


<b>Republic of Yemen</b>	<b>IPC analysis – Summary of findings</b> <b>Part 1: Acute Food Insecurity Projected Situation Overview</b>	<b>Valid until: 31 July 2017</b> <b>Created on: 1 March 2017</b>
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**Key Highlights**

- Food security in Yemen has deteriorated further since the last IPC analysis conducted in June 2016. An estimated **17 million people**, which is equivalent to **60% of the total Yemeni population**, are **food insecure and require urgent humanitarian assistance to save lives and protect livelihoods**. Among those, approximately 10.2 million people are in IPC Phase 3 ‘crisis’ and 6.8 million people are in IPC Phase 4 ‘emergency’. Nationally, the population under Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) has increased by 20% compared to the results of the June 2016 IPC analysis.
- **Conflict and civil insecurity are the main drivers of food insecurity** with devastating effects on livelihoods and the nutrition situation.
- **Displacement:** As of January 2017, over 2 million individuals were displaced across 21 governorates mainly due to the conflict. 85% of the conflict related IDPs come from Taiz, Hajjah, Sana’a City, Sa’ada and Sana’a Governorates. In February 2017, the Task Force on Population Movements reported an additional 44,226 IDPs, with the majority (31,860 individuals) from Taiz Governorate (Al Mokha and Dhubbab districts), followed by Al Hodaidah Governorate with 9,162 people.
- **Livelihoods and market disruptions:** The widespread civil insecurity has affected both urban and rural livelihoods resulting in protracted and continuous worsening of the food security situation. Restrictions and disruptions of commercial and humanitarian imports, mass displacements, loss of income, fuel scarcity and high prices, disrupted market systems, high food prices and the collapse of public services are aggravating the already fragile socio-economic context. Port infrastructure, essential for ensuring food imports and humanitarian assistance, are seriously threatened by the worsening conflict. Cultivated area and production in 2016 decreased by 38% compared to the pre-crisis period, affecting food availability and household stocks. Similarly, the majority of fishermen lost their fishing assets such as boats, nets and fishing gear and essential fishing infrastructure has been damaged.
- **Economic crisis:** The economic status of 78% households in Yemen is currently worse than in the pre-crisis period. This is mainly due to public budget deficit, which has led to a reduction in government expenditures, delayed or total unavailability of salaries for government employees since September 2016, collapse of the social protection system, liquidity crunch of the local currency, depreciation of the Yemeni Riyal against the US Dollar and depletion of central bank reserves. The economic meltdown aggravated and affected all dimensions of food security, especially food availability and access.
- **Acute malnutrition** is a major outcome of the severe food insecurity and is at alarming levels. Malnutrition has been a serious problem in Yemen for a long time, especially chronic malnutrition (stunting). However, the prevalence of acute malnutrition (wasting) has been rising in recent years, peaking in the last three years. Out of 22 governorates of Yemen, four governorates (Abyan, Taiz, Al Hodaidah, and Hadramout) have Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) prevalence above the WHO Critical threshold ( $\geq 15\%$ ). Seven and eight governorates have GAM prevalence at serious levels (10-14.9%) and poor levels (5-9.9%), respectively.
- **Humanitarian assistance** to most affected governorates did not fully cover the targeted beneficiaries in 2016. Main challenges faced are; lack of funding, the ongoing conflict, restricted movements of humanitarian aid workers and procurement and transportation of lifesaving supplies. Going forward, unconditional humanitarian access must be facilitated by all parties for all humanitarian actors to reach the most affected populations and scaled up to reach the demands of the growing population in need.
- **Worst affected Governorates:** Out of 22 governorates, **Seven Governorates are in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency)** –Lahej, Taiz, Abyan, Sa’ada, Hajjah, Al Hodaidah, and Shabwah. **Ten Governorates are in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis)** – Aden, Amran, Dhamar, Sana’a Governorate, Sana’a City, Ibb, Marib, Raymah, Al Mahwit, and Hadramout, and **three Governorates are in IPC Phase 3!** - Al Jawf, Al-Dale’e, and Al Bayda.



## Part 2: Summary of Findings, Methods, and Next Steps

### Key findings and issues

#### 1. Food Security and Nutrition

At national level, according to the nationwide Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessments (EFSNA – November - December 2016), all food security outcomes indicators have deteriorated. An estimated 17 million people are in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) as of March 2017 and throughout the March-July 2017 period. This means that at least 60% of the Yemenis do not have enough food to eat. In comparison with the previous IPC analysis conducted in June 2016, food security - as reflected by the number of people in IPC Phase 3 & 4 - has deteriorated by 20%. Nevertheless, there was a relative improvement in the overall food security situation in some districts of Ad Dale'e and Al-Bayda, which contributed to a shift to IPC Phase 3! from IPC Phase 4. This does not mean the two governorates are better off now. The food security situation remains unstable, the drivers of food insecurity are present and their relative improvement is largely attributable to ongoing and planned humanitarian assistance and improved access in some districts within the governorates. Moreover, the ongoing ground fighting and disruption of food availability and access has resulted in Al-Jawf Governorate worsening from IPC Phase 3 to IPC Phase 3! since the last IPC analysis in June 2016. Although the security situation has improved in Hadramout Governorate, the overall economic situation including agriculture, livestock, fisheries and small business has worsened and showing no improvement, reflecting alarming food insecurity and livelihood situation and shifting Hadramout from IPC Phase 2 in June 2016 to IPC Phase 3 in the projected IPC analysis.

