credit and loans; savings; liquid assets; etc. Physical: productive assets, such as tools and equipment; stores; housing; livestock; infrastructure; etc. Natural: land; water; forests; etc. (WFP. Food Security Assessment Learning Repository)."

[20]  **Looting** is typically considered the theft of property outside of armed conflict, while **pillage** is the theft of property within an armed conflict. The IPC uses **looting** to refer to the theft of property in a situation of organized violence generally, as pillage is a narrower action. **Asset-stripping** is looting conducted comprehensively and to an extreme extent, typically used in the context of food security analysis.

[21]  The asset may be destroyed or otherwise made useless. This may occur if an armed actor cannot easily remove the asset, such as standing crops that have not yet been harvested, if the armed actor lacks logistical capacity, such as the trucks or other vehicles needed to remove many assets at once, or if an armed actor has limited time, such as during a short raid or in the process of rapidly losing territory to another armed actor.

[22]  An asset may be made useless to a civilian population if access to the asset is denied, such as by preventing civilians from accessing their agricultural land, or if the civilian population is forcibly displaced away from the asset. While the asset may not be removed, damaged, or destroyed, it is no longer contributing to the food security of the owning or using household and their community.

[23]  Note that sieges are covered in detail in the mobility section.

forests, and surface or groundwater. These and other assets may also be targeted indirectly, such as through the targeting of infrastructure related to how a household could access or acquire other assets, like the targeting of the physical infrastructure of a financial system – bank offices, ATMs – or utility networks like electricity on which the financial system may depend. Any discussion of assets includes assets across actors – civilian households, public goods like roads and water systems, humanitarian programming like in-kind assistance and warehousing – and should be considered however needed in context.

While any degree of this kind of targeting would have consequences for food security, a pattern of systematic removal, destruction, and/or separation is of greatest concern. When organized violence is being used to target civilian livelihoods and coping capacity, as well as humanitarian programming, analysts should consider if this rises to the level of comprehensive livelihoods targeting.

Comprehensive livelihoods targeting can be considered as generally aligning with the following:

- Objective: Destruction and/or heavy suppression of major components of a food system within a geographic area and/or used by a specific social group, including humanitarian assistance.

- Primary Methods

  o Attempted or achieved asset-stripping; attempted or achieved removal or destruction of all productive and household assets regardless of the value to the perpetrator or the targeted population

  o Attempted or achieved prevention, inhibition, and otherwise rendering unfeasible of all livelihoods and coping strategies, including moderate to complete restrictions on movement for the targeted population related to markets, coping, and out-migration.

## How is organized violence interacting with civilian mobility?

Mobility is a critical intersection between organized violence and food security. Mobility is directly and indirectly impacted by organized violence, while almost all livelihoods and coping strategies require a degree of mobility, even if only over short distances.

Mobility is also often about perceptions of mobility, including how civilians view the costs and benefits of undertaking different forms of movement. The interactions of mobility and organized violence often vary by gender and age, particularly through the assignment of different livelihoods and coping strategies to different genders and age groups. The affected population is best placed to provide information regarding how they experience the interactions of organized violence and their own mobility.

Gender and age must be considered throughout any analysis of the interactions of organized violence and mobility. Men, boys, women, and girls are likely to have both shared and divergent experiences of some elements of organized violence. This is particularly true in the context of sexual and gender-based violence, including in how this affects mobility. This is covered in detail in the section "How is organized violence interacting with gender and age?".

Several key interactions between civilian mobility and organized violence are described below, although other interactions may be identified by analysts. This section focuses primarily on the forced movement and forced immobilization of civilian populations. Additional elements of mobility, like the use of checkpoints to control or extract revenue from civilian movement, are covered in later sections like Policies, Institutions, and Processes.

## Forced displacement: dispersion and concentration

Forced displacement may take many forms, including the destinations a population is forced to displace to and how this displacement may vary in distance and duration.

A population may be forced to displace to one or multiple locations, leading a displaced population that is dispersed or concentrated:

- **Dispersion:** Consider how civilians, such as of one social group, may be forced through the use and threat of organized

violence to leave an area through any available displacement route. This civilian population may become dispersed or scattered across multiple destinations, depending on the risks and opportunities identified by individuals and households.

- **Concentration:** Consider if there are situations or wider patterns of civilians, such as of one social group, being forced through the use and threat of organized violence to leave one area and concentrate in another area.

Forced displacement may also vary by distance and duration in different combinations, including micro-displacement and major displacement:

- **Micro-displacement:** This may involve short-distance, short-duration movement, potentially at high frequency, as displaced people expect or hope to quickly return to their area of habitual residence. Although sometimes challenging for monitoring systems to capture, it may result from some patterns in the forms and targeting of organized violence, especially where a major shift in armed actor control over territory and/or population does not occur. This form of displacement may allow civilians to remain near or often within their area of habitual residence. This may lead to reduced or minimal impacts on livelihoods if those are not also targeted by organized violence, while it may also severely disrupt their livelihoods and other activities needed for survival. Neither high nor low impact on food security can be assumed automatically.

- **Major displacement:** This may involve long-distance, long-duration displacement. The status of people experiencing this displacement may vary according to the displacement routes and destinations available to them and any social or other capital able to be leveraged on arrival. The provision of humanitarian food and other assistance at destination areas may heavily influence the impact of displacement on these populations. As with micro-displacement, neither high nor low impact on food security can be assumed automatically.

### Forced immobilization and sieges

- Consider if there are situations or wider patterns of forced civilian immobilization, where a population is forced to remain in place, potentially including restrictions on movement for even essential activities like accessing food, water, and medicine.

- A common form of forced immobilization is a siege, sometimes also referred to as besiegement or siege-like conditions. Definitions of these terms may vary widely in other contexts.

- Necessary elements of a siege include:

  ○ Armed actor control over entry and exit for a geographic area through the use and threat of organized violence, potentially in combination with the natural environment. An environmental factor may constrain or prevent civilian mobility, like a desert.

- Complete armed actor encirclement of a geographic area is not always required to achieve complete or near-complete immobilization of a civilian population.

- Encirclement by an armed actor does not require a literal circle of that armed actors' fighters and assets around an area. Different forms of violence may be used to ensure encirclement, including direct and indirect violence. Blocking civilian exit from a besieged area could involve the use of fortifications, like walls, static fighter presence, like at checkpoints, mobile fighter presence, including through patrols, indirect fire like shelling, such as of a main road, remote violence like landmines, such as in areas without a static armed actor presence, and killings of civilians who attempt exit, such as by snipers. Bureaucratic impediments may also be used, including clearance processes that become prohibitively expensive and deliberately confusing or impossible to complete.

- There is no urban requirement for a siege in IPC. This form of forced immobilization may be urban, peri-urban, or rural.

- For IPC, the most important considerations for determination of whether a siege exists are the degree to which:

  ○ Civilians are able to exit an area.

**Figure 11: Civilian Mobility in the Mozambican Civil War, 1977-1992**

In a study of the Mozambican civil war of 1977-1992, the wartime experiences of different groups within one rural district highlight how immobility, especially when forced, may indicate greater vulnerability and food insecurity than mobility. One study compared the strategies and outcomes for livelihoods and coping of migrant laborers, rural residents able to displace out of a drought-affected area in line with typical coping strategies, and rural residents within government-managed settlements. The study period included a severe drought in the area in the early 1980s. Those within the government-managed settlements faced the greatest restrictions on freedom of movement, including due to suspicion and organised violence from both government and rebel forces. As rural agriculture in the vicinity of these settlements became unviable, survival became increasingly difficult as resources became depleted and mobility was generally not possible.[xxxix]

- Food and other resources critical to survival, like water, are available and accessible within the area.

- Food and other resources critical to survival, like water, are able to enter the area.

As with all conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis, this analysis of permeability must place the perceptions and lived experience of the affected population at its center as data allows.

- Overall, this view of sieges means that rather than categorizing a situation as a siege or not a siege, analysts must consider the degree of permeability of a siege or possible siege. There may be complete and effective encirclement of an area and civilian population by an armed actor, but there may still be some level of civilian exit and resource entry, including food and other resources critical for survival. The degree of permeability can vary for different reasons, including:

  - **Armed Actor Interests:** Sieges can be used in pursuit of diverse interests, with some interests likely to increase permeability and others likely to decrease it. Beyond the taking of territory or the weakening or killing of a population, the permeability of a siege may be affected by other armed actor goals. These could include resource extraction, such as through selling goods like food to a besieged population at very high prices or in exchange for their other assets. A siege may also be permeable for civilian exit, but not food and other resource entry, if an armed actor is seeking to force the exit of another armed actor and/or civilians.

  - **Armed Actor Capacity:** Insufficient armed actor capacity may also raise the permeability of a siege, such as through an armed actor's inability to stop movement underground or by air or water even if they have blocked surface-level entry and exit on land.

**Table 3: Categories of siege permeability**

| Categorizing Siege Permeability – Civilian Exit and Resource Entry | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Permeability** | **Description** | **Example Indicators** |
| **High** | Frequent civilian exit and resource entry, including food. | Frequent humanitarian deliveries and/or commercial traffic. Large-scale smuggling, including civilian exit and resource entry, reported. Heightened food prices but no severe reductions in food availability. |
| **Moderate** | Partial civilian exit and/or resource en-try, including food. | Occasional humanitarian deliveries and/or commercial traffic. Smuggling activity, including civilian exit and/or resource entry, reported. Severely elevated food pric-es, but some food still available. |
| **Low to None** | Little to no civilian exit and resource entry, including food. | Lack of humanitarian deliveries and commercial traffic. No major smuggling operations known. Food availabil-ity may be greater limiting factor than access alone, including in markets. |

Analysts may need to consider categories of siege permeability. Three general categories are defined below, but this should be contextualized for each specific siege. Low to no permeability would have the greatest risk of severe or catastrophic food insecurity of these categories, all else equal.

- The risk and occurrence of a siege, and especially a siege long enough to severely raise the risk of severe or catastrophic food insecurity, often relates to several factors. These may include a failure to negotiate the exit of an armed actor from an area facing a risk of besiegement, like a city. It also requires that a more rapid military victory, like the seizure of an area by force, is attempted or has been attempted and failed to fully achieve its objectives.

- Sieges may also occur within each other, such as through the besiegement of a neighbourhood within a city that is also broadly under siege. Such micro-sieges are a frequent characteristic of organized violence in urban areas, especially when the besieging armed actor lacks the capacity to commit a very large number of fighters to the area relative to the size of the civilian population of that area. The permeability of these different micro-sieges within a broader besieged area may also vary. Analysts must always consider if there are multiple sieges ongoing at one time within a unit of analysis, as is likely to contribute to different levels of impact on food security across that unit of analysis.

- Sieges may involve varied levels of violence and may continue through pauses in direct violence like ceasefires or truces. The intensity of a siege may not always align with the intensity of direct violence observed.

### Distress migration

- For acute food insecurity analysis, distress migration may be considered as population movement undertaken as a coping strategy primarily to avoid death largely due to large food consumption gaps, malnutrition, and disease. While it may be a sign of a collapse in coping capacity, this is not always true.[xxii] Rapid, voluntary return is not typically expected. Distress migration may not involve active organized violence at the time of the movement, but it is not a fully voluntary choice as civilians are forced by extreme threats to survival to undertake this form of movement.

- Distress migration may occur in stages in some contexts, as populations seek to exhaust all locally available means of improving food access before undertaking longer and higher risk distress migration, such as to camps for displaced populations, urban centres, or other countries. Such primary and secondary distress migration can be viewed as similar to micro and major displacement.

- Consider if viable distress migration routes exist or will exist over projection periods. A complete lack of viable distress migration routes, all else being equal, raises the risk of famine compared to an alternative situation where at least one distress migration route is available to the affected population.

- Route viability only exists if the affected civilian population perceives a route as viable. A route with a perceived certain or near certain likelihood of death or other significant harm from organized violence or environmental factors – like a desert, extreme heat or cold, or deep water – for those seeking to engage in distress migration would generally not be considered viable even if it may appear so on a map to outsiders.

  ○ Route viability is likely to be strongly impacted by different elements of population vulnerability, including gender and age. Route viability may not apply to everyone within an affected population and analysts must consider how it may be different across social groups and demographics.

- While distress migration is typically a late or even final coping strategy as other strategies are exhausted, it may also be undertaken pre-emptively. Distress migration should be considered a likely, though not automatic, sign of coping collapse.

- Distress migration itself may also contribute to conflict, depending on factors like the food security status of the population in destination areas and the social scope of organized violence. Distress migration routes may also expose civilians to organized violence in many ways, including requiring travel between the areas of control of different armed actors or contested areas.

### How are organized violence and humanitarian programming interacting?

Analysts must consider two main interactions between organized violence and humanitarian programming:

- The impact of organized violence on humanitarian access, including for humanitarian assistance provision in food security, nutrition, health, and WASH.

- The impact of humanitarian programming on organized violence.

### Humanitarian Access

Conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis may consider the following operational definition of humanitarian access. Humanitarian access includes two groups of actors – humanitarian and civilian – and three components. Humanitarian actors and civilians must be able to enter an area, fully conduct and participate in all activities, and exit an area. Entry, activities, and exit are all necessary components of humanitarian access.

For each of these three components – entry, activities, exit – three dimensions must be considered for humanitarian actors and civilians. Both types of actors must be uninhibited, able to engage in all three components safely, and this must be sustained over time. Examples of these dimensions include:

- **Uninhibited:** Limited to no bureaucratic interference with humanitarian activities in an area.

- **Safe:** Humanitarian actors can enter an area, conduct their activities fully, and exit an area safely and without interference. Civilians face no risk of attack and/or theft of their received assistance when entering, engaging in an activity within, and exiting an area.

- **Sustained:** Humanitarian and civilian actors can enter an area, engage fully in humanitarian activities, and exit an area safely and without interference over time. If access is unstable or intermittent, then access is not sustained.

Analysts must also consider what enabling factors are needed for full humanitarian access and how these are impacted by organized violence. If escorts are needed, such as due to a requirement by some major humanitarian food assistance providers, but these escorts are regularly targeted by armed actors, then humanitarian access is likely to be severely diminished or completely unavailable. This may also be extended to civil unrest, which in different forms may also reduce humanitarian access even without direct armed actor involvement in civil unrest events.

There are ways that civilians may not benefit from humanitarian assistance as intended beyond the denial of humanitarian access. For example, to avoid condemnation or a suspension of humanitarian activities, armed actors may use tactics other than directly denying humanitarian access which can have negative consequences for civilian populations. This may include the use or threat of organized violence during a humanitarian activity, causing a humanitarian evacuation and abandonment of assistance being distributed, as well as taking the assistance provided from the civilian population after humanitarian actors have departed an area.

In such cases, humanitarian access has not been fully secured because of organized violence, even though humanitarian assistance may be reported as delivered. IPC would not consider this situation as involving full humanitarian access.

### Questions to consider include:

- How is organized violence, directly and indirectly, affecting the ability of humanitarian actors to enter an area, fully conduct their activities, and exit that area?

  ○ This includes different staff identities, such as foreign, same country but different area, or same country and same area, as well as contractual relationships, like staff or private contractors

- How is organized violence, directly and indirectly, affecting the ability of civilians to reach an area where humanitarian activities are occurring, fully engage in any activities, and exit that area with all assistance provided?

  o This should be considered against the social scope analysed under Key Question 3, including different social groups within an area and by gender and age

Analysts must also consider modalities not always requiring physical access to an area, such as the digital distribution of cash-based transfers. Different enabling factors for this form and delivery method for humanitarian food assistance need to be considered, including how organized violence interacts with telecommunications, electrical, and financial systems. The degree to which the digital delivery of humanitarian food assistance is feasible and likely to be achieved can in part be addressed with the analysis done in the subsections on the forms and targeting of violence as well as interactions of organized violence and Policies, Institutions, and Processes.

In cases where humanitarian access for data collection is limited or absent, TWGs and ATs should also consult IPC Resource 03: Guidance on evidence for IPC analysis of areas with limited or no access.

### The Impact of Humanitarian Programming on Organized Violence

More broadly, humanitarian programming may also interact with organized violence in diverse ways, including exacerbating or mitigating conflict. Humanitarian programming may negatively impact conflict in many ways, including when it is perceived as partial or not neutral and when armed actors actively exploit humanitarian programming for their own benefit, and

As with any resource in a conflict situation, humanitarian assistance may be instrumentalized by armed actors and used in pursuit of their positions and interests. Some of the ways that humanitarian programming may be exploited by armed actors include:

- Population control, such as through an armed actor requiring humanitarian assistance delivery only at locations where that armed actor wants to concentrate civilians

- Revenue generation, including directly through systematic theft, diversion, and taxation of humanitarian assistance, and indirectly, such as through selling or renting infrastructure like compounds and offices to humanitarian organizations

- Provisioning, or using humanitarian assistance to supply armed actor personnel through in-kind humanitarian assistance or the purchase of supplies from cash-based assistance

- Legitimation, or the use of interactions with humanitarian organizations to project a narrative of successful and externally recognized control and governance

Analysts must consider how humanitarian programming may be contributing to conflict, including through how the resources that programming provides factor into armed actor interests and capacity.