The most prominent drivers for food insecurity include rising prices of food, fuel for cooking and irrigation, water and medicine, accompanied by the poor performance of the agriculture and fishery sectors, loss of jobs and income opportunities and internal displacement of millions of citizens. Moreover, the liquidity crisis has directly affected more than 7 million members of the families that depend on government salaries thereby reducing not only their food purchasing power, but also their access to basic goods and services. Other factors include the lack of public social welfare programs, and overstretching of informal/traditional social protection mechanisms to protect the poorest and most vulnerable people as exacerbated by the increasing number of households hosting IDPs.

Malnutrition has been a serious problem in Yemen for a long time, especially chronic malnutrition (stunting). However, the trend of acute malnutrition has peaked in the last three years. Out of 22 governorates, four governorates – Taiz, Abyan, Al Hodaidah and Hadramout have Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) measured by Weight-for-Height Z scores above 15%, which is global emergency threshold according to WHO standards. Seven and eight governorates have GAM prevalence at “serious” levels (between 10 and 14.9%) and “poor” levels (between 5 and 9.9%), respectively. Al Mahara and Soqatra Governorates have no recent nutrition surveys or assessments.

Malnutrition status is aggravated by the dramatic breakdown of the health care system and its infrastructure, impact of the ongoing conflict, outbreak of cholera, and other epidemics, which affected several governorates for several months in 2016, depletion of safety nets, distressed livelihood coping strategies, and reduced ability to access food both physically and economically. Results from nutrition surveys conducted between August and December 2016 by UNICEF, MOPHP, nutrition partners and multi-sectoral EFSNA indicate that an estimated 2,030,000 children (1,035,000 boys and 995,000 girls) under the age of five are acutely malnourished and face an increased risk of morbidity and death. As a result, major attention to address acute malnutrition within this particular group in the different governorates should be given to provide emergency acute malnutrition treatment (OTPs and TSFP programs) as well as preventive services.

#### 2. Conflict and Internal Displacement

Since the escalation of the conflict in March 2015, most of the households are exposed to multiple risks, which resulted in massive internal displacement and out-migration. Some have returned to their original homes while others have been displaced for the last two years. According to the Task Force on Population Movement (TFPM) report (January 2017) around 2,007,216 individuals are currently displaced due to the conflict across 21 governorates. The majority of IDPs are from Taiz (547,200 individuals), Hajjah (391,596), Sana'a City (327,024), Sa'ada (315,138) and Sana'a Governorate (98,208). High proportions of IDPs were displaced within the first six months following the start of the conflict in March 2015; and 84% of IDPs have been displaced for more than a year. Moreover, the TFPM Emergency Tracking Report of February 2017 shows that, out of an additional 44,226 IDPs, 31,860 individuals were displaced in Taiz Governorate alone due to the recent escalation of the conflict in Dhubab and Al Mokha districts.

Fifty eight percent (1,157,664 individuals) of IDPs are hosted in five governorates among which three are in IPC Phase 4 (Taiz, Hajjah, and Sa'ada) and the other two are in IPC Phase 3 (Sana'a and Sana'a City). More than half (51%) of IDPs are hosted within communities while 20% are in collection centers or spontaneous settlements, causing an additional burden to the already exhausted resources and livelihoods options. During displacement, the majority of the IDPs lost/sold their livelihood assets and have had limited opportunities for employment and income options, which severely compromised their economic access to food. The food security and nutrition status of the IDPs is worse compared to non-IDPs. According to the recent EFSNA, the prevalence of households with poor Food Consumption Score (FCS) is higher among IDPs and refugees than non-IDPs at 30.5%, 38.6%, and 26.6% respectively. The Severe Household Hunger Score (HHS, 4-5) for IDPs is at 16.0% and Moderate HHS (IPC Phase 3) is at 32.1%, while for the non-IDPs the Severe HHS is 7.9%. The food security and nutrition situation among the displaced continues to deteriorate due to the malfunctioning economic system, weak institutions and poor access to basic services, combined with another wave of violence and instability and limited resources for emergency livelihood assistance and recovery programs.