# 3. Vulnerability to organized violence and the impact of organized violence on food security (current and projected)

This section uses a series of key questions to help analysts consider how different populations may be vulnerable to organized violence, including through exposure, susceptibility, and resilience, as well as how organized violence is interacting with food systems overall. This part covers the current and projection periods.

Analysts may find it helpful to utilize a food systems perspective when connecting their understanding of organized violence to population vulnerability and impact across the food security dimensions. Utilizing a food systems perspective in conflict analysis includes applying a working understanding of organized violence to a broad understanding of a food system, or collection of sub-national food systems. In line with the IPC Food Security Analytical Framework, a food systems perspective can help bring together contextual knowledge, including livelihood zones, market systems, and other elements of a food system, with analysis of organized violence, to understand population vulnerability and impact on food security in a particular situation.

The High-level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition defines a food system as follows:

• A food system gathers all the elements (environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, etc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the output of these activities, including socio-economic and environmental outcomes.

Analysts should use the answers to previous questions to help assess impacts at the level of food systems, which be the national food system, including its international connections, or the segments of it relevant to specific units of analysis. Consider the direct impacts of organized violence, such as the destruction and looting of assets, as well as the indirect effects, such as armed actor taxation of different activities within any part of the food system.

## Key questions 8-10: the interactions of organized violence and food systems

Key Questions 8-10 cover how organized violence may interact with population vulnerability and impact the food security dimensions. Analysis in this step takes output from Key Questions 1-7 above as its main inputs.

After analysing conflict as a hazard, including profiling armed actors, considering the scope, forms, and targeting of organized violence, and analysing how organized violence is interacting with civilian mobility and humanitarian assistance, the vulnerability and/or resilience of different populations to conflict within the current conflict landscape must be analysed to allow for conclusions on the impact of organized violence on food security.

Outcomes from this part include:

• A consensus view of population exposure, susceptibility, and resilience to organized violence, including for key food sources and livelihoods across different population and geographic areas currently and in the projection period.

• A consensus understanding of the impact of organized violence on food systems, including through multi-sector coping, interactions with the Policies, Institutions, and Processes (PIPs) environment, differential impacts on civilians by gender and age, and spatial and temporal disconnects currently and in the projection period.

• Consensus understandings of the impact of organized violence across the food security dimensions currently and in the projection period.

*Looking at the situation broadly, how is organized violence interacting with the national food system, inside and outside of any areas of interest for IPC?*

As with any hazard, different populations may have different levels of vulnerability to organized violence, leading to varied impacts on food security. Civilian vulnerability may vary by livelihood, social or political group, and other factors. Even within the same unit of analysis, one segment of the population may be more vulnerable to organized violence from one armed actor while another part of the population may be more vulnerable to organized violence from a different armed actor. Analysts cannot automatically assume that vulnerability and resilience will look the same for all population groups and any conclusions on this must be evidence-backed.

Organized violence is also likely to bring costs and benefits to different actors within conflict over time, including across a food system. The benefits to some actors may even increase as food insecurity worsens, including the onset or intensification of famine.[xxiii] There may be zero-sum trade-offs, such as through the violent transfer of assets from one group to another. Organized violence by one armed actor may lead to severe humanitarian consequences, such as through changing control of a major trade route, followed by organized violence that mitigates these same humanitarian consequences as that trade route is violently reopened by another armed actor.

Organized violence that crosses international borders may also bring a range of positive and negative impacts for different populations as different economic opportunities are destroyed, created, and shifted from the control of one actor to another, including formal trade, illicit trade and smuggling, and others.

Armed actor interactions with a food system may include the use or threat of organized violence to prevent an activity, reduce the frequency or output of an activity, change the costs of an activity, or change or redirect the output of an activity. Analysts must review these interactions – and potentially other interactions – and consider the cumulative impact on civilians across the pillars of food security.

## Table 4: Armed actors and food system

| Armed Actor Interaction with a Food System | Example |
|---|---|
| **Prevention of activity** | Armed actor blocks roads into a market |
| **Reduction of activity** | Armed actor attacks prevent planting of staple crops |
| **Changing the costs of an activity** | Armed actor implements a tax on livestock herds |
| **Changing or redirecting activity output** | Armed actor forces planting of cash crops instead of staple crops in territory it controls |

The occurrence of organized violence or the presence of an armed actor are not sufficient reasons on their own to make classifications of severe food insecurity. Interactions between organized violence and a food system may be negative, positive, or not cause any major changes. Armed actors may not only damage a food system, such as by destroying standing crops or looting harvested crops, but also leverage or exploit the food system in other ways, such as through the regulation and taxation of agriculture.

Civilians and armed actors also both have basic needs, or things they need to survive. Armed actor members require access to food themselves. Even in situations where an armed actor has engaged in some degree of food-related violence and caused harm to a food system, analysts must consider how the armed actor itself is surviving and what this means for different civilian groups, including those living in areas under that armed actor's control.

How are different populations exposed to the hazard of organized violence?

Answers to questions from the section "Assessing the Conflict Landscape" and "Analysing the Use of Organized Violence," including geographic, temporal, and social scope as well as armed actor control, armed actor positions and interests, and common forms and targeting of organized violence should be considered against what is known about the livelihood and coping strategies and assets of different populations across units of analysis.

One way to begin – and simplify – this part of the analysis is to consider two broad categories of resources and locations that may help in linking population vulnerability and food security impact with analysis of organized violence. Where these categories overlap in space and time may be some of the most common and/or impactful interactions between organized violence and food security. These categories, which often overlap, include:

- **Calories** – the most important foods for a given population, including the locations and pathways needed for the main livelihood strategies that produce or enable access to these foods, as well as the processing, distribution, and storage of these foods and the resources required for these activities.

- **Control** – The resources and locations that enable an armed actor to operate and pursue its objectives, including relating to revenue generation, recruitment, mobility, defence, obtaining supplies, and ideological or symbolic purposes

Armed actors may seek to utilize these locations and resources for their own benefit or to deny their benefit to another armed actor, such as through asset removal or destruction, as well as challenges to mobility, like blocking roads or other major infrastructure. Through both mechanisms – armed actor utilization and denial – civilians may experience a negative impact on their food security.

## Calories

Analysts should consider which foods provide most calories for a population being analysed. This may be a limited range of cereals, pulses, and cooking oils in many contexts.[24] With a shortlist of these key foods, analysts should identify foods that are largely imports (including humanitarian food assistance), largely produced domestically, or are roughly mixed in origin. This list may include humanitarian food assistance when relevant.

For all key foods, analysts should identify the key locations and pathways by which this food is produced within or enters the country, undergoes any domestic processing and storage, and then reaches markets where a given population has access to it. This could include a point of entry into the country like an international land border crossing or port, an area of major agricultural production, key roads, processing facilities and warehousing, and markets relevant to the population of a given unit of analysis. This should also include the most important locations and pathways needed by the main livelihood strategies of a given population related to the production of these foods or that enable access to these foods.

**Figure 12: Pathways for accessing calories**



Figure 12 shows a highly simplified look at some of the possible locations and pathways to consider when looking at main sources of, and means of accessing, calories within a wider food system, including how they become available and accessible for populations in different areas.

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24  While calories are not the only aspect of food that matters for well-being, micronutrients and food preferences are not a major focus of IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis. IPC manual 3.1 notes "For IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis, the severity of the inadequacy of energy intake is key for classification and not necessarily the adequacy of the micronutrient intake, which is important for classifying chronic food insecurity.".

Control

The control category covers resources and locations relevant to the needs and interests of an armed actor. Control refers to efforts to gain or exercise control by an armed actor as well as to deny control to another armed actor. Armed actors may seek to establish or increase control over a resource or location, as well as damage, destroy, or block access to a resource or location.

Armed actors must meet the basic needs of their organization to continue operating or expand, including the basic needs of their fighters and other personnel, like food and water, and income for paying personnel and purchasing supplies. Resources and locations related to armed actor basic needs and revenue generation may include many of the same resources and locations under the calories category – like major agricultural areas – and a range of other commodities with high potential for revenue generation, like commercial or artisanal mines for high-value minerals and precious stones, oil and natural gas infrastructure, and key transportation corridors and nodes like major roads and ports.

Armed actors may also seek to control areas that enable their use of organized violence and/or constrain other armed actors, such as areas where they recruit many fighters and resources and areas that impact armed actor mobility, such as major roads and bridges or topographic features like hills and other elevated ground. Other areas and resources of strategic importance to armed actors may vary widely by armed actor and context, as well as over time, including sites of ideological and/or symbolic significance.

Analysis of this category requires at least a basic understanding of the conflict landscape, particularly where armed actors already operate or exert some level of control over territory and population as well as the interests of different armed actors.

The importance of a resource or location to an armed actor may be seen in that armed actor's statements, other public secondary data about that armed actor, like revenue generation through particular commodities, and through analysis under Part 1 of the Guidance Note.

**Figure 13: Calorie pathways and resources for armed actors**

Analysts need to consider how these resources and areas that armed actors control or seek to control relate to the food system or parts of a food system, especially analysis done under the calories subsection. They may overlap, such as being the same area and resource, or they may intersect, such as how an armed actor seeking to control a port may impact many other areas of a food system even if they are not a direct focus of the armed actor's activities and use of violence.

Figure 13 shows a highly simplified version of some key points and pathways for calories now overlaid with key areas and resources for armed actors, including a state military and a rebel group. Armed actor taxation is common, including at the only port, multiple major roads, and in a major agricultural area as an in-kind harvest tax. There is an area with gold mines that was not identified when looking only at calories, though it is a major area and resource of interest when looking at control. This also links to the food system through the roads that the rebel group prioritized for control, with the same major road used for moving gold out of the mines also linking the agricultural area to an urban market.

State forces destroyed a key bridge to stop the rebel group from advancing towards an urban population, though at the cost of disrupting the flow of calories from the only port. This highlights how control is about not only an armed actor seeking control over an area or resource, but also seeking to deny control to other armed actors – in this case, a key transportation asset enabling armed actor mobility.

### Interactions between Calories and Control

Given an understanding of the domestic conflict landscape, including where and how different armed actors operate, analysts must identify key interactions between the points and pathways identified for key sources of calories and the livelihood strategies involved in their production or that enable access to them, as well areas and resources of importance to armed actors. This analysis may include humanitarian food assistance when relevant.

Analysts may find it helpful to consider key foods that are mostly or entirely imported separately from those mostly or entirely produced domestically. For each key imported food, analysts should review the ongoing or potential interactions between that import's pathway to consumers, including main consumer livelihoods in different areas, and organized violence. This may include interactions like armed actor control of and taxation at an international border crossing, the blockage of one major road by active conflict and further armed actor taxation on another, the destruction of a major urban market in a unit of analysis and a shift to alternative, smaller markets, which feature additional armed actor taxation.

Analysts may then link these interactions – increased food prices from armed actor taxation at the international border crossing, along the major road remaining open, and at the smaller alternative markets, as well as how the loss of one major road and the main urban market may impact labour opportunities and food availability, as well as the stability of this entire domestic section of this supply chain.

Analysts should then consider the international supply chain for this imported food, including the major supplier countries of this food to the country being analysed, and consider how any ongoing conflict along this international supply chain is impacting the food security dimensions. This may include conflict in the supplier country or along international transportation corridors.

For key foods that are produced domestically, analysts should consider how major production areas are impacted by organized violence, including agricultural land, water resources, and sources of agricultural inputs, and any needed processing facilities, roads, markets, and other infrastructure for distribution and storage.

Analysts must identify key interactions between the areas and pathways identified for each key domestically produced food and organized violence. This may include interactions like armed actor harvest taxation, the destruction of crops by a different armed actor, the blockage of roads along which agricultural inputs are normally transported to the production area, and the abandonment of some agricultural land because of a high threat of organized violence targeting civilians.

Analysts may then link these interactions – armed actor harvest taxation, road blockages reducing the availability and raising the price of agricultural inputs, and reduced area planted for key foods through agricultural land abandonment and forced cultivation of cash crops – may impact the food security dimensions, such as reduced food availability and access through lower production.

**Table 5: Interaction between areas/resource, calories and control**

| Area/Resource/Asset | Calories | Control | Example Interactions |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Port** | Imports for sale and humanitarian food assis-tance | Supply chain (food and non-food like weap-ons); revenue source | Taxation may raise food prices down supply chain; imports to opposition areas may reduce |
| **Agricultural land** | Agricultural production | Revenue source; rural population; territorial acquisition | Taxation may reduce food availa-bility/raise food prices; armed actor may attack to take control or destroy agriculture to deny resource |
| **Transportation infrastructure** | Food transportation | Enable own mobility; constrict mobility of opposing armed actors; revenue source | Taxation may raise food prices |
| **Urban markets** | Urban food availability and access | Urban popula-tion; revenue source; territo-rial acquisition | Taxation may raise food prices; fighting within or around city may damage infrastructure, reduce mobility, and limit labour oppor-tunities; armed actor may seek to reduce calories to urban popula-tion supporting other armed ac-tors |
| **Gold mines** | Livelihoods opportunity | Revenue source; risk of organized violence to shift control | May bring civilians to rebel territory for labour opportunities, raising exposure to organized violence by state; armed actors seek to control area and transportation linking it to export routes, like the same roads needed for movement of food, raising organized violence and taxation risks for that infrastructure |

### *How are populations susceptible to the hazard of organized violence?*

Looking at basic interactions – especially within key points and pathways if a food system – can help support analysis of population exposure to organized violence as a hazard. Susceptibility must also consider additional aspects of organized violence, however. The overlap or intersection of calories and control does not automatically mean positive or negative impact will occur.

Different populations are likely to be susceptible to organized violence to varying degrees and this may change over time. Some key reasons for different degrees of susceptibility to organized violence include answers to key questions from Part 1:

- **Livelihoods:** A first consideration for susceptibility to organized violence must always be the livelihoods of the potentially impacted population. Analysts must consider the most common and important strategies used to produce food and/or earn income to meet basic needs and what activities, assets, pathways, and locations are needed to operationalize these strategies. These may range from agriculture to more typically urban livelihoods, like employment in office-based deskwork. While subsistence agriculture may depend on factors like the availability and accessibility of rural labour, water, and arable land, urban employment may depend more on the availability and accessibility of electricity. Livelihoods and their enabling factors must be considered against what is known about the conflict landscape and the use of organized violence.

- **Armed actor interests and capacity:** Armed actor interests may make them more likely to take certain actions, or to conduct the same actions but do so in different ways. An armed actor may seek the forced displacement of a population into areas it controls, leading it to engage in comprehensive livelihoods targeting in areas that it does not control. Another armed actor may seek to establish its own territorial entity with its own governance structures, leading it to prioritize the avoidance of damage to a food system within territory it seeks to control. Even when armed actors have an interest in using organized violence in a certain way – like comprehensive livelihoods targeting – they may not have the capacity to do this, whether through a shortage of explosive weapons with which to destroy infrastructure or a shortage of fuel to move fighters to all areas it is interested in targeting.

- **Social scope of organized violence:** Armed actor interactions with different social groups may vary widely. One example can when an armed actor's personnel are heavily drawn from a particular social group. This could lead to positive interactions between that armed actor and that population, such as compromises on armed actor revenue generation, recruitment, and uses of violence. It may also lead to more negative interactions between that armed actor and that social group, including a heavy reliance by that armed actor on that population for revenue and recruitment, with violence frequently used to coerce the population into compliance. This may place high burdens on the population and constrain their ability to fully engage in typical livelihoods and coping strategies.

- **Forms and targeting of organized violence:** When armed actors have or seek control of an area or population to some degree, they make choices about the forms of violence to use and how these forms will be targeted. An armed actor seeking control of a major agricultural area may consider several options for how to achieve this goal. It may destroy all agriculture in that area to force the withdrawal of another armed actor, use selective violence against the personnel of the armed actor that already controls that area in a way that does little to no damage to agriculture, or attempt to take control rapidly through a large-scale attack that primarily targets another armed actor, but still causes some damage to agriculture. Even though the population of this area and their agriculture are exposed to organized violence in three scenarios, susceptibility may vary by different forms and targeting of organized violence.

Figure 14 brings back the highly simplified system shown after looking at calories and control, now with basic elements of social scope, forms, and targeting of organized violence added. The agricultural area has a population that is largely from the same social group as many of the rebel group members. There is high civilian support for the rebel group in the area, leading to favourable civilian-rebel relations. However, the agriculture of the area is known to be valuable to the rebel group and the population is perceived by the state as indistinguishable from the rebel group. Since the state is not currently able to directly reach the agricultural area, it engages in bombardment by air to damage or destroy agriculture and kill civilians.

At least one urban population shows high support for the state. This was part of the motivation for the state's forces to destroy the bridge leading to that urban population and impede a rebel advance from the direction of the port. Now, the rebel group has shifted from taxing movement on the major road leading from the agricultural area to the urban population to blocking the flow of calories completely. The rebel group already controlled part of this major road as it is linked to the export of gold from the mines it controls. Another urban population does not appear to strongly support any one side and the rebel group has attempted to openly challenge the state within that city, leading to damage to key infrastructure like urban markets and to reduced employment opportunities for that urban population.

**Figure 14: Interaction between food system and armed actor activities**

Additional factors affecting susceptibility include other aspects of this section, such as the Policies, Institutions, and Processes environment, especially how new, changed, or abandoned policies interact with a population's livelihoods. This may include different forms of armed actor revenue generation – which may affect some populations and livelihoods more than others – as well as policies reducing or preventing some livelihood and other activities, like grazing, fishing, hunting, firewood sales, and access to financial services.

*How are Policies, Institutions, and Processes (PIPs) affecting population vulnerability to the hazard of organized violence?*

Another aspect of vulnerability in the IPC Food Security Analytical Framework is the PIPs environment. Covering diverse forms and institutions of public authority and policies regulating daily life, PIPs may change substantially as organized violence occurs.[25] This may include the removal or non-implementation of previous policies, such as environmental regulations that previously restricted an activity like logging, as state and other authorities lose influence or withdraw from an area.

Armed actors also often seek to control territory and population through regulation of daily life, including the economic, social, and political spheres. Analysts need to understand how armed actors are exerting control, if any, and how these efforts impact a food system.

## Figure 15: Inverted Resilience in Tigray, 2021-2022

Within the Tigray Region of Ethiopia, significant advances in resilience were made in recent decades, including through the extension of the road network throughout the region, the establishment of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), and the growth of sesame production in low-lying areas like Western Tigray zone. During an extended period of peace, this contributed to reducing household, community, and regional vulnerability, especially for the densely populated highland areas in central and eastern Tigray Region. However, when conflict between the Tigray regional government, and subsequently a rebel group based in the region, and the federal government, Eritrea, and other aligned forces broke out, these foundational components of regional resilience became liabilities. Roads facilitated military offensives throughout the region, with the civilian population closest to roads the most exposed to organized violence. Budgetary transfers for the PSNP ceased, abruptly ending what had previously been consistent support for the most vulnerable households in the region. Lowland, sesame-producing areas had previously been annexed from a neighboring region and control remained contested. When these areas were forcibly taken during the conflict, the densely populated areas of central and eastern Tigray suddenly lost access to the lucrative seasonal employment needed to remain food secure.[xlvi]

Even without the direct use of organized violence, armed actors may prevent or inhibit the practice of common livelihoods and coping strategies. This may include restrictions of activities perceived to be associated with armed actor activity, such as bans on hunting or fishing, restrictions on assets like motorcycles, and more general restrictions on freedom of movement. This may involve formally declared policies, like a ban, or the outcome of policies, like an armed actor enacting a large increase in taxes and fees related to an activity that effectively prohibits the activity's practice.

Checkpoints are a highly common example of armed actor efforts to regulate civilian daily life without necessarily involving direct violence. While the threat of violence undergirds the authority and power of armed actor personnel manning a checkpoint, the day-to-day operation of the checkpoint may generally involve no actual violence. Checkpoints may be used for diverse, often overlapping purposes, including for observation, controlling civilian mobility, creating and reinforcing perceptions of an armed actor as a legitimate governing authority with the ability to provide security, and extracting revenue from civilian mobility. Analysts may find it helpful to highlight sections of a transportation corridors like roads and rivers with high concentrations of checkpoints to support later analysis of the interactions of organized violence and food systems, including how checkpoints inhibit or raise the costs of commercial and humanitarian traffic.

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[25] Policies, Institutions, and Processes (PIPs) here refers to "the external governance environment through which households negotiate the use of their assets and the configuration of livelihoods strategies," though also considers coping strategies, as well. Lautze, Sue, and Angela Raven-Roberts. "Violence and complex humanitarian emergencies: Implications for livelihoods models." *Disasters* 30, no. 4 (2006): 383-401.

PIPs changes may also involve the systems that enable many livelihoods, coping strategies, and forms of accessing food. PIPs may inhibit to stop the operation of financial, electrical, and telecommunications systems, preventing populations from accessing cash from their savings, livelihoods, remittances, and other sources, as well as reducing access to information.

Other common changes in the PIPs environment due to organized violence may come from outside the country being analysed, including in the form of sanctions and other international policies linked to organized violence. Such policy changes are also relevant given the potentially large impact they can have on food security, including through their effect on trade, domestic market prices, civilian mobility, and the provision of humanitarian assistance.

One important aspect of the PIPs environment includes how armed actors engage with and regulate (or not) humanitarian actors and humanitarian programming, including delivery within and through territory they exercise some degree of control over. Armed actors may block, enable, tax, and otherwise leverage the use and threat of organized violence to compel humanitarian organisations to operate in ways desired by the armed actor, going beyond challenges in humanitarian access highlighted by Key Question 7. Humanitarian food assistance may be permitted to be delivered, and it may appear that aggregate coverage of the population of an area is significant, but an armed actor may compel humanitarian organisations to act in ways contrary to the humanitarian principles, like providing humanitarian food assistance to only one social group and not another regardless of assessed need. Analysts must consider how the PIPs of armed actors relate to humanitarian programming and how interpretation of humanitarian food assistance delivery may need to be adjusted given what is known about armed actor PIPs.

**Table 6: Changes in Policies, Institutions and Processes**

| Example Key PIPs Change | Potential Food Security Impact |
| --- | --- |
| **Use of checkpoints on main road** | Higher market prices due to checkpoint fees; reduced household, commercial, humanitarian traffic |
| **Ban on fishing in contested area** | Reduced availability of and access to fish, loss of live-lihoods for households reliant on fishing, loss of po-tential coping strategy |
| **Suspension of electricity transmission into conflict-affected area** | Potential losses of employment opportunities, cold chain for food storage, night-time lighting for safer movement, potential rise in fuel prices due to shift to generators; reduction in telecommunications and financial services availability/access reducing access to information and digital/physical cash |

*Armed Actor Revenue Collection*

One common shift in PIPs occurs when armed actors change or enact new forms of revenue collection. This may involve extracting payment from humanitarian programming, economic sectors like agriculture, transport, and mining, individual households, settlements, and businesses, and other forms of formal and informal transfers. The implications for a food system may vary widely, as armed actor activity may impose new or higher costs on some activities, like the import of food commodities, while also potentially increasing the efficiency of these activities, like standardizing payments and reducing the number of checkpoints on a road.

A common feature of situations of violence is the extraction of revenue from many forms of movement. From individuals walking on forest paths to humanitarian convoys on major highways, formal or informal payment may be extracted in a context featuring sustained organized violence. Analysts must consider how these forms of formal and informal revenue collection from civilian movement may interact with a food system, including through its effects on household income and access to food as well as market prices.

Armed actor revenue collection may affect, but is not limited to:

- Food production, such as through harvest payments.

- Food processing, such as through payments from millers or other processing businesses.

- Food distribution, such as through payments on civilian movement, including commercial traffic.

- Food preparation, such as through payments on cooking fuel or water access.

- Household income, such as through household taxes or taxes on specific occupations

### Figure 16: Al-Shabaab Revenue Collection in Somalia

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin, better known as al-Shabaab, an armed actor waging an insurgency against the Federal Government of Somalia, reportedly continued to generate a majority of its financing through diverse informal taxation mechanisms as of late 2021. Overseen by al-Shabaab's internal Ministry of Finance, these efforts include the informal taxation of road usage and the transport of goods, businesses, agricultural production and livestock, assessed individual wealth, and other aspects of daily life.[xlvii] Not unique to this armed actor or to Somalia, similar revenue generation by a variety of armed actors is common globally, from the mix of checkpoints across Central African Republic[xlviii] to the cities and highways of Haiti. [xlix]

#### How is the hazard of organized violence affecting a population's resilience?

Organized violence may interact with the resilience of a population in many ways. Three key interactions include how assets may become liabilities, multi-sector coping, and interactions with seasonality.

#### Is organized violence transforming any assets into liabilities?

Organized violence may cause an inversion of community and household resilience. The assets and strategies that enhance resilience to one type of hazard, such as a drought, may also reduce resilience to organized violence. Markers of resilience, such as productive cropland, livestock, and all-weather roads may attract armed actors that seek to take control of or otherwise exploit these assets, rapidly increasing the vulnerability of households or communities that were previously more resilient. This inversion of resilience is an essential concept when considering how organized violence impacts food security.

More broadly, the degree to which an asset or activity is essential to civilian survival may change over time and space when organized violence is used. It is tempting for analysts to consider some of the foundations of food security analysis, like livelihood zone baselines or profiles, as fixed and unchanging as organized violence occurs or continues. However, civilians cope with and adapt to organized violence, including through altering livelihood and coping strategies.

When a conflict begins, there may be a rural population primarily reliant on agriculture for household food production and income generation. After the repeated use of organized violence in this area, previously agricultural households may have been forced to shift to an alternative livelihood or coping strategy, such as due to asset losses and loss of freedom of movement. While before conflict began, these alternative livelihoods or coping strategies may have been secondary or unimportant in supporting daily food access, organized violence may increase their importance over time as households come to rely on them. In this way, livelihood and coping strategies that were previously marginal may become indispensable.

*Are there trade-offs among the strategies that households use to cope with organized violence, food insecurity, and other threats to their survival?*

Even in the face of organized violence, civilians retain agency and will work to protect themselves and improve their situation. Civilians cannot be viewed only as passive victims in conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. From Afghanistan to Colombia, civilians have demonstrated many ways of working with, against, and through armed actors.

Armed actor agendas depend on civilian compliance to some degree, especially the provision of information and other resources by civilians to armed actors. Analysts should consider how civilians are cooperating with, resisting, or avoiding armed actor activities, including organized violence and non-violent activities, that affect the food system. As described in the targeting section, it may not be possible to make clear distinctions between armed actors and a civilian population in some contexts, especially when armed actors are deeply embedded in local communities. Different actors may play multiple roles, such as through participation in an armed actor as well as a separate civilian function, such as in community leadership.

Individuals, households, and communities also use coping strategies when faced with any threat to their survival – not only food insecurity. While IPC analysis primarily focuses on coping strategies related to food security, conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must consider multi-sector coping in recognition of the complicated decision-making that civilians are forced to make regarding organized violence as a shock and stressor. Protection coping strategies and food security coping strategies may overlap and interact in different ways, including through zero-sum trade-offs. For example, reducing exposure to organized violence may mean engaging in self-limiting behaviour, like no longer traveling to areas needed to meet other basic needs, like agricultural land, forests, or water points. Protection coping may also be more active, including forms of self-defense. This may involve severe trade-offs with food security and the ability to meet basic needs generally, as potentially significant labour capacity may be diverted to security activities, such as standing guard or patrolling, rather than productive activities like agriculture.

Civilian perception of the risk of organized violence is most important when considering how coping with protection risks may lead to reductions in other essential activities, like those needed to access food. Risks may be highly visible – such as through active conflict involving frequent, large clashes between armed actors – and much less obvious, such as from the contamination of agricultural fields with explosive remnants of war[26] and landmines or from frequent but seemingly unpredictable indirect fire, like airstrikes.

In contexts where organized violence is a consistent or recurring hazard, households may also undertake adaptive strategies to reduce their exposure and susceptibility to organized violence. Even when organized violence declines in frequency or intensity, household decision-making may still be impacted by high levels of uncertainty and a strong desire to minimize losses if organized violence intensifies or restarts. Individuals, households, and communities may significantly alter their ways of living within conflict over time, even without direct violence actively occurring or targeted at them specifically.

The relationships of armed actors with different populations may also change over time and should not be assumed to be rigid or operate strictly along identity lines, like ethnicity. Households and communities may use hedging strategies, like engaging with or even providing support to multiple armed actors simultaneously even if those armed actors are engaged in violent conflict with each other. This may occur in situations with uncertain or varied armed actor control or when it is not clear if any one armed actor is likely to achieve military victory. Households and communities may determine that broad armed actor engagement offers the most protection, rather than clear alignment with one armed actor or grouping of them.

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26  Explosive remnants of war refer to any "unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance" left by an armed actor, though deviates from a common international definition in that this definition is applied to armed conflict as well as organised violence more broadly, rather than armed conflict alone. Explosive ordnance refers to conventional munitions containing explosives. This typically includes IEDs, though mines are often referred to separately. See Enke, Thomas. *Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War, and IED Safety Handbook* (New York City: United Nations Mine Action Service, 2015). https://www.unmas.org/sites/default/files/handbook_english.pdf.

*Is organized violence causing any changes in the seasonality of key activities and vulnerability for a population?*

As the relative importance of assets and activities changes over time and space due to organized violence and its consequences, the seasonality of typical livelihoods, coping strategies, and hunger may also shift from a typical year in that context. Seasonal calendars may need to be revised due to organized violence.

If a core livelihoods activity is severely inhibited or no longer possible and a portion of a population now relies on an alternative or secondary livelihood activity, then the seasonality of this substitute activity must be considered and documented. The same logic applies to coping strategies. For example, a population that was previously reliant on rain-fed subsistence agriculture may have typically experienced a lean season during the growing season. After sustained organized violence causes a reduction in or the complete stoppage of agricultural activity, that same population may now rely on alternative livelihoods or coping strategies, like fishing and gathering wild foods. The seasonality of these alternative activities, including when a lean period may occur, may be completely different than the seasonality of rain-fed subsistence agriculture and the related lean season.

Are there ways in which the impact of organized violence on food security may be disconnected from the location or timing of organized violence?

Consider if and how some or all of the impact of organized violence on food security may happen sometime after a conflict event or set of events. One form of delay could be seasonality, where organized violence disrupts a planting season. The greatest impact on food security may not be felt by the affected population until the next post-harvest period, or up to 18 months later in an area with only one main harvest.

If delays in the impact of organized violence on food security are expected, this expectation should be incorporated into IPC projections and future updates on current status.

## Figure 17: Spatial Disconnects Between Conflict and Food Security in Yemen and Somalia

In Yemen, one study covering 2016-2018 found little correlation between the incidence of violent events and access to food within the same geographic region. However, it did show significant relationships between different measures of food security as well as other deprivations and the incidence of violence at other points along a supply chain. A regularly scheduled survey occurred before, during, and after a period of complete air and sea blockade of Yemen, including the main ports by which food, fuel, and other essential imports enter the country. Analysis of this survey disaggregated by when interviews were conducted in relation to the stage of the blockade showed that access to food and other humanitarian indicators rapidly deteriorated in response to the blockade. While violence did not categorically lead to reduced access to food in the same geographic areas throughout Yemen, some forms of violence showed indirect spatial connections to reduced accessed to food, particularly when major ports were affected.  A similar study in Somalia found that even localized organized violence – particularly when directed at civilians rather than infrastructure – along key transportation corridors could raise food prices in markets up to several hundred kilometres away while decreasing food traffic overall. This occurred even when organized violence did not heavily disrupt food production.[lx]

Similarly, organized violence in one location may impact food security in other locations with varied severity. A common way for organized violence to impact food security in areas beyond where the organized violence is occurring is via market systems. If critical market infrastructure like ports and bridges are destroyed, damaged, blocked, or become more expensive through armed actor revenue collection, then civilian populations dependent on the market system may experience food insecurity without any organized violence occurring in their area.

Organized violence may also inhibit or prevent food production in one area, leading to heightened reliance on markets for food access by the affected population. This increased demand may then raise prices throughout part or all of a market system, including in areas not directly affected by organized violence.

Similar to the questions under the section When to Conduct Analysis, analysts must also consider if there is organized violence outside of the country being analysed but along a supply chain critical to food security. Some degree of conflict analysis may be required to gauge the impact of this external supply chain disruption and to support related projection analysis.

*How is organized violence interacting with gender and age?*

While gender and age are embedded in all key questions, these topics are restated here to ensure that they are incorporated into the wider analysis.

Organized violence is highly gendered in its forms, targeting, and impact across all age groups. The gendered nature of organized violence interacts with the gendered nature of livelihoods and coping. Understanding the experiences of men, women, girls, and boys – and more nuanced categories within these – is critical to effectively analysing the interactions of organized violence and food security.

It should not be assumed that the lived experience of organized violence across genders and ages (and over time) is uniform. Fixed narratives for gender and age include the idea that only men perpetrate violence, that women are only passive victims, and that social and livelihoods roles by gender and age do not change during conflict.