### 3. Livelihoods and socio-economic impact of the conflict

The main sources of income for Yemenis vary and depend on the type of livelihoods practiced by the members of the households. According to EFSNA, the main sources of household income are regular salary from the public and private sector (40%), casual labor in both agriculture and non-agriculture (30%), petty trade and sale of agriculture and fish products (20%) and the remaining (10%) is from other sources, such as remittances. The ongoing conflict has seriously affected an already deteriorating economic performance, disrupted livelihoods, and income options in a number of ways. The airstrikes and ground fighting have damaged essential infrastructure for both public and private sectors including markets, roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, residential houses, power stations, agricultural farms, shops and water lines. As a result, most of the private businesses have been forced to shut down or reduce the workforce by more than half. The main reasons were physical damage to premises, loss of capital, mounting debt, lack of electricity and fuel, which has led to loss of livelihood options for more than 50% of the population.

The public budget deficit almost doubled between the first half of 2015 and 2016. Consequently, the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) was unable to finance the fiscal deficit, causing a severe liquidity problem leading to public budget expenditures and domestic debt service suspension in July 2016. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the oil and gas sector declined by about 76%, contributing to a drop in the GDP per capita in 2015. The oil and gas exports declined by about 86% in 2015 caused by a drop in foreign exchange reserves, and destabilizing the local currency. Moreover, lack of donor support has increased the deficit and may contribute to further depreciation of the Yemen Riyal (YER). To finance the deficit, the CBY used up most of its cash stocks, thereby causing a liquidity crisis. The entire social protection system has collapsed, with the suspension of safety nets programs for 1.5 million beneficiaries through the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) and 1 million beneficiaries for the public works program supported by the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and other public investment programs since mid-2015. In addition, monthly salary payments for public sector employees were suspended in September 2016, affecting more than 7 million people who are depending on that livelihood. Donors suspended most public investment programs, which has further affected millions of people who were benefiting from public works and cash for work development programs. Spontaneous insecurity incidence from time to time has affected small business and petty trade which the majority of poor households depend on for their livelihood. The recent damage on Amran's Cement Factory for example directly affected 54,000 people, including employees, casual workers, and residents through the closure of the plant. The same applies to the Al Barh Cement Factory in Taiz Governorate and the Bajil Cement Factory in Al Hodaidah Governorate, which were both heavily reliant on the Amran factory for raw materials and other inputs and had to shut down.

Basic social services, including education, health, and water, are collapsing in several areas of the country and humanitarian needs are on the rise, which puts growing pressure on humanitarian stakeholders in the country. As of October 2016, 1,604 schools had been damaged or destroyed as a result of the ongoing war, which deprived 720,000 students of their right to education. About 2 million children, including 513,000 internally displaced children, in Yemen are currently out of school. This represents 27% of the 7.3 million school-aged children. The liquidity crisis and the non-payment of teachers' salaries for months have also contributed to undermining education in the country. The overall livelihood and socio-economic situation is not showing any signs of improvement and, combined with the reduction and suspension of government salaries, is most likely to have a substantial negative impact on the overall food security situation in the country.

### 4. Local Agricultural Production:

The agricultural sector is critically important to both overall economic performance and poverty alleviation in Yemen. The majority (60%) of the households in Yemen practice agriculture (crop and livestock production) and consider it as their main source of income. Agricultural production in Yemen covers around 25-30% of the country's annual food requirement. In addition, the agriculture sector employs more than 50% of the workforce in the country. The central highlands, the southern uplands and the western coastal areas of Tihama are the core areas for the production of sorghum, millet, vegetables, fruits, and other cash crops in Yemen. Scarcity and high prices of fuel have resulted in high cost of irrigation, transportation, and marketing of agriculture products, in addition to increased prices and unavailability of agricultural inputs making the returns from sales lower than production costs), thereby forcing farmers to reduce cultivated areas by 38% in 2016 according to the EFSNA.

Crop production in the 2016-cultivation season experienced several constraints related to lack of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, fuel for irrigation, and others. Similar to crop production, livestock production, in particular small ruminants, decreased by more than 35% in 2016 compared to the pre-crisis period. This is related to a number of constraints aggravated by the current conflict, such as limited access to animal feed (e.g. fodder, access to the grazing, concentrate and mineral blocks etc.) and disease control due to the collapse of the disease control services. In addition, livestock holders have been forced to sell their animals to cover family basic needs. In 2016, the poultry sub-sector - largely a private investment - experienced major challenges related to the availability of and access to inputs, in particular poultry feed and vaccines, which are 100% imported.