TWGs and ATs are also encouraged to support this aspect of conflict analysis with quantitative and qualitative data disaggregated by gender and age, as needed for the Humanitarian Programme Cycle and programming more generally. A lack of disaggregated data, including on the lived experience of organized violence, would make it impossible to fully analyse the interactions of organized violence, gender and age, and food security.

IPC Resource 'Gender-sensitive IPC analysis' should also be consulted for additional detail.

## Mobility

The targeting of organized violence varies across genders and age groups, including how armed actors interact with civilians attempting to travel for different purposes. Men and boys may be suspected of being involved in organized violence directly or indirectly, and their movement may be inhibited to a greater degree than for women and girls. They may face a greater risk of physical harm, including death, than women and girls.

Women and girls may have greater nominal or actual freedom of movement. Armed actors may permit them to engage in livelihoods and coping activities more freely. However, women and girls may face lower risks of some types of physical harm, but far greater risks of other types of harm, like rape and sexual assault. Being granted permission to move by an armed actor and being allowed to move in complete safety can be very different things.

While not only women and girls face a risk of sexual and gender-based violence in areas affected by organized violence, in some contexts the risk tends to be higher for women and girls. Men and boys also face a risk of sexual and gender-based violence. Relative risk may vary significantly across contexts.

One key impact of differences in freedom of movement across genders and age groups may be seen in distress migration. The genders and age groups with relatively greater freedom of movement may engage in distress migration, while those with relatively lower freedom of movement may not be able to do so. Different genders may migrate to different destinations depending on their perception of the different risks on the migration routes available. This may lead to a high degree of household fragmentation. The absence of entire households engaging in distress migration as a household unit should not be taken as the absence of distress migration itself.

## Livelihoods and Coping Capacity

Organized violence may prompt changes in gender and age roles in livelihoods and coping. Men may be diverted from typical livelihoods roles to security roles, such as patrolling the perimeter of a community or launching attacks. This diversion of labour may force women, boys, and girls to undertake different roles in their households and communities. Whereas men may have ploughed fields before, women may now have to handle this activity, with boys or girls taking the role of sowing seeds.

Such changes in time allocation may have consequences for other activities. As household members seek to fill gaps in activities critical for survival, there may be reduced or no time for other activities or these activities may be done ineffectively. The consequences of these changes may range from reduced land ploughed, even if all necessary productive assets are available and agricultural land remains accessible, to a declining care environment for infants and young children.

## Infant and Young Child Feeding (ICYF) and Other Care Practices

Organized violence may have direct and indirect impacts on household care and feeding practices for infants and young children, especially those under five years of age and at risk of acute malnutrition.

Some of the most common pathways from organized violence to deteriorating care and feeding practices include the trade-offs that households and caregivers may be forced to make. As discussed in other guiding and probing questions, households and caregivers may be forced to make zero-sum decisions regarding different basic needs.

Pathways may be direct, such as when protection risks may lead to displacement to areas with a poor health environment and limited access to clean drinking water. The use of different forms of organized violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, may directly target caregivers like women and older girls. Other pathways may be more indirect, such as when the diversion of male labour into security roles leads to women and girls undertaking time-consuming atypical labour, including in agriculture or livestock-keeping. Younger household members may be forced to take over caregiver roles as older household members undertake atypical labour in livelihoods and coping.

In combination, direct and indirect impacts may lead to a deterioration in care and feeding practices as resources, including time, are reallocated according to the most urgent basic needs.

### *How is organized violence impacting food availability, access, utilization, and stability?*

Analysts must take their understanding of organized violence as a hazard and how it related to population vulnerability – including issues like exposure and susceptibility, PIPs, multi-sector coping, as well as gender and age – and consider how this may impact the food security dimensions: availability, access, utilization, and stability.

### *Review Analysis of the Interactions of Hazards (Organized Violence) and Vulnerability (Exposure, Susceptibility, and Resilience)*

1. Review analysis of exposure: including interactions of calories and control.

    a. Where are key sources of calories – domestically produced and sourced externally – found in the same places, and at the same time, as organized violence?

2. Review analysis of susceptibility: including how different factors affect the extent to which populations and their sources of calories may be negatively impacted by organized violence.

    a. How are key sources of calories – domestically produced and sourced externally – exposed to organized violence and negatively impacted?

    b. Given the consensus understanding of the conflict landscape, how does impact differ according to factors like the social scope, forms, and targeting of organized violence, as well as armed actor interests and capacity?

        i. Are there some groups impacted more than others?

3. Review analysis of other elements of vulnerability: including key ways in which organized violence is interacting with the PIPs environment, gender and age, and resilience as well as any potential spatial and temporal disconnects.

    a. How are key sources of calories – domestically produced and sourced externally – impacted by any changes in PIPs?

    b. How is organized violence interacting with gender and age, including through livelihoods and coping strategies, mobility, and IYCF?

    c. How is organized violence interacting with the resilience of different populations, including the transformation of any assets into liabilities or changes in seasonality, such as a lean period?

    d. Are there ways in which organized violence may be impacting food security in this unit of analysis, but the organized violence occurred outside the unit of analysis or before the current period of analysis?

# 4. Assess impact by food security dimension

Use the analysis of the hazard of organized violence and the vulnerability of the population to describe key impacts across the food security dimensions.

*How is organized violence impacting food availability and its stability?*

- How is the availability of domestically produced food impacted by organized violence?

  ◦ What production is exposed to organized violence?

    - Consider assets, locations, and pathways linked to production, from agricultural land and agricultural inputs to food storage and processing and the markets needed for non-producers to access this food.

  ◦ Whose production is this and how is that population susceptible to organized violence?

  ◦ Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets?

  ◦ Are there indirect impacts, like disruption to a supply chain for inputs into food production, even without organized violence happening within this unit of analysis?

- How is the availability of imported food for sale impacted by organized violence?

  ◦ What points and pathways in the entry, storage, processing, distribution, and sale of key foods are exposed to organized violence?

  ◦ Who is engaged in these activities, especially the purchase of imported food, and how is that population susceptible to organized violence?

  ◦ Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets, like a market or storage facilities being destroyed?

  ◦ Are there indirect impacts, like in-kind taxation along a supply chain?

- How is the availability of humanitarian food assistance (imported and/or sourced locally) impacted by organized violence?

  ◦ What points and pathways in the entry, storage, processing, and distribution of the commodities included in ongoing humanitarian food assistance are exposed to organized violence?

  ◦ Who is engaged in these activities, especially the recipient population of humanitarian food assistance, and how is that population susceptible to organized violence?

  ◦ Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets, like humanitarian warehousing being destroyed or looted?

  ◦ Are there indirect impacts, like in-kind taxation along a supply chain?

- How is the availability of alternative or supplemental food sources, especially those obtained through common coping strategies, impacted by organized violence?

  ◦ What alternative or supplemental food sources are exposed to organized violence?

    - Consider assets, locations, and pathways, whether related to wild foods from forested areas or urban parks to substitute ingredients for bread and their sources

  ◦ Who relies on these alternative or supplemental foods and how is that population susceptible to organized violence?

○ Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets?

○ Are there indirect impacts, like disruption to a supply chain for inputs into food production, even without organized violence happening within this unit of analysis?

### How is organized violence impacting food access and its stability?

How is organized violence impacting access to:

- Domestically produced food

- Imported food for sale

- Humanitarian food assistance (imported and/or sourced locally)

- Alternative or supplemental food sources, especially those obtained through common coping strategies

Including through:

- Any changes in availability?

- Any changes in civilian mobility, like an inability to travel to markets or fishing grounds?

- Any changes in indirect impacts, like increased taxation, disruption to transfers through social networks, and changes in household labour capacity?

- Any changes in household income and purchasing power, including due to the impact of organized violence?

### How is organized violence impacting food utilization and its stability?

How is organized violence affecting the ability of households to store, prepare, and metabolize food?

- How is organized violence affecting safe water availability, access, and utilization?

  ○ If the impact of organized violence on the water system has not been analysed, analysts may need to refer to the subsection on the interactions of organized violence and water and health systems before addressing these food utilization questions.

- How is organized violence impacting household food storage?

  ○ This may include storage infrastructure and enabling systems like electricity

- How is organized violence impacting household food preparation?

  ○ This may include interactions between organized violence and energy for cooking availability, access, and utilization, including preferred energy for cooking and any alternatives, whether firewood, charcoal, cooking gas, electricity, and other sources

- How is organized violence impacting the health environment, including IYCF, drivers of infectious disease, and healthcare availability, access, and utilization?

  ○ If the impact of organized violence on the water system has not been analysed, analysts may need to refer to the subsection on the interactions of organized violence and water and health systems before addressing these food utilization questions.

### How is organized violence interacting with health and water systems?

Analysts may also need to consider how organized violence is interacting with other systems, such as those for water (including water, sanitation, and hygiene), and health, including nutrition services.

Although not directly informing classifications of acute food insecurity, these systems strongly influence the second-level outcomes of nutritional status and mortality. Divergence between the severity of first and second-level outcomes should be explained, while second-level outcomes are also of increasing concern in higher IPC phases. Roust analysis of second-level outcomes is also required for analysis of possible Famine, including classifications of ongoing Famine, projections of likely Famine, and risk of Famine statements.

Analysts should consider water and health systems similarly to food systems, including how organized violence is interacting with all the key elements of and inputs to these systems. For water (safe or any) and related services like sanitation and hygiene, as well as healthcare, analysts should review the exposure and susceptibility of key components of these systems and how this impacts availability, access, and utilization.

As with food, this analysis should extend to humanitarian programming, including humanitarian access and patterns of interactions between humanitarian organisations providing these services and key armed actors.

## Conflict analysis to support IPC projections

Making predictions about the onset of organized violence is a difficult challenge. For example, in reviewing the state of conflict prediction and the prediction of the humanitarian consequences of conflict with a heavy focus on quantitative analysis and modelling, the Centre for Humanitarian Data concluded in 2022 that 'we do not see immediate applications of conflict prediction for triggering anticipatory action'.[xxiv]

IPC analysis is not expected to solve this systemic problem. However, the best attempt possible should be made to build scenarios that include analysis of the occurrence of organized violence and the likely impact of organized violence on food security.

As with current classification processes described above, conflict analysis to support IPC projections involves two components:

- Projecting the occurrence of organized violence

- Projecting the impact of organized violence on food security

For projection analysis, the occurrence of organized violence can refer to organized violence that is already ongoing or the onset of organized violence where there had been none in the current period. Onset refers to a situation where organized violence becomes a hazard that drives or contributes to acute food insecurity where it was not as of the current period. As with other hazards, organized violence may be projected at different severities for different locations over time.

Analysts should consider their conflict analysis for the current period, including how organized violence has interacted with the typical seasonality of food security, livelihoods, and coping. This analysis may have implications for the validity period of projections typically used if seasonality has changed.

Per Manual V3.1, IPC updates should take place when previous scenario assumptions have been invalidated. The building of scenario assumptions, especially in relation to efforts to project the onset, or not, of organized violence should not be taken as an 'all-or-nothing' task. There is considerable uncertainty and analysts are asked to produce the best scenarios possible given available information at the time of analysis. Updates are encouraged when new information is available or previous assumptions are invalidated and classifications of areas or populations have likely changed.

The outcome of this section should be a set of assumptions for two issues:

- The most likely evolution of organized violence

- The most likely impact of organized violence on food security

As with all IPC projection analysis, assumptions for a most likely scenario should include only those assumed events and outcomes that are more likely to occur than their alternatives. Analysts must not include events and outcomes that they conclude have a risk of occurring, may occur, or could occur.

Individual assumptions must also develop into a coherent scenario. Assumptions for one armed actor or area cannot contradict another, such as that one armed actor will agree to a ceasefire, decreasing organized violence, while an armed actor it is in conflict with will not accept the same ceasefire and organized violence will increase.

To support the tracking of assumptions and real-time monitoring, including of risk factors, assumptions for organized violence and its impact ideally indicate what specifically will most likely occur and where, with at least minimal justification, and how it relates to food security. If formulated as distinct statements (though this is not a requirement), they may look like:

**Possible Format:** [Element of conflict] will likely [evolution] in [geographic areas] because [evidence/justification], impacting [who/how food security].

**Example:** Conflict will likely escalate in Unit of Analysis A because the de facto authorities will seek to regain full control of major highways and border crossings with Neighboring Country, displacing populations along these routes and further disrupting their livelihoods during the planting season.

This section supplements IPC Resource 4: Projection Analysis. That resource should be referred to for general guidance on IPC projection analysis.

## Projecting the occurrence of organized violence

Projections should consider how organized violence may change in the projection period, including beginning, restarting after a pause or stoppage, increase or decrease in frequency, intensity, and scope, or remain the same. It is important to consider all possibilities for changes in organized violence and not automatically assume a continuation of recent trends.

Projection assumptions about organized violence should be as specific as data and understanding allow, including covering key questions 1-7.

Wherever analysts identify some level of risk of organized violence, an assumption should explicitly be made and documented, regardless of whether organized violence is projected to occur or not. This ensures that there is still an assumption to be tracked and, if this assumption is invalidated, that a projection update can be considered.

Projections should be categorical in nature, rather than attempts to quantify most likely organized violence. Categorical projections may include designations like major, moderate, and minor organized violence and reference to specific events or types of events occurring when feasible. If analysts are unable to make projections for precise geographic areas and periods, they may consider reducing precision and shifting from an assumption to a risk factor to monitor.

### Armed actors' goals and capacity

One of the most important aspects of projecting organized violence is making assumptions regarding the most likely behaviour of the different armed actors involved over the projection period. One way to approach this task is to consider what an armed actor is seeking to do, including its claimed positions as well as assessment of its interests, in comparison to what that armed actor is capable of doing as of the onset of the projection period. This requires at least a basic understanding of the armed actors engaged in organized violence, their long-term goals and what may be needed to achieve them in the short to mid-term, the capacity of these armed actors to act on these goals, and patterns in the forms and targeting of organized violence used by these armed actors. Analysts are encouraged to make full use of previous sections of this document to help them build assumptions here.

Analysts must also consider how other aspects of the conflict landscape enable or constrain armed actors, including how this may change in the projection period. The seasonality of organized violence is especially important to consider in projection periods, as the natural environment may shift from enabling certain forms of organized violence to constraining them and vice versa. Armed actors also do not act in isolation, meaning that assumptions about other actors, armed or not, are also important to consider.

One issue that can rapidly affect the capacity of an armed actor is a large, sudden change in the provision of material support. An armed actor may experience a large increase or decrease in capacity as third-parties decide to begin, increase, decrease, or end their material support to that armed actor. For example, a neighbouring or other state may provide an armed actor in the country being analysed with most or all of its weapons and supplies. If that state decides to end or heavily reduce this support, that armed actor may experience a large and rapid decline in capacity.

**Key questions to ask about armed actors in projection analysis**

1. Considering an armed actor's stated goals and that armed actor's goals as assessed by analysts, what actions would bring these goals closer to achievement?

    a. Analysts may need to work backwards from an overarching goal, like takeover of a national government, to more intermediate or short-term goals that align with an IPC projection period, like taking control of a smaller objective closer to areas where the armed actor already exercises some degree of control.

    b. If analysts previously identified international interests for an armed actor, such as due to being a proxy of or affiliated in some way with a state sponsor, then the interests of that sponsor should also be considered here.

2. Considering the capacity of that armed actor, the broader conflict landscape and other contextual factors like seasonality, which of the actions that might bring it closer to achieving its goals are feasible?

    a. This question is about the options available to an armed actor, rather than one most likely action, which comes in the following question.

3. Taking the conclusions reached for question 1 and 2 regarding what an armed actor may seek to do as well as what it has the capacity to do, what actions are most likely for this armed actor in the projection period?

*Preparatory activities*

Preparatory activities are those that contribute to an armed actor's capacity to conduct or resist organized violence. Preparatory activities may indicate that an armed actor will use organized violence offensively, such as launching new attacks or continuing ongoing attacks, or that an armed actor has some expectation that it may be attacked itself. Analysts must review any available information regarding preparatory activities when building assumptions about what armed actors are likely to do in the projection period.

Preparatory activities may include actions like the mobilization or recruitment of fighters as well as significant or atypical movement of fighters or military assets. Activities to increase the number of fighters in an armed actor may take many forms, including voluntary or involuntary recruitment of new fighters, or the activation of reserve forces. Efforts to increase fighter numbers may indicate a likely change in the occurrence of organized violence, depending on other available evidence. While detailed information regarding all armed actor movements and dispositions is unlikely to be available, note should be taken of available reporting on significant or atypical armed actor movements. Annex X includes additional information on what may be considered significant or atypical movement.

Similarly, civilians may anticipate the use of organized violence and act pre-emptively. Actions may include migration out of an area where the risk of organized violence is perceived as high and may involve entire households or household fragmentation. There may be changes in economic activity, like the movement of productive assets including livestock to areas with a lower risk of violence, or changes in market prices, and social activity, such as reductions in public gatherings or nighttime activity.

Armed actor public statements, including press releases, social media, and other open-source information, regarding intentions, expectations, and concerns are an important source of information. As with any information coming from an armed actor, the guidance here is not to take information without question, but more to not categorically disregard this information.

Public statements may also not directly refer to specific events. They may develop into a pattern of statements that work to build a narrative that may support the eventual use of organized violence. Narratives may include statements about threats facing a particular group like an armed actor or social group, and the political, social, and economic standing of that group in relation to others.

*Triggers for organized violence onset, continuation, or increase*

Analysts may also identify other forms of triggers, or sudden or acute events that raise the likelihood of new or intensified organized violence. These may include a diverse range of political, social, and economic events that make organized violence more likely to begin, continue, and/or intensify. They tend to work in conjunction with longstanding issues.

Escalatory activities refer to actions that raise the likelihood of organized violence outside of an ongoing situation of violence. This may include escalatory activities in a context where no sustained use of organized violence among armed actors is identified or where there is a cessation or some form of pause within an ongoing situation of violence. Escalatory activities may be non-violent or violent.

Non-violent escalatory activities may vary widely in their form as well as social and geographic scope. They may include political actions, particularly those that indicate attempts to change power dynamics and access to resources. These could include the gradual or abrupt reduction in power of a political party or social group, such as by the dismissal of officials from a particular group, or the harassment, jailing, or exiling of politicians, activists, or other prominent individuals from a given group. Other actions may include changes in the governance of resources, like how administrative boundaries are drawn around key resources. Other actions may involve armed actor personnel but not involve violence, including an increase in the number of checkpoints or the imposition of a curfew for civilians.

## Figure 18: Armed Actor Integration and the Potential for Escalation

Several forms of non-violent escalatory activities preceded the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), that began on April 15, 2023. One of the final issues discussed between these armed actors before organised violence began was the potential integration of the RSF into the SAF. While integration was far from the only cause of the onset of new organised violence in Sudan, it did serve as an important catalytic issue. The merging of armed actors is common globally, often as part of peace agreements. The process of armed actor integration can bring high risks of organised violence, however, given how it can substantially alter power dynamics in a context. A non-state armed actor being integrated into state security forces might see its officers demoted or barred from senior positions, limiting their access to patronage networks. Its lower ranking members may be kept out of the best trained and equipped units like special forces or presidential guards, limiting the former group's ability to remobilize or launch a coup. Globally, even the integration of pro-government militias into state security forces has been found to increase the risk of civil war renewal.[lxiii]

Violent escalatory activities could include a range of activities that involve violence, which may or may not be organized and do not necessarily indicate an ongoing situation of violence between two or more armed actors. These could include the disappearance or targeted killing of prominent individuals from a particular group, the use of violence by state security services against civil unrest like protests or riots, or small-scale events that are organized but not yet linked to an ongoing situation of violence, like initial clashes between a new armed actor and security services like the police, the stealing of weapons and supplies from small and remote armed actor outposts or bases, and the use of coercion against civilians to acquire supplies and recruits.

Red lines are outcomes that any actor with current or potential capacity for organized violence would take as a strong trigger for the use or escalation of organized violence. Analysis of red lines should always consider the perceptions of the actor, rather than the perceptions of analysts. Red lines may include what an actor perceives as an existential threat. This means that the red line may be an outcome that an actor sees as threatening the end of its existence as an actor.

Existential threats may take many forms. They could be the loss of a critical supply line, like the sole land or sea route economically linking an actor like a state to global markets for essential goods like staple food commodities.

Red lines may more commonly involve outcomes that are not seen as an existential threat but are still considered to be so unacceptable as to make the likely costs of organized violence worth the potential gains or avoidance of significant loss. These can include outcomes that do not threaten actor existence but may still be a severe threat to an actor's power, including continued capacity for violence. These may also involve severe reputation risk or damage, such as a battlefield defeat that does significantly alter the course of a conflict but is symbolically significant, or involve normative transgressions, such as the use of a particular method of warfare.

## Mitigating factors for organized violence

Mitigating factors for organized violence are processes and events that reduce the likelihood of new or increased organized violence and/or raise the likelihood of a decrease in organized violence. Increasing or decreasing organized violence may include the frequency, intensity, and/or scope of organized violence.

The most important mitigating factors relate to the positions and interests of armed actors, including the strategic or overarching and long-term goals they seek to achieve through the use of organized violence. The achievement of major goals – especially in terms of their actual interests and not only stated positions – may lead to reductions in their use of organized violence, at least in some areas or forms. Broader root causes of conflict, though largely outside the scope of this document, may also reduce or be addressed, reducing the motivations of a broader portion of the population to participate in, support, or otherwise comply with armed actors.

Other mitigating factors may involve a specific process or event, like the onset of a ceasefire that all or most armed actors may abide by, or ongoing peace negotiations that most or all armed actors may meaningfully engage in. These do not automatically mean that organized violence will reduce, however, as covered under the following subsection.

## Active and latent organized violence

Organized violence may be active, or ongoing, as well as latent, or when the root causes of organized violence remain or worsen but there is no active organized violence within a certain analysis period. When making assumptions about organized violence, especially if ongoing organized violence will end or if new organized violence will begin, analysts must be careful in how they consider the drivers of organized violence. A reduction or stoppage of organized violence may signal that the drivers of that organized violence are being addressed or mitigated. The reduction or stoppage may also not signal any change in organized violence, but instead reflect other dynamics, like armed actor capability, seasonality, or a temporary agreement among armed actors. Analysts must determine if a reduction or stoppage of organized violence in the current period is most likely temporary or durable.

A common analytical challenge is when some form of peace agreement or ceasefire are announced. Analysts may want to assume that these types of agreements automatically mean that organized violence will end, and that this stoppage will endure. While this is always possible, these agreements may also enable future organized violence by giving time and space for armed actors to acquire supplies like ammunition, recruit, train, and move fighters, and engage in other preparatory activities. This may be defensive, given the uncertainty of these processes, or it may be intentionally offensive, with plans to launch attacks when preparations are complete. As it is not possible for other armed actors to know with certainty what another armed actor's plans are, any preparatory activity within these reductions or pauses in organized violence raise the risk of future organized violence.

Analysts must consider the conflict landscape and broader context of any peace or other agreement regarding the use of organized violence. If the root causes of organized violence remain or have worsened, active organized violence may have become temporarily latent, rather than durably ending. Analysts must also consider that the end of one situation of organized violence at one level is not necessarily the end of all organized violence at the same level or at other levels. See the overview of levels of organized violence in Annex 3 for greater detail.

## Projecting the impact of organized violence on food security

Assumptions on likely organized violence are the starting point of this section. Analysts must take their assumptions about the most likely evolution of organized violence – including any new onset, increases, and decreases – and review their analysis of the interactions of organized violence and the food system.

*Assumptions about population vulnerability to organized violence*

1. Review analysis of exposure, including interactions of calories and control.

    a. How is the exposure of key sources of calories – domestically produced and sourced externally – and the livelihoods that produce and enable access to them likely to change given the most likely scenario for organized violence?

2. Review analysis of susceptibility, including how different factors affect the extent to which populations and their sources of calories may be negatively impacted by organized violence.

    a. How is the susceptibility of different populations, their key sources of calories, and the livelihoods that produce and enable access to them likely to change given the most likely scenario for organized violence?

        i. Given the most likely scenario for organized violence, how will impact likely differ according to factors like the social scope, forms, and targeting of organized violence, as well as armed actor interests and capacity?

            1. Will differences in impact likely change within the projection period?

3. Review analysis of other elements of vulnerability, including key ways in which organized violence will likely interact with the PIPs environment, gender and age, and resilience.

    a. How are key sources of calories – domestically produced and sourced externally – and the livelihoods that produce and enable access to them likely be impacted by any recent or likely changes in PIPs?

    b. How is organized violence likely to interact with gender and age, including through livelihoods and coping strategies, mobility, and IYCF?

    c. How is organized violence likely to interact with the resilience of different populations, including the transformation of any assets into liabilities or changes in seasonality, such as a lean period?

        i. How are any previously assessed changes in resilience, like the transformation of assets into liabilities or a shift in the onset of the lean season, likely to impact populations within the projection period?

    d. Are there ways in which organized violence will likely impact food security in this unit of analysis, but the organized violence occurred outside the unit of analysis or before or during the current period of analysis?

*Assumptions about the Impact of Organized Violence on the Food Security Dimensions*

Following assumptions on organized violence and population vulnerability, analysts must make assumptions about the impact of organized violence across the food security dimensions. Analysts should take their analysis of impact in the current period as a starting point and determine if any changes in impact are likely based on their most likely scenario for organized violence and population vulnerability.

*How is organized violence impacting food availability and its stability?*

- How is the availability of domestically produced food likely to be impacted by organized violence?

    ◦ What production is likely to be exposed to organized violence?

        - Consider assets, locations, and pathways linked to production, from agricultural land and agricultural inputs to food storage and processing and the markets needed for non-producers to access this food.

- Whose production is this and how is that population likely susceptible to organized violence?

- Are there likely to be direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets?

- Are there likely to be indirect impacts, like disruption to a supply chain for inputs into food production, even without organized violence happening within this unit of analysis?

- How is the availability of imported food for sale likely to be impacted by organized violence?

  - What points and pathways in the entry, storage, processing, distribution, and sale of key foods are likely to be exposed to organized violence?

  - Who is engaged in these activities, especially the purchase of imported food, and how is that population likely to be susceptible to organized violence?

  - Are there likely to be direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets, like a market or storage facilities being destroyed?

  - Are there likely to be indirect impacts, like in-kind taxation along a supply chain?

- How is the availability of humanitarian food assistance (Imported and/or sourced locally) impacted by organized violence?

  - What points and pathways in the entry, storage, processing, and distribution of the commodities included in ongoing humanitarian food assistance are exposed to organized violence?

  - Who is engaged in these activities, especially the recipient population of humanitarian food assistance, and how is that population susceptible to organized violence?

  - Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets, like humanitarian warehousing being destroyed or looted?

  - Are there indirect impacts, like in-kind taxation along a supply chain?

- How is the availability of alternative or supplemental food sources, especially those obtained through common coping strategies, impacted by organized violence?

  - What alternative or supplemental food sources are exposed to organized violence?

    - Consider assets, locations, and pathways, whether related to wild foods from forested areas or urban parks to substitute ingredients for bread and their sources

  - Who relies on these alternative or supplemental foods and how is that population susceptible to organized violence?

  - Are there direct impacts, like asset removal and destruction or the separation of civilians from assets?

  - Are there indirect impacts, like disruption to a supply chain for inputs into food production, even without organized violence happening within this unit of analysis?

### *How is organized violence impacting food access and its stability?*

How is organized violence likely to impact access to:

- Domestically produced food

- Imported food for sale

- Humanitarian food assistance (imported and/or sourced locally)

- Alternative or supplemental food sources, especially those obtained through common coping strategies

Including through:

- Likely changes in availability?

- Likely changes in civilian mobility, like an inability to travel to markets or fishing grounds?

- Likely changes in indirect impacts, like increased taxation, disruption to transfers through social networks, and changes in household labour capacity?

- Likely changes in household income and purchasing power, including due to the impact of organized violence?

### How is organized violence impacting food utilization and its stability?

How is organized violence likely to impact the ability of households to store, prepare, and metabolize food?

- How is organized violence likely to impact:

  - Safe water availability, access, and utilization?

  - Household food storage?

    - This may include storage infrastructure/assets and enabling systems like electricity

  - Household food preparation?

    - This may include interactions between organized violence and energy for cooking availability, access, and utilization, including preferred energy for cooking and any alternatives, whether firewood, charcoal, cooking gas, electricity, and other sources

  - The health environment, including IYCF, drivers of infectious disease, and healthcare availability, access, and utilization?

### Assumptions on likelihood of delivery and utilization of humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian food assistance in IPC analysis is considered in projection classifications when it is planned, funded, and likely to be delivered and utilized by a population. Inclusion criteria for humanitarian food assistance and how to conduct analysis of plans and funding are covered in IPC Guidance Resource 6: Humanitarian Food Assistance in IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analyses.

The likelihood of delivery and utilization by a population depends on many factors, including how a hazard like organized violence will likely interact with humanitarian programming. Analysts should review their analysis of the interactions of organized violence and mobility as well as humanitarian programming, then consider their most likely scenario for organized violence.

### Key questions for the likelihood of humanitarian food security assistance delivery and utilization

- How is organized violence, directly and indirectly, likely to impact the ability of humanitarian actors to enter an area, fully conduct their activities, and exit that area?

  - This includes different staff identities, such as foreign, same country but different area, or same country and same area, as well as contractual relationships, like staff or private contractors

- How is organized violence, directly and indirectly, likely to impact the ability of civilians to reach an area where humanitarian activities are occurring, fully engage in any activities, and exit that area with all assistance provided?

  - This should be considered against the social scope analysed under Key Question 3, including different social groups within an area and by gender and age

- If humanitarian food assistance that is planned and funded or likely to be funded includes digital cash-based transfers, then how is organized violence likely to impact, directly and indirectly, the enabling systems for these digital transfers, including electricity, telecommunications, and financial services?

*Risk factors to monitor*

Risk factors are potential triggers for analysis updates and new analyses, covering how key hazards may occur or evolve in ways that could positively or negatively impact food security differently than assumed in a single most likely scenario.

Risk factors for organized violence should cover how organized violence could occur or evolve in ways that are different from the most likely scenario, leading to improvement or deterioration in food security in the short to mid-term.

Like assumptions, risk factors should ideally be trackable, using a mix of generalized risks and specific risks identified during analysis. The addition of specific detail, while not required, will support monitoring efforts and help a TWG find consensus on whether a risk factor has occurred, and an update or new analysis is required.

For example, a general risk factor may include how conflict could intensify, expand, or reduce beyond what has been assumed. This covers nearly anything that could happen with conflict and offers flexibility to the TWG.

Additional specific risk factors may refer to key events and processes of concern that a TWG or AT identified during its analysis, where the TWG or AT already has some confidence in what the specific impact of the risk factor occurring would likely be on food security. This may include a statement like:

Conflict could intensify, expand, or reduce beyond what has been assumed, including the collapse of the local ceasefire in X and Y locations, leading to conflict escalation and a rise in displacement during the planting season.

## Communication of conflict analysis

This section supplements the IPC Style Guide section on IPC Analysis and Countries in Conflict.

*Communication products*

When an IPC analysis concludes that organized violence is a key driver of acute food insecurity, at least key aspects of the conflict analysis conducted should be described in IPC communication products, including briefs and snapshots, beyond listing conflict and/or organized violence in the key drivers' section. When organized violence is widespread in scope and/or the impact on food security is severe or extreme for large areas or populations, TWGs and ATs may consider a subsection on conflict in communication products.

The level of detail and length of publicly communicated conflict analysis should align with the degree to which organized violence is a driver of acute food insecurity as well as the sensitivities of publicly communicating this in each context. Any Catastrophe or Famine (IPC Phase 5) classifications caused by organized violence should be given greater detail than when organized violence is causing or contributing to minimal or no acute food insecurity. However, every aspect of conflict analysis does not always need to be communicated, including armed actor names not in common usage, analysis of interests, and analysis of other political processes related to conflict. Support in making these determinations is always available from the IPC Global Support Unit, including its Communications team.

When conflict or organized violence are a driver of acute food insecurity, TWGs and ATs must ensure that they are considered throughout all components of a communication product, including overview, current period, projected period, humanitarian food assistance, key assumptions, risk factors, and recommendations.

Citation of sources used in conflict analysis in communication products should refer to third-party, publicly available sources to the greatest extent feasible. Source citation should always prioritize safeguarding, as described under the section "Special Considerations for Conflict Analysis".

**Terminology:** The communication of conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must remain neutral and objective. This includes:

- Avoiding emotional, pejorative, or value-based language, such as adjectives like cruel or barbaric, armed actor labels like terrorist or thugs, and any insulting or inflammatory language including those based on identities, like ethnic or religious epithets.

○ Even when analysis suggests that an armed actor is heavily comprised of members of a specific social group or geographic area, no IPC analysis or communication product should use the name of that entire social group or geographic area in place of a name for that specific armed actor. For example, the names of entire ethnic groups should never be used as the stand-in for the name of an armed actor, such as "the conflict between the [ethnicity] and the [ethnicity]".

• Avoiding legal terminology, including accusations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other categories of acts found in national or international law, as these determinations are beyond the scope of IPC analysis and the IPC's mandate.

• Using the terms conflict or organized violence to refer to the hazard and using the term fighter to refer to an individual engaged in organized violence. Generally, do not use the terms armed conflict or combatant.

• Using official armed actor names when feasible in context. Armed actor names should reflect the consensus understanding developed when analysing the conflict landscape and not contradict other guidance in this note, including the avoidance of emotional, pejorative, and value-based language.