Fishing is a key livelihood sector in Yemen especially among the coastal communities in the Red and Arabian seas. At different stages of the fish value chain, there are important income sources and self-employment opportunities. The fishing industry is dominated by the small-scale sector, which currently supports the livelihoods of an estimated 667,000 people. Due to the current conflict, the majority of fishermen lost their fishing capital such as boats, nets and fishing gear and essential fishing infrastructure has been damaged. Fishing areas are limited and fishermen cannot move freely within the normal fishing zones. In some areas of the western coast such as Taiz and southern of Hodaidah fishing activities are totally stopped and this may expand along the western coast if fighting continues in that area. In addition, shortage and high prices of fuel, damaged of lack of cool storage facilities, high transport cost and limited marketing opportunities are the main challenges for the sector. Moreover, due to the closure of land, air, and marine ports for fish exports that cause either loss or reduced employment and income for many traditional fishermen.

## 5. Market situation and food commodities' prices

More than 70% of rural communities rely on local markets for their daily food requirements. Markets are also very important to the farmers, as these are the only avenue to sell their products and get inputs for their farms. According to the EFSNA, under normal times, more than 50% of the rural households do not have a market within their localities. The nearest markets for 40% and 20% of households are within 6-20 Km and more than 20 Km, respectively. Physical access to markets is therefore one of the main constraints particularly in the highly conflict affected governorates. Moreover, markets and road infrastructure are in poor state for the functional markets. Destruction of road infrastructure has adversely affected food transportation and distribution resulting in increased prices and sporadic availability of some food commodities. Except for informal black market trade, traditional cross-border trade with neighboring countries is no longer possible, which has seriously affected the whole production and marketing chain in the Agriculture and Fishery sector.

The availability of imported commodities is severely affected by the continued depreciation of the YER against the US Dollar (USD) resulting in price increases of basic food and non-food commodities. The Governorates of Taiz, Sa'ada, Hajjah, and Shabwah, which are under IPC Phase 4, are among the most affected in terms of availability of commodities in local markets. Moreover, imports of essential commodities including food items are adversely affected by the lack of foreign currency and YER depreciation – with the average exchange rate in January 2017 reaching higher than YER330/USD in parallel markets compared to the official rate of YER250/USD. The National price of basic commodities sharply increased compared to the pre-crisis period. According to market price bulletins published by FAO/FSTS and monthly market watch published by WFP, in January 2017, prices of essential food items increased sharply after staying stable for the past four months. Consequently, the national average price of wheat flour (main staple) was 32% higher in January than in the pre-crisis period. Prices of red beans and sugar also rose by 55% and 26%, respectively. Taiz, Al-Al Hodaidah, Shabwah, Sa'ada and Hajjah (IPC Phase 4), Mareb (IPC Phase 3), and Al Jawf (IPC Phase 3!), are the most effected by high food commodity prices. Coupled with poor purchasing power and insecurity, inflation is expected to significantly worsen the food insecurity situation among poor households including IDPs and returnees.

### **National level Assumptions for Food Security Outcome Projection (1 March 2017 to 31 July 2017)**

The IPC National Technical Working Group (NTWG) determined the development of food security outcomes in all the governorates and contributing factors to build the most likely scenarios for the projection period, to facilitate decision-making, response analysis, planning and implementation. Governorates under Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) are given due attention due to the likelihood of further deterioration of food security outcomes. Special focus was also given to two highly populated governorates (Al Hodeida and Taiz) located along the western Red Sea coast where fighting is ongoing and with the highest number of IDPs.

- The ongoing conflict and insecurity is expected to continue in most of the governorates, most significantly in Taiz and Al Hodaidah Governorates, along the Red Sea coast. In all areas of concern where the conflict is ongoing or most likely, it is expected to affect the onset of the cultivation season from April onwards. This will prevent normal access to fields for cultivation, further cause of populations' displacements, disrupt livelihoods, periodically interrupt trade flows, and limit availability of food in the markets.
- The following shocks and hazards are expected to continue during the projection period:- Continuation or sporadic escalation of conflict, high food prices, continued displacement, increased prevalence of diseases, shortage of fuel, blockage on imports, limited or no humanitarian assistance to the affected population, declining wage labor, worsening income and purchasing power, currency crisis and insolvency. The compounded effects of the shocks and hazards will directly affect food security outcomes in the projected period.
- In the coming months, food consumption could further deteriorate and worsen more particularly in the districts with active conflict and blockage
- Scarcity and high cost of fuel and other agriculture inputs and expected poor access to the farmlands will drastically affect all local agricultural production chain and the main source of income for the rural population.
- The liquidity and the hard currency issue will remain the same affecting the overall economic system of the country. Yemen Riyal value against the USD will most likely further decline.
- Imports of commercial and humanitarian food into the country is expected to be severely affected if the Al Hodeida port infrastructure is further destroyed by airstrikes or if there is active fighting within Al Hodeida city. There is high probability of progressive increases of basic commodity prices because of slower import trends. Given the volatility of the situation in Yemen, a deterioration can potentially be very sharp and sudden, should the conflict substantially reduce or impede imports completely because of more infrastructure damage to Al Hodeida port. The most likely scenario is that Al Hodiadah sea port will continue to function in the next 5 months, but in its minimal capacity as the fighting progresses towards the port from the southwest part of the governorate.
- The suspension of safety net programs (SWF) is expected to prevail and households that dependent on this scheme will continue to suffer.
- The macroeconomic situation will most likely deteriorate further. The delays/suspension of salaries for government employees are likely to remain unchanged.
- If humanitarian actors do not have access to the people in need to provide much needed humanitarian assistance, and side-by-side implementing activities that enhance livelihood resilience, larger populations than those estimated will be food insecure by the end of the projected period.
- The food security and nutritional status of vulnerable populations is likely to deteriorate further and some pocket areas are likely to experience more catastrophic conditions unless an adequate level of humanitarian food assistance and protection of livelihood is availed.
- Shortage of foreign currency may further worsened which will severely affect imports.
- The supply and availability of essential food and non-food commodities is likely to deteriorate further.
- Limited job opportunities and income generating activities will remain unchanged at minimal level.
- The overall economic, social, and political situation will most likely remain unchanged or may further deteriorate during the projected period.