○ Naming armed actors can be helpful when describing organized violence. However, attribution for specific acts is likely not be needed or feasible in every context. In most cases, a reference to an armed actor does not need to include attribution to specific acts. Reference of armed actors should generally avoid directly assigning blame for acute food insecurity to specific armed actors in communication products, although this may sometimes be feasible.

## Supplemental section: organized violence and famine

Although the IPC famine classification is quantitatively defined, time-bound, and area-specific, the chain of events that leads to famine can be thought of as a process. A process view of famine focuses on the speed, scale, and direction of changes in food security and nutritional status, as well as other sectors like health and water, sanitation, and hygiene, and how movement through this process may be observed.[xxv]

Conflict analysis in the context of the IPC can make use of a composite view – where famine is an event and a process – in assessing how quickly deterioration in outcomes occurs. It can also support analysis of how likely it is to occur, up to and including Catastrophe/Famine. The rate of deterioration will vary depending on the pre-conflict vulnerability, including health, livelihoods, and socio-economic structures. Communities already facing high levels of stress, food insecurity, or with limited coping strategies available to them – including distress migration – are likely to deteriorate more quickly.

Historically, famines driven by climatic shocks could take several livelihood cycles to occur, as two or more consecutive harvests were missed, such as due to drought, in the context of subsistence agriculture. A famine process might take two to three years. For famine driven by organized violence – as recent famines have been – there is a risk that a famine process could begin and accelerate rapidly, taking less than one livelihood cycle to occur, or potentially less than a year.

Some initial key questions to ask regarding organized violence and an accelerated famine process include the below. If there is any potential for famine to be ongoing or to occur in the short-term, the following key questions should be considered, as applicable. This is not an exhaustive list of risk factors and analysts must also consider other risk factors within their context.

This section may be used independently or as a supplement to the guidance found in Risk of Famine: Definitions, tools and procedures for analysis. Any Risk of Famine or other famine-related analysis must adhere to all relevant protocols in the IPC manual and all other IPC resources.

### *Have any critical shifts in organized violence occurred in the last six months?*

Critical shifts are large and sudden changes in organized violence that may rapidly raise the risk of extreme food insecurity, including famine. While a single critical shift on its own may not be a signal of a rising risk of extreme food insecurity and famine, they may combine with other critical shifts, other hazards besides organized violence, and the vulnerability of the affected population. Some key critical shifts are highlighted below, although analysts may identify many other forms of critical shifts. All questions below are in the present tense, though analysts should consider how the impact of critical shifts and other events in the past may be interacting with any recent or ongoing critical shifts.

*Has comprehensive livelihoods targeting started to be used by an armed actor against a specific area or population?*

This question should use the conclusions reached for the questions on targeting (Key Questions 5-7).

*Have any large and sudden increases in the frequency and/or intensity of organized violence occurred in areas of concern, especially directed at livelihoods and coping strategies?*

- Large and sudden increases in the intensity and/or frequency of organized violence, especially when directed at livelihoods and coping strategies, can accelerate a famine process. These increases may take many forms, one of which may be an offensive.

- An offensive has the potential to act as a sudden-onset, high-impact shock capable of significantly altering conflict dynamics and food security, especially when livelihoods and coping strategies are directly targeted.

- Some possible but not required criteria for identifying an offensive include:

  ○ **Act(s) of aggression:** An operation initiated by one armed actor or set of armed actors against other actors, rather than something initiated against them. Generally, more proactive than reactive.

  ○ **Objective(s) of armed actors:** May be strategic or tactical.

  ○ **Multiple events:** Any single event alone is unlikely to constitute an offensive. Consider if a set of military actions has been observed that may constitute an offensive. May not be clear until offensive is well underway.

  ○ **Discrete period of time:** As a collection of actions, the offensive has a beginning and end.

  ○ **Scale:** Even in contexts of low-intensity conflict, at least some indications of atypically large scale of actions in terms of the number and types of forces involved. Different scales to consider include:

    - Geographic scale (administrative units, topographic features)

    - Organizational scale (types and numbers of armed actor units, integration of infantry, vehicles, aircraft, and artillery, indications of level of planning and operational coordination)

    - Temporal scale (length of operation, reasons for ending operation)

  ○ **Labelling:** An offensive may be reported and discussed as such by armed actors, media, humanitarians, researchers, etc.

*Has a siege begun or has an ongoing siege intensified, leading to lower permeability of that siege?*

This question relates to the siege subsection of the mobility section. Analysts should identify situations where an armed actor has control over entry and exit of civilians and/or food and other objects needed for survival for a geographic area through the use and threat of organized violence, potentially in combination with the natural environment. This may be an urban, peri-urban, or rural situation. The main concerns are the entry of food and other basic needs like water as well as the exit of civilians, including for distress migration. Sieges are often permeable to some degree, allowing limited goods into an area, such as through black markets or entry points beyond the capacity of the encircling armed actor, like tunnels or entry by air. Sieges with highly limited permeability or that are fully impermeable are the greatest concern for famine risk, especially in a prolonged situation. This may mean three or more months, though the definition of prolonged may vary by context.

*Have major changes to a frontline occurred, such as a large breach or total collapse?*

Frontlines are geographic areas where an area of control or area of influence of one armed actor meets that of another. It may be precisely defined, such as with armed checkpoints and basic fortifications, or it may have no precise delineation. There may be contested areas of uncertain control, or areas where no armed actor claims control.

### Has organized violence led to the loss of any critical mitigating factors?

Critical mitigating factors include some of the most important means of preventing, or at least delaying, a final collapse of coping and the onset of famine. Three critical mitigating factors commonly inhibited or fully prevented by organized violence are discussed below, although analysts may identify additional critical mitigating factors affected by organized violence. As with critical shifts in organized violence, the impact of past reductions or losses of critical mitigating factors should be considered when analysing recent or ongoing losses.

### Are there populations without viable distress migration routes?

This question relates to the mobility subsection. If there are no viable safe destinations or routes to safe destinations are closed or inhibited, then distress migration is likely not possible and will not be observed, even if a famine process is underway. This analysis must prioritize the perspectives of the affected population. If analysts believe a destination is viable or a route is open but qualitative data suggests that civilians do not agree with these conclusions, then it cannot be concluded that a destination is viable or that a route is open. Analysts must always consider if distress migration is not observed because there is not a need for distress migration or if it is not being observed because that strategy is not possible.

Are there civilian populations that humanitarian actors do not have full access to, including any areas with a complete loss of humanitarian access for three or more months?

Analysts should review any answers to the humanitarian programming subsection and utilize the same definition of humanitarian access provided there, including for humanitarian actors and civilians and across the three components: safe, uninhibited, and sustained.

Prolonged lack of humanitarian access to affected populations is of particular concern in IPC analysis, especially after civilians have started receiving and relying on humanitarian assistance for survival. It is important to highlight areas and populations where a complete lack of humanitarian access is prolonged, and for analysts to track this lack of access.

The period of three or more months should not be taken as an absolute quantitative threshold but only as a guiding number. Analysts may find that differing durations of humanitarian access loss will have varied humanitarian consequences, including severe and extreme food insecurity, in different contexts.

### Have rear areas been attacked or overrun?

Rear areas are spaces that are at least somewhat shielded from direct violence due to the active protection of an armed actor and physical distance. In these spaces, civilians may avoid significant livelihoods disruption or be able to invest in livelihoods, including the recovery of livelihoods degraded or destroyed by organized violence. A rear area may reflect pre-existing settlement patterns, such as villages not reached by attacks from an armed actor, or new ones, such as areas where an internally displaced population settles after fleeing organized violence.

Rear areas interact with civilian resilience. If they hold, they may promote resilience and allow core livelihoods like agriculture to resume after disruption. However, if civilians in a rear area establish and invest what limited resources they have in a rear area only to lose this investment when a rear area is attacked or taken over by a different armed actor, such as when a frontline shifts or collapses, then the deterioration in food security may be greater than if the rear area was never established.

# Annex 1: Common sources for conflict data and analysis

Conflict data and analysis should be sourced from reputable open-source information to the greatest extent possible. This will mitigate concerns regarding political sensitivities, bias, and other issues that can arise.

Available third-party data and analysis to support conflict analysis within IPC analysis will likely be unique to each context. However, some common global resources will most likely be available for situations in which IPC analysis requires supporting conflict analysis.

As with all other IPC analysis, many forms of data will be useful in conducting conflict analysis. This data may be quantitative or qualitative, primary or secondary. No single form of data is to be privileged over others.

What follows are only suggested public sources. There is no requirement to make use of any of the below.

## Lived experience

Organized violence and its humanitarian consequences are best described by the population experiencing them. TWGs are strongly recommended to actively seek out data based on lived experience, including through their own quantitative and qualitative data collection as well as secondary sources. The ways in which organized violence and its humanitarian consequences are described by the affected population, including their own terminology and definitions, should be considered alongside globally standard terminology and definitions.

As described throughout this document, lived experience is critical to conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. Key elements of this analysis, including the interactions of organized violence with gender and age as well as the viability of distress migration routes, cannot be concluded without any incorporation of lived experience.

## Conflict event data

TWGs are highly encouraged to identify sources for quantitative data regarding the occurrence of different forms of conflict events. This data also commonly includes key characteristics like event type, fatalities, geolocation, and armed actors involved. This data can be helpful in addressing many of his note's guiding questions, especially regarding the conflict landscape and the use of organized violence.

One recommended source of conflict event data is the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED).

ACLED has nearly global coverage and already covers all countries using IPC. It offers downloadable datasets after registration, providing georeferenced conflict event data over time. This includes a variety of open-source data, including from newswire and other media sources, as well as a range of other methods, such as bilateral agreements with organisations active in conflict settings.

ACLED data is publicly available and provides a broad look at conflict trends over space and time. It provides a strong quantitative foundation for conflict analysis for any country of concern to IPC. ACLED operates an Early Warning Hub, including analysis of sub-national conflict event trends and emergent armed actor analysis. This can support scenario-building for IPC projections. Access to ACLED data should be ensured prior to beginning conflict analysis to support IPC analysis.

ACLED also includes brief descriptions of each event reported. Event descriptions can offer helpful detail that should not be overlooked, especially when analysts seek to identify possible patterns in food-related violence.

In addition to ACLED, other conflict event data should also be considered, including through xSub, a database of conflict event databases.[xxvi] Other sources of conflict event data may include humanitarian organisations, like the International Non-governmental Organisation Safety Organisation (INSO), various teams or units within United Nations peacekeeping operations, and regional or locally focused observatories.

Additional quantitative input should also be considered when available. This may include the Violence Early-Warning System (ViEWS) at Uppsala University. ViEWS forecasts the risk and severity of conflict from 1-36 months in Africa and the Middle East.

While conflict event data may appear to provide much of the data a TWG seeks when analysing conflict, a note of caution is needed. Conflict event data comes with multiple well-known biases, especially when sourced primarily from publicly available, English-language media reporting.

Some of the most effective means of addressing common biases in quantitative conflict event data are also practices that this guidance generally recommends for IPC analysts. Reclassifying quantified characteristics of organized violence, like event or fatality counts, into categories can help mitigate bias in conflict event data. One example of recategorization rules for ACLED data supplemented with additional information, including qualitative data, is given in Figure 1.

Recategorization makes use of simple criteria for a limited set of categories, such as only High, Medium, and Low.[xxvii] As noted more broadly by Miller et al, the responsible use of quantitative conflict event data often entails trade-offs, including assessing and mitigating biases through acceptance of lower precision:

**Figure 18: Potential framework for recategorizing civilian fatalities from quantitative conflict event data**

| Civilian fatality level | Rule |
| --- | --- |
| High | Published source registers some civilian or unknown fatalities, AND interview data or published source suggests civilian killing was 'massive', 'widespread', 'large', 'collectively targeted' or 'indiscriminate', or that 'large numbers', 'many people' or 'scores' were killed. |
| Medium | Published source or interview registers some fatalities or some fighting between combatants, or displacement of civilians due to fighting, or evidence of major troop movements, or civilians being 'shot at' or 'attacked', BUT does not use the descriptors in the 'high' category. |
| Low | Published source or interview describes 'calm' or cites political events that should preclude civilian killings. |
| Unknown | Interview and published data absent. |

"For example, measures that are less precise may be less vulnerable to bias. A binary measure of whether a location experienced violent conflict in a particular year is more robust than a specific number of attacks; categorical data on casualties is more reliable than precise numbers of those killed or injured; and aggregating data spatially or temporally may be wise, depending on one's research question."

## International Crisis Group (ICG)

ICG offers publicly available, primarily qualitative conflict analysis, with coverage of every IPC country. It offers a robust starting point for understanding conflict dynamics, particularly the political, economic, and military logic of observed organized violence. ICG analyses tend to focus on the national level, and so may not be granular enough for specific geographic areas of concern for IPC. Nevertheless, it can still help to inform broad understanding of conflict dynamics. In some cases, it may be possible for a TWG to receive briefings from ICG prior to an IPC analysis workshop. TWGs are encouraged to identify the analyst or analytical team covering their context and engage with them to see what may be possible.

## Other organizational sources

Within any given country where conflict analysis in support of IPC analysis is to be undertaken, there is also likely an entire ecosystem of protection and conflict data collection and analysis unique to that context. This ecosystem may look different within each context in terms of its composition and size. TWGs must remember that every humanitarian organisation has obligations in conflict sensitivity, the first component of which is robust context analysis. The conflict analysis needed in IPC has a high level of overlap with the analysis needed for protection and conflict sensitivity, as well as programming across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. There are very likely to be multiple uses for the same analysis and TWGs are strongly encouraged to identify a range of actors that may be able to contribute to and benefit from conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis. The needed data and analysis may not always be called "conflict analysis" or refer to organized violence and TWGs will need to familiarize themselves with the actual content of a wide range of monitoring and reporting systems.

Additional sources may include humanitarian reporting on conflict and other events, such as the mixed methods work, including quantitative conflict monitoring, of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), conflict monitoring by an NGO Forum or other collective humanitarian body, and conflict monitoring by operational humanitarian agencies. There may be quantitative or qualitative conflict monitoring specific to one context, such as the Nigeria Security Tracker or Kivu Security Tracker. A variety of academic and other research institutions may also provide conflict analysis and other analysis directly relevant to conflict analysis, such as the Rift Valley Institute's work across the Greater Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region. IPC analysts should also make use of whatever media reporting is available directly rather than only secondarily through the datasets and analysis of others.

Many contexts will also have a range of publicly accessible reporting by various UN bodies, including Panels of Experts mandated by the UN Security Council, various units like a Joint Mission Analysis Centre or Human Rights Division within UN peacekeeping operations, and other analysis by UN missions, agencies, funds, and programmes active in the country. Data and analyses from these bodies may be quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods and all relevant organisations should be canvassed for new reporting prior to an IPC analysis.

## Armed actors

One often overlooked source of conflict data are armed actors themselves. It is important to consider what narrative a party to a conflict is seeking to build and the perceptions they are seeking to create among other parties, such as humanitarians or the general public. The media and propaganda of armed actors can at times be surprisingly telling, such as stated, specific plans to conduct an operation. This is not a suggestion to take armed actors at their word without question, but rather to incorporate the information they make available into conflict analysis alongside all other available information. The veracity and reliability of different types and forms of armed actor claims may become steadily clearer over time as patterns emerge.

## Food security, nutrition, and other routine data collection to support IPC analysis

As described in IPC Manual 3.1, the IPC does not and cannot prescribe data collection methodologies and is not a data collection tool itself. This Reference Documentcan only inform data collection in the same way that broader IPC analytical framework can. The below are only possible options that may be considered or built on and are not requirements of the IPC.

Data collection tool response options: Where organized violence is a hazard or could become one in the short to mid-term, TWGs should review response options in typical data collection systems like nationwide household surveys. These tools should include response options covering conflict or other comparable but locally understood terminology – with appropriate translations – are included. Criminality or banditry options may also be needed for ease of understanding, though these can be aggregated with conflict during analysis as needed. Common questions where these response options are needed include those linked to household experience of shocks, household challenges for activities like accessing a market and engaging in main/most important livelihoods, and other common modules.

Civilian mobility: Questions regarding civilian mobility and any challenges to it are often included in humanitarian assessments, especially for protection and conflict sensitivity. Food security and nutrition assessment can consider incorporating these questions or modified versions of them to ensure that civilian mobility and food security are directly linked. These questions may include how much mobility, such as travel time, is required for the main livelihoods and food security coping strategies identified by a household followed by questions about how far different members of that household can safely move.

Civilian mobility is ideally assessed quantitatively and qualitatively and would cover aspects of permissible mobility by armed actors where relevant as well as mobility as perceived by the affected population. It is essential to ensure data on mobility is disaggregated by gender and age otherwise critical nuance will be missed. If women and girls in a certain context are responsible for a specific coping strategy like wild food collection, but an assessment has only male respondents or data cannot be disaggregated by gender, then analysis of coping will be incomplete.

**PIPs:** It is important to ensure that PIPs are considered in all assessments and that, where needed, dedicated data collation is conducted, even if light-touch only. Data collection on PIPs may involve ensuring some coverage in routine data collection, like allowing for policy changes to be reported as a shock affecting households, as well as new data collection. This may include adjustments to monitoring tools like those for semi-structured interviews to ensure that basic but impactful policies, such as a publicly reported banning of a livelihoods activity for security purposes, are captured in broader food security and nutrition monitoring.

Armed actor revenue collection may appear harder to assess directly for humanitarians. In addition to desk reviews for information directly on this issue, humanitarian assessment may also be possible in some contexts. Common ways of doing so include, when feasible, interviewing or surveying key informants with information on revenue collection mechanisms like checkpoints when these potential respondents come areas accessible to humanitarian actors. These key informants may include herders, commercial drivers, farmers at locations like major market centres.

**Multi-sector coping:** No single indicator has been successfully developed to measure multi-sector coping. However, TWGs can consider options for measurement of coping strategies for other immediate threats to life, particularly protection and health. Knowing only that a food security coping strategy was or was not used is often inadequate for a complete analysis. To explore household decision-making regarding basic needs, other coping strategies must be explored. Often, coping with multiple threats to survival simultaneously means making severe trade-offs among needs, such as stopping travel to distant agricultural fields because they are unsafe or relegating infant and young childcare to young girls because older household members have been given new tasks. It is helpful to explore these issues quantitatively and qualitatively, including through possible adjustment to the Livelihoods Coping Strategy Index, the inclusion of additional non-food security coping questions in survey tools, and the adjustment of qualitative tools to allow for broader discussion of multi-sector coping.

**Livelihoods/coping mortality:** In standard assessment of mortality, such as a SMART survey, it may be possible to include a very small number of follow-up questions when a death is reported by a household. Follow-up questions could cover any activity that the deceased was engaged in at time of death, such as engaging in a livelihood or food security coping strategy. Livelihoods/Coping deaths can be considered as a subset of overall mortality for consideration in contributing factor analysis, including in analysis of the forms and targeting of organized violence. A high proportion of trauma-related mortality linked to livelihoods and food security coping could support claims of comprehensive or other livelihoods targeting in an area or among a population.

# Annex 2: Additional case studies

The following case studies are offered to provide additional examples of some of the aspects of conflict analysis to support IPC analysis highlighted in this document.

## Ethiopia and Madagascar: Famine processes with and without conflict[27]

The Tigray Crisis in Ethiopia demonstrates how conflict can accelerate a process of famine as compared to a famine process driven primarily by climatic shocks like drought, as in the case of Madagascar. Conflict began in the Tigray Region in early November of 2020. The organized violence that followed rapidly created severe and extreme food insecurity, leading to the largest magnitude famine conditions since the 2011 famine in Somalia.

While Tigray was generally one of the most food secure areas of Ethiopia in at least the five years prior to the onset of conflict, organized violence quickly shutdown trade, severely disrupted regional agriculture, and deprived many households of urban labour opportunities and some of the most lucrative seasonal labour opportunities in low-lying, sesame-producing western areas.[xxviii] Humanitarian operations also faced significant disruption due to conflict. In combination, this led to approximately 400,000 individuals experiencing famine conditions within 6-9 months of conflict, or much less than a single livelihood cycle for the region, such as in agriculture.[xxix] Famine conditions developed while organized violence remained widespread throughout Tigray region and before most organized violence began occurring outside the region.

In contrast, southern Madagascar experienced three consecutive years of drought, leading to successive disrupted or failed harvests in the same districts over three livelihoods cycles. The effects of the drought were also compounded by other shocks, including restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic and rising food prices. Overall, the onset of famine conditions, affecting a limited population, by mid-2021 and an identified risk of famine for one district in a projection period up to October 2021 were the result of a gradual famine process largely driven by climatic events and unfolding season by season.[xxx]

## Iraq and Syria: Armed actors and food systems

The impact of conflict on food systems is often assumed to be categorically negative, with varying degrees of loss for all food system actors. While this is frequently the case, conflict analysis that supports IPC analysis must also consider the ways in which armed actors use organized violence and the threat of it to exploit food systems in different ways, including for revenue generation and concrete demonstrations of governance capacity and ideology. By considering a more diverse range of interactions between armed actors and food systems, analysis can better understand the winners and losers of these interactions, including the impact on food security for different segments of a civilian population.

The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, has featured concerted efforts by many armed actors to exploit food systems. Martinez and Eng argue that for any armed actor in Syria, the provision of welfare to civilians within territory they control or seek to control has been as important to their long-term viability as the actual use of violence. Armed actors have sought to bolster their own capacity in welfare provision, especially in relation to food security, while degrading that of their adversaries. This has been seen prominently in armed actor behaviour related to the provision of bread.

Then Syrian Prime Minister Wael Halqi said in 2014 that "We will always provide the needs to produce bread, which is a red line for the Syrian government". This statement was backed by massive government expenditures on bread subsidies, support to the infrastructure behind bread production like milling facilities and bakeries, and the systematic targeting of this infrastructure in areas controlled by armed opposition groups. Other armed actors sought to compete with the Syrian government, including the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria. So-called "wheat wars" involved efforts by Kurdish authorities to outbid the Syrian government competition for wheat production and trade, including by offering much higher rates to farmers when purchasing their harvest.

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[27]  Whereas a Risk of Famine was identified for certain areas in Madagascar and Ethiopia, no Famine classification was made in either country in this period.

Islamic State (IS) likewise sought to compete in bread provision, including through price controls, subsidies, distributions, and other mechanisms. However, IS' focus on food security also extended far beyond bread, including systematic efforts to control land and agriculture. At its territorial peak in Iraq and Syria in 2014-2015, IS controlled much of the breadbaskets of Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, IS seized 60% of the cropland in Ninewa province and 75% of the cropland in Kirkuk province, which together accounted for 40% of Iraq's wheat production. Ninewa alone accounted for 56% of Iraq's barley output. IS fully or partially took over governates in Syria cumulatively accounting for 77% of wheat production and 72% of barley production. See Figure 11 for a map of how the territorial peak of IS overlapped with a significant proportion of the agricultural land in Iraq and Syria.

**Figure 20: IS area of influence at territorial peak and agricultural land in Iraq and Syria**



Contrary to international expectations, agriculture in these areas did not collapse after IS took them. In many areas 2015 was even a bumper harvest after above-average rainfall. By one estimate, wheat and barley production alone may have yielded up to $56 million 2015 at prevailing IS tax rates for irrigated and rain-fed crops. Total agricultural revenue would also account for additional crops, like fruit and cotton, as well as additional points of taxation along the value-chain, including processing and distribution, which IS was known to tax.

IS exploitation of agriculture was not limited to taxation, however. From 2014 to 2018, agriculture:

- "…allowed the Islamic State to control land, food, populations, and the economy";

- "…provided the Islamic State with an income stream that was not only more resilient to external attacks than other sources, but also one that played into the group's governance ambitions, allowing them to convey the appearance of a legitimate state";

- "…allowed the Islamic State to demonstrate, through its actions, a real-world manifestation of its Salafi-Jihadi ideology".

- To accomplish these aims, IS established a Department of Agriculture and Livestock, which was "responsible for agricultural and animal resources," as well as "maintaining food security for Islamic State residents." This department, in conjunction with others, imposed an intrusive system of regulations on the civilian population and their livelihoods. This included timetables for agricultural activities, harvest plans and monitoring, requirements for crop types, regulated water usage, and rules on household grain stocks. It also engaged in the systematic expulsion of some groups from their land, including religious minorities, and the redistribution of this land based on IS' ideology, as well as widespread land rental conditional on payments and use for agriculture. The IS effort to control agriculture within its territory even went so far as to mandate that "no harvesting can be conducted without the presence of an authorized person from the Department of Agriculture and the farmer or his agent".

This case study highlights how assumptions of food system collapse due to conflict, or a close spatial and temporal relationship between conflict events and food security outcomes, could lead to inaccurate IPC analysis. Armed actors interact with food systems in many different ways, including not only direct attacks, but various forms of exploitation. Food systems may become an integral component of armed actor revenue-generation or strategies for broader governance and manifestation of ideology. When non-state armed actors seek to systematically regulate a food system or a component of it, as in the case of Islamic State's Department of Agriculture and its work in Iraq and Syria, civilians may experience shocks and stressors directly related to conflict, but not necessarily to events involving the use of direct violence.

## Mozambique: Reference period analysis and forecasting conflict

Following years of increasing tension in Cabo Delgado province in north-eastern Mozambique, an insurgency began in October 2017. While the group is sometimes formally known as *Ahl as-Sunna wa-l Jama'a*, it is more generally known as al-Shabab, or the youth. This is not to be confused with the al-Qaeda-linked group al-Shabaab in Somalia. Despite numerous battlefield defeats in subsequent years, including repeated raids on its encampments, the insurgency continued to grow and adapt. It has demonstrated increasing capacity, including in tactical coordination and intelligence, including the ability to mobilize hundreds of fighters for major attacks on large towns or military bases.

In June 2019, al-Shabab became the Mozambican wing of Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), together with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Though nominally a single group, ISCAP operates as two distinct but affiliated groups in a way similar to ISWAP and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). While ISGS is technically subsumed under the West African Province, it does not appear to be operationally controlled by ISWAP. As an affiliate of IS, *al-Shabab* is not directly controlled by IS-Central in Iraq and Syria. The benefits of affiliation are likely more diffuse than vertical integration or a large resource injection, including being able to adopt the branding of IS, receiving some degree of technical and other assistance, and attracting some involvement of foreign fighters, especially more ideological group members. The leadership of the group is thought to only partly be Mozambican, with Tanzanians constituting a major portion. This inner core is considered to be the most ideological component of the group.

By June 2020, *al-Shabab* was estimated to have up to 1,500 fighters despite recurrent heavy losses, with at least some in the Mozambican government estimating that there were thousands of additional members or supporters in non-combatant roles like mechanics and nurses. The group reached its territorial peak, at least temporarily, after its March 2021 takeover of the strategic coastal town of Palma. This event spurred international action on the insurgency, including the deployment of 1,000 Rwandan personnel and a deployment from multiple member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The size of the SADC force was not publicly disclosed, though an earlier suggestion had been for a force of up to 3,000. Joint Mozambican and Rwanda operations retook a series of towns from al-Shabab in the following months, including the recapture of Mocímboa da Praia, which the group had held since August 2020, the only district capital under their control.

Even at its territorial peak so far, it is unclear to what extent *al-Shabab* tapped major potential revenue sources, including the precious stones common to some areas of Cabo Delgado and the drug trade, especially heroin, that makes use of Swahili Coast ports like Mocímboa da Praia. The group did not appear to establish much in the way of administration in areas of control or influence, including the *zakat* collection now seen in areas of other IS affiliates like ISWAP. Raiding civilians for basic resources like food and clearing the civilian population from some areas continues to be common, though there have been at least some instances of the public distribution of goods like food by the group.

With the Rwandan and SADC deployments rapidly leading to major territorial losses for *al-Shabab* after a string of insurgent victories, some observers may be tempted to forecast the continued defeat of the insurgency. However, even some in the Mozambican government concede that the outright military defeat of the group is unlikely and that containment and degradation may be the path to success. The structural factors that supported the onset and growth of the insurgency remain in place, including the basic ecology of Cabo Delgado, especially its dense forests and extensive coastline, as well as its land border with Tanzania, the significant underdevelopment of the province, and a variety of long-held political grievances among social groups within the province and between some of these groups and the central government. In addition to considering how the repeated regrowth, and often expansion, of *al-Shabab* since the early days of the insurgency in 2017 can inform forecasting of conflict dynamics, comparative analysis can also be useful.

One option for comparative analysis to support forecasting may be to consider the jihadist boom-bust cycle proposed by Aisha Ahmad. Examining attempts to build jihadist proto-states globally, Ahmad finds similar patterns among many different attempts. She defines a jihadist proto-state as "a nascent political entity that features a near monopolization of force in a territorial enclave within or across state borders, a hierarchical leadership with repressive capabilities, and rudimentary governing institutions to enforce laws". While it is not immediately apparent that al-Shabab was actively engaged in the establishment of a jihadist proto-state per se, it has consistently vocalized and acted on grievances related to governance and daily life, like adherence to a specific interpretation of sharia and sought to actively control large areas, including a district capital.

Ahmad uses the concept of a boom-bust cycle to depict three spectrums. These cover forms of external pressure, jihadist strategy, and jihadist governance. External pressure ranges from surges to withdrawals of forces opposed to a jihadist group. Jihadist strategy includes withdrawing from territory and investing in non-tax revenue-generation like licit and illicit businesses to fund insurgency to claiming territory and investing in governance, funded by taxation. Jihadist governance refers to the overall operating methods of a jihadist group, ranging from an insurgency to more systematic rule through a proto-state, as by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. See Figure 12 for a graphic depiction of the boom-bust-cycle.

## Figure 21: Ahmad's jihadist boom-bust cycle

Ahmad uses the boom-bust cycle to explain how jihadist groups endure through expansion and contraction, including how they may expand again even after the establishment and collapse of a proto-state. While *al-Shabab* did not appear to establish a proto-state itself, this model can be useful in thinking through how the group's strategy and tactics may evolve in the 6-12 months, or longer, following major territorial losses and the potentially sustained presence of external forces alongside Mozambican security forces. As ISWAP appeared to learn the lessons of 2015, when their declared Islamic state was steadily dismantled by a combination of Nigerian security forces, foreign mercenaries, and regional security forces. Without the capacity to ensure the sustained occupation large swathes of rural areas, especially the forests and mountains most hospitable to insurgent basing, ISWAP rebuilt over a period of years.

A similar progression of events may unfold in northern Mozambique, as the longevity of foreign deployments in Mozambique and the capacity of the Mozambican armed forces, outside of several special units, is in doubt as of late 2021. *Al-Shabab* may adjust its strategy and tactics to reflect the bust segment of the cycle, rebalancing towards insurgency, investing in businesses, including a wide range of licit and illicit trade, and revising plans for when and how to reoccupy strategic territory, including port towns, after foreign forces reduce or end their operations in the north. In the short to mid-term, the group may attempt to continue its predatory management of the territory it continues to have control or influence over, though the treatment of civilians may stabilize to ensure some minimal level of resources is available to a group now confined to more rural and remote areas of the north.

Deeper consideration of other African affiliates of Islamic State, as well as other jihadist insurgencies in the way of Ahmad, may yield further insights. All of these possibilities regarding *al-Shabab's* trajectory, especially their potentially evolving treatment of civilians and counterinsurgency policies directed against them and civilians in the north, will have significant consequences for the food security status of the civilian population. Assuming that armed actor strategy and tactics will remain static, or that recent battlefield losses will permanently reduce the capacity and territorial holdings of *al-Shabab*, are unlikely to hold true.

# Annex 3:  Levels of organized violence

Organized violence often occurs at different levels, including in its geographic scope and objectives.[xxxi] Organized violence at any level can cause, sustain, and contribute to acute food insecurity, including famine. These levels are not mutually exclusive and may overlap. The end or pause of one type of conflict may not automatically mean the end or pause of another. In some cases, a pause or cessation or one category may contribute to the initiation of a new conflict of the same or a different type now that resources can be reallocated.

Three levels that may be useful in IPC analysis include:

- **National Violence:** A situation of violence involving two or more armed actors using organized violence in pursuit of national objectives, including but not limited to regime change, devolved governance or autonomy, or secession. The state is likely to be, but is not necessarily, one of the main armed actors involved.

    - **South Sudan Example:** Beginning in late 2013, the government of South Sudan and the non-state Sudan People's Liberation Army-in Opposition (SPLA-iO) were engaged in a civil war, where the SPLA-iO sought to use force to take control of the national government and enact its political agenda or at least compel adoption of portions of this agenda. This conflict was the primary reason for the 2017 declaration of famine in South Sudan.

- **Sub-national Violence:** A situation of violence involving armed actors without identified national level objectives, which are pursuing political agendas beyond limited local issues, engaging in violence characterized by multiple indicators of organisation and intensity. Sub-national violence may involve objectives focused on natural resource access and control, and thus may have economic or political aims.

    - **South Sudan Example:** On 16 May 2020 in Jonglei State, a large grouping of well-organized fighters originating from Pibor County launched a coordinated attack on a series of villages over a 70 km stretch of Uror and Nyirol Counties, primarily in furtherance of subnational political, social, and economic objectives. Despite claims that this was a large cattle raid, no cattle camps were reportedly targeted and mass cattle seizure did not occur. While the heavy involvement of uniformed security personnel among both the attacking and defending forces was observed, neither government security forces nor the SPLA-iO or other nationally-oriented rebel groups were the primary armed actors engaged. The situation of violence within which this event occurred ultimately led to a declaration of Famine Likely for a small area of Jonglei State by the end of 2020.