## SPECIAL FOCUS

### Al-Hodaidah Governorate

Al-Hodaidah is the second largest governorate in Yemen in terms of population size. It boasts a population of about 3.19 million people, accounting for 11.5% of the total Yemeni population. The June 2015 and June 2016 IPC analyses classified Al-Hodaidah in IPC Phase 4, similar to the projected analysis for March – July 2017. The governorate has been exposed to a large numbers of airstrikes since the escalation of the conflict in the last 2-3 months, damaging infrastructure, including the biggest seaport for food and non-food commodities in the country and notably affecting food supply and imports.

**Current Situation:** According to EFSNA data, food consumption indicators (Poor FCS is 21.1%; Borderline FCS: 32.8%; HHS Moderate: 37.5%) show a major deterioration that led to a number of people moving from acceptable to borderline FCS and from borderline to poor FCS, compared to 2014. Livelihood change indicators (direct evidence) shows that 18.6% of the households practices crises coping strategies, and 11.9% of the households practice emergency coping strategies, thereby reflecting upper IPC Phase 3 levels. In addition to livelihood disruptions, in and out migration due to the ongoing conflict has resulted in significant loss of employment. Indirect: hand fish production is limited due to restriction in fishing areas. In addition, the majority of fishermen have lost their productive assets such as boats, nets and fishing gear and also essential fishing infrastructure. Damages to the sector infrastructures along the coastline of the Red Sea and the Yemeni, siege of land, sea and air, have led to the destruction of all exports and related activities. Average household sheep holding decreased by 35% in 2016 compared to pre-crisis levels. Global acute malnutrition (WHZ) is at 25.3%, which is considerably high, above the WHO critical emergency threshold ( $\geq 15\%$ ) which is indicative of IPC phase 4.

#### Assumption over the coming months (March - July 2017)

- **Hazards:** Conflict is assumed to continue in this area and livelihoods are expected to be further affected due to insecurity. Displacement will also take the same trend through July.
- **Availability:** Rainfall and weather conditions are expected to follow the normal seasonal patterns through July. The evidence used for this analysis represents a post-harvest season (cereals); therefore, it seems justified to assume that the outcome elements will deteriorate during the period of analysis if sufficient support is not delivered. It is assumed that Al Hodaidah port will remain operational and allow imports. However, the macroeconomic crisis will result in a decrease in imports and overall availability of food.
- **Access:** Diesel prices, agriculture inputs and conflict will likely restrict participation in farming and fishing activities even in the peak fishing and agriculture season. During Ramadhan, which is scheduled for June, prices of livestock and main commodities will go up. Generally, prices are projected to increase by 40% between February and July and by over 50% compared to pre-crisis period. Incomes are expected to be below average and Government salaried employees would not earn on time. The social welfare fund is expected to remain inaccessible.
- **Food Assistance:** Planned food assistance is expected to increase in terms of ration size per capita, but not in terms of number of beneficiaries. This trend will continue at current level (national figure) up to May but starting from June there is no plan for food assistance due to lack of resources. In addition, current food assistance maybe redirected towards other most affected governorates.