- **Localized Violence:** A situation of violence involving armed actors or groups without nationally or sub-nationally oriented objectives. Such violence may be recurrent and/or severe, but of limited geographic and social scope.

    - **South Sudan Example:** Through the 2020 dry season, small groups engaged in intense organized violence involving up to several hundred fighters, with dozens of fighter and civilian fatalities, over a limited geographic and social scope on the Western Flood Plain. Objectives were primarily a mix of political and social and fighting was concentrated among a small set of fourth-level administrative units. Localized violence has frequently been a major driver of the occurrence of localized famine conditions in several of the worst-affected areas, including areas like Greater Tonj as well as Cueibet County.

# Annex 4: Armed actor capacity to use organized violence

This annex is to support analysis of armed actor capacity. Capacity refers to the ability of an armed actor to use organized violence to achieve strategic goals and tactical objectives. It involves many attributes that can be assessed separately. While a comprehensive analysis of armed actor capacity is neither necessary nor likely possible within an IPC analysis, a basic understanding of capacity is needed to understand the most likely impact of organized violence on food security.

Some aspects of capacity are highlighted in the following questions, like group size, but others that can require greater nuance, like training, are not. Aspects not covered can still be introduced into the analysis if such information is readily available or considered critical for a given analysis.

- Can the size of the armed actors be roughly estimated, including likely available fighters as a numeric range?

    ○ A general understanding of armed actor size can help analysts triangulate reports of organized violence, assess likely impact of organized violence, and make projections about future organized violence.

    ○ A precise count of fighters is likely neither possible nor desirable. However, approximations of size are often available from public secondary sources for many groups. It is helpful for analysts to get a general sense of the order of magnitude of an armed group's fighters. While there may not be any significant difference between a group having 500 fighters or 600 fighters, analysis of group may be substantively impacted by concluding that a group likely has tens of fighters instead of thousands of fighters.

    ○ Fighters refers to individuals who directly engage in organized violence on behalf of the armed actor. This does not refer to broader definitions of membership in the group, like the dependents of fighters that do not directly engage in combat. Fighter is deliberately intended to be a more flexible category than the international legal definition of combatant. Analysts supporting IPC analysis should not attempt to determine if any legally specific categories like this apply.

    ○ Example: Reports from multiple reliable sources may indicate that a series of battles occurred in a specific area over a week. Some reports may describe the number of fighters involved as "large," while others may estimate numbers of fighters involved, like "around 1,000" or "low thousands". Certain sources may compare the number to standard unit sizes in conventional military structures, like reporting that "battalion-sized forces" were involved – although background of the source matters, as unit sizes may differ across different systems. While it is not possible to put together a precise estimate of the number of fighters involved in this series of events, it is possible to get a rough idea of the size and to compare this with rough estimates of armed actor fighters in the relevant area. The rough size of forces may be much larger than the armed actors known to be in the area, like a local militia, suggesting that other armed actors became involved.

- Does the group seem to have dozens, hundreds, or thousands of fighters?

    ○ While an exact count of a group's force size is not necessary here, it is helpful to at least have a sense of the order of magnitude of the group's strength. Even a very rough estimate can be helpful initially and revised later if needed.

- How many fighters appear to be involved in a typical attack by this group?

    ○ When the group conducts its most common form of operation, roughly how large does the attacking force appear to be? Again, order of magnitude can still be helpful even if precise estimates are not available.

    ○ Do reports often mention tens, hundreds, or thousands of fighters estimated to have participated in individual attacks? Does this number often fluctuate? Do different forms of organized violence often seem to involve different numbers of fighters?

- Are fighters in the group full-time or mobilized when the group needs them, such as to conduct an attack or to defend against one?

  ○ Fighters may be in the group full-time, as in the standing army of a state or some version of part-time, such as for specific operations or seasonally, as can be common in many community-based groups. Groups may also use a mix of these types of fighters.

    - Consider how the use of full-time or some form of part-time fighters may affect an armed actor's capacity to use organized violence at different times of the year. A group that maintains a standing core of fighters year-round, but mobilizes a majority of its fighters seasonally, such as in the months before a staple crop harvest when labour is available, does not have the same capacity at all times of the year.

- What are the types of weapons most commonly used by the armed actor?

  ○ Weapons may include small arms, light weapons, and heavy weapons, though refers broadly to any equipment used to commit violence.

    - Small arms can be considered here as firearms operated by an individual, including handguns, rifles, and light machine guns.

    - Light weapons can be considered here as crew-served firearms like a light mortar or mounted heavy machine gun, small explosives like hand grenades, and firearms with explosive munitions like a rocket-propelled grenade that are man-portable.

- Example: While there may be frequent organized violence in a given area, many incidents may involve only small arms. Only some incidents may involve light weapons, like a light mortar. This detail may, along with other evidence, signal that certain events are of greater significance than others.

    - Heavy weapons here can be considered as those too large or heavy for operation by one or several individuals on foot, including heavy mortars, towed or self-propelled artillery, and armoured fighting vehicles like tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

    - Access to heavy weapons may be limited in many contexts. Even when an armed actor has access to heavy weapons, they may be cautious in their deployment if they are difficult to replace once lost. In this way, heavy weapon deployment and usage may sometimes act as a strong signal of which armed actor was involved in a given event or pattern events, the intensity of organized violence, and the intentions of an armed actor. Consideration of heavy weapons can be particularly helpful in projection analysis.

- Example: Reports of organized violence may indicate that shelling occurred. In a context where numerous local groups operate but do not possess artillery that could be used for shelling, the detail of shelling may help analysts determine that an actor other than the local groups became involved, a potentially useful indication when combined with other information. If it is known that the only armed actor in an area possessing the needed artillery at the time was government security forces, then this may indicate that these forces became involved.

  ○ A detailed and exact inventory of a group's weaponry is neither possible nor needed. Considering general categories of weapons may support analysts in triangulating reports of organized violence, assessing likely impact of organized violence, and making projections about future organized violence.

  ○ It can be helpful for analysts to consider some basic questions about weapons, including:

    - Do most fighters of the group have access to small arms?

    - Do at least some fighters in the group have access to light weapons?

    - Does the group have access to at least some operational heavy weapons?

- Is the group able to conduct operations far from where it bases its fighters?

  ○ The meaning of 'far' here depends on the context. 'Far' for a community-embedded militia may refer to geographic areas outside of those where its community resides. 'Far' for a national military may refer to distances from its formal bases, as well as from main roads, airports, and other critical transportation infrastructure. For any armed actor, 'far' refers both to distance and the difficulty of traveling that distance, such as due to elevation and land cover.

  ○ When a group conducts operations far from where it typically bases its fighters, is it able to maintain the presence of these fighters over time?

    - Even if a group is able launch operations far from where it normally bases its fighters, it may not have the capacity to keep fighters supplied and may keep operations short as a result.

    - There may be areas where the group's fighters stay for a few hours, a few days, or a few weeks. Maintaining a presence may look like establishing new bases or camps and then leaving them or occupying existing infrastructure like a village or the base of another armed actor.

# Annex 5:  Armed actor control over territory and/or population

- Armed actors seek to control territory and population. Armed actor control must be considered as degree of control, rather than absolute categories of control/no control. Control of population may not also mean control of territory, just as control of territory may not mean control of population.

  ◦ Armed actors are also not the only actors seeking to exert control over territory and population. Other actors, including formal and informal civilian institutions, also seek control.

- Control is unlikely to neatly fit with the boundaries of existing administrative units in reality, even if this remains a common way of mapping armed actor control. It is likely that multiple armed actors, like an insurgent group and state security services, exercise a degree of control over the same territory and population in at least some areas.

  ◦ Example: While state security services may exert a high degree of control over a territory and its population during the day, another armed actor may have greater control at night. A population may be paying taxes to the state as well as to the armed group, while having access to dispute resolution mechanisms offered by the state as well as the armed actor. There may or may not be violence occurring in this area even as multiple armed actors exert varying degrees of control in different forms.

- Analysts can consider a framework for assessing control that covers three dimensions: spheres, practices, and capacities.

  ◦ Spheres of control refer to aspects of daily life over which an armed actor may try to exert control. Spheres include economic, social, and political activity. These spheres may often have a high degree of overlap.

    - The economic sphere includes all economic activity, including that of food systems. Control in the economic sphere may include efforts to extract revenue, such as through the taxation of livelihoods activities like agricultural, as well as to influence what sort of activity occurs, like the cultivation of certain crops instead of others.

    - The social sphere includes the daily life of civilians and their behaviour. Control in the social sphere may include operational and normative control. Efforts in operational control may include restrictions on what civilians can do, like build houses within a certain distance of an armed actor camp or base, or curfews. Efforts in normative control may include other aspects of civilian behaviour, like regulation of civilian clothing or religious activity.

    - The political sphere includes activity related to authority and decision-making. Efforts in political control may include the co-optation of existing authority structures, like community-level institutions for decision-making, or the establishment of new structures. They may also include changes in which actors are able to participate in different kinds of decision-making, like the exclusion of a certain social group or all women from decision-making.

  ◦ Practices of control refer to the forms taken by efforts to exert control over different spheres. Practices may vary widely like forms of violence. Different practices may be used in different spheres and in line with different armed actor capacities.

    - Key practices of concern include violence, dispute resolution, taxation and other revenue collection, regulation of movement, and regulation of access to aid and other services.

  ◦ Capacities of control refer to the "resources that enable armed groups to apply practices of control and shape different spheres of control". Three key capacities include coercive, organizational, and financial.

    - Coercive capacity refers to an armed actor's capacity to use organized violence.

    - Organizational capacity refers to an armed actor's ability to exercise control over its own fighters and other personnel, including the use of organized violence only when sanctioned by armed actor leadership. This also includes any mechanisms of accountability within an armed actor for when fighters and other personnel do not comply with rules, norms, and other guidance from armed actor leadership.

    - Financial capacity refers to the financial resources that an armed actor is able to access.

- Analysts can consider practices of control across the three spheres as indicators of control for their analysis.

  ◦ Analysts may consider where armed actors have high, medium, and low degrees of control for both territory and population. Analysts may also consider additional categories as needed, though categorical designations are recommended rather than quantitative ones. Multiple armed actors may also exhibit mixed degrees of control across the same territory and population.

- High control may include territory and populations where an armed actor:

- Moves openly during the day, including fighters with weapons

- Systematically collects revenue through mechanisms like taxation of livelihoods and civilian movement

- Successfully engages in dispute resolution through the operation of courts or other justice institutions

- Successfully regulates civilian movement

- Successfully regulates civilian access to aid or other services

- Uses highly selective violence infrequently to enforce its control

- Medium control may include territory and population where an armed actor:

- May not always move openly during the day and fighters may not be able to openly carry weapons at all times

- May engage in some forms of revenue collection, but it is not consistent throughout the territory or across the population

- May engage in some dispute resolution activities

- May engage in some regulation of civilian movement and access to aid or other services

- May use selective violence frequently or a mix of selective and indiscriminate violence to enforce its control

- Low control may include territory and population where an armed actor:

- Does not move openly during the day, especially fighters with weapons

- May engage in limited revenue collection, which may be ad-hoc and focused on one or several key activities

- May attempt little or no dispute resolution activities

- May attempt little or no regulation of civilian movement and access to aid or other services

- Uses mostly indiscriminate violence to enforce control or does not attempt to use coercive practices to exert control

○ Analysts should consider if armed actors are competing for control of territory or population in an area or if only one armed actor exerts control.

**Figure 22: Bahiss et al Cycle of Control**

# Annex 6:  Patterns of violence

- Establishing patterns of violence for a general situation as well as specific armed actors is essential to disaggregated analysis of organized violence, including profiling armed actors and identifying food-related violence.

- One definition includes "the pattern of violence (A, X, T, L) is the matrix summarizing for organization A, subunit X, at time period T, and at location L the forms of violence, and for each combination of form, target and technique, the frequency in which X regularly engages". Figure 14 summarizes each of these key terms:

**Figure 23: Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood definition of 'pattern of violence'[xxxii]**

## Table 1
## Definition of "pattern of violence"

| Dimension | Definition | Examples (not exhaustive) |
|---|---|---|
| Repertoire | The forms of violence in which the organization regularly engages | Homicide, torture, forced displacement, rape, forced abortion, etc. |
| Targeting | For each element of the repertoire, the social groups against whom the organization regularly engages with that form of violence. | An ethnic group, male members of an ethnic group, political prisoners, prisoners of war, LBGTI persons, combatants of rival organizations, residents of "enemy" village or neighborhood, etc. |
| Technique | How the organization carries out that form of violence against that social group | Techniques of killing include execution by firearm, execution by machete, shelling, suicide bombing, etc. |
| Frequency | The count (of events or victims) or the rate of attacks, of victimization or of perpetration by the armed organization using a specified repertoire element, targeting and technique (or their specified aggregates, e.g., the frequency of torture with any technique). If a count, ideally it would include some estimate (however rough) of its uncertainty. If a rate, both the numerator and the denominator should be clearly specified. | For example, take a case in which the repertoire element is torture and the social group is political detainees. (Assume that the analyst is not concerned with differences in technique). If it is possible to estimate frequency, the count would be the incidence (the number of incidents of torture or of persons, along with an estimate of its uncertainty), prevalence,[a] or rate of perpetration,[b] depending on the purpose of the analysis. |

A. The number of persons tortured at least once/the number of detainees

B. The number of incidents or persons tortured/the number of members of the relevant unit of the armed organization (all members or the members of the responsible unit, depending on the purpose of the analysis)

# Annex 7:  Significant or atypical armed actor movement

- The deployment or redeployment of fighters and military assets may refer to the activity of any armed actor. Military assets refer to any assets of an armed actor that are not personnel, including weapons, vehicles, and supplies like ammunition, food, and medicine.

- While analysts are not expected to have detailed information regarding all armed actor movements and dispositions, they are expected to take note of available reporting on significant armed actor movements.

  ○ Significant may refer to the size of a movement, including the number of fighters, vehicles, and units. Reports making note of "large," "mass," or similarly described shifts in the positioning of an armed actor's fighters may indicate that the occurrence of organized violence is likely in conjunction with other information. There are reasons other than organized violence that large numbers of fighters may be moved, including training exercises and natural hazards.

  ○ Significant may also refer to key fighters or weapons:

    - Key fighters may include elite fighters that have received advanced training and are regularly paid and supplied in contrast to other fighters or units. These may special forces or other units with special designations like guarding national leadership or engaging in counterterrorism. They may also be lower capacity units but have a history of being used for specific tasks like engaging in offensives where high casualties are expected or engaging in indiscriminate violence. Fighters may be both elite and have a history of highly specific assignments, like offensives, making them a stronger indicator of future organized violence.

    - Key weapons may include heavy or otherwise advanced weapons, like helicopter gunships, multiple-launch rocket systems, or unmanned combat aerial vehicles, otherwise called drones. Sometimes, the movement of such weapons may indicate a likely change in levels of organized violence, particularly in contexts where these weapons are not widely available. Where an actor only has a small number of something like a helicopter gunship, and suddenly most of these aircraft are deployed to one area of a country, it may signal a coming change in organized violence in that area.

# Annex 8: Additional tools for projection analysis

## Reference periods

- Reference periods can guide projection analysis for conflict. Analysing how similar situations have occurred and evolved in the past within the same context and across other contexts can inform the assumptions made about conflict dynamics within a projection period. Such analysis can make use of historical knowledge of a context, such as previous periods of conflict as well as comparative cases from other contexts.

- This analysis should not automatically rely on the most recent years of conflict data available, as current and projection periods may not be structurally similar to recent years. Analysis is needed to select the most appropriate reference period, which may be recent or more distant from the current or projection periods.

- While historical events will not repeat themselves deterministically, they can inform an understanding of how conflict dynamics and their humanitarian consequences can potentially occur in the present and near-term future. The organized violence of today is strongly informed by that of the past, which is often heavily and explicitly recognized by armed and other actors themselves.

- Reference period selection requires distinct analysis. While this can be done as required in real-time, it is more efficient and effective to use a combination of primary and secondary data to build up a working collection of reference periods related to organized violence and how food security was impacted. This functions as a form of baseline analysis, as some aspects of reference points are unlikely to change or may change slowly over time.

## Pre-mortem analysis

- A pre-mortem analysis assumes that an outcome of concern has already occurred and then considers different pathways resulting from that outcome. A pre-mortem analysis can help analysts identify how something like organized violence could plausibly cause outcomes like extreme food insecurity or famine.

- Pre-mortem analysis can be considered as a tool. Analysts can specify that an outcome like Ph4 Emergency has occurred due to organized violence, and then assess how this could plausibly happen. This may involve working backwards chronologically from the Ph 4 onset to the current period of analysis.

# End notes

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