#### Conclusions:

In the coming months, considering the above-mentioned assumptions, Food Consumption is expected to deteriorate and the number of people in Phase 3 move more consistently towards IPC Phase 4, especially because of the eroded purchasing power of the most vulnerable and the foreseen increased prices of imported food. This deterioration is assumed to be linear and limited to the population not targeted by food assistance, however, shall this governorate not be prioritized by humanitarian agencies and – in any case by May 2017 - should the food assistance be subject to significant disruption, the situation might sharply deteriorate. Taking into consideration the Yemen context with different contributing factors related to the livelihoods of the people, the main livelihoods of most the vulnerable groups including casual labourers (both agriculture and non-agriculture), fishermen, marginalized groups, the landless, women headed households, and government employees, will be disrupted. As a result, the main livelihoods of most vulnerable groups in the governorate will deteriorate and will be under risk of further erosion as the alternative livelihood options are very limited and exhausted. The nutrition situation, already in IPC phase 4 is expected to further deteriorate and its level should be kept under strict monitoring and surveillance is necessary as pockets of higher severity could develop especially in the south of the governorate. The other contributing factors including the reduction of agriculture production, reduction of commercial and humanitarian food imports into the country and the different constraints of food transportation and distributions to the needy population have contributed to shortages of food in the market and reduced overall supply, which have resulted in the deterioration of food consumption. In addition, the purchasing power of the households has been significantly reduced unable to cope with the high prices of food and other essential commodities.

### Taiz Governorate

Taiz is one of the most populous governorates in Yemen with a population of 3.18 million and above, accounting for 11% of the total Yemeni population. The June 2015 and June 2016 IPC analyses classified Taiz in IPC Phase 4 same as with the projected analysis in March – July 2017 showing the deteriorated food security situation and eroded Livelihood coping mechanisms. The governorate is one of those with active conflict and most sustained fighting since 2015. The conflict has reached most of the districts of Taiz and the city has been under siege for around two years.

#### Current situation:

Food consumption indicators show the following: Poor FCS: 31.6%; Border line FCS: 38.1%; HHS moderate: 29.9%; HHS severe: 6.5% and rCSI >20: 33.8%. Convergence of these indicators shows that the food consumption in Taiz is at IPC Phase 4 levels. Compared to the pre-crisis (2014), poor and borderline FCS significantly deteriorated. Only 30% of the populations have acceptable FCS. The livelihood change indicators (direct evidence) are showing that 51.5% of the households practice crisis coping strategies and 6.5% practice emergency coping strategies. Moreover, Taiz has the highest number of IDP in the country. In January 2017, more than 30,000 people fled from Almokha districts alone. In addition, it is the most affected governorate by the on-going conflict, which resulted in significant loss of employment. Fishing in the coastal part of Taiz (Almokha and Dhubab) stopped totally. All exports from the governorate stopped due to closure of land, sea, and airports, which led to loss of livelihood activities for most households. In addition, the government employees have not received their salary for more than 5 months. Global acute malnutrition as of May 2016 in Taiz city was 17% with SAM 1.9% and in Lowland was 25.1% with SAM rate 5.3%. The prevalence of acute malnutrition is high and above the WHO critical emergency threshold ( $\geq 15\%$ ) which is IPC phase 4.

#### Assumption over the coming months (March – July 2017)

- **Hazards:** Taiz has seen the heaviest and most sustained fighting since the conflict escalated in 2015. The conflict has reached most of the districts of Taiz and the city has been under siege for around two years. Access in and out of the city remains restricted and dangerous for both patients and humanitarian actors. Recently, armed hostilities have increased substantially along western districts, including fierce fighting in the districts of Dhubab and Al Mokha. Heavy fighting is expected to continue in coming months and may expand to other districts within the governorate. Livelihoods population will further be affected due to insecurity. Displacement rates will also take the same trends through July 2017.
- **Availability:** Rainfall and weather conditions are expected to follow the normal seasonal patterns through July. However, the insecurity can affect agriculture activities in the fighting areas, in addition to the lack of inputs for both crops and livestock. Therefore, it is assumed that the local production will deteriorate during the period if sufficient humanitarian support is not delivered. Al Mokha port will remain closed. Fishing also will not be possible in the coast of Taiz. Physical access to most of districts will remain difficult and complex, affecting food availability in the governorate.
- **Access:** Shortage and high prices of diesel and agriculture inputs due to the conflict will likely restrict agriculture activities in the governorate. During Ramadhan, which is scheduled for June, prices of livestock and main commodities will go up. The prices in Taiz compared to the pre-crisis period is the highest in the country, the imported food commodities in February 2017 were higher by 72% for the wheat flour, 88% for sugar, 50% for rice, and 69 % for imported vegetable cooking oil. For diesel, in January 2017, the price was still significantly higher than the pre-crisis period, i.e. by 85% for diesel, 136% for petrol, and 180 % for cooking gas. The social welfare fund will remain inaccessible and liquidity issues and people's income may remain the same or worsen.
- **Food Assistance:** Humanitarian aid to the different pocket areas is very challenging to many aid agencies. Unless, humanitarian assistance reaches the affected population in the coastal areas of Al Mokha and neighboring districts, as well as in the highlands and the three districts of Taiz city, the humanitarian situation might deteriorate further among the 1.6 million people under acute need. Moreover, the recent wave of violence in the coastal area and sporadic fighting in the highland districts might further complicate humanitarian assistance and access in Taiz. An immediate and consistent supply of assistance to the affected population is of paramount importance.

#### Conclusion

In the coming months and taking into consideration the above-mentioned assumptions, the food consumption could further deteriorate more especially in the districts with active conflict and blockage. The scarcity and high cost of fuel and other inputs with poor access to the farmlands can drastically affect the coming seasons starting in April, which will have a direct impact on the agricultural production chain, including labor. If humanitarian actors do not access all the people in need by the coming months, the situation may deteriorate dramatically. The nutrition situation as it was explained above (IPC phase 4) is expected to further deteriorate and its level should be kept under strict monitoring and surveillance is necessary as pockets of higher severity could develop especially in the lowland districts including Almokha and Dhubab where heavy fighting is ongoing. The other factors contributing to this deterioration include the reduction of agriculture production, complication of the commercial and humanitarian food imports into the country and the different constraints of food transportation and distributions of humanitarian aid to the needy population.

### Methods, Process & Key Issues

The Yemen IPC National Technical Working Group (NTWG) convened and conducted the acute food insecurity analysis from February 20 to 23, 2017, covering the 22 governorates of Yemen using the IPC Acute Food Insecurity Classification Protocols. The analysis team was composed of multiple agencies representing different governmental and non-governmental organizations, including UN agencies, resource partners, and international partners. The IPC process brought together available food security information in a systematic manner to produce the best possible estimates of the food security situation under the prevailing conditions. Despite the difficult conflict period, the IPC exercise had full participation of 69 analysts drawn from the Yemen NTWG, including government ministries, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations and representatives from Governorates.

The IPC accredited trainers from FAO and WFP conducted a 2-day refresher training on IPC Version 2 tools and procedures prior to the analysis workshop. The EU funded FAO/FSIS programme in close coordination with WFP VAM Unit and the Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS) of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), which facilitated the training and analysis workshop. The Yemen IPC NTWG collected and collated available data and information on food availability, access, utilization, and stability from assessments carried out in 2016 and two months in 2017. The data repository included the Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (EFSNA), WFP's mVAM and market monitoring system, FSTS/FSIS Market Data, OCHA, UNICEF/MoPHP SMART surveys data, WHO, FSAC, government institutions, recent TFPM Reports, rapid assessments from Save the children, Acted, Oxfam, NRC and others, which were made available to the IPC analysis team. In addition, the latest reports from the different Governorates and the local knowledge and different expertise from NTWG members contributed to the systematic IPC analysis and classification of the governorates using Acute Food security IPC protocols.

The analysts included experts in agriculture, livestock, nutrition, food security, statisticians, engineers, economists, markets, water & sanitation and other persons familiar with the governorates. Nine groups were formed to work on governorate level meta-analysis. Each group included a combination of experts from the different sectors together with other experts familiar with the socio economic and other contributing factors in the governorates. The small groups conducted the analyses and presented to the plenary discussion using the IPC analysis worksheets and analytical framework. Finally, the IPC phase classification map was produced through an intensive discussion and technical consensus among the members of the NTWG. Population estimates for each phase and governorate were calculated using the general principles of the IPC. The Yemen IPC NTWG concluded that the analysis was based on sufficient evidence to reach the highest levels of confidence (i.e. "High" Confidence) for the majority of the governorates as per IPC protocols, except for three governorates Sa'ada, AlMahara, and Soqatra which lacked recent data and for which confidence levels are "acceptable".

The Yemen NTWG requested the IPC Global Support Unit (GSU) to carry out a Real Time Quality Review (RTQR) as an added quality assurance step in the validation process of the Yemen IPC Acute Analysis. The purpose of real time review was to support IPC quality assurance and help ensure technical rigor and neutrality of the analysis. The exercise provided an additional technical input to the Yemen IPC TWG, before the stakeholder validation and release of IPC Analysis results. The RTQR review also provided an important learning exercise for Yemen IPC partners to help identify IPC technical areas to strengthen for improved quality assurance of future IPC analyses, especially in relation to best use of evidence.

Indicators to be monitored (all governorates)	
Civil unrest and Conflict	Weekly
Food Availability and Imports ( commercial and humanitarian)	Weekly
Expenditures trend (Purchasing Power)	Quarterly
Fuel price and availability	Weekly
Main commodities prices	Weekly/Monthly
Health and Nutrition	Weekly/Quarterly
Humanitarian assistance and access	Monthly
Internal Displaced Population Movement (IDPs, Returnees and Refugees)	Monthly
Rainfall and seasonal performance	Monthly
Casual labor opportunities and rates	Monthly
Terms of trade (wage and animal vis-à-vis food)	Monthly
Exchange rate YER against foreign currencies	Weekly
Human, plant and livestock diseases	Monthly
Water availability	Quarterly
Natural hazards	Quarterly
Desert Locust	Monthly



Part 3: Population Table

YEMEN IPC - 1 March - 31 July 2017 Estimated Population by IPC Phases

Governorate	Total Population (CSO projection 2017)	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		P3 and above	
		%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No
Ibb	2,837,000	24%	680,880	20%	567,400	40%	1,134,800	16%	453,920			56%	1,588,720
Abyan	568,000	10%	56,800	10%	56,800	35%	198,800	45%	255,600			80%	454,400
Sana'a City	3,233,000	20%	646,600	25%	808,250	40%	1,293,200	15%	484,950			55%	1,778,150
Al Bayda	760,000	28%	212,800	20%	152,000	35%	266,000	17%	129,200			52%	395,200
Taiz	3,182,000	5%	159,100	20%	636,400	40%	1,272,800	35%	1,113,700			75%	2,386,500
Al Jawf	589,000	40%	235,600	15%	88,350	30%	176,700	15%	88,350			45%	265,050
Hajja	2,129,000	10%	212,900	15%	319,350	30%	638,700	45%	958,050			75%	1,596,750
Al Hodieda	3,189,000	15%	478,350	30%	956,700	30%	956,700	25%	797,250			55%	1,753,950
Hadramout	1,489,000	20%	297,800	20%	297,800	45%	670,050	15%	223,350			60%	893,400
Dhamar	1,913,000	20%	382,600	25%	478,250	40%	765,200	15%	286,950			55%	1,052,150
Shabwa	632,000	5%	31,600	20%	126,400	35%	221,200	40%	252,800			75%	474,000
Sana'a	1,150,000	25%	287,500	20%	230,000	40%	460,000	15%	172,500			55%	632,500
Aden	925,000	10%	92,500	30%	277,500	50%	462,500	10%	92,500			60%	555,000
Laheg	983,000	15%	147,450	15%	147,450	25%	245,750	45%	442,350			70%	688,100
Mareb	329,000	25%	82,250	30%	98,700	30%	98,700	15%	49,350			45%	148,050
Al Mahwit	695,000	35%	243,250	25%	173,750	25%	173,750	15%	104,250			40%	278,000
Amran	1,052,000	25%	263,000	25%	263,000	35%	368,200	15%	157,800			50%	526,000
Ad Dale	720,000	27%	194,400	25%	180,000	30%	216,000	18%	129,600			48%	345,600
Rayma	566,000	34%	192,440	20%	113,200	30%	169,800	16%	90,560			46%	260,360
Sa'adah	1,078,000	10%	107,800	10%	107,800	35%	377,300	45%	485,100			80%	862,400
Al Maharah	150,000	60%	90,000	25%	37,500	10%	15,000	5%	7,500			15%	22,500
Soqatra	66,000	50%	33,000	35%	23,100	10%	6,600	5%	3,300			15%	9,900
National	28,235,000	18%	5,128,620	22%	6,139,700	36%	10,187,750	24%	6,778,930			60%	16,966,680

Recommendations for Next Steps and Decision Making

- The March 2017 IPC analysis results highlight an alarming food security and nutrition situation in the country during the period March –July 2017. The food insecure population requires urgent humanitarian assistance to save lives and protect their livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition. Special advocacy and lobbying for humanitarian access and support to those inaccessible districts is urgently required.
- Special attention should be given to certain districts and IDP populations within the governorates where pocket areas of more severe food insecure populations may be present and masked by governorate level analysis. Of particular interest are Taiz governorate districts in the Lowlands -western coast, Taiz City, and southern district in Al Hodaidah Governorate.
- Advocate and lobby for the lifting of restrictions that limit importation of essential commodities and access to humanitarian services.
- The protracted conflict has continued damaging the lives and livelihoods of the population. The humanitarian community, donors and partners should continue advocating for and implement the twin-track approach of providing humanitarian assistance, and side by side implementing activities that enhance resilience of livelihoods.
- Food security and nutrition outcomes and humanitarian assistance should be monitored, as the situation could further deteriorate if response mechanisms are not in place. The Yemen IPC NTWG highly recommends to all stakeholders and decision makers to continue providing the necessary technical, financial, logistics, and administrative support to regularly conduct Integrated Food Security and Nutrition surveys that will be used for the next IPC. This will ensure that all governorates have most recent data and information.
- To ensure compatibility and synergy, stakeholders and partners are advised to streamline their data/information collection and analysis according to Yemen and international standardized assessment methodologies. In order to analyze the food security and nutrition situation at a lower administrative level, the Yemen IPC NTWG recommends planning district level data collection and information sharing in order to overcome the data gaps and strengthen food security analysis at all levels.



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\*The EC in the global partnership is represented by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission